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This landmark volume brings together leading scholars in the field to investigate 
recent conceptual shifts, research findings and policy debates on the informal 
economy as well as future challenges and directions for research and policy. 
Well over half of the global workforce and the vast majority of the workforce in 
developing countries work in the informal economy, and in countries around the 
world new forms of informal employment are emerging. Yet the informal work-
force is not well understood, remains undervalued and is widely stigmatised.
 Contributors to the volume bridge a range of disciplinary perspectives includ-
ing anthropology, development economics, law, political science, social policy, 
sociology, statistics, urban planning and design. The Informal Economy Revis-
ited also focuses on specific groups of informal workers, including home- based 
workers, street vendors and waste pickers, to provide a grounded insight into 
disciplinary debates. Ultimately, the book calls for a paradigm shift in how the 
informal economy is perceived to reflect the realities of informal work in the 
Global South, as well as the informal practices of the state and capital, not just 
labour.
 The Informal Economy Revisited is the culmination of 20 years of pioneering 
work by WIEGO (Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organ-
izing), a global network of researchers, development practitioners and organisa-
tions of informal workers in 90 countries. Researchers, practitioners, 
policy- makers and advocates will all find this book an invaluable guide to the 
significance and complexities of the informal economy, and its role in today’s 
globalised economy.
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Introduction
Martha Chen and Françoise Carré
Informal economic activity is as old as humankind and, today, is emerging in 
new places and new guises. Historically, all employment, businesses and eco-
nomic activities were informal until policies and laws were introduced that 
created a divide between formal and informal, that is, between economic units 
that are registered with relevant administrative authorities and those that are not 
and between workers with employment- based social protection and those 
without.
 In the early 1970s, the British anthropologist Keith Hart coined the term 
“informal sector” to refer to the economic activities of migrants from northern 
Ghana in the capital city Accra (Hart 1973); and the International Labour Organ-
ization’s Employment Mission to Kenya popularised the term to refer to what 
was earlier called the “traditional sector” (International Labour Organization 
1972). Since then, the “informal sector” or “informal economy” has become a 
field of study in several disciplines. In economics, theory and research have 
tended to focus on what drives the informal economy and its predicted decline; 
whether and how it is linked to formal regulations and the state. In other discip-
lines, theory and research have focused on new and emerging forms of economic 
informality: how once- formal jobs are being informalised; how informal workers 
are being integrated into the global system of production and exchange; and 
how, otherwise, the informal economy is linked to modern capitalist develop-
ment. Meanwhile, also since the 1970s, a parallel field in urban studies – on 
informal housing, settlements and land markets – has emerged (Roy and Al 
Sayyad 2004).
 In today’s global economy, two billion people – more than 61 per cent of the 
world’s employed population – make their living in the informal economy (ILO 
2018a). They are engaged in both traditional and modern economic activities and 
in most branches of industry, including traditional artisan and craft production; 
street vending and market trading; construction and transport; manufacturing, 
including industrial outwork; personal and information technology services; and 
work intermediated by digital platforms. Through their economic activities, 
informal workers contribute to households, societies and economies around the 
world: serving as the main source of income for hundreds of millions of house-
holds; helping to reduce hunger and poverty; contributing to the production of 
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goods and services for domestic and international markets; and contributing to 
the preservation of local culture and social life. And yet, informal workers, their 
livelihoods and their contributions are not well understood or valued but, rather, 
tend to be misunderstood, undervalued or often stigmatised.
Background to this volume
Since it was founded in 1997, the global network Women in Informal Employ-
ment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) has sought to improve statistics and 
research as well as conceptual and policy understanding of the informal 
economy. WIEGO has collaborated with the International Labour Organization 
(ILO), the International Expert Group on Informal Sector Statistics, and national 
statistical offices to improve statistics on the informal economy; and with 
researchers and research institutions in many countries to improve research and 
data analysis on the informal economy. Also, WIEGO has helped build a global 
movement of organisations of informal workers, including national, regional and 
international networks of domestic workers, home- based producers, street 
vendors and waste pickers.
 In November 2017, as part of its 20th anniversary celebrations, the WIEGO 
Network invited three dozen well- known scholars on the informal economy to a 
research conference at Harvard University. Rather than presenting their latest 
research, the participants were asked to reflect on the evolution of theory and 
research about the informal economy in their own discipline and research and on 
a common set of questions for each session. Their reflections triggered 
exchanges between them and other participants in the conference: the result of 
which are reflected in this Introduction, the Conclusion and the individual chap-
ters of this volume. It is rare to have had such a diverse group of thought leaders 
tackling related questions and conundrums about the informal economy.
Why focus on the informal economy?
First and foremost, well over half of all workers globally, 90 per cent in develop-
ing countries and 67 per cent in emerging economies, are informally employed. 
It is only in developed countries that most workers (82 per cent) are formally 
employed (ILO 2018a). As Jan Breman puts it, “formal conditions of earning a 
livelihood [have] become the economic status of only a small and privileged 
segment of labouring men and women” (Chapter 1). Yet how we think about 
labour, labour markets and labour regulations is predicated on the notion of 
formal wage employment with a recognised employer- employee relationship in 
formal places of work (firms, offices, factories). Also, how we think about enter-
prises, production and exchange is predicated on the notion of large formal 
enterprises, again in formal places of work, and the transactions between them. 
There is a clear need to rethink production and distribution, commerce and 
markets, employment and labour, self- employment and enterprises through the 
lens of informal workers and their economic units and activities.
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 Second, there is significant overlap between working informally and being 
poor: a higher percentage of informal workers than formal workers are from poor 
households; a higher percentage of all workers in poor households, than in non- 
poor households, are informally employed; and only 3 per cent of all informal 
workers are employers, the one segment of informal workers that, on average, are 
non- poor (Chen et al. 2005; ILO 2018a; Bonnet, Vanek and Chen 2019).
 Third, there is also significant overlap between informal employment and 
non- income dimensions of inequality. The tripartite discussion on Decent Work 
and Informal Employment at the 2002 International Labour Conference con-
cluded that informal workers face greater deficits than formal workers in regard 
to the four pillars of decent work: economic opportunities, labour rights, social 
protection and voice (ILO 2002a). Informal workers also face greater deficits in 
decent living compared to formal workers: on average, they have less access to 
adequate and affordable health, education, housing and basic infrastructure ser-
vices as many live in underserved informal settlements, neighbourhoods or vil-
lages (Chen 2019). Despite these disadvantages, as the evidence cited in this 
volume will show, informal workers and their activities contribute to poverty 
reduction and economic growth.
 Why now? Given transformations in the organisation of work and labour 
markets including new forms of informal employment, now is the appropriate 
time to take stock of the significant shifts in rethinking on the informal economy 
over the past two decades and explore emerging challenges related to it that will 
need policy and research attention going forward.
Unique features of this volume
This volume seeks to enhance our understanding of the informal economy by 
pulling together the perspectives and analyses of three dozen well- known 
scholars of the informal economy. Contributors to this volume represent several 
disciplinary perspectives: anthropology, development economics and labour eco-
nomics, labour law and labour relations, political science, social policy, soci-
ology, statistics, urban planning and design.1 They address several cross- cutting 
areas of policy research – economic development, urban planning, social protec-
tion – and the role of the state and regulation. The volume is further anchored by 
a focus on three groups of informal workers, their livelihood activities and the 
impact of the policy and regulatory environment on these activities: (1) home- 
based workers; (2) street vendors; and (3) waste pickers. These are three large 
and important groups of informal workers who, in their everyday work lives, 
interface with more powerful economic actors and the state.
 The contributors reflect on the past, present and future of the informal economy 
– and the theoretical, research and policy responses to the phenomenon within 
their disciplines. In so doing, they draw on their own research in around 20 coun-
tries, including: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, France, Ghana, 
India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, South Africa, Tanzania, Thai-
land, Uruguay and Zimbabwe.2 In sum, this volume provides an intellectual and 
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grounded view of recent advances in knowledge and thinking as well as future 
research and policy challenges regarding the informal economy.
 This volume is not only cross- disciplinary and multi- regional in scope but 
also features reflections, looking back and forward, of leading scholars on key 
theoretical and policy debates on the informal economy. Rather than offering a 
collection of individual writings, or reports of findings from diverse, loosely 
related research projects, the book results from a combination of individual per-
spectives and collective engagement around shared concerns about informal 
workers and the scholarship on the informal economy.
The structure of the book
This Introduction summarises the recent rethinking on the informal economy by 
the chapter authors, starting with their analysis of how past perceptions and pol-
icies regarding the informal economy, dating back a century or more, are 
reflected in current perceptions and policies. Following this Introduction, the 
chapters in this volume are organised into parts by disciplines, themes and 
groups of informal workers: each part containing two to four chapters. Part I fea-
tures the reflections of two prominent scholars on the informality of capital and 
the state in relation to the informality of labour. Part II features recent develop-
ments in statistics on the informal economy as well as research on the phenom-
enon by the global network WIEGO (Women in Informal Employment: 
Globalizing and Organizing), which convened the conference and prepared this 
volume.
 The disciplinary parts cover statistics (Part II), economics (Part III), labour 
law (Part IV), social policy (Part IX) and urban planning and design (Part V). 
Political science and sociology, as well as each of these disciplines, are woven 
throughout. The informal worker parts feature homeworkers, street vendors and 
waste pickers. The Conclusion calls for a paradigm shift in future research and 
policy, drawing on the recommendations of the authors and their deliberations 
during the WIEGO 20th anniversary research conference.
Definitions of economic informality
Many unofficial definitions of the informal economy are used in the wider 
literature. It is important, therefore, to briefly introduce the official inter-
national statistical concept and definition of the informal economy and the 
related concepts and definitions of the informal sector and informal employ-
ment. The International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS), convened 
every five years by the International Labour Office (ILO), has adopted two 
official international statistical terms and definitions related to the informal 
economy: informal sector refers to the production and employment that takes 
place in unincorporated or unregistered enterprises (1993 ICLS); and informal 
employment refers to employment without social protection through work – 
both inside and outside the informal sector (2003 ICLS). The informal 
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economy refers to all units, activities, and workers so defined and the output 
from them. Together, they form the broad base of the workforce and economy, 
both nationally and globally.3
 It is also important to acknowledge that many observers criticise the concept 
of informality as being too fuzzy and the formal- informal dichotomy as being 
too binary. One aim of this volume is to share the conceptual clarity regarding 
the informal economy, and its component parts, that has emerged in recent years 
and is reflected in the international statistical definitions. Admittedly most 
workers and enterprises fall on a continuum between being fully formal or fully 
informal, but the formal- informal divide while “easy to criticize” is “useful” for 
policy and for “understanding the state”, as Barbara Harriss- White argues (p. 39, 
in this volume). Further, for statistical measurement purposes, it is necessary to 
establish boundaries between – and within – informal and formal employment.
Legacies of the past
Much of the literature on the informal economy, especially in economics, is ahis-
torical. Yet understanding informality in the past is key to understanding inform-
ality today and thinking about informality in the future. Many of the dynamics of 
informality in developing countries today played out 100 years or more ago in 
developed countries, as Lucía Fernandez illustrates by comparing the situation 
of waste pickers in Paris, France, in the late 1800s with waste pickers in Monte-
video, Uruguay, today (Chapter 23). It is important to understand what, histor-
ically, drove not only the informal economy but also the dominant theories and 
negative stereotypes about the phenomenon.
 While the term “informal sector” can be traced back to the seminal 1973 
article by Keith Hart on the economic activities of migrant workers in Accra, 
Ghana, the concept of a formal- informal divide dates back to earlier times. Jan 
Breman traces the antecedents of “the conceptual divide between formal and 
informal” in the domain of the economy and employment to the early twentieth 
century (Chapter 1). Kate Meagher traces differences in the size and dynamics 
of informal economies in Africa to differences in colonial economies (Chapter 
31); Caroline Skinner and Vanessa Watson trace the antecedents of urban plan-
ning today to planning by the colonial state (Chapter 15); and Ravi Kanbur also 
traces the mindset that some phenomena are informal (thought to be illegal and 
undesirable) while other phenomena are formal (thought to be legal and desir-
able) back to the colonial state (Chapter 7).
 In this Introduction, we summarise how the informal economy has been per-
ceived historically in three domains of theory, research and policy: economic 
growth and industrial development; labour markets, labour rights and organising; 
and urban planning and design.4
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Economic growth and industrial development
The process of economic growth and industrial development, as James Heintz 
details, has been associated in economics with “a transformation of the structure 
of employment”, notably, “the movement of labour out of agriculture and into 
industrial and service jobs”, and out of informal self- employment into formal 
wage employment (Chapter 8). This assumption is premised on the historical tra-
jectory of today’s high- income countries: mainly in the Global North but also 
the East Asian Tigers. In the 1954 essay for which he received a Nobel Prize in 
Economics, W. Arthur Lewis cautioned that this structural transformation would 
take longer in developing countries with a surplus of labour but predicted that, in 
the long term even in developing countries, economic growth and industrial 
development would generate enough modern jobs to absorb surplus labour from 
the traditional economy: what is referred to even today as the “Lewis Turning 
Point” (Lewis 1954).
 However, in low- income countries, especially those in which population 
growth has outstripped employment growth, traditional forms of informal 
employment have persisted. And, in recent years, new forms of informal 
employment have emerged across developing, emerging and developed eco-
nomies. As Heintz notes, large formal firms are increasingly mobilising labour 
without entering into wage employment contracts, thanks in large part to new 
technologies (Chapter 8). Cases in point are the outsourcing of production 
through global value chains and the linking of demand and supply for goods and 
services through digital platforms. These trends call into question whether, as 
predicted, wage employment will rise and self- employment will decline with 
economic growth in today’s developing and emerging economies.
 Clearly, traditional forms of informal employment, notably self- employment, 
have persisted in most developing countries and many emerging countries. And, 
around the world, once- formal jobs have been informalised – severing them 
from labour rights and social protection – and new forms of informal wage 
employment and contracted employment have emerged. The net result is that 
today, in emerging economies, 67 per cent of all workers are informally 
employed and 49 per cent are self- employed; and, in developing countries, 90 
per cent of all workers are informally employed and 72 per cent are self- 
employed (ILO 2018a; Bonnet, Vanek and Chen 2019).
 But global and regional averages mask significant differences in economic 
development and informal economies, even within regions, that must be taken 
into account in mapping out the implications for workers and policy. Kate 
Meagher draws on the pioneering work of Thandika Mkandawire (2010) to 
explain why some countries in Sub- Saharan Africa, notably in Southern Africa 
but also in East Africa, have smaller informal economies than countries in other 
parts of Africa, tracing the differences to the “differential capacities and eco-
nomic objectives of colonial states” (Meagher, Chapter 31, p. 234). Former cash 
crop economies, concentrated in West Africa, “gave free reign to informal busi-
ness networks”, while former labour reserve economies, predominantly in 
Introduction  7
Southern Africa, “smashed and criminalized” such networks to maintain a 
surplus pool of unemployed; and the former concession economies of Central 
Africa “fostered violent modes of informal labour organisation and control” 
(Meagher, n.d.: 6). These legacies have influenced postcolonial patterns which, 
in turn, have created new layers of variation.
Labour markets, labour rights and organising
Perhaps the most persistent misconception about labour markets is that all eco-
nomies are on a path leading to the prevalence of wage employment, that is, 
dependent employment with “pay for time worked” (hourly/weekly/monthly). 
The labour markets of high- income countries have been dominated by wage 
employment for over a century; and the majority of informal workers in 
developed countries are wage- employed. Models of economic development, 
based on the experience of these economies, posit that all economies, including 
emerging and developing economies, will undergo a progressive integration of 
the bulk of the labour force into wage employment (see Heintz, Chapter 8 in this 
volume, for a review of this kind of argument).
 In developing countries, however, the majority of all workers and, more so, 
of informal workers are self- employed, mainly as own- account workers or con-
tributing family workers (see Chapter 6 by Chen and Chapter 3 by Vanek in this 
volume; ILO 2018a),5 with little evidence of a downward trend in self- 
employment across these countries. Another inappropriate – and detrimental – 
characterisation results from the association of self- employment in developing 
countries with the forms of self- employment which prevail in developed coun-
tries, namely, professionals and entrepreneurs. By contrast, many of the self- 
employed in developing countries are own- account workers who operate in 
single person or family units with unpaid contributing family workers. Very few 
own- account operators are professionals or entrepreneurs. Most seek to multiply 
household income sources as a hedge against economic risks and few are able to 
accumulate enough customers and profit to hire workers or expand their 
business.
 An important consequence of the prevailing view that economic growth will 
inevitably result in a predominance of formal wage employment is that most 
models of the labour market focus almost exclusively on the characteristics and 
dynamics of formal wage employment. Such models are of limited usefulness 
when considering economies where the bulk of workers are not wage- employed. 
Furthermore, both labour law and the design of social protection are premised 
almost exclusively on wage employment. Developing countries have followed 
these models and approaches – having inherited and adhered to the perspective 
that the employer- employee relationship should be the main employment 
arrangement and at the core of protective regulations. What has come to be 
known as the “standard employment relationship” – full- time, year- round, 
employment with a single employer – was institutionalised from the late 1940s 
in high- income and some middle- income countries and, though becoming less 
8  Martha Chen and Françoise Carré
prevalent since the 1980s even in high- income countries, remains the foundation 
of most labour regulation and most models of labour markets. However, labour 
supply and demand operate differently in labour markets dominated by self- 
employment than in labour markets dominated by wage employment.
 A correlate and concurrent aspect of the institutionalisation of wage employ-
ment as a norm is the presumption that informal workers are not “real” workers 
with a place in labour law6 and with shared concerns around which they can coa-
lesce, mobilise and organise for collective action and bargaining with actors and 
institutions that impact on their activities. This perspective has led, in many 
countries, to significant “blinders” in employment standards and labour law, 
especially the law on representation rights.
 Judy Fudge notes that the legal invisibility and exclusion of informal workers 
will continue as long as policies that “draw the boundaries of labour rights and 
standards by reference to the contract of (formal) employment” prevail (Chapter 
12, p. 105). Pointing to the inadequacy of such a frame for workers for whom no 
entity that exercises “direct control over the worker’s performance” can be identi-
fied, Judy Fudge argues that this inadequacy does not preclude devising mecha-
nisms for protecting such workers and regulating such employment relations. Both 
Adelle Blackett, writing in Chapter 13 about domestic work, and Judy Fudge, 
writing about homeworkers and other subcontracted workers, underscore that 
forms of labour in which women have been concentrated are especially excluded, 
even erased, from the sphere of worker rights. They both argue, moreover, that the 
dichotomy between work and non- work around which labour law has been built is 
not well suited to the activities of women who often combine (unpaid) family work 
with informal work, sometimes with more than one form of each. Blackett further 
highlights dimensions specific to domestic work, including the nexus of work in 
the private/domestic sphere and tasks integral to the historical gender- based divi-
sion of labour in the household. She also highlights the perpetuation of racial hier-
archies when domestic work is performed by subordinated racial- ethnic groups 
such as African- Americans in the USA and black Africans in South Africa, by 
rural- urban migrants, and by immigrants from the Global South to high- income 
countries (many of whom come from former colonies).
 Michael Piore discusses the challenges of enforcing labour standards in global 
and domestic production chains due to unclear employer responsibilities for 
working conditions and calls for alternative national modes of enforcement that 
specifically address the fragmentation of work arrangements (Chapter 14). He 
notes country examples of systems better suited to such production settings, 
mostly “integrated” labour enforcement systems that draw regulatory attention 
to the causes of poor working conditions rather than focusing on single infrac-
tions. To govern home- based industrial outwork (called homework) in global 
supply chains, Marlese von Broembsen argues that national regulations and 
models of enforcement will need to be strengthened by multi- jurisdiction efforts 
to govern employment (Chapter 18).
 The international and national labour movements tend to adhere to the notion 
that organised labour relations only pertain to workers in employer- employee 
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 relationships. Until fairly recently, established unions have overlooked and some-
times explicitly excluded informal self- employed because “they have no boss” 
with whom to bargain; this has led them to assume that most informal workers 
have no need for collective representation and bargaining. The prevailing view that 
only employees are workers has also led to a mistrust of the informal self- 
employed who, without an employer, are assumed to be autonomous entrepreneurs 
with little interest in unionisation. The global movement of informal worker organ-
isations that has emerged from the 1970s onward has challenged this perspective 
and demonstrated that informal workers, including the self- employed, can engage 
in collective action and bargaining (Gallin 2002, 2006; Bonner and Carré 2013; 
Eaton, Schurman and Chen 2017).7 The fact that in some sectors the majority of 
informal workers are women (who also are often not considered “workers”) plays 
a role in contributing to policies and union organising strategies that exclude 
informal workers, especially women. As a notable exception, the Self- Employed 
Women’s Association (SEWA) of India, which now has over 1.5 million women 
members, was started by Ela Bhatt, a labour lawyer working at the time with a 
local textile union (the Textile Labour Association) which supported her organ-
ising efforts with women informal workers (Bhatt 2006).
 The notion that labour relations and collective bargaining are solely relevant 
for employees is historically inaccurate. In many countries, informal self- 
employed self- organised in guilds. In what are now developed economies, virtu-
ally all workers were once informal, either self- employed or working as 
domestics, vendors, teamsters, casual day labourers or as homeworkers in the 
manufacture “putting out” system without benefit of social protection or redress 
from abusive conditions. Labour organising and the formation of worker associ-
ations and unions were prime forces behind the recognition, spread and then 
formalisation of employer- employee relationship with employment- based social 
protection and labour rights. As Jan Breman notes, this “emergence of formal-
ised politics and policies of employment” occurred alongside the expansion of 
modern industrial capitalist development (Breman, p. 31, in this volume). In 
other words, unions and other worker organisations were a main force behind 
formalisation, though by no means the only one.
Urban planning and design
In the colonial era in many countries, cities tended to be divided into two sectors: 
the planned formal city of colonial rulers and the unplanned informal city of the 
“native” population. Arguably, this divide took its most egregious form in colo-
nial South Africa under Apartheid: when Black African townships and “Col-
oured” neighbourhoods were kept outside the white cities and towns of the 
colonial rulers. sometimes right outside the town as “dormitory” neighbourhoods 
to provide labour to the city or town.8 As Kanbur observes elsewhere, the neg-
ative mindset about informal economic activities stems from this divide as all 
informal activity by the native population was treated with suspicion and con-
demnation by the colonial state, as somehow tainted by illegality (Kanbur 2014). 
10  Martha Chen and Françoise Carré
As Caroline Skinner and Vanessa Watson explain, the colonial state not only 
shaped city landscapes but also shaped the profession and practices of urban 
planning (Chapter 15).
 In sum, reflecting and driven by these legacies, historic patterns of inclusion 
and exclusion remain embedded in dominant models today of economic plan-
ning, labour organising and urban planning. Few economic policy- makers see 
informal workers as a legitimate target of economic policies. The international 
labour movement and trade unions of formal workers remain unsure what to do 
with (or for) the informal self- employed and, as Uma Rani details, are increas-
ingly turning their attention to new forms of precarious and disguised wage 
employment, including workers in the gig or ‘on- demand’ economy facilitated 
by digital platforms (Chapter 9). Also, urban planners and city officials, in decid-
ing what are legitimate uses of public space, still either overlook or ban outright 
street vendors; and, in modernising municipal solid waste management, often 
fail to integrate informal waste pickers. And, yet, the historically excluded have 
played – and continue to play – important roles in providing essential goods and 
services when cities fail to do so. In this volume, Skinner and Watson cite a 2009 
survey across 11 cities in southern Africa which found that some 70 per cent of 
poor households normally sourced foods from informal traders or street vendors 
(Skinner and Watson, p. 127, citing Crush and Frayne 2011: 798). Also, as Lucía 
Fernandez, Jérémie Cavé and Melanie Samson detail, informal waste pickers 
have historically provided – and in many cities continue to provide – the essen-
tial service of collecting waste and reclaiming recyclables (Chapters 23, 24 and 
25 in this volume).
Recent advances and rethinking
Over the past two decades, there has been significant rethinking about the 
informal economy – its size, composition, characteristics, and contribution; what 
drives it; its links to the formal economy and integration into the global 
economy; its relationship with the state and capital – thanks in no small measure 
to the authors in this volume, most of them scholars of the Global South and 
many of them from the Global South.
Statistical measurement of informal employment
The past two decades have witnessed significant advances in the measurement of 
informal employment; progress is evident in the statistics cited in this Introduc-
tion as well as specific data used in the chapters. This is significant because the 
integration of the measurement of informal sector and informal employment in 
official statistics is key to improving the visibility of informal workers and to 
informing advocacy and policy.
 Joann Vanek underscores how much progress has been made during the 
2000s in mainstreaming the informal economy in official statistics and dissemi-
nating data as they become available at the national and city levels (Chapter 3). 
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In so doing, she highlights the role that WIEGO, as an informed user of official 
statistics, has played in improving national and international statistics on 
informal employment. Working closely with the International Labour Organiza-
tion and national statistical offices, WIEGO has contributed to three editions of 
Women and Men in the Informal Economy: A Statistical Picture: the first in 2002 
presented cross- national statistics on informal employment from 25 countries 
using indirect and residual methods; the most recent in 2018 presented the first- 
ever global estimates of informal employment – inside and outside informal 
enterprises – in developing, emerging and developed countries, using microdata 
from over 100 countries. One sign of progress is that, thanks to the ILO and 
WIEGO, informal employment has been designated an indicator under Sustain-
able Development Goal 8 on Decent and Productive Work and Economic 
Growth (Indicator 8.3.1 Share of non- agricultural informal employment in total 
employment).
 More recent progress includes the adoption in 2018 by the International Con-
ference of Labour Statisticians of a revised Classification of Status in Employ-
ment (ICSE- 18) which addresses several concerns of relevance to adequately 
measuring informal employment. Françoise Carré reviews, in particular, the new 
status category of “dependent contractors” for workers who, though presumed to 
be fully independent and, therefore, classified as self- employed, in fact, exert 
little autonomy in their work, in running their operation, and depend on another 
actor or entity in order to access the market for the product of their work 
(Chapter 4). This is a step towards better classifying industrial outworkers, 
(dependent) homeworkers, and the so- called “gig” workers in the on- demand 
economy. Crucial to measuring and understanding informal work, including 
home- based work, the ICSE- 18 also introduces the “place of work” variable as 
key to classification.
 Individual countries have made significant advances in measuring the size of 
the informal economy, its contribution to national income, and in detailing 
important sub- groups of informal workers. Analysing 2017–18 data for Mexico, 
where the statistical office (Institute of Statistics and Geography, INEGI) has 
been a pioneering leader in the development of official statistics on informal 
employment, Rodrigo Negrete reports that the informal workforce (which repres-
ented 57 per cent of employment) contributed nearly one- quarter (23 per cent) to 
the GDP of that country: with the contribution of informal workers inside the 
informal sector (i.e., informal enterprises) slightly lower (at 11.1 per cent) than 
the contribution of informal workers outside the informal sector (11.7 per cent) 
(Chapter 5). Also, INEGI has devised questions to measure the dependency of 
workers on other economic agents, helping to identify “dependent contractors” 
and illuminate the situation of other categories of informal workers.
Informality and economic growth
The share of informal employment in total employment is highest in developing 
countries (at 90 per cent) and lowest in developed countries (at 18 per cent) yet 
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quite significant in emerging countries (at 67 per cent) (ILO 2018a; Bonnet, 
Vanek and Chen 2019), suggesting that the structural transformation from a pre-
dominantly informal to a predominantly formal economy takes time. Moreover, 
within the different country income groupings, there is significant variation 
between countries in the size and composition of informal employment, depend-
ing on the level and nature of economic growth, including the degree of struc-
tural transformation.
 Clearly, the predicted demise of the informal economy – the Lewis “turning 
point” – has not yet materialised in many emerging economies and most devel-
oping countries. In part, this is due to the level and nature of economic growth 
across countries. In part, this “was the result of a deliberate state policy (and not 
a reflection of the limits to state competence or of the residual or incipient nature 
of informal economic activity” (Harriss- White, p. 13, in this volume). In part, 
this is due to the nature of the globalised economy in which work, as Meenu 
Tewari puts it, has become “splintered and distributed across the global through 
highly mobile value chains” (Chapter 19, p. 151). Through this and other pro-
cesses, informality has rapidly become “the organising principle of the glo-
balised economy” (Breman, p. 32, in this volume). In other words, informality is 
a structural feature of modern capitalist development, as the structuralist thinkers 
Manuel Castells and Alejandro Portes pointed out (Castells and Portes 1989).
Informality and economic policies
Elsewhere, Ravi Kanbur has argued that:
[T]he economic frameworks which dominate analytical and policy discourse 
… are flawed. They take too aggregated a view of informality and as a result 
come up with inappropriate policy analysis and prescriptions. This aggrega-
tive lens also reflects a certain mindset towards informality, which views it 
as a mass or a lump, and indeed a problem to be addressed. A disaggregated 
perspective is not only a better description of reality; it helps to break clear 
from mindsets that date back at least to colonial times.
(2017: 2)
A key example of a flaw in the aggregated view of informality is that all informal 
workers are seen as targets of tax policies and tax reforms. Also elsewhere, Ravi 
Kanbur, with Michael Keen, makes the case that, while taxing the informal 
economy is still a priority for many governments and financial institutions, some 
segments of the informal economy already pay taxes of different kinds while 
other segments fall beneath the tax threshold for certain kinds of taxes (Kanbur 
and Keen 2014). Kanbur and Keen conclude that it is important, therefore, to 
disaggregate the informal economy when considering tax policy, regulations and 
other policies (ibid.).
 Ravi Kanbur makes the case that in order to design appropriate policies, data 
for specific groups or segments of the informal economy is required. But, as 
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Marty Chen explains, WIEGO has found that while disaggregated data on 
different segments of informal employment – by status in employment, branch 
of industry, place of work and gender – is needed to inform policy, aggregate 
measures of the size and contribution of informal employment are needed to first 
attract the attention of policy- makers.
 Kanbur offers a framework for defining and distinguishing between different 
types of informality in relation to taxation. The questions he poses apply equally 
well to the formal- informal divide in other areas of policy, namely, “Is formality 
the compliance with all policies and informality the non- compliance with any? 
… Or is there an intermediate definition, and, if so, what?” Harriss- White frames 
the same question slightly differently – as a selective engagement with regula-
tive law: “A firm may be registered and have (1–10) bank accounts, but flout the 
building regulations, the environmental laws as well as the labour laws, and 
evade tax” (Chapter 2),
 Imraan Valodia and David Francis argue that using tax status, specifically not 
paying taxes, to define informality “is clearly inexact and is an inappropriate 
proxy” (Chapter 10). They illustrate the complex dynamics between the tax 
system and the informal economy with the case of how informal traders in South 
Africa experience the Value Added Tax (VAT) system. VAT is charged at each 
stage of the production process and each business registered as a VAT vendor 
collects the tax at time of sale and is entitled to claim back the VAT expended 
on inputs. In contrast, operators who are not registered VAT vendors, such as 
most informal operators, are unable to claim back the VAT on the inputs they 
purchase and have to absorb this cost or try to pass it on to their customers. This 
clearly limits the profitability and competitiveness of informal businesses. This 
example challenges the presumption that all informal workers operate informally 
in order to evade taxation.
Informality, labour markets and regulations
As noted earlier, most labour laws and most labour market models are premised 
on the notion of formal wage employment under a recognised employer- 
employee relationship in formal places of work. James Heintz points out that the 
neo- classical economic model of supply and demand for labour premised on 
wage employment is inappropriate for markets dominated by self- employment: 
as the self- employed supply their own labour (and capital) and the demand for 
their labour is a derived demand for the goods and services they produce 
(Chapter 8). The neo- classical model of the labour market also does not fit labour 
markets in which a large share of wage employment is not formal but, rather, 
informal, disguised or contracted.
 Further, the neo- classical economics notion of the informal self- employed as an 
entrepreneurial class, who choose to operate informally in order to avoid regula-
tions and taxations (Maloney 2004), does not match the reality of most informal 
self- employed, especially in developing countries. Very few informal workers are 
employers who hire others: 3 per cent globally, 2 per cent in developing countries, 
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3 per cent in emerging countries and 6 per cent in developed countries (ILO 2018a; 
Bonnet, Vanek and Chen 2019). A large percentage of informal workers are own- 
account operators in single- person and family units: 45 per cent globally, 54 per 
cent in developing countries, 44 per cent in emerging countries and 28 per cent in 
developed countries. And a not- insignificant percentage of informal workers are 
contributing family workers in family units: 16 per cent globally, 22 per cent in 
developing countries, 16 per cent in emerging countries and 6 per cent in 
developed countries (ibid.). Among these three groups of self- employed, only the 
employers could be considered an entrepreneurial class.
 The persistence of informal employment has been attributed, by many main-
stream economists, to excessive regulations by the state, notably labour regula-
tions, which create incentives for firms to operate informally outside the purview 
of regulations (Maloney 2004). To test this assumption, Urmila Chatterjee and 
Ravi Kanbur studied the impact of India’s Factories Act of 2011, which requires 
manufacturing firms of a certain size to register and comply with regulations. 
They found that the category of firms that are not affected by the Act given their 
small size (which they call Outsiders) far exceeds (at 97 per cent of all manufac-
turing firms) all the other categories of firms (which they call Compliers, Evaders 
and Avoiders) put together (Chatterjee and Kanbur 2015). Harriss- White notes 
that earlier industrial regulations in India, including the Madras Non- Power Fac-
tories Act 1947, the Madras Shops and Establishments Act 1942 and the Indus-
trial Disputes Act 1947, were not devised to regulate informal modes of 
production and employment (Chapter 2).
 Another important issue addressed in this volume is self- employment, both 
how it is understood conceptually as well as how it is treated in policies and 
laws. As Harriss- White observes: “This is a field of bitter debates. Is self- 
employment capital, labour or neither?” (Chapter 2, p. 41). In India, the 
National Commission for Enterprise in the Unorganised Sector (NCEUS), 
“clearly saw self- employment as ‘Janus- faced’ (on the one hand disguised wage 
work and on the other micro- capitalist activity)” (NCEUS 2007a, 2007b). As 
noted earlier, most informal self- employed are own- account or contributing 
family workers who put more labour than capital into their livelihood activities; 
and some are dependent contractors or disguised wage workers misclassified as 
self- employed.9 Under labour law in India, employers of up to five hired 
workers (accounting for over 95 per cent of all Indian firms) are classified as 
labour, not capital “on the grounds of their small scale compared with the cor-
porate sector and their lack of access to social safety nets” (Harriss- White, 
Chapter 2, p. 41). Yet court cases filed to provide legal rights or social protec-
tion to informal self- employed are usually struck down unless an individual 
employer can be identified (ibid.). For this reason, Kamala Sankaran has con-
cluded elsewhere that “self- employed workers are both declassed and disen-
franchised” (Sankaran 2008).
 Marty Chen presents the well- known WIEGO model of segmentation within 
the informal economy by status in employment and by sex, including the average 
earnings and poverty risk of each segment (Chapter 6). In brief, average earnings 
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go down and the risk of poverty goes up across the following hierarchy of 
informal employment statuses: employers, employees, own- account workers, 
causal day labourers, industrial outworkers and contributing family workers. 
Among these segments, men are over- represented among employers and women 
are over- represented among industrial outworkers, especially those who produce 
goods in or around their own homes (called homeworkers), and among contrib-
uting family workers. The ILO successfully recommended “own account 
workers and contributing family workers” as an indicator of vulnerable employ-
ment under Millennium Development Goal 1 (Eradicate Extreme Poverty and 
Hunger).10 With the ILO, WIEGO has promoted the first- ever global estimates 
of informal employment, which show that own- account workers and contrib-
uting family workers, together, constitute 61 per cent of informal employment 
and 42 per cent of total employment globally (ILO 2018a; Bonnet, Vanek and 
Chen 2019).
 To sum up, most economic and urban planners, as well as mainstream trade 
unions, do not know what to think or do about informal self- employment. As 
Breman notes, some observers glorify “the self- reliance associated with it” (p. 34 
in this volume) and call for unleashing the untapped entrepreneurial spirit and 
productivity of the informal self- employed. Other observers assert that informal 
self- employed represent unfair competition to formal enterprises by avoiding 
regulations, taxes and rents or are a “drag on the economy” due to their low pro-
ductivity (Levy 2008). And still other observers see the informal self- employed 
as mainly low- end survivalists. Through its statistical analysis and field research, 
as Marty Chen details, WIEGO has found that informal employers have the 
highest average earnings among all informal workers; and that both own- account 
workers and contributing family workers tend to invest more labour (than 
capital) into their economic activities and face numerous costs and risks due to 
the stigmatisation and penalisation of the informal economy. The first- ever 
global estimates of informal employment, summarised by Joann Vanek, indicate 
that the informal self- employed who hire workers, and might therefore be con-
sidered an entrepreneurial class, represent only 3 per cent of all informal workers 
globally: 3 per cent of men informal workers and 1 per cent of women informal 
workers (Chapter 3). The vast majority of informal self- employed, and the 
majority of all informal workers, are own- account workers and (especially 
among women informal workers) contributing family workers (ILO 2018a; 
Bonnet, Vanek and Chen 2019). In sum, the majority of the self- employed are 
not entrepreneurs but rather working poor persons who operate in single- person 
or family units.
Informality, labour rights and organising
Progress has been made in thinking of alternative ways to provide rights and 
protection to informal workers in countries across the Global South and the 
Global North. Judy Fudge proposes alternative ways of approaching regulation 
to provide standards in working conditions and protection from risks (Chapter 
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12). She proposes a conception of work as a relationship that extends beyond the 
normative employment “contract” and even beyond relationships to encompass 
the context and physical environment in which all types of work take place. She 
argues that, in order to stand in for employer- employee relationships, policy 
must look for “functional equivalents to the institutional role that the employer 
played in the standard employment relationship” (p. 106, in this volume). Imple-
menting a principle of functional equivalency requires a significant shift in the 
role of the state and the balance of bargaining power away from employers and 
corporations. Countries where the state triggers tripartite policy negotiations and 
is not captive to powerful interests likely stand a better chance of moving in this 
direction. Given the organisation of domestic work across borders, Adelle Black-
ett, drawing on selected countries’ experience with formalising domestic work, 
analyses the necessary alternative of a transnational framework to regulate it, 
that is “rooted in equality” – gender and racial- ethnic equality – and that chal-
lenges the boundaries of labour law, integrating migration law in particular 
(Chapter 13).
 Michael Piore proposes alternative national administrative models for the 
enforcement of labour standards for production units in developing countries 
which are engaged in international or domestic sourcing (Chapter 14). He points 
to the lessons from “generalist” enforcement systems, such as those of France, 
Spain, the Dominican Republic and other countries that have followed a general-
ist model of labour inspectorates with a broad mandate to enforce labour stand-
ards as a whole. This model holds promise for developing countries because 
their inspection systems often lack the administrative and personnel resources to 
effectively enforce regulations one firm and one violation at a time, which is 
what specialist enforcement systems do. A generalist approach to labour inspec-
tions compels the attention of enforcement agents to the causes of standards vio-
lation – often located within the organisation of production sites and chains, 
according to Piore. The generalist enforcement model shifts enforcement 
resources to changing the factors in production and industry organisation that 
create risks for workers and holds the potential to be more effective than levying 
fines for individual violations which, in practice, depletes the efforts of under- 
resourced enforcement agencies (also Piore and Schrank 2018). Piore raises 
caveats about policies that treat the informal sector as monolithic whereas it is 
highly heterogeneous in terms of enterprises and operators; and the tendency of 
governments to focus more on the regulation of enterprises and less on the regu-
lation of employment conditions and the social protection of workers 
(Chapter 14).
 Alternative approaches to establishing and maintaining some labour standards 
(e.g., minimum wages) in garment production chains that include both factory 
and home- based workers are featured by Meenu Tewari (Chapter 19). These 
experimental approaches combine action or negotiation “at the top” with leading 
brands and retailers along with engaging workers producing for the brand – as 
well as other workers – in their geographic community, where they live, through 
a mix of social services delivered in collaboration with public administrations, 
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and production and marketing community enterprises or networks. These 
approaches are distinctive in two ways. First, they use collaborations with a 
broad range of actors beyond unions or worker organisations, such as NGOs, 
universities, buyers, and governments. Second, the locus for worker mobilisation 
is the community of residence rather than the workplace of the specific factory 
issuing work orders.
 Finally, progress has also been made in the realm of collective mobilisation 
by informal workers in spite of their near invisibility in labour rights law. In fact, 
organising informal workers has a long history, mirroring the evolution of work 
arrangements. At the dawn of the industrial age in the eighteenth century, “all 
workers were informal” as Dan Gallin highlights in his historical overview of 
organising informal workers (Gallin 2011). As they organised into unions, 
fought and won rights, the situation of workers started to become formalised. 
However, many workers, especially in developing countries and particularly 
women and minorities, were left out of this process and remained in what 
became known as the informal sector or informal economy (ibid.).
 More recent organising among informal workers can be traced back to the 
founding of SEWA in India in 1972. In 1983, SEWA was recognised as a trade 
union and accepted as an affiliate by the International Union of Food, Agricul-
tural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers (the IUF ). 
During the 1980s, domestic workers’ organisations in Latin America formed a 
regional alliance, CONLACTRAHO. During the 1990s, home- based workers 
began to organise and to engage in a campaign for the ILO Convention on 
Homework (C177) which was adopted by the International Labour Conference 
in 1996. Recognising the important role that data on the significance of home- 
based work played in the campaign for the convention, SEWA and its allies 
founded WIEGO in 1997 to provide research, statistical, technical and advocacy 
support to organisations of informal workers and to help build sector- specific 
networks of these organisations (Chen 2000, 2013). Since then, WIEGO and 
SEWA, together with the IUF and other organisations, have helped build a 
global movement of organisations of informal workers, including the Inter-
national Domestic Workers Federation, four regional networks of home- based 
workers (called HomeNets), StreetNet International and a global alliance of 
waste picker organisations (Bonner et al. 2018). Between them, as of mid- 2019, 
these sector- specific networks had more than 500 affiliated organisations in 90 
countries with a combined total membership of around 5 million informal 
workers.
 A growing field of scholarship, well represented by contributors to this 
volume and others,11 has focused on the roots of mobilisation, forms of organisa-
tion, types of negotiation among informal workers and the alliances of organisa-
tions of informal workers with the international labour, cooperative and women’s 
movements. Of particular interest is the fact that informal worker organisations 
engage in negotiations with a variety of actors, private and public.
 The state has turned out to be a significant actor at all levels – municipal, 
regional/state, national – because many informal workers operate in public space 
18  Martha Chen and Françoise Carré
and because housing, infrastructure, social protection, urban and economic pol-
icies directly affect their economic activities. Most importantly, because informal 
work takes place with little recognition or protection from the state, but within 
the punitive arm of the state which imposes constraints or barriers to informal 
workers, the state often is the key dominant actor from whom informal workers 
need recourse (Chen 2014a).12
 Several contributors (Rina Agarwala, Adelle Blackett, Sonia Dias, Lucía 
Fernandez, Sally Roever, Melanie Samson, Chris Tilly) analyse how informal 
wage workers and (especially) the informal self- employed, make claims on 
local, regional and national governments, pointing to similar strategies across 
worker groups. They seek to negotiate or bargain with the state to be included in 
economic policies, in urban planning and in social protection systems; to gain 
access to public space, public services and public procurement; or to seek pro-
tection – or recourse – from adverse incorporation into local markets or global 
value chains. For example, street vendors (Sally Roever) and waste pickers 
negotiate or bargain with the state (often local government) for access to public 
space, access to waste and the right to bid for solid waste management contracts 
(Sonia Dias, Lucía Fernandez, Melanie Samson). In sum, the state is the main 
interlocutor for many informal workers seeking the right to work as well as 
access to public space as the workplace, to other public goods and to social 
justice.
 However, the state does not prove any more receptive as a bargaining 
counterpart for the informal self- employed than corporations do for informal 
wage and contract workers. There is an extensive track record of “fits and starts” 
in bargaining between organisations of informal workers and representatives of 
local, regional and national governments. Hurdles thrown in the way may be 
institutional, such as not recognising organisations of informal workers as repre-
senting workers or as a bargaining partner; or tactical, such as the repeal of 
standing agreements or changes in legislation and policy (e.g., cancelling ordin-
ances regulating access to vending areas); or simply the cancellation or post-
ponement of bargaining processes. In spite of such hurdles, several chapters in 
this volume underscore the value of collective mobilisation of the informal self- 
employed and the strategies and conditions that make the achievement of gains 
possible.
Informal livelihoods and cities
A major impetus for recent rethinking on the informal economy among urban 
planners, designers and scholars is the fact that urban planning laws and land use 
zoning have remained largely unchanged since the colonial era in most develop-
ing countries. Caroline Skinner and Vanessa Watson advocate challenging spe-
cific notions associated with this colonial legacy, including the notions that 
homes and public space serve only a single function or use; that informally pre-
pared and distributed foods are a threat to consumer health; and that informal 
workers do not contribute to the economy or to urban service delivery (Chapter 
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15). Another impetus is the fact that non- compliance with urban planning laws 
and land use zoning is not confined to the poor but also involves non- compliance 
by the elite, corporations and the state itself (Roy 2005): see the final section of 
this Introduction.
 Other contributors to this volume call for critical urban theory, based on crit-
ical urban practice, from the Global South. Gautam Bhan calls for an alternative 
vision of informal settlements that addresses the intersectionality of informal set-
tlements and informal livelihoods and an alternative approach to building settle-
ments together with the urban informal poor to meet both their residential and 
livelihood needs (Chapter 17). Amin Kamete critiques dominant urban planning 
theories and approaches which espouse ideal standards of perfection, adopt sci-
entific methods and prescribe universal, technical, de- politicised solutions to 
urban problems and calls for rethinking, politicising and contextualising urban 
planning with a mandate to reconcile the aspirations of different strata of urban 
society (Chapter 20). Rahul Mehrotra criticises current approaches to urban 
design as being too focused on architecture – and the ideal of permanence 
(Chapter 16). Highlighting that cities are in a state of flux, due to economic and 
political uncertainty, as well as to climate change, Rahul Mehrotra calls for a 
new approach to urban design which focuses on this state of flux – and the 
impermanence it implies – and embeds the possibility of adaptation and trans-
itions across time and space into the design of the built environment.
 The chapters in this volume on street vendors and waste pickers describe 
cases of critical urban practice: the provision of design, shelter and legal services 
to street vendors in Durban, South Africa, and the integration of waste pickers 
into solid waste management in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, and Johannesburg, South 
Africa. Being involved in these alternative urban practices has informed the crit-
ical urban theory- building of the authors. For instance, the activist academics 
Sally Roever and Caroline Skinner, who have supported organisations of street 
vendors in their struggles for more inclusive city approaches to informal trading, 
have promoted the twin concepts of “the abuse of authority” by city officials and 
police towards street vendors and the “costs of informality” to the street vendors 
resulting from this abuse. Sally Roever further illustrates how urban regulatory 
regimes (licensing, permitting) as well as taxation, and the enforcement thereof, 
often operate adversely for street vendors (Chapter 22). Also, the activist aca-
demics Sonia Dias, Lucía Fernandez and Melanie Samson, who have supported 
organisations of waste pickers in their struggles to be integrated into municipal 
solid waste management systems, have promoted the twin concepts that waste 
pickers should have “the right to waste” and that waste should be seen as an 
“urban public good” – or as Jérémie Cavé argues – as a commons.
Informality and social policy
As Rodrigo Negrete underscores, “the concepts of the informal sector and 
informal employment broadly encompass those forms of labour market arrange-
ments where risks are personal and not buffered by any institutional protection” 
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(Chapter 5, p. 61, in this volume). Francie Lund traces the evolution of 
approaches to social protection and informal workers, including the role of the 
WIEGO Social Protection programme in drawing attention to the social protec-
tion needs of informal workers across the life- cycle and especially for women, 
including: health care, occupational safety and health, childcare and care in old 
age (Chapter 26). There is growing recognition that informal workers represent 
more than half of all workers globally and that, at the core of working inform-
ally, is exclusion from employment- based social protection. This recognition is 
one impetus for the call for universal social protection on social justice grounds. 
But there is also a call for universal social protection on efficiency grounds: 
many economists who call for universal social protection do so because they 
assume that regulating labour markets creates distortions and, more specifically, 
that social protection schemes targeted at informal workers create perverse 
incentives for firms and workers to remain or become informal (Maloney 2004; 
Levy 2008).
 In brief, there are two cases being made for universal social protection: one 
on social justice grounds, the other on efficiency grounds. Committed to social 
justice, contributors to this volume examine the potential benefits and risks for 
informal workers of universal approaches to social protection based on citizen-
ship rather than work status. Laura Alfers and Silke Staab both point out that 
universal social protection has been reduced in some countries to social assist-
ance in the form of cash transfers, often contingent cash transfers; or in other 
countries to health insurance for hospitalisation accompanied by a reduced focus 
on public health services, especially preventive health (Chapters 27 and 28). 
Both call for moving beyond the binary debate whether to link or de- link social 
protection from work status and call for promoting fundamental reforms to social 
protection. Laura Alfers proposes that work status and citizenship should be con-
sidered in relation to each other; and recommends addressing the risks informal 
workers face as workers through exclusion from – or adverse inclusion in – other 
spheres of policy. Silke Staab also calls for moving beyond isolated transfer 
schemes to integrate social assistance with social insurance.
 Sarah Cook shows how, in the case of China, the rights of informal workers 
to social security are inextricably associated with migrant status (Chapter 29). 
While contributory (formal employment- based) social insurance and non- 
contributory (largely residence- based) social assistance schemes have dramatic-
ally expanded in coverage over the past decade in China, the context of 
institutionalised “urban- rural dualism” means that informality of employment is 
largely associated with migrant workers who consequently have limited claims 
to benefits either through employment or residence. Rina Agarwala and Kamala 
Sankaran describe welfare funds in India for workers in specific industries, 
raised through a tax on output of firms in those industries, as a promising 
approach to social protection for informal workers, which retains a focus on the 
responsibility and liability of employers but which is being undermined by the 
recent consolidation of the tax system in India (Chapters 30 and 32).
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Informality, poverty and growth
Not all informal workers are poor and some owners of informal firms profit from 
exploiting their employees. But, given the lack of social (and legal) protection 
and the costs and risks faced by informal workers, there is significant overlap 
between working informally and being poor (Chen et al. 2005). Despite the dis-
advantages they face, informal workers contribute to poverty reduction and to 
economic growth through their economic activities. However, the contribution 
of the earnings of informal workers to household income remain underestimated 
and undervalued. Michael Rogan and Paul Cichello present findings from South 
Africa on the income effect of the earnings of informal workers (Chapter 11). 
Applying an econometric model to national data, they found that informal 
workers in South Africa, particularly informal wage workers but also informal 
self- employed, contribute to reducing the poverty level of their household. They 
estimate that “eliminating 100 informal self- employment activities, as some gov-
ernment policies have sought to do in order to discourage ‘illegal trading’, would 
drive as many individuals into extreme poverty as eliminating 63 formal jobs” 
and that “Informal employees and domestic workers have a ‘per job’ impact on 
poverty reduction which is even closer to a formal job” (p. 101, in this volume).
 Over the years, attempts have been made to measure the GDP contribution of 
the informal economy (ILO 2013a). But these estimates have been confined to 
the GDP contribution of the informal sector (i.e., informal enterprises) and do 
not include the contribution of informal workers outside the informal sector who 
work for formal firms or households. Mexico is an exception. As reported 
earlier, in Mexico in 2017, the contribution of informal workers inside the 
informal sector (i.e., informal enterprises) to the country’s GDP was slightly 
lower (at 11.1 per cent) than the contribution of informal workers outside the 
informal sector (at 11.7 per cent) (Chapter 5 in this volume).
 Finally, it is important to note that several global norms recently adopted by the 
international community reflect the recent rethinking about the informal economy, 
thanks in no small measure to the research of contributors to this volume and the 
joint advocacy of WIEGO with SEWA and other organisations of informal 
workers. In 2015, the global community renewed its commitment to “a more 
peaceful, prosperous and just world” by adopting the Sustainable Development 
Agenda (known as the 2030 Agenda) which includes two new stand- alone goals 
which are of critical importance to the working poor in the informal economy: 
Goal 8 on inclusive sustainable economic growth and decent and productive 
employment; and Goal 11 on inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable cities. Also 
in 2015, the ILO adopted ILO Recommendation 204 on the formalisation of the 
informal economy which recognises that most informal workers are from poor 
households trying to earn a living against great odds and need protection and pro-
motion in return for regulation and taxation; and that regulated use of public space 
(in cities) and natural resources (in rural areas) is essential to the livelihoods of 
informal workers. Reaffirming these earlier commitments, the New Urban Agenda, 
adopted at the 2016 Habitat III Summit, recognises the contribution of the working 
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poor, especially women, in the informal economy and calls for enhancing their 
livelihoods, their legal and social protection, their access to support services as 
well as their voice and representation (Habitat III 2016: paragraph 59).
Current challenges
Today, the global economy, the world of work, and cities are all in flux. This 
flux and the changes associated with it are reshaping the informal economy 
and bringing new opportunities as well as new costs and risks to informal 
workers. These changes underscore why the enhanced, grounded and nuanced 
understanding of the informal economy reflected in this volume is of 
immediate concern. The Conclusion to this volume will summarise the future 
research, policies and regulations recommended by the contributors to monitor 
and address the impact of these changes on informal workers and their liveli-
hood activities.
Economic growth and industrial development
Several patterns of current economic growth and industrial development are 
impacting the size, composition and earnings of the informal workforce. To 
varying degrees, depending on the country, the structural shift of employment 
– and economic output – is from agriculture to manufacturing13 or to services, 
both high- end and low- end. Globally, among all informal workers, 38 per cent 
are in agriculture, 18 per cent in manufacturing and 44 per cent in services 
(ILO 2018a; Bonnet, Vanek and Chen 2019). The share of trade that is inter-
national, and the associated expansion of global value chains (GVCs), are at 
unprecedented levels (World Bank 2018). The lead firms in many GVCs down-
load risks and costs to informal workers at the bottom of their chains while 
paying them below the minimum wage: see Marliese von Broembsen in 
Chapter 18 in this volume and Chen (2014a). The informalisation of once- 
formal wage jobs, especially in the Global North, continues. And the numbers 
of workers accessing work via digital platforms in the on- demand economy are 
growing fast and largely under informal arrangements without labour rights or 
employer contributions to social protection.
 Meanwhile, new emerging technologies such as robotics and artificial intel-
ligence are shaping the quantum and nature of work. Also, the recent expan-
sion in the scope, size and power of finance is shaping the nature of the 
economy. Traditionally, the financial sector provided funds to finance produc-
tion. Today, the finance sector trades in goods and services, often on specula-
tion. While the financialised economy threatens to dominate and destabilise the 
productive economy (Sundaram and Hui 2019), robotics and artificial intelli-
gence, and other dimensions of what has been termed the Fourth Industrial 
Revolution, threaten to undermine and destabilise employment and work 
opportunities.
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Cross- border and rural- urban migration
The UN estimates that globally, in 2015–16, there were 740 million internal 
migrants (i.e., those who migrate within their country of birth) (IOM World 
Migration Report 2018); 244 million international migrants (up from an estim-
ated 155 million in 2000) (ibid.); and 25.9 million refugees or asylum seekers 
(UN International Migration Report 2017): representing around 7 per cent of the 
world’s population. Most international and internal migrants, refugees and 
asylum seekers end up working informally, at least for some time, to earn a 
living. As Cook highlights, “Migration and urbanisation are intrinsically associ-
ated with informality – of employment, but also of housing, rights to urban 
‘space’, status and security and entitlements or access to services” (Chapter 29, 
p. 221).
Urbanisation and urban planning
Around the world, cities are not only growing but also changing. In an attempt 
to achieve World Class or Modern City status, many cities are undertaking major 
infrastructure and real estate development projects: building boulevards, roads 
and mass transit systems as well as malls, business centres and convention 
centres. In the process, a big new player has entered many cities for the first 
time: multinational real estate developers. This has changed the political 
economy of many cities. Caroline Skinner and Vanessa Watson report an 
increase in Africa of urban land grabs by developers since the 2008 financial 
crisis, resulting on increased pressures on the resource base and workplaces of 
urban informal workers (Chapter 15, p. 125). Gautam Bhan reports that, in India, 
city governments which used to “turn a blind eye” to urban informal settlements 
and urban informal economic activities are now increasingly evicting, or other-
wise regulating previously accessible space: motivated by the increased competi-
tion for and value of urban public land and public space and often in collusion 
with real estate developers (Chapter 17). Further, he points out, new forms of 
urbanism – such as peri- urban development, corridors, special economic zones, 
enclaved residential space – do not leave much space for informal workers to 
live and work. Finally, the impacts of climate change are driving migration to 
cities and threatening to put more pressure on the already- overcrowded settle-
ments and livelihoods of the urban poor (Ghosh 2017).
 Meanwhile, many cities around the world are de- industrialising, contributing 
to a loss of formal jobs and increased competition for informal employment 
opportunities. Also, the common policy response to informality by city govern-
ments has been eviction and relocation of informal settlements, informal markets 
and the urban poor to the periphery of cities. Under the name of market develop-
ment, street vendors are evicted – with or without relocation – on a daily basis: 
and relocation, when it happens, is often to built markets at some distance from 
the city centre far from where potential customers are concentrated. Similarly, 
under the name of slum redevelopment, “vertical, multi- storey small apartment 
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blocks are being built … at scale in the city’s peripheries where land is available 
cheaply” (Chapter 17, p. 137). Neither form of relocation, of informal markets or 
of informal settlements, is viable for the urban poor, given the distance (and the 
cost of transport) to their work, their suppliers and customers. In response, 
Gautam Bhan, with others, has called for making housing not only adequate and 
affordable but also viable in terms of livelihood opportunities (Bhan, Harish and 
Anand 2014).
 In sum, recent trends are associated with increased fragmentation and seg-
mentation in production and distribution through global value chains, as detailed 
by Meenu Tewari, and in the economic and social fabric of cities (Chapter 19). 
This fragmentation and segmentation have led to what Rahul Mehrotra, in the 
urban context, calls “a condition of flux”; and have created new – and intensified 
old – costs and risks for the working poor in the informal economy (Chapter 16). 
This reality is reflected in the fact that, in 2018, “more than one quarter of 
workers in low- and middle- income countries were living in extreme or moderate 
poverty” (ILO 2019, Executive Summary: 2). As Jan Breman highlights, there is 
simply “not sufficient waged employment for the globalised workforce” so that 
many persons seeking work will continue to resort to self- employment in the 
informal economy where they face being stigmatised, penalised or even 
criminalised, making it difficult, if not impossible, to earn a decent living 
(Chapter 2).
Informality, capital and the state
In addition to debunking many of the dominant (largely negative) myths or 
stereotypes about the informal economy, several authors in this volume under-
score that informality is associated with the state and with capital, not just with 
work and labour. Most prominently, Jan Breman critiques the persistent focus on 
the informality of one factor of production – i.e., labour – and the complete dis-
regard of how informality pervades the other factor of production – i.e., capital – 
and the state (Chapter 1); and Barbara Harriss- White observes that “Informal 
activity is not confined to the economy, it pervades the state … and policy 
process” (Chapter 2, p. 42). In other words, as Rodrigo Negrete aptly observes: 
“Informality is a phenomenon or set of practices that in principle is widespread 
throughout the economy rather than in only a part of it” (Chapter 5, p. 61).
Informality as state policy
There is a widespread notion that informality flourishes when states are fragile 
or weak, or otherwise lack competence. But several contributors to this volume 
highlight that informality is often driven by deliberate state policy. The state, 
they point out, decides which aspects of the informal economy to turn a blind 
eye to, which to tolerate or which to get rid of; and which aspects of the informal 
economy to support or promote. As Kate Meagher concludes from her analysis 
of informal economies in Africa: “informal economies are not something that 
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emerges purely outside the state”: rather, “the state plays a role in the different 
size and character of informal economies” (Chapter 31, p. 234).
 Historically, most governments have treated the informal economy as a 
problem to be dealt with, as being non- productive, illegal or even criminal. The 
result, as noted earlier, is that most existing policy and legal frameworks are 
inappropriate for, biased against or outright hostile towards informal workers, 
their enterprises and activities. The result, more fundamentally, is that the 
working poor in the informal economy tend to be excluded from public goods – 
such as public space, public services and public procurement – which, in turn, 
tend to be privatised to – or otherwise appropriated by – the rich and powerful. 
In the nineteenth century, as Jérémie Cavé reminds us, Karl Marx famously 
pointed out that peasants were no longer allowed to collect firewood from the 
estates of landowners once profitable uses for land developed (e.g., for mining or 
sheep rearing) (Chapter 24). About the same time in Paris, as Lucía Fernandez 
reports, traditional informal waste pickers – called chiffoniers – were being 
denied the right to collect waste (Chapter 23). Today, as cities around the world 
modernise, informal waste pickers are being denied the right to collect and 
recycle waste and informal street vendors are being evicted from public spaces: 
yet both waste and public space, as Jérémie Cavé and others in this volume 
argue, should be considered public goods, like the urban commons.
 In effect, many state policies are exclusionary by design. Moreover, some 
states ignore, overlook or under- value informal workers and their livelihood 
activities. For example, home- based workers are overlooked as both workers and 
as residents, with the result that they are not seen as a target of labour regula-
tions and often do not receive basic infrastructure services for their homes which 
double as workplaces. Also, street vendors and market traders are not recognised 
as taxpayers who contribute to city revenue: by paying operating fees and market 
rents and by paying VAT and other sales taxes on the inputs they purchase; or as 
contributors to food security and the well- being of (especially) the poor by 
selling goods and services at affordable prices and (if not evicted) in convenient 
locations. And waste pickers are not recognised for their contributions to the city 
by collecting waste and to the environment, by reclaiming recyclables that would 
otherwise end up in landfills or incinerators.
Informality of capital
Several contributors to this volume question the supposition, as Jan Breman puts 
it, “that capital firmly belongs to the domain of formality” (Chapter 1, p. 33). 
Both Jan Breman and Barbara Harriss- White characterise the informality of 
capital – and of the state – as structures of privilege and power for whom formal 
rules do not apply. Barbara Harriss- White highlights the different forms or 
degrees of informality that capital can take.
 Indeed, there are many actors who operate informally, outside the formal 
rules of the state. A forthcoming edited volume entitled The Wild East?: Crim-
inal Political Economies across South Asia, edited by Lucia Michelutti and 
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Barbara Harriss- White, documents how (among other cases) money launderers 
operate globally and the mafia is proliferating in countries like India, acting as 
intermediaries between the state, capital and the informal economy.
Informality, state and capital
Finally, several contributors to this volume highlight the frequent collusion of 
the state and capital: more specifically, the collusion of different levels of gov-
ernment with “organised lobbies” (Barbara Harriss- White) or “big businesses” 
(Jan Breman) to identify or create loopholes in – or simply bypass – existing 
rules and regulations to serve their mutual interests. They highlight the operation 
of informality at the tip, not just the base, of the economic pyramid, especially in 
cities At the tip, informality is associated with the state and with the owners of 
capital: specifically, the ways in which governments set the legal rules of the 
economic (or urban) game but then, often in collusion with big business (notably 
real estate developers in cities), take advantage of loopholes in existing regula-
tions or make exceptions to these regulations to serve their own interests and 
those of the rich and powerful classes.
 In urban theory and research, as Veronica Crossa points out:
[T]hese first approaches to informality in general, and also to street vending 
specifically, rarely explored street vending in relation to the formal institu-
tions of the state or as a product of the existing fissures within the state. The 
state was never called into question.
(Chapter 21, p. 168)
But a current strand of critical urban theory does. Veronica Crossa cites 
Ananya Roy who, in her study of urban planning in India, contrasts the collu-
sion of city governments with housing authorities and real estate developers 
in the appropriation of public land for private housing (“elite informality”) 
with the criminalisation by city governments of the appropriation of public 
land by the urban poor for their settlements (“subaltern informality”). Ananya 
Roy concludes:
The planning and legal apparatus of the state has the power to determine … 
what is informal and what is not, and to determine which forms of inform-
ality will thrive and which will disappear … .to construct and reconstruct 
categories of legitimacy and illegitimacy.
(2005: 149)
This raises the question of why informality at the base of the economic pyramid 
– the working poor trying to operate in the gaps in public space and public rules 
– tends to be penalised, while informality at the tip of the pyramid – the rich and 
powerful colluding with the state to bend formal rules – tends to be rewarded. 
Put another way, who decides which informality – at the tip or at the base – is 
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good or bad? To quote Shakespeare’s Hamlet: “There is nothing either good or 
bad – but thinking makes it so.”
Notes
 1 This volume and the conference that gave rise to it did not include scholars from the 
management sciences. There are important strands of research and theory on the 
informal economy in the management sciences, focusing on informal enterprises and 
entrepreneurs, including notably the distinction between the legality (under formal 
rules and regulations) and legitimacy (under informal rules and norms) applied to the 
ends and means of informal enterprises drawn by Justin Webb and others (Webb et al. 
2009).
 2 The informal economy in Arab countries is not specifically addressed in this volume. 
The International Labour Organisation, the Economic and Social Commission of 
West Asia and the WIEGO network have begun a collaborative initiative to improve 
statistics on the informal economy building on the first- ever report on the informal 
economy in the region (Aita 2017).
 3 The operationalising of these international statistical definitions is left to national sta-
tistical offices and hinges on the institutional framework and politics of each country.
 4 For a review of three early schools of thought on the informal economy – dualist (ILO 
1972), structuralist (Castells and Portes 1989) and legalist (de Soto 1989) – as well as 
a more recent school of thought – the voluntarist (Maloney 2004), see Chen (2014a).
 5 Contributing family workers are considered self- employed by the statistical and regu-
latory system of most countries. Following the 2018 revision of the international clas-
sification of status in employment, they will be distinguished from independent 
self- employed workers (ICLS 2018).
 6 The USA splits labour and employment law, whereas usually in other countries labour 
law incorporates employment law.
 7 See Gallin (2002). Also Gallin and Horn (2006).
 8 A notable exception in British and other colonies were the cantonments, permanent 
military establishments, where often both (mainly colonial) officers and (mainly 
“native”) soldiers lived and trained.
 9 The increase in disguised wage employment in new and old forms, and of some forms 
of dependency among nominally self- employed workers, is one of the factors that 
prompted the 2018 20th International Conference of Labour Statisticians to develop 
and adopt a new status in employment sub- category, namely, “dependent 
contractors”.
10 Significantly, in 2018, “360 million people were contributing family workers and 1.1 
billion worked on their own account, often in subsistence activities that are pursued 
because of an absence of job opportunities in the formal sector and/or the lack of a 
social protection system” (ILO 2019: 2).
11 For example, Agarwala, Bonner, Carré, Chen, Chun, Dias, Lindell (2011), Rojas and 
Tilly (2019), Webster et al. (2017).
12 During the 2018 and 2019 International Labour Conferences, an active delegation of 
informal workers, supported by WIEGO, SEWA and the International Domestic 
Worker Federation, successfully negotiated for the inclusion of a clause on violence 
by state authorities in the Violence and Harassment Convention, adopted in 2019.
13 Some countries also have experienced rapid employment growth in construction.
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The bane of the labouring poor under 
globalised capitalism
Jan Breman
There are many entry points to researching and understanding informality but 
the diverse dimensions hang together. Interdisciplinarity is the alpha and omega 
of informality: the interconnections among the fields parcelled out of economics, 
political science, sociology, anthropology, law, social policy and public adminis-
tration need to be mapped. In addition, a historical perspective is of overriding 
importance to comprehend the dynamics of informalisation. To reflect on what 
has transpired in the past, the retrospective must be stretched to roughly half a 
century ago in order to highlight the changed magnitude, scope, fabric and 
setting of informality since its inception. After all, it was as the felicitous 
outcome of an anthropological case study in the late 1960s that the concept hap-
pened to be coined. This refers to the seminal paper which Keith Hart wrote on 
the economic activity of footloose labour in Accra (Hart 1971). But while the 
concept of informality is traced back in its nomenclature to this origin, it was 
actually the outcome of an earlier development: the emergence of formalised 
politics and policies of employment in reaction to the emerging domination of a 
capitalist mode of production in Europe’s urban- industrial economy during the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While informal employment con-
tinued to exist and remained the character of engagement in gainful activity for 
the overwhelming majority of the world’s workforce, formal conditions of 
earning a livelihood had become the economic status of only a small and privi-
leged segment of labouring men and women.1
 The spectrum of investigation has greatly expanded since the conceptual 
watershed between formal and informal came about. Initially considered a niche 
of the urban economy in Third World countries located in the Global South, the 
informal ‘sector’ was thought to be a waiting room for the labouring poor who, 
pushed out of the countryside, made their way to the towns and cities in the hope 
of finding a better existence. Industrialisation was expected to accelerate and 
absorb the influx of people from the rural hinterland who were going to qualify 
for jobs in the mills and other urban employment and in the process move up to 
the formalised economy. From the beginning the bias has been not only to track 
the outcome of the shift in the rural- urban balance but also to register its 
meaning and impact only at the site of arrival, which resulted in understating 
even until today the variegated practices of informality which regimented labour 
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in the rural- agrarian economy. A similar bias is noticeable with regard to migra-
tion which tends to be described as leaving the village and resettling in the city. 
It has led to overstating the rate of urban growth taking place because many of 
those who venture to leave the village are not able to establish a permanent foot-
hold in the city and after a season, a year or at the end of their working life are 
pushed back again.
 Spatial mobility is often not migration but circulation. Off- and-on hiring 
frequently coincides with off- and-on coming and going. The predicament of 
remaining on the move prevents people from bringing dependent members of 
their households along in their flight from the land. Indeed, informality and 
circulation tend to reinforce each other and to classify people who remain foot-
loose as part of the reserve army of labour.2 The rampant policy of slum evic-
tion going on in many countries in the Global South throws up barriers to 
low- skilled or unskilled newcomers in their desperate attempt to stay on in the 
city (Breman 2016b). Desperate, because there is a dire lack of employment 
where they come from. Households in urban slums may every now and then 
tolerate members unable to contribute fully to the joint budget because bouts 
of unemployment frequently occur. But growing old and losing one’s capacity 
to work for an income are burdens too heavy for the working and earning 
members to carry, and force people in that predicament to disappear from the 
scene. Ill- equipped for survival, most of them return to their place of origin to 
end their life in slow starvation. This is a major reason why people unable to 
qualify for waged work happen to be underrepresented in the urban localities 
in which the labouring poor congregate, as in the slum vividly portrayed in 
Katherine Boo’s study (Boo 2012).
 Informal activity used to be labelled initially as a ‘sector’, expecting that it 
would fade away with the expansion of the formal economy. This did not happen 
and, as a consequence, what initially had been perceived as a problem was by 
the end of the 1980s turned around into a solution.3 This tale of “solution” 
implied doing away with formal employment and the body of labour legislation 
that had been formulated and implemented to regulate this mode of waged work 
on the pretext that it hampered economic growth. As a consequence, the work-
force casually and intermittently employed on informal terms and conditions 
increased to 80 per cent or more of all people engaged in waged work in the 
Global South. Informalisation not only accelerated at a rapid pace but also made 
inroads into the much- reduced formal economy, to the extent that the formal- 
informal divide has lost much of its former rigidity. Was it the price that the 
catching- up economies were forced to pay for lagging behind in development? 
This piece of wishful thinking became unravelled around the turn of the century 
and more so with the onset of the great recession which hit economies around 
the world in the first decade of the twenty- first century.
 Under neoliberal capitalism, informality rapidly became the organising prin-
ciple of the globalised economy, propelled by dynamics which resulted in the 
return of the social question for the workforce of the world at large (Breman and 
van der Linden 2014; Breman et al. 2019). That same conceptualisation seems to 
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imply that “the Rest” is not becoming like “the West”. The received wisdom of 
the long- cherished development paradigm that promised equality and emancipa-
tion for the countries and people locked in poverty may well begin to change in 
the opposite direction. The compartmentalised notion of a Second World, next to 
the Third World and now also the First World, has fallen by the wayside. The 
segmentation of the planet in this zonal divide has become an obstacle to our 
understanding of the integrated global economy. The restructuring in the model 
of integration going on suggests that in our research designs the nation state, 
which so far has been the frame of analysis, is being replaced by a social class 
perspective. The regime of informality as it operates in the globalised economy 
with its repercussions and ramifications should be at the top of the future 
research agenda.
 Informality, as discussed both in the realm of research and policy, is predomi-
nantly if not exclusively understood with reference to labour, work and employ-
ment. For no good reason at all, as I found in the course of my empirical 
investigations in rural and urbanising India from the early 1960s, covering a 
period of over half a century. This persistent focus is a reduction to absurdity 
since it singles out merely one factor of production – i.e., labour – completely 
overlooking how it also pervades no less the working of capital and vice versa. 
The supposition that capital firmly belongs to the domain of formality can be 
questioned on many counts. To begin with, capital owners or managers often 
resort to the informalisation of their business in order to evade appropriation of 
the surplus value generated by labour through taxation by the state.4 Accumula-
tion of capital takes the shape of maximally reducing labour costs and. to make 
that happen, the writ of the state needs to be circumvented. This argument boils 
down to saying that if the informal- formal dichotomy makes any sense at all, 
there is ample reason to explore and document the contrast for both factors of 
production and their entanglement. Why is it that the circulation and accumula-
tion of capital beyond the reach of the state are a question much less raised and 
investigated than the origin, composition, flow and control of labour under the 
heading of informality? The opaqueness of capital in the informal economy, the 
way it is accrued, collected, spent, saved and, above all, drained off, needs to be 
unveiled. This is actually one of the reasons why it makes sense to talk of 
informality instead of precarity, a term which has come to dominate the discus-
sion on these issues as waged in the Global North. There is nothing precarious 
about the role of capital in the economy but the way it is kept informalised as the 
black circuit should be the subject of in- depth research. Studies focused on the 
role of intermediaries (moneylenders, sub- contractors, jobbers. touts and other 
agents) are of crucial importance to highlight the way labour is linked to capital. 
The pivotal role of capital in the informal economy needs to be placed on the 
future research agenda. In my overview on the nature of informal work (Breman 
[2013] 2016a), I have argued that the neoliberal mode of capitalism is a regime 
of unregulated informality which not only embraces the economy at large but 
also extends to politics and governance. The rampant practices of extortion, cor-
ruption, fraud and other forms of malfeasance to which urban as well as rural 
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slum- dwellers no less than all other ranks of citizens fall prey to are committed 
by officials and politicians who, from top to bottom, privatise their public author-
ity, exemplifying what I have called the informalisation of formal power and 
administration (Breman 2019b).
 Some other themes also need to be placed high on the future research agenda. 
The first is the social identity, composition, and cohesion of the household in 
which working women are embedded: the relations between adults and minors, 
men and women, workers and dependants. Field- based research indicates there 
is a trend to a contractualisation of ties between its members. An appetite for 
consumerism indicates the pressure for spending income both on life- cycle 
events (marriage, birth, death) and on a range of daily commodities also among 
the classes facing indigence. The notion that needs and wants should be under-
stood in a relational and relative context makes it impossible to fix a line which 
neatly divides the poor from the non- poor. Which needs are considered basic and 
which belong to the realm of wants cannot be reified but depend on the eco-
nomic, social and cultural circumstances under the lenses of study and action. 
Another feature which affects the fabric and stability of the household is the 
splitting up of this core social unit in multi- locationality when some of its wage- 
earning members, mostly males, go off in search of work far away from home 
for a variable length of absence. The information gathered on the impact of 
labour migration – often better addressed as labour circulation – tends to 
emphasise mainly or exclusively its economic impact. Much less discussed is the 
non- economic fallout of gender- selective mobility: the growing marginality of 
those who leave in order to contribute to the budget the household needs to cope 
but are unable to share in its intimacy and social life. The disruption of bonds of 
affinity and sharing in togetherness gives an instrumental flavour to interpersonal 
relationships. The household has once more become a workshop. It means that 
the ethos of capitalism has penetrated into the milieu of the labouring poor, 
expressed in pronounced individuation. It is in this respect that the multiple and 
sometimes conflicting roles of working women in running the household (in pro-
duction, reproduction, care) have to be foregrounded. The collapse of the house-
hold occurs when due to chronic illness, disability or addiction (to drink, drugs, 
betting, gambling and different forms of abuse) the delicate balance between 
those who contribute to its maintenance and those who are unable or unwilling 
to do so is distorted to a point that its viability has irreversibly eroded.
 A second theme for urgent research concerns the notion of self- employment, 
which often is a form of disguised waged work, but tends to be looked upon as 
the focal point of informality policies, together with the glorified myth of self- 
reliance associated with it. From this perspective, unemployment is only at issue 
in the formal economy. This very incorrect notion has dominated. As a result, 
work time of the self- employed which remains idle – i.e., underemployment – is 
seen as a problem that they themselves must solve. The study of unemployment 
in the informal economy should be identified as a research priority. A recurrent 
finding is that work done by males is higher waged than that by females and the 
latter are often classified as unskilled ‘helpers’. Women are often deprived of 
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waged labour as long as men are around, able and willing to do the work on 
offer. An increased gender imbalance may also be the result of a revitalisation of 
patriarchy even among working- class communities that in the past could not 
afford to downgrade the autonomy of women in manoeuvring themselves inside 
and outside the household.5 One striking feature of the overarching problem of 
jobless growth is the substitution of labour by capital, due not only to technolo-
gical change but also altered employment modalities to increase the productivity 
of labour in order to achieve higher profits. In the ongoing substitution of labour, 
women and men in the low- skilled to unskilled workforce seem at first sight to 
be equally vulnerable but coping with this dismal trend tends to victimise 
females of all ages more than males. We seem to have reached a stage where 
there is not sufficient waged employment for the globalised workforce. Another 
dimension of the same problem is the crying need for public provision of social 
security and protection for both the labouring and the non- labouring poor.
 A third important theme is the many- faceted obstructions to collective action, 
both from within the informal economy (caused by occupational multiplicity, 
part- time engagement, constant rotation around worksites and sectors, social 
marginality) and from the social forces driving it (employers, politicians, policy- 
makers). The worldwide flexibilisation of employment has accelerated, due to 
not only a strategy to cheapen the price of labour maximally and, to no lesser 
extent, in order to realise this objective, to prevent collective action. Of course, 
WIEGO (Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing) can be 
flagged as an exemplary exception to a disconcerting practice which throws 
people at work back on self- representation in their vulnerable efforts to bargain 
for a better deal. This situation in the landscape of informality has to be assessed 
carefully and requires being framed in a wider context of similar attempts at 
mobilisation for decent work and a dignified livelihood. Capitalising on 
WIEGO’s significant role and network would enable us to list ways and means 
to overcome the ploys of capital to keep labour segmented, fragmented, if not 
atomised. In a new study, I have investigated the history from past to present of 
labour- tying arrangements by prepaid or postponed wage payments, a plight 
from which women no less than men suffer. A capitalist form of labour attach-
ment defined as neo- bondage has become a device for employers and contractors 
to deny agency- based concerted attempts to strike for a better deal (Breman 
2019a).
 The last proposal is not on what to research but how to do it. In addition to 
official statistics and quantitative surveys, a wide range of case studies are 
needed to zoom in on the ground level – waged work and what it yields for live-
lihood – and trace the connection- cum-interaction between the various actors 
and stakeholders. To commission such a set of studies would require expertise 
with a distinct emphasis on qualification and familiarity with fieldwork- based 
investigations. The set of studies and writings already collected could be sub-
jected to cross- cutting analysis, resulting in essays presented from a variety of 
meaningful analytical perspectives related to the world of informality, for 
example, schooling and skilling; handling debt and savings; the painful adage of 
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never being too young or too old to work; the plight of coping with irregularity 
and insecurity; the jobber and his trade; the problem of finding shelter while 
remaining adrift; what a footloose, wayward existence implies. In so many 
words, this is an argument to capture the canvas of informality by combining 
macro- level and micro- level research. In the nature of a crucial methodological 
consideration is my suggestion to come as close and as long as possible to the 
objects of investigation: the labouring poor. Some of the references made above 
– Katherine Boo’s slum vignette and the volume by S. Anandi and Karin 
Kapadia – have carefully documented the assertion for gendered emancipation 
among the people who are down and out. In a similar vein is the monograph, Is 
This Azaadi? Everyday Lives of Dalit Agricultural Labourers in a Bihar Village 
(2018), in which Anand Chakravarti zeroes in on the victims of deeply ingrained 
inequality whose visibility and voices have remained suppressed from genera-
tion to generation. Much to his own regret, the author could not put on stage half 
of the people suffering from oppression and exclusion. He was unable to include 
the pitiable plight of women in his stark portrait of misery, coercion and dis-
crimination. Considered inferior to men, they are even prevented from taking 
part in the struggle for equality. Giving voice to a major part of humanity mar-
ginalised in subhuman existence is an urgent research endeavour.
 Even more ambitious would be a method of documentation in which the 
targets of investigation write up their own profiles. To this break with conven-
tional techniques of data collection, which attempts to bridge the gap between 
outsiders and insiders to the scene described and analysed, social rights activist 
and public intellectual Harsh Mander has made a major contribution. His tribute 
is related to my own field of research in India but has, of course, much wider 
relevance:
‘Engaged’ research into the subjective realities of people’s experience leads 
to a more nuanced and complete understanding of not only those elements 
which can be objectively measured, such as income and consumption, but 
the full complexity of poverty. Listening to the stories and ‘words from the 
heart’ of people who, as partners in the research, reconstruct their own lived 
experiences, and their analysis, knowledge and aspirations, democratizes 
knowledge, and leads to a more complete and nuanced understanding of ele-
ments such as hunger, discrimination, social exclusion, stigma and disem-
powerment. Such research, done with empathy and respect, ethical concern 
and personal accountability, and without compromising the search for the 
truth, is both legitimate and has academic and practical value. The know-
ledge and insights derived from it can be invaluable in efforts to secure the 
human rights of disadvantaged and oppressed people, and in the design and 
evaluation of public policy.
(Mander 2018: 253)
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2 India’s informal economy
Past, present and future
Barbara Harriss- White
Advances in theory and research
Deliberate informality
Historical research has established that long before Keith Hart invented the 
concept of informality, “un”-organisation was the result of a deliberate state 
policy (and not a reflection of the limits to state competence or of the residual or 
incipient nature of informal economic activity).1
 India’s Madras Non- Power Factories Act 1947, the Madras Shops and 
Establishments Act 1947 and the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 were not 
devised to regulate a pre- capitalist era. They were championed by unions, 
civil servants and labour commissioners to check abject work conditions and 
abuses to wage- labour. (These included long hours of work and little rest, 
lack of ventilation, meagre or no holidays, and savage punishment for “delin-
quence”.) But they were drafted as weak and splintered laws, neglecting 
wages, access to social security (the provident fund) and outlawing union 
activism except under restrictive conditions. Fiercely opposed by industrial 
lobbies, their coverage was confined to the largest factories, with sweeping 
exemptions, much discretion for the inspectorate, arbitrary decisions by 
undermanned tribunals and feeble punishments. In laws hampered by idiosyn-
cratic definitions of labour, all establishments with fewer than three wage 
labourers were exempted (the great majority of all modern Indian firms); paid 
holidays were waived and casual labour was ineligible for protection. Prepos-
terous reasons advanced by Business Associations and Chambers of Com-
merce convinced legislators to amend laws and reduce the scope of protection. 
Holidays were not practicable especially when work was organised through 
contracts: ‘workers don’t want them’. The cost of compliance would increase 
hardship for labour. Women and children were not workers, but, in any case, 
work was better for children than school. Not being factories or shops, work-
shops could not be covered. Activity was piecemeal and therefore not work. 
For Rajagopalachari, “women … needed protection from the labour laws 
rather than through the labour laws” (Dietrich- Wielenga, 2019). The acts were 
phased in reluctantly.
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 So the state and a host of organised lobbies were complicit in the scoping of 
an economy of small capitalist firms, socially regulated by norms of caste, local-
ity, and gender, controlled through the private rules of business associations, 
protected at the expense of labour. Together, they created the classifications of 
livelihoods informing judicial interpretations and case law, most prevailing to 
this day.
Selective engagements with regulative law
The paradoxical binary of informal and formal is easy to criticise but useful in 
drawing attention to the state’s regulative capacity – as seen above. But just as 
the classes of informal labour have been identified according to their precarity, 
autonomy and income, their non- work rights and claims (Lerche 2010), so firms 
may also be distinguished according to their engagement with regulative law. A 
firm may be registered and have (1–10) bank accounts, but flout the building 
regulations, the environmental laws as well as the labour laws, and evade tax. 
The frontier of informality is not so much Akhil Gupta’s famous ‘blurred 
boundary” (1995) between state and society as Aseem Prakash’s “political 
space”’ (2015). We still do not know enough about it.
Contractualisation
New public management, neoliberal ideology, tax evasion and stretched public 
finances combine to make privatisation irresistible on efficiency grounds, to 
reduce deficits in public accounts, and to formalise/register firms that are engag-
ing selectively with the regulative environment. Contractualisation is penetrating 
corporations as well as the state (Chen 2007). Its outcomes are a massive deteri-
oration in conditions and rights of wage labour and self- employed workers. For 
instance, Indian Railways, public hospitals and municipalities are all contractu-
alising their sanitation workers whose monthly earnings are collapsing from 
approximately 20,000–25,000 Indian rupees plus full work rights and union-
isation to approximately 6,000–8,000 Indian rupees with none. This workforce is 
being re- informalised.
Austerity and the necessity of informal wage- work and  
self- employment
In addition, we meet a process of double informalisation – first, in the day- job 
(long shifts of casual wage- work) and, second, in the essential supplementary 
side- jobs (self- employment). This daily double informality adds to the obstacles 
to formalisation since non- work time for political mobilisation is squeezed to 
destruction. The feminisation of waste collection work is another obstacle to 
formalisation because to the double burden of wage work plus self- employment 
is added the third burden of reproductive work. Then, when women succeed in 
joining unions, they often have to struggle against anti- female biases in agendas 
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and practices: reason enough to salute Renana Jhabvala, the Self- Employed 
Women’s Association (SEWA) and Women in Informal Employment: Globaliz-
ing and Organizing (WIEGO).
Informality and illegality
While much informal activity is left deliberately unregulated, research by 
Michelutti’s team (Michelutti and Harriss- White 2019) has revealed the large 
extent of activity that is not outside the reach of law but is outside the reach of 
law enforcement and is therefore criminal. Either it deliberately breaks laws and/
or it produces and trades in illegal commodities. India’s criminal economy is dif-
ficult to identify, first, because a given firm may be selectively formal, informal 
and criminal and, second, because when law is impossible to enforce (as when 
there is one pollution inspector per district, without transport), in practical terms, 
it does not exist. The Michelutti project also shows how sectors of the economy 
(coal, fuel, real estate, granite, sand, liquor) may be dominated by criminal 
organisations – “mafias” – with origins not always in capital but in labour and in 
the profits of trade union leadership.
The regionalisation of social inclusion/exclusion
Not only is there growing evidence of the persistence of Gunnar Myrdal’s 
“archaic forms” and Geoff Hodgson’s social “outliers”, forms of social regula-
tion all expected to disappear with the animal spirits of markets and Weber’s 
steel cage of the state (Myrdal 1968; Hodgson 1988), but their roles are also 
reworked as the components of a social structure of accumulation and of market 
order: policing entry, maintaining contractual standards, resolving disputes, 
engaging with labour to control its rates, stabilising and supporting profit. 
Approaches to identifying such social institutions range from the specialised 
(e.g., gender) through the formalised (e.g., institutions/organisations such as 
banks, unions and business associations) to the set of all institutions without 
which informal work and production and social reproduction could not take 
place (adding race/caste, property relations, households and kin, education, 
health, housing, courts, social and economic policy and even language to the 
forces and practices shaping the informal economy). New commodities are 
thought to be untainted/“neutral” to social regulative forces but more often than 
not, this is not the case.
 Recent work on caste, ethnicity, religion and gender shows how the social 
structure of accumulation is also a social structure of discrimination. Lack of 
access, disadvantage, exclusion and marginalisation are not only specific to sectors 
of the economy but are also regionalised in ways changing consistently over time 
(Fouillet 2010; Raju 2015; Vidyarthee 2015; Harriss- White 2017a). These robust 
regions are not co- terminus with the territories of states but often cross state 
boundaries. While they cannot be the product of politics/policy, the jury is out over 
the question of whether state policy can reduce regions of disadvantage.
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The idea of the solidary economy
While trade unions have been struggling for wage workers for well over a 
century, the capacity of the solidary economy to provide an alternative model 
of development to capitalism is at present being widely discussed and ques-
tioned in India, as elsewhere, especially in Latin America (Laville 2010). 
Social and environmental objectives are pursued alongside economic ones 
through self- organisation in cooperative, associative and solidarity relations. 
Like the informal economy, the solidarity economy is a fuzzy concept and a 
multitude of terms have also sprouted to describe it: solidary economy, social 
economy, the moral and ethical economy, the human and popular economy. 
The concept of collective action differs from that of solidary economy because 
sectional economic interests may be collectively pursued, as in the case of 
Business Associations (which may also pose as workers organisations). The 
question at issue for organisations like WIEGO is whether, in the overlap 
between the solidary and the informal economy, distinctive forms of empower-
ment for women may be generated which challenge both the logic and modes 
of expansion of capitalism and the movement towards Karl Polanyi’s destruc-
tive market society (Polanyi 1944).
Key theoretical challenges and research gaps
The status of self- employment in the capitalist economy: economic 
expansion by multiplication
This is a field of bitter debates. Is self- employment capital, labour or neither? 
Since the self- employed are found everywhere, is the entire informal economy 
non- capitalist? If not, what is it? For Kalyan Sanyal and Partha Chatterjee, the 
non- corporate economy is the “needs economy” (Chatterjee 2008), for Altvater 
(1993), it is the “reserve army”, for Kumar and Bhaduri (2014), the domain of 
“jugaad”, for Jeffrey (2010), that of “time pass”. For the National Commission 
for Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector (NCEUS 2007a, 2007b), self- 
employment is clearly Janus- faced (on the one hand, disguised wage work and, 
on the other, micro- capitalist activity). And for WIEGO, most self- employed 
workers are vulnerable workers, mainly own- account and contributing family 
workers, and potential agents of collective action.
 But they rarely expand. Why not? Many explanations have been advanced: 
victims of adverse exchange relations; victims of investment- consumption 
balances preventing expansion; victims of expansion by multiplication of small 
firms using savings and resources transferred and mobilised at marriage and 
inheritance? Meanwhile the Indian labour law regards employers of up to five 
wage labourers as labour not capital (95 per cent of all Indian firms) on the 
grounds of their small scale, compared with the corporate sector and their lack of 
access to social safety nets. However, for the self- employed, as labour, unless an 
individual employer can be identified, court cases about work conditions are 
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usually struck down. Hence Sankaran (2008) has concluded that self- employed 
workers are both declassed and disfranchised. And to the extent that self- 
employment is disguised wage- work, then labour politics needs to be trans-
formed to include the politics of workplace rents and technologies, of the terms 
and conditions of loans, of the processes of pricing raw materials and products 
and of access to infrastructure. A tall order.
 When self- employment drives both GDP growth and increases in livelihoods 
(ILO 2018a), what is to be done? WIEGO has been active here in extending 
social and economic policies that protect and support own- account workers and 
family units.
Critical implications of informality for a green transition
Is the informal economy less or more polluting and environmentally damaging 
than the formal economy? The answer seems obvious: the more human labour 
per given output, the less the energy from fossil fuel (as in handloom versus 
power- loom weaving). When poverty resides in the informal economy, poorer 
countries (and classes within countries) have lower greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions per capita. But it can be counter- argued (as in the cook- stove controversies, 
Kay 2013) that when primitive technology is used in the informal economy, it is 
less efficient in energy and materials and has worse well- being outcomes than 
later technologies.
 While standard coefficients for GHG emissions from economic activities are 
published, are they accurate converters for the informal economy? They may be 
under- estimates (because calculated at efficiency frontiers) or alternatively over- 
estimates (because the informal economy uses less fossil- fuel per unit of output). 
As yet there is no substitute for field research fusing social science and environ-
mental science to identify pollution hotspots (Gathorne- Hardy 2015). Scoping 
the frontiers for technological alternatives encounters huge problems. Evidence 
is unsystematic; few studies examine trade- offs between livelihoods, costs and 
GHGs. The world needs a portal which examines frontier technologies, scales, 
patent protection and property rights, finance, costs, gendered employment, 
materials and energy use plus environmental damage in many dimensions (e.g., 
GHGs, biodiversity and soil losses, proximate pollution) – a “silver buckshot” 
approach to the ecological crisis rather than a “silver bullet” (Prins and Rayner 
2007). Policy elites are defensive of the status quo. Their assumptions about 
policy processes and state capacities are vulnerable to errors of simplification. 
And so to the final point.
Informality and policy
Informal activity is not confined to the economy, it pervades the state and has to 
be understood and negotiated if change initiated by civil society is to materialise. 
Policy comes packaged in labelled fields, many of which sit ill at ease with the 
actual practice of state interventions: agriculture, for example, requires inputs 
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not just from the agriculture ministry but from most others. The time is ripe to 
specify wider sets of policy pre- conditions without which a given policy cannot 
be expected to work as intended. The same is true for political pre- conditions, 
including relations between state and civil society. When arranged against a 
policy objective, the means by which opposition to it is identified, neutralised 
(bought off, avoided, destroyed, pre- empted, democratised) are as important as 
the policy itself.
 Informality is not a labelled field for policy – at best, in India, it is the “unor-
ganised sector” or “casual labour”. Even though not regulated directly by the 
state, policy fields can affect informal activity. In 2016–17, the shock event of 
demonetisation alerted many economists to a stream of policies initiated under 
Congress: aadhaar (the still technically illegal unique identifier), followed under 
the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) by an unsuccessful amnesty for black money, 
digitisation and the electrification of money transfers, jan dhan (the people’s 
bank account), demonetisation and the new Goods and Services Tax, the ulti-
mate purpose of which is to destroy the cash economy – in the name of quashing 
counterfeiting, smuggling, black money and terrorism – and the effect of which 
has been to devastate the informal economy, especially women’s work (Ghosh et 
al. 2017; Harriss- White 2017b; Reddy 2017). Since what seem deliberate attacks 
cannot be resisted in the informal economy, the question is whether such 
moments can stimulate collective organisation.
 Just as the informal economy has shown much continuity during the era of 
liberalisation so, in the neoliberal state, reforms pile up like sedimentary rock 
strata, preserving stratified interests and their policies.
 At the same time as being privatised, policy processes are themselves infor-
malised. Not confined to faction, corruption, extortion and the proliferation of 
illegal markets within the state, relations of private status, of desecularisation, of 
lobbies colluding with or dominating bureaucracies at fractal scales, of party pol-
itics, of physical intimidation and violence, of ignorance and incompetence 
combine to result in policy outcomes far from those apparently intended. The 
informal state has been characterised as a “shadow state” (with socio- political 
institutions running activities for which the state is formally responsible; Harriss-
 White 2003), a “hybrid state” (giving and seeking rents; Prakash 2017) with 
state- society relations “blurred” (Gupta 1995) and “porous” (Rajagopal 2015). 
While the “deep state” is generally regarded as involving politics, intelligence 
and the military- industrial complex, India’s has been characterised as a “conge-
ries of relations between business, career politicians, gangland mafiosi and the 
police” (Jha 2013). So deregulation is the reregulation of a state that has in prac-
tice been long deregulated (if ever regulated in the first place). Re- deregulation 
legitimises and expands the scope of the informal economy and polity. If such a 
state is an ensemble of “policies, laws and acts, processes and protocols, institu-
tions, social, political and governmental actors and planning history” (Sundare-
san 2017: 21), then there will be hostile opposition to formal activity and 
formalising the informal economy. To address this opposition needs mainstream-
ing in policy!
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 And what are the impacts on women and on gender relations when policies 
have effects so far removed from those “intended” that intentionality itself must 
be questioned? Do their heavier reproductive burdens than those of men reduce 
choice in livelihoods and negotiating power in organisation?
 Until we understand this informalised politics, we are not going to understand 
how policy works, why it fails in terms of stated intentions and why constructive 
policy suggestions may fail.
Note
1 See Das Gupta (2016) and Dietrich- Wielenga (2019) for the post- Independence period 
and Sankaran (2008) for the contemporary period.
Part II
Informal employment
Advances in statistics and research

3 Advances in statistics on informal 
employment
An overview highlighting WIEGO’s 
contributions
Joann Vanek
From the beginning, WIEGO (Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing 
and Organizing) recognised that statistics were needed to draw public and policy 
attention to the size and contribution of the informal economy and the situation 
of women and men in it, and, therefore, it placed the development of these statis-
tics high on its agenda. WIEGO became involved in the community and frame-
works of the international statistical system while representing the reality and 
perspective of informal workers, particularly in the Global South, often counter-
ing the strong representation of developed countries. In this effort, WIEGO faced 
two major challenges. First, the measurement of the informal economy needed 
to be mainstreamed in labour force and economic statistics. Second, the data 
produced needed to be disseminated in formats that were easily accessible to 
researchers, policy- makers and advocates. These challenges became the object-
ives of the WIEGO Statistics Programme.
The development of concepts and methods
The first challenge involved developing and advocating for concepts, classifica-
tions and methods that identified and tabulated informal employment and its 
workers in official statistics. To do this, WIEGO worked with statisticians in the 
International Labour Office (ILO) and other international organisations in the 
regional and national statistical offices and with the International Expert Group 
on Informal Sector Statistics (called the Delhi Group, as it is convened by the 
Government of India).
 In 1993, four years before WIEGO was founded, the Fifteenth International 
Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) had adopted a standard definition of 
employment in the informal sector, a concept defined in terms of the characteris-
tics of the production unit in which employment takes place (ILO 1993). This 
concept, however, did not reflect all of the workers of concern to WIEGO, notably 
informal wage workers in formal firms or households. WIEGO then advocated for 
a broader concept including all employment which is not covered or insufficiently 
covered by formal arrangements through their work, whether or not it takes place 
in the informal or the formal sectors. Guidelines concerning a statistical definition 
of informal employment were adopted by the 17th ICLS in 2003 (ILO 2003).
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 The concept of informal employment is of major significance in developing 
countries; however, it is also relevant in developed countries where employment 
arrangements frequently and increasingly leave workers with no formal social 
protection or worker benefits. In 2007, WIEGO began working on a new statisti-
cal priority, namely, to develop a common framework for labour statistics relat-
ing to both developed and developing countries. With the ILO, WIEGO 
organised a conference on the topic in 2008 at Harvard University and continues 
this work through the Economic Commission for Europe Expert Group on 
Quality of Employment. A WIEGO Statistical Brief, “Relating Quality of 
Employment to Informal Employment”, details the importance and relevance of 
the definition of informal employment to the economies of developed countries 
and to the study of trends in the structure of employment across all countries 
(Carré, Negrete and Vanek 2016).
 The classification of labour statistics that has the most relevance to informal 
employment is the International Classification of Status in Employment (ICSE). 
This standard provides information on the nature of the economic risk and 
authority that the employed population experience at work. A revision of the 
1993 version of this classification was requested by the 19th ICLS to provide the 
information required to adequately monitor the changes in employment arrange-
ments taking place in many countries, for example, the growth of non- standard 
forms of employment. Dependent contractors, homeworkers and other industrial 
outworkers – groups of concern to WIEGO – are not well reflected in ICSE- 93. 
WIEGO prepared a paper with proposed considerations for the revision of the 
ICSE- 93 and was selected to be among the experts in the working group pre-
paring for the review of the ICSE- 93 by the 20th ICLS (ibid.). In October 2018, 
the 20th ICLS approved the Resolution concerning Statistics on Work Relation-
ship (designated as ICSE- 18), which reflects the proposed revisions. The ele-
ments of the Resolution that are of particular concern to WIEGO include: a new 
status category (Dependent Contractors) which reflects the situation of many 
informal workers, including that of homeworkers, and the inclusion of place of 
work, domestic workers and job- related social protection coverage as essential 
cross- cutting variables and categories.
 In several ways, WIEGO encourages and provides technical support to coun-
tries to collect data on informal employment, including adopting the new defini-
tions and methods. With the International Labour Organization (ILO), and the 
Delhi Group, WIEGO was a member of the team which prepared a manual pro-
viding technical guidance to countries on designing and implementing surveys 
of employment in the informal sector and informal employment (ILO 2013a). 
WIEGO also organised and collaborated on training efforts in countries and in 
regions. For example, with the ILO, the Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) and the Japanese Government, WIEGO co- led 
two courses on statistics on the informal economy at the Statistical Institute for 
Asia and the Pacific, the first in the summer of 2015 and the second in the fall of 
2017. These courses trained 48 national statisticians and labour ministry officials 
from 27 Asian countries.
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 WIEGO has developed a Statistical Brief Series which includes briefs on 
methods for the collection, classification, tabulation and analysis of official 
national statistics on the informal economy and specific groups of informal 
workers. The statistical challenge in these briefs is generally not how to capture 
these workers as employed but rather how to identify and classify the category of 
work or occupation in which they are employed. In part, this challenge arises 
because these groups tend to be in employment arrangements that are more diffi-
cult to measure and classify than workers in formal arrangements. It also arises 
because these groups are not well reflected in the standard international and 
national classifications for employment. Special methods are often needed in data 
collection and tabulation, as well as classification, to identify these workers.
 The United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda provides a major 
incentive for improvement of data to support the monitoring of progress in 
implementing the goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda. In particular, the selec-
tion of “the share of informal non- agricultural employment” proposed by the 
ILO and WIEGO, as Indicator 8.3.1 under Sustainable Development Goal 8, 
raises the priority of data on informal employment in the agendas of national sta-
tistical offices. This should increase the availability of statistics on the topic. 
WIEGO’s work to promote globally the development of statistics on informal 
employment has contributed to the selection of this indicator.
The dissemination of statistics
The second main challenge of the WIEGO Statistics Programme was to put sta-
tistics on the informal economy in the hands of users – ranging from researchers, 
policy- makers and officials, to advocates and organisations of informal workers. 
Each of these sets of potential users requires data in different formats – micro- 
data sets and databases for researchers, concise reports on the main statistics 
available for policy- makers, and targeted briefs focusing on specific groups of 
workers for advocates and organisations of informal workers.
 In 2002, the ILO published the first international compilation of statistics on 
the informal economy with estimates for the developing regions and the best 
available data on two groups of informal workers – street vendors and home- 
based workers (ILO 2002b). The report, Women and Men in the Informal 
Economy: A Statistical Picture, was prepared by a WIEGO team to support the 
General Discussion on Decent Work and the Informal Economy at the 90th 
Session of the International Labour Conference, Geneva, in June 2002.
 In 2013, ILO published the second edition of Women and Men in the Informal 
Economy: A Statistical Picture (ILO and WIEGO 2013). The publication was a 
collaboration between ILO and WIEGO. It featured national data in the ILO- 
WIEGO Database on the Informal Economy, another outcome of the ILO and 
WIEGO collaboration. A second set of estimates on the informal economy in 
developing regions based on these data was published as a WIEGO Working 
Paper, “Statistics on the Informal Economy: Definitions, Regional Estimates and 
Challenges” (Vanek et al. 2014).
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 Comparing the methods used and the data available in preparing the two sets of 
estimates shows the progress made in the development of statistics on informal 
employment. The estimates in the first edition of Women and Men in the Informal 
Economy: A Statistical Picture (ILO 2002b) were based on residual or indirect 
measures of informal employment for only 25 countries. The second set of estim-
ates in the WIEGO Working Paper was based on direct measures of informal 
employment in 40 countries and indirect measures in 81 countries and a sophistic-
ated and robust analytic approach combing direct and indirect measures.
 The third edition of Women and Men in the Informal Economy: A Statistical 
Picture, published in 2018, was prepared by the ILO with technical advice 
from WIEGO (ILO 2018a). It advances the field in several important ways: for 
the first time, (1) statistics on the informal economy are presented at the global 
level, based on developed as well as developing countries and including agri-
culture as well as non- agricultural sectors; (2) a common set of criteria were 
used to measure informal employment inside and outside the informal sector; 
and (3) micro- data from over 100 countries were processed to produce the 
national, regional and global estimates. To make these estimates accessible in 
a user- friendly format to a wider audience, ILO and WIEGO also collaborated 
on the publication of Women and Men in the Informal Economy: A Statistical 
Brief (Bonnet, Vanek and Chen 2019). Finally, WIEGO produced the key sta-
tistics and statistical messages in a pamphlet Counting the World’s Informal 
Workers: A Global Snapshot (ILO- WIEGO 2018).
 Given the urban focus of much of WIEGO’s work, the development of city- 
level statistics on informal employment and groups of urban workers – domestic 
workers, home- based workers, market traders and street vendors and waste 
pickers – is a high priority for WIEGO and organisations of these workers. As of 
mid- 2019, WIEGO had commissioned data on informal employment and spe-
cific groups of informal workers in 19 cities and presented it as a section of the 
WIEGO Dashboard (WIEGO n.d.) These data – as well as the national and 
regional data in the Dashboard – are based on official statistics. The national and 
regional components of the Dashboard are being updated with the new ILO 
estimates. WIEGO is also updating the city- level data and publishing them in the 
WIEGO Statistical Brief series.
 The WIEGO Statistical Brief series not only covers the methodological topics 
outlined above but also provides statistics in accessible formats on informal 
employment and specific groups of informal workers. Some of the briefs present 
statistics at the regional level while others present data at the country, urban or 
city levels. The production of these briefs has largely been in response to 
requests by organisations of informal workers and also by the WIEGO Urban 
Policies and Focal Cities teams.
Final note
Since WIEGO was founded in 1997, great advances have been made in provid-
ing statistics on the informal economy. As this chapter highlights, WIEGO has 
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made an important contribution to these advances, at times being the driving 
force behind them. Informal employment is becoming an integral part of main-
stream labour statistics, for example, ILO now integrates data on informal 
employment into its main database, ILOSTAT. Moreover, the first- ever global 
statistics on informal employment are now available based on the 2018 ILO har-
monised estimates. Thanks to these global estimates, we now know that:
• More than 60 per cent of total employment worldwide is informal.
• Around 90 per cent of employment in developing countries and 67 per cent 
in emerging countries is informal.
• Globally, 44 per cent of all workers are self- employed and 60 per cent of 
informal workers are self- employed. In developing countries, 72 per cent of 
all workers and 80 per cent of informal workers are self- employed. And in 
emerging countries, 49 per cent of all workers and 63 per cent of informal 
workers are self- employed.
4 Informal employment in 
developed countries
Relevance and statistical measurement
Françoise Carré
This chapter presents an argument for the value of applying the definition and 
measurement of informal employment across all types of economies, thus apply-
ing it to developed countries where recent employment changes make it relevant 
and warrant attention. Measuring informal employment across all countries calls 
attention to areas of change in employment patterns that are shared across coun-
tries and to the global interconnection of the labour markets.
 The chapter also details one area of progress in international statistics that is 
of interest to both developed and developing countries and will facilitate 
improved measurement of informal employment. Changes in employment that 
warrant attention include the following. In developed countries, where dependent 
(or wage) employment is the norm, the growth of non- standard employment 
such as fixed- term or intermittent work has resulted in the differentiation of 
wage employment. Where the labour market was conceived as primarily entail-
ing differences in wages or skills across jobs, it now is deemed to entail disconti-
nuities due to the work arrangements themselves. Most importantly non- standard 
work arrangements most often entail reduced or no employment- related social 
protection and sometimes reduced coverage under some labour standards, 
depending on the country. In addition, work arrangements that sit uneasily 
between waged/dependent and self- employed/independent have grown, are 
poorly accounted for in labour force statistics, and require improved statistical 
measurement and policy attention.
 Somewhat in contrast, but concurrently, developing countries where non- 
wage employment (own- account work, self- employed employer, and contrib-
uting family workers) prevails, there is growing co- existence of traditional 
self- employment (craft, vending, transport, farm work) with newer forms of 
work arrangements that also sit uneasily between independent and dependent 
employment; in most countries, for policy purposes, workers in these work 
arrangements are treated as self- employed. Classifying these newer forms of 
work has presented a challenge for national and international statistics.
 Informal employment, its contrast with formal employment, has mainly been 
considered as relevant to developing economies; however, informal employ-
ment highlights and names what are discontinuities in labour markets – the 
presence of distinct types of jobs, qualitative differences in work arrangements 
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and differential treatment under regulations, all with consequences for workers. 
This is a pattern that labour markets in developed countries increasingly share. 
The research literatures in the Global North and the Global South refer to these 
employment discontinuities differently, for example, as non- standard work 
among countries of the Global North and informal employment among coun-
tries of the Global South (e.g., Berger and Piore 1980). Nevertheless, there are 
underlying similarities in the ways that researchers have talked about such dis-
continuities in labour markets and their implications for workers; both refer to 
various types and degrees of labour market segmentation.
 Many of these changes in wage employment arrangements in developed 
countries sever workers from access to employment- related social protection 
(Carré 2015a). The lack of access to employment- related social protection is at 
the core of the definition of informal employment. This is protection against life 
risks that affect the ability to work and earn (e.g., illness, disability, or ageing). 
Persons who are in informal employment either are employees of formal firms or 
of households but do not receive social insurance or benefits through their 
employment due to the nature of their work arrangement1 or are self- employed 
or employees in informal enterprises (i.e., unincorporated economic units that 
are not registered with national authorities) and, as a result, do not have access to 
social insurance, or are contributing family workers.
Informal employment in developed countries
Examining the presence and dimensions of informal employment requires taking 
account of the institutional setting of those countries. Most workers in developed 
countries are employees; they are in dependent employment. The bulk of 
employment is in formal firms – with concentrated ownership of large corpora-
tions (though not necessarily large workplaces, or even large companies). Today, 
large formal firms are at the centre of the process of changes in wage employ-
ment that has manifested as the growth of non- standard work arrangements – 
what has been called the “informalisation” of employment. The policy 
environment for employment in the developed countries is rich in regulations 
and their enforcement has historically been relatively consistent.
 In this environment, several changes drive the emergence and growth of work 
arrangements akin to informal employment and that have contributed to the seg-
mentation of the labour market. First, and as already noted, a significant contrib-
utor has been the growth of non- standard work arrangements among wage 
workers. Fixed- term, temporary, casual, intermittent and other similar work 
arrangements as well as certain forms of casual part- time work have experienced 
significant and steady growth over the past four decades in European and North 
American countries, in particular, but also in high- income countries of other 
regions (ILO 2015a).
 Second, work arrangements that blur the boundary between employee/
dependent status and self- employment/independent status have grown, especially 
in developed countries. In these arrangements, individual workers are treated as 
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self- employed/independent workers and made responsible for their own social 
insurance (e.g., retirement contributions). But many are not independent oper-
ators; they are economically dependent. They do not have the autonomy to make 
decisions about how to engage with the market. In order to have tasks to perform 
or to access customers for whom to perform a service, many depend on a 
company that contracts for their work, or a digital platform run by a corporation 
that directly benefits from the proceeds of their work. They have little “control 
over their access to the market”. Nevertheless, in most countries, they currently 
are categorised as independent workers, as self- employed (Carré, Negrete and 
Vanek 2017). As a result, in most countries, they have no employment- related 
social protection; they purchase their own insurance without contribution from 
the contractor or the platform company. They bear many of the risks of auto-
nomous economic activity but have limited or no autonomy.2
 Third, labour standards violations have increased in some (primarily low- wage) 
industries, in some countries. These violations result in de facto informal employ-
ment. Because these practices amount to fraud, they are not readily visible in offi-
cial statistics. Instead, country- specific studies using regulatory audit data on 
minimum wage violations (Weil 2005; Weil and Pyles 2005–06) or employee mis-
classification as self- employed (Carré 2015b) or surveys focused on multiple 
labour standards violations in specific low- wage industries such as restaurant, 
retail, or home care (Bernhardt et al. 2009) document practices in contravention of 
labour regulations. This third pattern, though likely of smaller scale, nevertheless 
matters because it has arisen over the past 20 years in settings where previously it 
was much less of a policy concern. (Also of note, labour standards violations are 
relatively new in developed countries but are frequent in developing countries.)
 The implications of these changes for workers and the rise of informal 
employment that they represent warrant policy attention (OECD 2019) and 
underscore the relevance of the definition and measurement of informal 
employment across types of economies. A wide array of studies from the Inter-
national Labour Organization, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), the European Union, and country- based researchers 
indicate that work in job arrangements such as fixed- term work, temporary 
work, casual work, on- demand economy (platform) work and other forms of 
non- standard work are associated with a lower level of employment- based 
social protection coverage, sometimes irregular earnings, more frequent unem-
ployment, and higher poverty risk (Carré 2015a; ILO 2015a, 2015b, 2016a, for 
reviews). They are associated with ILO- defined Decent Work deficits.
 There is some recognition that the changes discussed above result in work 
arrangements that meet the definition of informal employment. For example, 
Eurostat (the European Statistical Office) now provides information about the 
informal sector (i.e., employment in informal enterprises) on its website. There-
fore, it has become possible and necessary to measure informal employment in 
developed countries. The ILO has done so with its first- ever harmonised cross- 
national estimates (ILO 2018a) which have extended the statistical measurement 
of informal employment significantly (see Vanek, Chapter 3, in this volume).
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Value of cross- national measure of informal employment
The value of measuring informal employment cross- nationally is that it enables 
the portrayal of global employment changes whereas, until recently, there was a 
disjuncture in labour market analyses between developed and developing coun-
tries. Also, for policy purposes, it is critical to show the magnitude of workers in 
informal employment and the nature and degree of impacts, in particular, the 
lack of employment- related social protection or absence of labour standards 
coverage.3 Furthermore, for international policy debates on the quality of 
employment and its economic and social consequences and for their national 
policy implications, it is important to have an accurate cross- national statistical 
picture, something that has not been possible without a nearly unsurmountable 
task of reconciling detailed labour force statistics across all countries. The cross- 
national measurement of informal employment in no way detracts from detailed 
statistics on diverse work arrangements conducted at the national level. Data on 
informal employment complement these national statistics that are specific to 
each country’s institutional context.
 The cross- national measurement of informal employment also can draw atten-
tion to parallel patterns across types of economies which may not otherwise be 
seen as salient. For example, non- standard wage employment in formal sector 
firms, a pattern well established in OECD countries since the 1980s has spread; 
large formal sector firms in middle- and low- income countries have followed 
suit in the last decade, including in India, Mexico and South Africa.
Progress in international statistics: the relevance for the 
measurement of informal employment
This chapter now turns to specific areas of progress in international statistics that 
have taken place to take account of employment changes across countries and to 
inform policy discussions at the global, national and local levels. This has been 
achieved through the revision of the International Classification of Status in 
Employment (ICSE-93) that was approved by the 20th International Conference 
of Labour Statisticians (ILO 2018b). Among a number of significant structural 
changes, the new classification, ICSE- 18, most notably addresses two areas dis-
cussed in the preceding section: (1) ambiguous work arrangements (between 
wage and self- employment); and (2) changes in wage employment, both of 
which are relevant for developed as well as developing countries.
The new ICSE and its implications for classifying work arrangements 
between wage and self- employment
One of the main purposes of the revision of ICSE – but by far not its sole 
purpose – was to address the difficulty of measuring workers in ambiguous work 
arrangements. Workers in an (in)dependent contractor employment situation – 
“in between” dependent and independent employment – are found in labour 
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markets across high-, middle- and low- income countries. Industrial outworkers 
and homeworkers are found across all country- income groups, but predomi-
nantly in developing countries. Employment mediated through digital platforms 
tends to be organised on a contractor model across all types of economies. For 
example, around the world, digitally intermediated service provision – ride- 
sharing or food delivery work, for example – has been organised on a contractor 
(self- employment) model. So far, it has proved difficult to classify such work 
arrangements, both in developed as well as developing countries.
 The new classification, ICSE- 18, departs significantly from the overarching 
high- level divide used in classification systems until now – that between paid/
wage employment (dependent) and self- employment (independent) – and which 
has governed the existing classification system, ICSE- 93. This dichotomy is 
based on two dimensions: “Authority” or autonomy in decision- making 
regarding the activities of the economic unit; and “Risk” or financial investment 
in the operation.
 The limitation of the existing ICSE- 93 was that it conflated both dimensions: 
the autonomy in economic decision- making and control had been expected to 
counterbalance the risk or investment involved. In practice, this conflation of 
both criteria resulted in the assumption that a worker who is paid based on end- 
product (in “work for profit”)4 is automatically independent/self- employed while 
a worker receiving a wage is dependent/employee (ILO 2013b). In reality, 
workers now are often paid based on an end- product but also bear risks similar 
to those faced by independent workers (income at risk and responsibility for own 
social protection), yet have little or no autonomy in decision- making regarding 
their operation or work performance, or do not control their access to the market.
 Instead, the new ICSE- 18 includes two – complementary – classification hier-
archies: ICSE- A based on Authority (or autonomy) to identify and classify 
Dependent and Independent workers; and ICSE- R based on Risk to classify 
workers in employment for pay and those in employment for profit. It represents 
a break from the Employee/Self- employed divide, and from a single classifica-
tion hierarchy. Both classification hierarchies are necessary for labour force sta-
tistics; and ICSE- R is needed for the System of National Accounts.
 The new classification system enables proper accounting and visibility of 
workers in ambiguous situations, such as those described above and who will 
be classified as “Dependent Contractors”, a new sub- category. On the Auto-
nomy hierarchy, dependent contractors are classified in the Dependent workers 
group, along with Employees and Contributing Family Workers. On the Risk 
(and investment) hierarchy, they are classified as in employment for profit, 
along with Employers and independent own- account workers in household 
market enterprises. Interestingly, developing country representatives in ILO 
regional consultations welcomed the new Dependent Contractor category and 
supported its adoption. They had found it difficult to classify many of the 
workers in their countries as either independent self- employed or dependent 
wage employed.
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New category of Dependent Contractors
The new classification, ICSE- 18, provides an international statistical definition 
for dependent contractors. It is summarised in the following way. Dependent 
contractors are workers employed for profit:
• who have contractual arrangements of a commercial nature to provide goods 
or services for or through another economic unit;
• who are not employees of that economic unit;
• who are dependent on another entity that exercises control over their pro-
ductive activities and directly benefits from the work performed by them.
a Their dependency may be of an operational nature or economic nature such 
as through control over:
• access to the market;
• the price for the goods produced or services provided;
• or access to raw materials or capital items.
b The economic unit on which they depend:
• benefits from a share of sales produced by the dependent contractor; 
and/or
• benefits from reduced labour costs when the work performed by 
dependent contractors may otherwise be performed by its employees.
c The activity of the dependent contractor would potentially be at risk in the 
event of termination of the contractual relationship with that economic unit.5
Following this 2018 revision, guidelines on how to measure dependent contrac-
tors are being developed by the ILO in consultation with National Statistical 
Offices (NSOs), a process that is expected to take a few years. As noted earlier, 
dependent contractor work arrangements exist across all types of economies. Ini-
tially used in selected industries like publishing in developed countries, 
dependent contractors can now be found in other sectors and occupations. Indus-
trial outworkers and homeworkers in developing countries who are doing piece 
rate work for orders issued by a garment sub- contractor in a global supply chain 
also are candidates for classification as dependent contractors. These workers are 
not small- scale independent operators, though they own the workplace and 
equipment and pay for electricity. To receive work orders through the produc-
tion chains of larger companies, they depend on the sub- contractor for instruc-
tions, for supplies, and take a price set by the ordering company. So- called 
freelance workers and platform intermediated workers/“gig workers” likely 
would also be classified as dependent contractors.
 Developing measurement guidelines for the Dependent Contractor category is 
challenging due to the large variety of circumstances and relationships that yield 
dependency for a worker. Initial testing in Denmark and Chile indicate that 
measurement guidelines may need to allow for some variation in survey ques-
tions across types of economies and possibly industrial sector.6
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Employee sub- categories
Improvements provided by ICSE- 18 also include, within the Employee category, 
four detailed sub- categories: permanent employees, paid apprentices/trainees/
interns, fixed- term employees and short- term/casual employees. The latter two 
sub- categories cover the prevailing non- standard forms of employment for 
employees. In combination with variables on social protection coverage, data on 
these categories will provide the share of workers in non- standard wage employ-
ment that also are informal.
Further improving the reporting of informal employment
The ICSE- 18 also provides cross- cutting variables, several of which have signi-
ficant relevance for informal employment. The “Type of workplace/Place of 
work” variable is identified as “essential” for the compilation of coherent statis-
tics on work relationships and for the identification of important groups of 
interest. It will be useful for classifying many of the occupations of informal 
workers, including home- based workers, street vendors and market traders.
 Also, the 20th ICLS resolution has clarified the definition for domestic 
workers. This category of workers is the subject of an ILO Convention (C 189). 
In a number of countries, domestic workers have been excluded from main 
labour standards regulation and often employment- related social protection. 
Therefore, it is important for countries to have an international definition for this 
category of workers and to monitor the number and work arrangements of these 
workers.
Conclusion
Significant changes in employment patterns across developed, emerging and 
developing economies have occurred in the past two decades. Employment 
arrangements have become more diverse, and many arrangements sever workers 
from access to social protection through work. These trends raise the importance 
of the application of the definition of informal employment across all economies, 
developed as well as emerging and developing ones. Cross- national measure-
ment is needed to keep track of the consequences of informal employment for 
workers and to inform global policy discussions. Progress has been made in 
international statistics to better measure employment changes. This chapter has 
highlighted key changes that enable a more accurate representation of employ-
ment patterns and better reporting of informal employment across countries. 
Official statistics have been better at classifying formal workers than informal 
workers, though the latter dominate employment in low- income countries. The 
changes included in ICSE- 18 will help represent informal workers more accu-
rately across all country income groups.
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Notes
1 Employees in such arrangements may also lack coverage under labour standards.
2 So far, this pattern is not considered fraud under the laws of most countries and the 
ambiguity has not been addressed with a regulatory change.
3 A relevant policy concern is that if countries tie access to key features of social protec-
tion to a form of dependent work/employment, how should they think about connecting 
(or reconnecting) workers to social protection who are severed from it due to features 
of their work arrangement, as, for example, when it is not clear whether there is a direct 
employer?
4 Statistical classification term meaning that the basis for pay is the end product rather 
than effort spent and that the worker directly bears financial risk, or benefits, from the 
results of the enterprise, be it a one- person enterprise.
5 ILO, “The 20th ICLS Resolution Concerning Work Relationships,” presentation by M. 
Frosch at the International Statistics Institute, World Statistics Congress, IPS- 320, 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 18–23 August 2019.
6 Papers for International Statistics Institute, World Statistics Congress, IPS- 320, Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia, 18–23 August 2019.
5 The measurement of informal 
employment in Mexico
Rodrigo Negrete
Mexico has made the measurement of informal employment and employment in 
the informal sector a high priority for many years. The priority placed on informal 
employment is rooted in the country’s economy, legal culture and demography. 
Mexico is a heterogeneous country, with a diverse economy. A vigorous manufac-
turing export sector (automobile, air and space industries) coexists alongside sub-
sistence agriculture, street vendors, cottage industries and similar small- scale 
production. Moreover, in the formal manufacturing sector, the wave of globalisa-
tion in the 1990s created pressures to make intra- industry labour relationships as 
flexible as possible and in doing so promoted informal arrangements.
 Mexico historically has had problems in implementing the rule of law. On the 
one hand, this means the state has a rather weak fiscal/tax base; on the other, vast 
numbers of the population do not have effective labour and social rights though 
these are enshrined in the Constitution. Further, many commercial transactions 
do not benefit from contractual guarantees.
 Demographically, Mexico has a rapidly ageing population. Many have no 
pension and families are no longer large or live close enough to serve as a de 
facto social protection net. For these reasons, the standard indicators of employ-
ment and unemployment are not sufficient to serve as leading labour indicators 
or key signals to understand the changes in Mexico’s labour market. Since 2012, 
Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI, in its Spanish 
acronym) has supplemented the standard economic indicators with data on 
informal employment and employment in the informal sector. As with the 
standard indicators, the indicators related to informal employment distinguish 
urban and rural areas and state- regional levels and are disseminated on a quar-
terly basis. This chapter describes the strategy adopted by Mexico to measure 
informality, provides statistical data on its informal economy and reports on the 
policy measures and reforms the data have triggered to improve the situation of 
the employed and the Mexican economy.
The conceptual framework
The 15th and the 17th International Conferences of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) 
set a classification framework which identifies the part of employment that is 
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formal, the part that is informal and the modalities of the latter case to achieve 
a holistic classification of employment.1 The underlying logic of the frame-
work is to apply operational criteria based on the status in employment 
classification:
• Independent (self- employed) workers are classified under an enterprise- 
based approach (informal sector).
• Dependent workers (either de jure or de facto) are classified based on their 
current employment relationship, i.e., whether it provides them (in law or in 
practice) basic or standard social benefit and social protection.
While not explicit in the 17th or the 19th ICLS recommendations, the concepts 
of the informal sector and informal employment broadly encompass those 
forms of labour market arrangements where risks are personal and not buffered 
by any institutional protection. Therefore, the concepts point to situations 
where their employment does not provide persons with the basic or standard 
guarantees relating to either their commercial transactions or employment 
relationships.
 While informality is a diverse phenomenon, the final outcome or situation 
should not be confused with whatever causes it, for example, breaking the law, 
not knowing the law, blind spots in the law, ways to circumvent the law, new 
realities not yet covered in law, etc. Another essential point is that informality is 
a phenomenon or set of practices that in principle is widespread throughout the 
economy rather than in only a part of it.
Mexico’s measurement approach: the labour force survey
The Mexico labour force survey (ENOE; Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y 
Empleo) provides data for the country’s key indicators on informal employment, 
comprising both the individual and the enterprise levels of data.2 The design of 
this survey has three key elements to produce these data:
• sample size of 120,000 dwellings (out of a total 30 million in the country);
• quarterly collection and reporting of data;
• special design (section 4) which includes questions on characteristics of the 
economic unit in which the respondent is working.
There are numerous strengths to this approach:
• Provides comprehensive data on informal employment and employment in 
the informal sector, by quarter.
• Yields statistical series for both short- term and structural analysis.
• Facilitates contrast with formal employment
• Provides the specific demographic context of the individual as well as the 
household.
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• Supplies the labour matrix input needed by national accountants to calculate 
the size of the informal economy (share of gross domestic product, GDP) on 
an annual basis.
• Eliminates the need for additional costs in collecting and disseminating data 
available at the national level (including rural areas) as well as state (provin-
cial) levels.
However, there are also weaknesses in the approach. It is easier to identify the 
size of informal employment than the size of one of its components, the informal 
sector. The measurement of the informal sector still remains challenging. In the 
case of proxy respondents, the person may not know or answer accurately ques-
tions on the characteristics of the economic unit. Moreover, the industry struc-
ture of the informal sector, in particular at certain levels of disaggregation 
(beyond the two- digit level) may not be accurate since the survey sample was 
not designed to take the industry classification into account.
Statistics on the informal economy in Mexico
Table 5.1 presents a comprehensive overview of employment in Mexico and is 
reported quarterly on the INEGI website (INEGI, n.d.). The employed popula-
tion in Mexico is approximately 53.8 million workers with around 30.5 million 
(57 per cent) corresponding to informal employment and 23.3 million (43 per 
cent) to formal employment. Dependent wage/salary workers, comprising around 
35 million of the employed, are the largest status category. Of these, around 
15 million are informal and 20 million are formal (so for this subset, proportions 
are the other way round, 43 per cent informal and 57 per cent formal). The 
second largest category are own- account workers at around 12 million, most of 
whom (more than 10 million) are informally employed. Among the auxiliary 
non- paid workers, 97 per cent are contributing family workers and the remaining 
3 per cent are non- family apprentices.3
 Data are also provided on the sector composition of employment (Figure 5.1). 
Employment in (1) the informal sector is the largest component at 14.7 million, 
followed by (2) informal employment insertion in formal/registered economic 
units (7.5 million); (3) 5.9 million employed informally in agriculture; and 
(4) 2.2 million more in paid domestic service who are employed by private 
households. What in the following is called informality outside the informal 
sector encompasses these last three categories (2, 3 and 4).
 One of the uses of the ENOE is to supply the national account system with 
the labour base required to achieve completeness and infer the contribution of 
the informal economy to GDP. Figure 5.2 shows the informal economy has con-
tributed about one quarter of the total GDP of the country with a slight decrease 
from around 23.7 per cent of GDP in 2003 and a peak in 2009 as result of the 
global crisis to around 22.7 per cent in 2017. One of the unique features of 
the Mexico estimates is the calculation of not only the contribution made by the 
informal sector but also the contribution of informal employment outside the 
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Outside the informal sector
Subtotal Non-farm Farm
1. Employment by 53785257 23317416 30467841 14745649 15722192 9781907 5940285
1.1 Age groups 53785257 23317416 30467841 14745649 15722192 9781907 5940285
From 15 to 24 years 8923072 2980732 5942340 2266845 3675495 2500062 1175433
From 25 to 44 25440231 12465637 12974594 6340715 6633879 4473857 2160022
From 45 to 64 16519231 7226223 9293008 5001772 4291236 2419328 1871908
65 years on 2851894 624844 2227050 1122131 1104919 376353 728566
Not specified 50829 19980 30849 14186 16663 12307 4356
1.2 Educational attainment 53785257 23317416 30467841 14745649 15722192 9781907 5940285
Incomplete grammar school 5807918 720227 5087691 2195824 2891867 867283 2024 584
Grammar school completed 9336003 2088300 7247703 3625752 3621951 1846288 1775663
Junior high school 18352232 7407905 10944327 5683723 5260604 3669375 1591229
High school and college 20238184 13075203 7162981 3231647 3931334 3385322 546012
Not specified 50920 25781 25139 8703 16436 13639 2797
1.3 Status in employment 53785257 23317416 30467841 14745649 15722192 9781907 5940285
Paid dependent workers 36827208 20192753 16634455 4850865 11783590 9213894 2569696
Salary paid 34697486 19984387 14713099 4075538 10637561 8255584 2381977
Non-salary paid modalities 2129722 208366 1921356 775327 1146029 958310 187719
Employers 2567512 1527077 1040435 1040435 – – –
Own-account workers 12014579 1597586 10416993 7874667 2542326 – 2542326
Auxiliary non-paid workers 2375958 – 2375958 979682 1396276 568013 828263
Not specified – – – – – – –
1.4 Industry 53785257 23317416 30467841 14745649 15722192 9781907 5940285
Primary activities 6717753 777468 5940285 – 5940285 – 5940285
Agriculture, fishing and husbandry 6717753 777468 5940285 – 5940285 – 5940285
Secondary 13786824 6874072 6912752 5362727 1550025 1550025 –
Mining and electricity 417200 370866 46334 18473 27861 27861 –
Manufacturing 8903071 5495395 3407676 2208470 1199206 1199206 –
Construction 4466553 1007811 3458742 3135784 322958 322958 –
Tertiary 32960001 15624809 17335192 9379200 7955992 7955992 –
Trade 10109798 4116344 5993454 4185683 1807771 1807771 –
Hotels, restaurants and food services  
  stalls
4018289 1197099 2821190 1967905 853285 853285 –
Transport and communications 2799865 1349381 1450484 1028531 421953 421953 –
Financial and professional services 3844426 2612293 1232133 547237 684896 684896 –
Social services 4425435 3550083 875352 150035 725317 725317 –
Other services 5525234 985628 4539606 1499809 3039797 3039797 –
Government administrations and 
international offices
2236954 1813981 422973 – 422973 422973 –
Not specified 320679 41067 279612 3722 275890 275890 –
Source: INEGI, Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo.
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informal sector. The contribution of the informal sector has been somewhat 
lower than that of informal employment outside the informal sector. The contri-
bution of informal employment outside the informal sector to total GDP has 
oscillated mostly between 12.7 and 11.3 per cent.
 It is clear that informality is, above all, a structural feature of Mexico’s labour 
market; as such, sudden fluctuations in its share on total employment cannot be 
expected. However, as a consequence of the global crises in 2008 there was a 
shift towards a higher level of informal employment than before, as observed 
between 2009 and 2012. Actually, in the second decade of this century, the GDP 
growth rate in Mexico has not regained significantly, averaging a rather medi-
ocre 2.5 per cent between 2012 and 2017. However, a string of reforms had an 
































6.06 19.51 0.94 0.19 1.18 1.60 0.57 7.57 22.48
Agriculture 2.38 0.41 0.19 0.02 0.35 2.54 0.00 0.83 5.94 0.78
Subtotal 14.71 19.98 1.92 0.21 1.04 1.53 10.42 1.60 2.38 30.47 23.32
Total 34.70 2.13 2.57 12.01 2.38 53.79
Figure 5.1 The formal/informal labour matrix.
12.3 12.1 12.4 12.2 12.5 12.7 12.0 12.0 11.7 12.3 12.3 11.8 11.5 11.3 11.7
11.3 11.1 11.4 11.1 10.9 10.3 12.4 11.5 11.4 11.1 11.3 11.3 11.3 11.3 11.1
23.6 23.3 23.8 23.2 23.5 22.9 24.4 23.5 23.1 23.4 23.6 23.1 22.8 22.6 22.7
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Outside the Informal Sector Informal sector Informal economy
Figure 5.2  Contribution of Informal Economy (Total, Inside and Outside Informal 
Sector) to GDP.
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reform in 2012 that recognised diverse short- time/casual non- standard modali-
ties of labour engagements as legal (and thus entitled to basic social protection 
as workers) had an important impact. Then, in 2013, the federal government 
launched an initiative to commit governments down to a state level to register 
and regularise all supervised workers, including those not previously recognised 
as such. Next, in 2014, a fiscal reform was launched to give fiscal amnesty to 
economic units not so far registered before the income tax collector authority 
(SAT, the Mexican equivalent of the US Internal Revenue Service); specific pro-
visions were added in 2015 regarding micro- scale economic activities, extending 
the fiscal amnesty years in exchange for registration. All these reforms con-
tributed to a decrease in informal employment both within and outside the 
informal sector to the lowest levels in years and this in a context of slow eco-
nomic growth. It is worth mentioning that these reforms were a response to the 
statistics on informal employment that INEGI placed at the core of the public 
conversation with regard to the situation of both the labour force and the labour 
market in Mexico.
Future challenges
This chapter has shown that the concept of informal employment, and one of its 
components, the informal sector, are key indicators of the Mexican economy. 
For these indicators to continue to provide accurate and comprehensive informa-
tion on the economy, changes will need to be made in their measurement and 
tabulation to reflect changes in the economy and in statistical standards. For 
instance, the 19th ICLS and its adoption of the new framework on work statistics 
classify subsistence production as work, however, not necessarily as employ-
ment (ILO 2013c). Moreover the 20th ICLS and the resolution concerning statis-
tics on work relationships identify a new status category, namely dependent 
contractors, who are workers and formally independent, however, they are oper-
ating under the terms set by a third entity which directly benefits from the 
dependent contractor performance: a labour insertion favoured by the platform/
gig economy (ILO 2018b) and not contemplated before. The identification of 
these workers will also require changes in both data collection and classification 
as this group is not specifically covered in the informal employment framework 
based on the previous classification of status in employment, ICSE- 93 (see 
Figure 5.1). Doing so will create a tension between ways of understanding 
informality that are based on legal (de jure) criteria and those based on other (de 
facto) criteria. This is because categories such as dependent contractors can be 
registered as operators of one- person business (seemingly formal enterprise) 
while they are dependent and labour under vulnerable or disadvantaged employ-
ment arrangements. In particular, they are not entitled to unemployment benefits 
in most countries, nor to paid sick leave, so, like informal workers, the full 
burden of economic risk and contingency is on them.
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Notes
1 According to the international statistical standards adopted by the 15th ICLS, the 
informal sector consists of a subset of unincorporated enterprises (i.e., not constituted 
as separate legal entities independent of their owners) that also are not registered with a 
national government authority. In contrast to the focus on the production unit in the 
concept of the informal sector, the 17th ICLS guidelines identify a broader concept of 
informal employment in which the job or worker is the unit of observation. Informal 
employment refers to an employment relationship that is not, in law or in practice, 
subject to national labour legislation, income taxation, social protection or entitlement 
to certain employment benefits. For the full definitions see ILO, Report of the Fifteenth 
International Conference of Labour Statisticians (Geneva: ILO, 19–28 January 1993) 
and ILO, Report of the Seventeenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians 
(Geneva: ILO, 24 November–3 December 2003).
2 For a full description of the survey and the measurement of informal employment, see 
ILO (2013a).
3 The 19th ICLS does not consider non- paid apprentices as employed. Also, all of the 
Mexican data produced so far pre- dates the 19 ICLS framework, so also includes the 
whole of subsistence agriculture (see Future Challenges section).
6 WIEGO research on informal 
employment
Key methods, variables and findings
Martha Chen
Through our statistical and research work, WIEGO (Women in Informal 
Employment: Globalizing and Organizing) seeks to inform theoretical, research 
and policy debates on the informal economy and to provide organisations of 
informal workers, and their representative leaders, with the necessary evidence 
to effectively demand the legal and policy reforms they need to secure and 
enhance their livelihood activities. In addition to generating supportive data and 
research, WIEGO promotes policy dialogues between informal worker leaders 
and dominant stakeholders, including governments, corporations and inter-
national development agencies.
 In so doing, WIEGO’s task is to present the necessary information:
• statistical data and research findings on the size and contribution of the 
informal economy to attract the attention of policy- makers and other key 
stakeholders;
• statistical data and research findings on the composition and characteristics 
of different segments of the informal workforce to inform policy- making;
• documentation and dissemination of good policies and practices which 
protect and/or promote informal livelihoods to inspire innovative thinking 
about policy design.
This chapter on WIEGO’s research work complements the chapters in this 
volume by Joann Vanek (Chapter 3) and Françoise Carré (Chapter 4) on 
WIEGO’s statistical work. After a brief introduction to WIEGO’s approach to 
field research, the chapter discusses four key variables in the composition of 
informal employment and illustrates, based on WIEGO field research findings, 
how these variables intersect with the wider institutional environment to deter-
mine outcomes for different segments of informal employment and different 
groups of informal workers.
WIEGO field research
In addition to analysing statistical data as they become available and analysing/
documenting promising policies and practices, WIEGO engages in field research 
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on different topics of concern to informal workers, including: economic trends; 
value chain dynamics; urban policies; social protection (including health, occu-
pational health and safety and childcare); laws and regulations; organisation and 
representation; and technology.
 To inform the focus and design of our field research, WIEGO typically under-
takes three kinds of background research: (1) consultations with organisations of 
informal workers to determine what research topics or issues are most important 
to informal workers; (2) literature reviews to assess what is known and thought 
about how the research topic relates to informal workers; and (3) institutional 
mapping to identify key stakeholders and their relationship to/stance on the 
informal economy and the research topic.
 WIEGO’s field research on different topics typically involves participatory 
qualitative tools, a questionnaire survey and key informant interviews. The qual-
itative component of our research is based primarily on Participatory Informal 
Economy Appraisal (PIEA) – an innovative method designed to capture system-
atically the perceptions and understandings of informal workers, in their own 
words, in a focus group setting.1 This method was originally designed for a 
10-city study carried out in 2012 to interrogate what impacts three sectors of 
urban informal workers and their livelihoods, how they respond, and which insti-
tutions help or hinder. In that study, each city team2 conducted 15 focus groups 
of about five participants each per sector (Chen 2014a; Roever 2014; Dias and 
Samson 2016). Nine focus group tools – organised around the themes of sector 
characteristics, driving forces and responses, institutional environment, and con-
tributions of the sector – were used to generate data related to the conceptual 
framework. These PIEA methods have been adopted for subsequent field studies 
on health, occupational health and safety, technology and law as they related to 
informal workers. The results of the focus groups are recorded in reports of 
about 10–12 pages, immediately after each focus group is conducted. Ideally, the 
focus group data is then coded to facilitate analysis on different topics.
 The design of the questionnaire survey is informed by our background 
research and, if time allows, by the findings of our qualitative research. The 
sample for our questionnaire surveys typically includes the focus group particip-
ants plus an equal number from a purposive sample. After the quantitative and/
or qualitative research is finished, and preliminary findings are specified, we 
conduct interviews with key informants from organisations of informal workers, 
government and other stakeholders to help interpret the field research findings.
 In addition to these generic field research methods, WIEGO has developed an 
Informal Economy Budget Analysis (IEBA) methodology which examines how 
government budgets address the needs and interests of different groups of 
informal workers and explores what opportunities exist for informal workers (or 
their representatives) to participate at different stages of the budget process. The 
IEBA methodology was first developed and tested in South Africa as part of a 
policy process to address the informal economy in Durban. WIEGO then com-
missioned an analysis of government budgets from an informal economy per-
spective in four cities: Belo Horizonte in Brazil, Lahore in Pakistan, Metropolitan 
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Lima in Peru, and Quezon City in the Philippines. More recently, WIEGO has 
added the interrogation of government revenue in using the methodology in 
Accra, Ghana, and Monrovia, Liberia.
 Finally, WIEGO is committed to co- producing knowledge with local organi-
sations of informal workers and to featuring the voice and expertise of informal 
workers in our research reports (Ogando and Harvey 2019). In most of our field 
research studies, local organisations of informal workers are involved in the 
design of the research study, helping to set priority topics, identify testable hypo-
theses and specify appropriate questions, and in the implementation of the 
research, helping to establish contact with the sample population, conduct the 
research methods, analyse and interpret the findings. After a field study is com-
pleted, the WIEGO research team and the local organisation of informal workers 
which helped facilitate the research jointly analyse the findings to draw out the 
policy lessons and messages: both the lessons/messages specific to the different 
research sites and samples as well as the common lessons/messages across sites 
and samples (or sub- groups in the sample). These policy lessons and messages 
are published and disseminated together with the research findings. WIEGO then 
seeks to ensure all findings and policy lessons/messages are disseminated in 
user- friendly formats, ideally in local languages, for worker education and policy 
advocacy by organisations of informal workers.
Key variables
Through both our statistical and research work, WIEGO has found that four vari-
ables are key to measuring and understanding the dynamics of different seg-
ments of the informal workforce, namely, (1) the branch of economic activity; 
(2) the status in employment; (3) the place of work; and (cross- cutting these); (4) 
the sex of the worker. WIEGO has promoted the use of all four variables in the 
collection, tabulation and analysis of labour force data and in our field research.
Branch of economic activity
The branch of economic activity is defined by the products or services produced 
by the unit in which a person works or, in the case of own- account workers, the 
person her/himself. In standard usage in both statistics and economics, there are 
three main branches of economic activity – agriculture (and related sectors); 
manufacturing; and services (including trade). To fully understand the informal 
workforce, it is important to disaggregate “agriculture and related sectors” into 
agriculture, dairy and livestock production, fishery, hunting and forestry (includ-
ing collection/processing of non- timber forest products); “manufacturing” into 
various product lines (e.g., textiles and garments, artisan goods, shoes and sport-
ing goods, electronics and pharmaceuticals, automobiles and planes); and “ser-
vices” into separate sub- branches, including trade and construction as well as 
personal and information technology services.
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Status in employment
The two key dimensions of status in employment are: (1) the type/degree of eco-
nomic risk involved in the job; and (2) the type/degree of authority over the 
establishment or other workers. Until recently, the International Classification of 
Status in Employment (ICSE) included four main statuses: employer, employee, 
own- account worker, and contributing family worker. But in today’s globalised 
and digitalised economy there are increasing numbers of workers who do not fit 
neatly into one or another of these four statuses: notably, contracted or sub- 
contracted workers who absorb risks but do not have authority over the estab-
lishment or other workers or even the sale of products/services. The well- known 
new example is the Uber driver; the age- old example is the industrial outworker. 
With the ILO, as reported by Joann Vanek and Françoise Carré in Chapters 3 
and 4, WIEGO promoted the addition of a new status category – “dependent 
contractor” – which was added to the ICSE by the 20th International Conference 
of Labour Statisticians in 2018.
Place of work
Historically, labour force surveys did not routinely include a “place of work” 
question. This is because it was assumed that most workers worked in so- called 
“standard” workplaces – offices, factories, shops, hotels or restaurants – which 
belong to the employer. In 1998, at the second meeting of the International 
Expert Group on Statistics on Informal Employment (the Delhi Group), WIEGO 
made the case that the “place of work” is a key indicator for identifying and clas-
sifying informal workers. Increasingly, national statistical offices are including a 
“place of work” question in their labour force surveys which asks the respondent 
whether s/he works in one or more of the following places of work:
• Own dwelling/around own dwelling/structure attached to own dwelling
• Own enterprise/unit/office/shop (but separate from own dwelling)
• Employer’s office/shop/factory/fixed site (but not dwelling)
• Employer’s dwelling/structure attached to employer’s dwelling
• Construction site
• Street or other public space
• Market
• Mobile/on a vehicle
• Door- to-door
• Farm/agricultural field/pasture/forest/fishing site
• No fixed workplace
• Other
In our field research, WIEGO has interrogated the costs, risks and benefits of 
working in different places of work: including, own home, home of others, 
streets and markets, dumps or landfills.
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Sex and other demographic indicators
To understand the roles and status of women and men within the informal 
economy, it is critical to disaggregate all statistical data and research findings, 
including on the three indicators above, by sex. Cross- tabulation by age and educa-
tion as well as sex would be ideal. Other important demographic indicators, which 
WIEGO hopes to promote as part of our statistical work and research going 
forward, as data and resources allow, include whether informal workers are from 
minority racial, ethnic or caste groups; where they live, notably whether they live 
in informal settlements; and whether they are urban- rural or cross- border migrants.
Illustrative findings
Over the years, through different research projects, WIEGO and our local 
research partners have generated significant evidence on the importance of these 
indicators in both measuring and understanding the composition and characteris-
tics of informal employment.
Segmentation of the informal workforce by status in employment and sex
In 1998, with funding from the World Bank, WIEGO commissioned reviews of 
the existing literature and statistics on the links between informal employment, 
poverty and gender (Charmes 1998; Sethuraman 1998). To summarise the 
research findings and statistical data presented in these reviews, the following 
graphic (without the poverty risk arrow, Figure 6.1) was developed to illustrate 
Figure 6.1  WIEGO model of the informal economy: segmented by status in employment 
and sex with average earnings and poverty risk.
Source: Chen et al. (2016).
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gender segmentation and gender gaps in earnings within the informal economy 
by status in employment. Over the years, as data and resources have become 
available, WIEGO has tested the segmentation model captured in this iconic 
infographic with national data from multiple countries: the model has stood the 
test of time and space. In 2004, for the 2005 edition of Progress of the World’s 
Women 2005: Women, Work and Poverty (Chen et al. 2005), we commissioned 
an analysis of national data that captured the average earnings and risk of being 
from a poor household of workers in the different segments (what we call 
“poverty risk”).
Segmentation of the informal workforce by status in employment and 
sex: average earnings and risk of being from a poor household
What follows is a summary of some illustrative findings on how these key vari-
ables mediate the impact of city policies, laws and services on three groups of 
urban informal workers: home- based workers, street vendors and waste pickers.
Home- based workers: place of work and status in employment
By definition, home- based workers produce goods and services from in or 
around their own homes. Home- based workers face several risks associated with 
their homes doubling as workplaces. First, most live and work in homes which 
are small (often one or two rooms), which make it difficult to carry out produc-
tive work when other members of the household need the same space for other 
purposes. Second, most of their homes are of poor quality, made of inferior 
materials, poorly ventilated and subject to flooding or leaks. Third, most do not 
own their homes- cum-workplaces which discourages them from expanding or 
improving their homes. Fourth, many live and work in underserved informal set-
tlements with little or no basic infrastructure services, including water, sanitation 
and electricity. Without secure tenure, either de facto or de jure, and without 
basic infrastructure services, home- cum-workplaces are not productive work-
places (Chen 2014a).
 There are two basic types of home- based workers: those who work on their 
own (the self- employed) and those who work for others (mainly as industrial 
outworkers, called “homeworkers”). It is important to distinguish, conceptually 
and statistically for policy purposes, between the two categories. Both categories 
are impacted in the same way by city housing and zoning policies and by city 
services. But the two categories operate in different ways and with different con-
straints within markets. Most self- employed produce goods and services for 
local markets or customers, while homeworkers produce for value chains, either 
domestic or global. Lead firms in domestic and global value chains tend to 
download many costs and risks to homeworkers, including the costs of work-
space, equipment, energy and supplies and the risk of volatile or uncertain work 
orders, while paying them very low piece rates.
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Informal traders: place of work
In terms of place of work, there are two main groups of informal traders: those 
who vend on streets or in open- air markets (what organisations of street vendors, 
the Self- Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) and WIEGO call “natural 
markets”) and those who trade from built markets. Both groups face risks associ-
ated with city policies and practices but the type of risks vary significantly 
between the two groups. Street vendors face harassment, confiscation of goods, 
and evictions. Market traders face the risk of fires as well as other risks associ-
ated with little or no basic infrastructure services – water, sanitation, and electri-
city. Another key variable among street vendors, with a gendered outcome, is 
the type of product sold: the 2012 study found that those who sell perishables 
(more often women) are more likely than those who sell durables (more often 
men) to have their goods confiscated or simply “taken” by the police and local 
officials (Roever and Chen 2014).
Waste pickers: status in employment and place of work
Most waste pickers are own- account workers or members of cooperatives: a few 
(more so men than women) are employers; and a few (more so women than 
men) are employees. Those who work in dumps or landfills face the greatest 
occupational health risks while those who work in sorting warehouses face the 
least occupational health risks. Cooperatives of waste pickers have been able to 
negotiate with city governments for warehouses to sort and store waste and for 
contracts to collect and recycle waste. Also, waste pickers who are organised, 
and have ID cards, are less likely than other waste pickers to be harassed by 
local authorities or the general public.
Conclusion
Key findings: systemic costs and risks
The key finding of WIEGO’s field research is that informal workers face several 
systemic sources of costs and risks, including
• dominant narratives which stigmatise informal workers and their livelihood 
activities as being non- compliant (i.e., evading registration and taxation); 
having low productivity (i.e., being a drag on the economy); creating pres-
sure on public space; being associated with “crime and grime”.
• biased policies and laws which are often burdensome for or punitive 
towards informal units, activities and workers, including commercial laws 
which are biased towards formal firms with hired workers who operate in 
so- called “standard” workplaces (shops, factories, offices, hotels, restaur-
ants); and sector laws which are also biased towards formal firms and 
against informal activities; lack of access to public space (to pursue their 
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livelihood activities); lack of access to public services at their workplaces 
(basic infrastructure and transport services); lack of access to public 
procurement (i.e., right to bid for public contracts); lack of legal recognition 
and the right to representation in rule- setting and policy- making processes 
relating to their livelihoods.
Indicators of power: collective voice and representation
Two key variables, central to WIEGO’s research and work more generally, are 
not often captured in official statistics, namely, whether or not the informal 
worker is a member of an organisation of informal workers and whether organi-
sations of informal workers have effective representative voice (i.e., are invited 
to participate in policy- making and rule- setting processes). To illustrate the 
importance of these variables, consider Belo Horizonte, Brazil, where local 
organisations of waste pickers have a long- standing formal partnership with the 
municipal government. In the 2012 multi- city study, by WIEGO and local part-
ners, Belo Horizonte was the city in which the lowest percentage of waste 
pickers reported the following common problems faced by waste pickers every-
where: lack of access to waste, lack of access/high cost of infrastructure (notably 
workshops for sorting, storing and processing recyclable waste), unfair regula-
tions, and harassment (Dias 2011a; Dias and Samson 2016).
The way forward
WIEGO remains committed to the co- production of knowledge with organisa-
tions of informal workers through our research: to jointly interrogate the real- life 
problems of different groups of informal workers and the sources of the struc-
tural disadvantages and injustices they face; to privilege the voice and expertise 
of informal workers in our research reports; and to bridge the ground realities of 
informal workers and mainstream academic and policy debates. We are also 
committed to building theory inductively from grounded research.
 All members of WIEGO’s research team have other primary responsibilities 
at WIEGO, as coordinators and implementers of our programme activities. In 
other words, all of WIEGO’s researchers are activists. We do not separate our 
research and statistical work from our policy advocacy and movement building 
work: all are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. We seek to be rigorous in our 
research and statistics while also empowering informal workers and their 
organisations.
 In addition to co- producing knowledge with organisations of informal 
workers, WIEGO remains committed to promoting a more appropriate and 
favourable regulatory environment for informal workers: by increasing the voice 
of organisations of informal workers in policy dialogues and promoting their 
perspectives on different policy responses to the informal economy, including 
different approaches to formalisation. Going forward, WIEGO will draw on the 
conclusions to this volume and engage with the contributors to this volume, as 
WIEGO research: key methods and findings  75
well as organisations of informal workers, in setting our future research and 
policy agenda.
Notes
1 The qualitative methodology was developed collaboratively with Caroline Moser, 
Angélica Acosta and Irene Vance. It is an adaptation of earlier participatory methodol-
ogies developed by Robert Chambers and Caroline Moser with others.
2 Each city team consisted of two qualitative researchers, two quantitative researchers 
and a facilitator from a local organisation of informal workers. A member of WIEGO’s 
research team supported each city team through data analysis and report writing.

Part III
Economics and the informal 
economy






In this chapter I move away from the conventional labour regulation perspective 
on informality and instead take an enterprise taxation perspective. But the argu-
ments I make should be familiar from the points I have made in the labour regu-
lation arena (Kanbur 2017). I argue that the economic frameworks which 
dominate analytical and policy discourse in this area are flawed. They take too 
aggregated a view of informality and, as a result, come up with inappropriate 
policy analysis and prescriptions. This aggregative lens also reflects a certain 
mindset towards informality, which views it as a mass or a lump, and indeed a 
“problem” to be addressed. A disaggregated perspective is not only a better 
description of reality, it helps us break clear from mindsets that date back at least 
to colonial times.
 One of the great stylised facts of development is that richer countries raise a 
higher share of gross domestic product (GDP) as taxation. Thus, countries like 
Tanzania, Uganda, Pakistan, India are in the 10–20 per cent range, while in the 
US it exceeds 25 per cent, in Germany it exceeds 35 per cent, and in France and 
Sweden it is higher than 40 per cent (Ortiz- Ospina and Roser 2019). The low 
rates of tax revenues are in turn one explanation for the low rates of public goods 
provision, which hamper growth and inclusive development. While there are 
debates on whether shares of tax revenue in GDP approaching 50 per cent are 
excessive, there seems little disagreement that shares approaching 10 per cent 
are too low – even basic government functions may not have the resources to be 
performed, let alone enhance functions such as maintaining infrastructure or 
public employment schemes for security and poverty reduction.
 The connection between informality and low tax revenue is an easy one to 
make, and indeed has been made. For example, in its assessments of challenges 
to domestic resource mobilisation, the African Development Bank lists “the 
cross- cutting structural bottlenecks: high levels of informality, a lack of fiscal 
legitimacy and huge administrative capacity constraints” (Mubiru 2010: 4), and 
goes on to specify further the informality “challenge”: “Taxing the informal 
economy: Africa’s vast ‘informal economy’ – workers and companies operating 
outside the reach of the law or public administration – is a major obstacle to 
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broadening the tax base and collecting direct taxes” (ibid.: 4). And yet such a 
statement is too general and too diffuse. Among other issues, it does not distin-
guish between those activities which are outside the tax net by design, those 
which are legally outside the tax net by choice of the enterprise, and those which 
are illegally not paying tax. This often leads to a blanket characterisation of 
“informality”. Worse, it leads to suspicion and condemnation of all informal 
activity as tainted by illegality. What we need is a framework for defining and 
distinguishing between different types of informality in relation to taxation.
A framework
Kanbur and Keen (2014, 2015) have developed a framework in which enter-
prises can respond in different ways to a tax regime. They consider a situation in 
which some economic attribute of an enterprise, say, total sales (as for VAT), is 
taxed, but the tax only applied beyond a minimum threshold. Those below the 
threshold are outside the tax net by design – not through their own doing but by 
the decision of the tax authorities. What about those above? These enterprises 
can choose between fully complying with tax law, adjusting out of the tax net by 
lowering sales down to the tax threshold, or staying within the tax net but not 
complying with the tax law. Even for non- compliance, there is a range of options 
available. An enterprise could only declare its sales partially, or completely go 
off the books.
 All of these choices are seen in practice. For each enterprise, the choice 
depends on the size of its unconstrained sales, and the costs and benefits of each 
action, which in turn depend upon a range of parameters such as the strength of 
government enforcement, including the probability of getting caught and the 
magnitudes of fines if caught. Detailed analysis shows (Kanbur and Keen 2014) 
that enterprises can be classified into five categories of compliance (Table 7.1).
 The pure theory suggests a relationship between unconstrained sales and tax 
compliance category. Of course, the theory is only suggestive. It leaves out many 
relevant factors so that at best it predicts a direction of possible effect – of 
course, in reality, some small, medium and large enterprises may be ghosts, 
partial evaders or compliers. From the theory, the smallest enterprises, labelled 
here “Microenterprises”, are those whose size falls below the tax threshold. The 
largest enterprises are those who find it beneficial to comply with the tax law, 
Table 7.1 Categories of enterprise by tax compliance
Label Size by pre-tax sales and response to tax
Microenterprises Smallest of all; below the tax threshold so tax does not apply
Adjusters Next size up; adjust by lowering sales to just below the tax threshold
Ghosts Next size up; not pay any tax at all
Partial evaders Next size up; under-declare sales to evade taxation partially
Compliers Largest firms – full declaration of sales and remittance of tax
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hence they are labelled “Compliers”. This is because the probability of getting 
caught and the fines if caught, are sufficiently high that for them, honesty is the 
best policy. Enterprises that are just above the size of microenterprises find it 
worthwhile to reduce their sales below their natural size and to come in just 
below the tax threshold, thereby avoiding paying tax. What they lose through 
lower sales, they make up in taxes not paid. Note that these enterprises, labelled 
“Adjusters”, are not illegal, they are adjusting and avoiding tax, not evading it. 
However, the next two size categories up are indeed evading tax. The “Ghosts” 
are those who disappear from the tax books entirely and declare no sales whatso-
ever. The “Partial Evaders”, as the name suggests, are those who only declare 
part of their income. For them, the benefits of partial evasion outweigh the 
expected costs of getting caught. And so we come back up the sales ladder to the 
“Compliers” for whom the cost- benefit calculation goes in the other direction.
What is informality and what is the role of tax policy?
This framework can of course be extended and made much richer in structure. 
However, simple as it is, this framework allows us to capture the essence and 
logic of the impact of tax policy on enterprises. And it allows us to ask the ques-
tion: what is informality? In regard to taxation, it is clear what formality is in 
Table 7.1. It is those enterprises that fall within the tax net and comply. So 
informality is by definition the complement of this category – all the other enter-
prises that do not fall within it. But it is immediately seen that there are four such 
categories, two of which involve illegality, but the other two of which are per-
fectly legal. These categories each have particular economic characteristics 
because they are the outcomes of different cost- benefit calculations, involving 
different policy parameters.
 The analytical coarseness of a dichotomy between formal and informal can be 
seen by conducting a simple exercise. What is the effect of changing the tax 
threshold, let us say by lowering it to bring in even smaller enterprises into the 
tax net? As should be clear intuitively, and as is shown formally in Kanbur and 
Keen (2014), the tax threshold, which bites at low levels of sales, does not affect 
the decisions of large enterprises deciding between complying and not comply-
ing. That boundary depends on other policy parameters, such as resources put 
into enforcement or the magnitude of fines levied. The tax threshold itself does 
not affect formality as conventionally conceptualised and measured in taxation, 
namely, enterprises who fall in the tax net and who fully comply. It thus does 
not affect aggregate informality either.
 However, even though the tax threshold does not affect aggregate informality 
as conventionally measured, it nevertheless has real economic consequences, 
including for various sub- categories of informality. On the one hand, it will 
bring smaller enterprises into the tax net. But it will also affect incentives for 
larger enterprises to adjust below the tax net – those costs are now higher 
because sales have to be lower to get out of the tax net. The optimal tax thresh-
old taking into account these different repercussions is derived in Kanbur and 
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Keen (ibid.), but it has little to do with the aggregate level of informality (which, 
of course, is invariant to the tax threshold).
 The situation is even more complicated when, as in practice, there are effect-
ively multiple tax regimes. These can be actual tax regimes, for example, taxes 
on enterprise profit as well as a sales tax. Or they can be labour regulation 
regimes which act like tax regimes. Thus, for example, if an enterprise is 
required to register and bear the consequent costs, these costs are analogous to 
taxes in the cost- benefit calculation of enterprises. With multiple tax regimes, 
what is informality? Is formality compliance with all regimes, so that informality 
is non- compliance with any? Or is there an intermediate definition and, if so, 
what? These questions remain unanswered in the analytical literature.
 However, even more important than the difficulties that the disaggregated 
multiple tax regimes framework causes for analysis, is that it highlights a full 
range of taxes which small enterprises do in fact pay – many of these taxes being 
themselves under the radar of national level tax systems. For example, local 
taxes are paid by small vendors to local authorities. Further, a whole series of 
small and larger- scale bribes are paid to local officials by small operators merely 
to ply their trade when these official can cite some (perhaps long forgotten) regu-
lation. Thus, at the ground level, these small operators are not out of the tax net 
at all, no matter how it looks from a macro level perspective.
Aggregation, disaggregation and mindsets
Aggregation and disaggregation can be presented, as I have done so far, as prim-
arily an analytical issue. One should not, of course, pursue the reductio ad 
absurdum of full and complete disaggregation – a map of scale 1 to 1 is of no 
use to anybody. But there is such a thing as being too aggregative, and I have 
argued for the pitfalls of that perspective. However, aggregation and disaggrega-
tion are also to do with mindsets which have long framed the informality dis-
course, as I have argued in Kanbur (2014).
 The administrative and bureaucratic mindset on informality is perhaps best 
illustrated by the academic and colonial administrator Boeke (1953), whose writ-
ings I have interpreted as painting a mind picture of a wall between two parts of 
the colonial economy – one governed by rules and regulations of the colonists, 
and the other, the “native economy” following its own methods and structures 
outside these rules (Kanbur 2014). In this world- view, disaggregation and differ-
entiation within the native economy were not of great interest – much more 
important was the wide gulf between that and the “modern” economy of the col-
onists. And it was thought that as colonisation proceeded, the native structures 
would be brought into the “modern” fold. This aggregative mindset still persists 
among post- colonial governments, now as between the formal and the informal 
sector.
 The aggregative mindset in academic economics goes back at least to the 
two- sector development model of Lewis (1954), where one sector was 
“urban”/“industrial”/“high productivity”/“capitalist”, while the other was 
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“rural”/“agricultural”/“low productivity”/“traditional”. In this world- view, devel-
opment proceeds by the transfer of labour from the traditional to the capitalist 
sector. This perspective was followed in the 1970s by the highly influential 
 two- sector model of Harris and Todaro (1970), in which one sector was “formal” 
and regulated, and the other sector was “informal” and unregulated. In this per-
spective, the cause of informality was regulation, which led to lower employ-
ment in the regulated sector, with the displaced labour moving to the unregulated 
sector. The “answer” to this “problem” of informality was thus deregulation. In 
the late 1990s and 2000s, De Soto (2003) popularised another aggregative per-
spective, that the real distinction was between part of the economy where legal 
contracts held sway and could be enforced (“formal”) and where they could not 
(“informal”). The appropriate policy response was thus to extend the reach of 
the legal system into those parts of the economy where the government’s writ 
did not run. This is reminiscent of course of the modern taxation perspective – to 
extend tax regimes to cover those activities they do not currently cover.
 The key point, however, is that “informality” is not uniform – perhaps even to 
such an extent that the term informality itself may have limited analytical power, 
important though it remains in the broad policy discourse. Rather, we should 
take a disaggregated view, addressing different types of informality and their 
specific characteristics and needs, and fashion policy interventions tailored to the 
great variety of economic circumstances which fall under the broad label. The 
taxation and informality discourse stands as an excellent illustration of this 
dictum.
8 Informality and the dynamics of 
the structure of employment
James Heintz
A great deal of effort has gone into measuring informality, documenting working 
conditions, and understanding the constraints that informal workers face. Apart 
from broad trends, less attention has been paid to documenting how informal 
employment changes over time. One of the central policy debates centres on the 
need to transform informal employment to improve outcomes for working 
women and men. Is there a need for formalisation, what does it mean, and how 
might it be achieved? But discussions of formalisation typically view informal 
employment changing incrementally – moving specific individuals, jobs or 
enterprises closer to formality. One way of thinking about this process is to 
imagine a continuum of informality. Formalisation therefore requires making 
marginal changes to employment arrangements along this continuum to move 
existing forms of paid work towards greater formality.
 But does formalisation (or informalisation, the expansion of informal employ-
ment, for that matter) happen incrementally? Or do the important shifts in inform-
ality represent larger disruptions of the status quo – through structural 
transformations of the economy? In the 1950s, South Korea had a similar level of 
development, demographic structure, and patterns of employment as Kenya. Agri-
culture was a large sector, small- scale self- employment was common (i.e., there 
was a sizeable informal sector), and formal wage employment was relatively 
limited. In a matter of a few decades, this all changed. Formal wage employment 
expanded rapidly with the process of industrialisation. Informality declined, par-
ticularly informal self- employment. Informality eventually took on a different form 
and began to be associated with wage employment. Specifically, after the 1997 
East Asian economic crisis, the rapid increase in non- regular wage employment 
was a central concern – rather than the persistence or growth of an informal sector 
consisting of small- scale enterprises. These changes did not happen piecemeal, 
through the formalisation of individual employment arrangements. They occurred 
because of a structural transformation of the Korean economy. Kenya did not 
experience a similar structural shift. Informal self- employment in small, household 
enterprises and farms continues to characterise much of the employment in Kenya.
 The classic Kaldorian explanation of why employment is transformed during 
the process of development was based on the experience of industrialisation in 
high- income economies of the Global North and can be applied, to some extent, 
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to the newly industrialising economies in East Asia that experienced a similar 
transformation in the last decades of the twentieth century. This narrative of 
structural change goes something like this: Labour moves out of small- scale 
agriculture and into other sectors, most importantly manufacturing and other 
types of industrial production. Due to advances in production methods and tech-
nology, labour is more productive in these industrial sectors than in traditional 
agriculture. These productivity gains translate into economic growth, as an 
industrialising country is able to produce more goods and a more diverse array 
of products. As more labour moves out of traditional agricultural activities and 
into industrial production, the average productivity of the economy grows.
 Higher levels of labour productivity also support improvements in living stand-
ards. When incomes rise, households tend to spend a smaller share of their total 
income on food and start buying other things. People are able to purchase the 
manufactured goods produced, leading to further industrialisation. Demand for 
services also rises. This supports an expanding service sector and new employment 
opportunities. Within this narrative of industrialisation, the process of economic 
development is therefore associated with a transformation of the structure of 
employment, with labour moving out of agriculture and into industrial production 
and a growing service sector. The spatial distribution of labour also changes. The 
movement out of agriculture is associated with the urbanisation of the workforce.
 Industrial production is typically associated with economies of scale. When 
economies of scale exist, the average productivity of industrial activities 
increases as firms become larger and larger and as economies diversify, produc-
ing spill- over benefits from one sector to another. Workers increasingly 
specialise in specific tasks and focused activities. Team production can be more 
efficient than having each worker involved in all stages of the production 
process. Larger factories, with specialisation and joint production, yield rapid 
increases in productivity.
 Larger firms require larger workforces. How do these companies hire the 
labour they need? One option would be to treat workers as self- employed, inde-
pendent contractors and negotiate individual contracts with each worker, outlin-
ing the specific tasks that need to get done. Indeed, this was done in the putting 
out system of the early factories in Britain and in the US when the productive 
contribution of individual workers could be identified and joint, or team, produc-
tion was not well established. However, as production systems became more 
complex, constantly negotiating and re- negotiating individual contracts for an 
expanding workforce would have been costly and taken time. Plus, it adds a 
layer of uncertainty. What if the company cannot find the right person to do a 
task that is essential to production? An alternative solution is to hire workers as 
paid employees who show up every day and perform a standard set of tasks. As 
firms get larger, this employment arrangement is more efficient. The process of 
industrialisation, therefore, is associated with more of the workforce being 
employed as paid employees.
 The emergence of a wage labour force transformed the way societies, and 
economists, have come to think about labour markets. When wage labour is the 
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predominant way that paid employment is organised, the labour market can be 
thought of as operating though the interaction of labour demand (i.e., employers 
or firms hiring employees) and labour supply (i.e., wage workers looking for 
jobs that match their skills and experience).
 This pattern differs from that observed in economies with a large informal 
sector in which self- employment accounts for a large share of employment. For 
instance, three- quarters of all workers in Africa and two- thirds of all workers in 
South Asia are self- employed (ILO 2018a; Bonnet, Vanek and Chen 2019). 
Indeed, 44 per cent of all workers globally are self- employed, though the share 
of self- employment in total employment varies widely across countries (ibid.). 
For workers in self- employment, the distinction between labour demand and 
labour supply is blurred, and the standard model of a wage labour market does 
not apply. A different model for these self- employment-dominated labour 
markets is required – one that sees the demand for the labour of the self- 
employed coming, not from profit- maximising employers, but from the final 
demand for the services or goods that informal self- employed workers produce.
 When the countries of the Global North were industrialising, employees in 
factories often organised themselves to bargain for improvements in working 
conditions, either as unions or other types of worker organisations. Negotiations 
involved hours of work, safety concerns, wages, hiring and firing practices, and 
other aspects of overall working conditions. Collective action among workers 
results in the regulation of labour markets, setting minimum standards and basic 
levels of decency. These labour standards eventually found their way into 
national labour laws that spell out a range of social protections for working 
people. In other words, paid employment becomes formalised through a process 
of collective action linked to the transformation of these economies.
 For these reasons, the process of economic development has been 
accompanied by a far- reaching transformation of the structure of employment. 
To summarise, the stylised narrative – based on the historical trajectory of coun-
tries that have gone through, at least to some degree, a process of industrialisa-
tion – is as follows. There is a movement of labour out of agriculture and into 
industrial and service jobs. Many workers experience improvements in their 
standards of living. Working as paid employees replaces forms of self- 
employment as the dominant employment arrangement. And, as wage employ-
ment expands, these employment relationships become increasingly regulated 
and formalised through processes of collective action at various levels – the 
firm- level, the industry- level, and the national- level. Formalisation, therefore, 
has been a result of structural changes in economies.
 However, formal wage employment itself is subject to change and can become 
informalised, as discussed earlier in the case of Korea. Global integration and 
technological changes often redistribute power away from labour and towards 
capital, or away from employees and towards employers. These changes in the 
balance of power have been associated, in many cases, with a roll- back in worker 
protection and deregulation of labour markets. One outcome has been the infor-
malisation of wage employment in countries where wage employment dominates.
Informality and structure of employment  87
 Further advances in technology and the organisation of our economies will con-
tinue to shift transactions costs and redefine employment arrangements. One 
reason, but not the only reason, for the emergence of large- scale wage employment 
during a process of industrialisation is that organising employment relationships 
this way, as opposed to hundreds or thousands of individual contracting arrange-
ments with self- employed individuals, allows for specialisation and realisation of 
economies of scale. However, in recent years, the costs of contracting with indi-
vidual self- employed workers have fallen with the emergence of new technologies. 
Increasingly, large firms can mobilise the labour they need without entering into 
wage employment contracts. The employment model of Uber (and other parts of 
the “gig economy” and the global sourcing of “crowd work”) is a case in point. 
These practices may come to alter how labour markets evolve and the nature of 
future transformations in the structure of employment – with important implica-
tions for how we think about questions of informality and formality.
 Given the importance of structural change, as well as structural differences in 
labour markets, it is not surprising that there are different typologies for thinking 
about informality in developing and developed countries. Why is it difficult to 
come up with a unifying framework? Because the structures of the economies 
are different, and informality is not a continuous variable. For these reasons, 
trying to develop a unified framework without an appreciation of structural 
differences across countries’ economies is challenging and perhaps misguided.
 This points to an important area of research – understanding the relationship 
between informality and structural change. In this regard, the economic history 
of informality is important – but, with few exceptions, research in this area is 
largely missing (see Harriss- White in Chapter 2 and Breman in Chapter 1, for 
examples of such exceptions). It has a lot to contribute to our understanding of 
labour market structure and how it changes over time. In the nineteenth century, 
many western high- income countries had structures of employment with wide-
spread informality. It would be interesting to explore what these looked like and 
how this structure changed over time.1
 This discussion has important policy implications. The formalisation debate 
is flawed because it considers the path to formality to be an incremental one, 
based on individual enterprises or jobs and the idea that informality can be 
thought of as a simple continuum. There are research projects that try to docu-
ment how informal enterprises can move up – from very micro, to micro, to 
small, then medium- scale enterprises. But does this happen in isolation? The 
ability of one firm to formalise may depend on what is happening to other enter-
prises in the economy. We need more work in this area to truly understand the 
dynamics of informal employment.
Note
1 Examples of these processes from the US include Cobble and Vosko (2000) and Mont-
gomery (1980).
9 Old and new forms of informal 
employment
Uma Rani
Until recently, informal labour was seen as a “transitory phenomenon” which 
would decline with economic development. However, informal labour continues 
to persist as a major form of work arrangement in the Global South and it has 
become increasingly prevalent in the Global North as well and is a growing 
concern. This chapter makes an attempt to outline the trajectories of old and new 
forms of informal labour in the Global South and in the Global North using the 
most recent data available. It also makes an attempt to identify the factors that 
seem to be driving these forms of informal labour.
What do the data suggest?
In the Global South, traditional forms of informal labour continue to persist. In 
most of the countries, over half of all workers are informally employed as own- 
account workers, casual day labourers, contract workers, industrial outworkers, 
homeworkers, without a clear employer- employee relationship, and they do not 
receive any labour and social protection from their employers. Indeed, just under 
half of the global workforce, both men and women, are self- employed (ILO 
2018a; Bonnet, Vanek and Chen 2019). The past decade has seen some attempts 
at formalising the informal in the Global South but the approach and the results 
have been mixed, with some progress in some of the Latin American countries. 
Argentina, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Uruguay reduced 
informal employment by more than 10 percentage points between 2002 and 
2013. This was a result of the region’s economic growth, and the formalisation 
strategies of legislations and incentives that were provided to both the workers 
and their employers (ILO 2014).
 While in most of the Global South “informality” has always been the norm, 
today the trend is on the rise in the Global North, in the form of outsourcing, and 
flexible and temporary work. There has been an increasing trend of temporary 
employment (5.5 and 6.4 percentage points over the past two decades in the 
European Union and Canada) and part- time employment, which is involuntary 
in nature (two- fold increase in Spain and Slovakia over the past decade). Part- 
time work has not only grown in importance over the past decade but there has 
been diversification in its form, based on hours of work like “short part- time”, 
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“marginal part time” and “on- call work”. “On- call” work, including zero- hour 
contracts, has brought variability and unpredictability to work and hours and is 
more prevalent in the service sector (transport, public administration and health), 
construction and agriculture. On average, 2.5 per cent of employees had “on- 
call” work in Europe and the highest incidence was recorded in the Netherlands 
and Slovenia in 2004 (ILO 2016a).
 There has also been a rise in temporary agency work and other contractual 
relationships involving multiple parties over the past decades in the Global North 
and the largest markets for temporary work were the United States, Europe and 
Japan (ibid.). Similarly, since the 2008 global financial crisis, there has been a 
rise in “disguised employment” wherein employees are falsely classified as 
“independent” or “self- employed” and, therefore, do not enjoy their rights as an 
employee. In Slovenia, 3.6 per cent of the employed and in the US, about 8–13 
per cent of the workers in the construction sector are “falsely self- employed” 
(ibid.). Finally, the past decade has observed the growth of the “on- demand” or 
“gig” economy, wherein digital platforms mediate work between firms, indi-
vidual customers and a global or local pool of labour for a variety of tasks and 
services (crowd work platforms like AMT, Crowd Flower, Click Worker, 
UpWork, Microworkers; Task Rabbit; Uber; Zomato, domestic work apps such 
as Didi). These digital platforms can be classified as on- line web- based plat-
forms and local app- based platforms (Berg et al. 2018). The characteristics of 
these workers resemble that of dependent workers, however, they are classified 
as “independent contractors” or “self- employed” or “freelancers” which has been 
contested and led to labour disputes (Cherry 2016). Some of the recent attempts 
to estimate the size of the online gig economy show that in the European Union 
between 1 and 5 per cent of the adult population have participated in the on- line 
platform economy for a paid task (Forde et al. 2017). Similarly, a study of 14 
European countries shows that about 10 per cent of the adult population has pro-
vided labour services on platforms (Pesole et al. 2018).
 These new forms of labour in the Global North resemble the informal labour 
of the Global South. However, there is also a rise of such labour in the Global 
South, which is largely undertaken by educated labour forces working in call 
centres and on digital platforms from home, which distinguishes them from the 
traditional informal labour, who possessed low levels of skills and had lower 
levels of education. These new forms of work do not provide minimum wages, 
workers’ benefits, health insurance and pensions to workers. The tasks that these 
workers perform are quite varied and range from developing software architec-
ture, applications, and algorithms to developing databases, web development, or 
product design to microtasks such as data collection, categorisation, tagging, 
transcriptions and content moderation. Most of the microtasks are geared 
towards developing databases for big firms, which have the potential of being 
used for automation or promoting products and services (Rani and Furrer 2019). 
Some of the tasks, such as content moderation, screening for scenes of obscen-
ity, hate speech, war zone footage, abuse of children and of animals and more, 
have significant psychological impacts on the workers (Roberts 2016). Workers 
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in India and the Philippines undertake a substantial proportion of such work, 
either in business processing outsourcing (BPOs) or on digital labour platforms.
 The Global South has also observed a rise in informal work in formal firms, 
such as contractual and temporary work, which do not provide any protection to 
workers.
What are the factors that drive these forms of employment?
The development economists in the 1950s and 1960s were of the notion that the 
“traditional” or informal sector would disappear as development of industries 
would absorb the labour from this sector, based on the experience of Japan and 
some other European economies (Lewis 1954). However, the informal sector has 
not disappeared but instead has thrived in various forms since then and indeed it 
is part and parcel of the processes of industrialisation, development and 
globalisation.
 The growth of the informal sector in the 1980s was due to the reorganisation 
of production systems from Fordist mass production towards “flexible special-
isation” (Chen 2007; Piore and Sabel 1984). The dependence and interlinkages 
between the formal and informal sector, especially in the manufacturing process, 
helped to reduce the costs of formal manufacturing and distribution, thereby 
increasing the market competitiveness of formal firms (Castells and Portes 
1989). Further, one could argue that in reciprocation, the workers and enterprises 
in the informal sector were able to upgrade their skills and technology through 
these linkages and improve their quality, efficiency and productivity. However, 
this was not sufficient for them to grow and integrate into the formal sector.
 Further, increasing globalisation and pressures from it have also resulted in 
shifting the organisation strategies adopted by the firms, like sub- contracting and 
outsourcing. Due to global competition, firms hire core workers on informal 
work arrangements and outsource production and services to other small firms 
and countries. This has led to an increasing trend towards temporary, part- time 
and contract jobs, as well as industrial outwork, which has led to the erosion of 
income and benefits for the workers. Further, structural adjustment programmes 
in many parts of Africa, Asia and Central and Eastern European countries also 
resulted in the expansion of informal employment.
 The countries in the Global North, especially Europe, have over the past 
decades observed partial deregulation, wherein they not only have implemented 
reforms liberalising the use of fixed- term contracts but also have allowed the 
growth of temporary and short- term contracts and diversified forms of part- time 
work. Further, the decline of unionisation and the regulatory role of collective 
bargaining have also been major factors in the rise in such forms of work. In 
both the Global North and the Global South there are worker protection laws but 
these are not widely implemented and enforced.
 Technological developments and the rise of services have also led to increasing 
global integration in the past decades. A number of IT firms, including Amazon 
and Google, which used to perform most tasks in- house using permanent workers, 
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are now outsourcing jobs to call centres, small firms and crowd- work platforms as 
tasks can be completed at a rapid pace using a global pool of labour. This is con-
sidered to be a new business model, called the new Taylorist production process, 
and is increasingly gaining popularity globally, as it reduces transaction costs, 
fosters productivity and employs a global pool of the most educated labour force. 
The global marketplace for digital piecework allows bidding and competition for 
rates and this, by design, drives the value of labour to the lowest global bidder, 
which further leads to the commodification of labour. By using a global labour 
force, this business model does not allow the workers to organise, as workers are 
dispersed and also are competing for jobs or “gigs”: this is damaging working con-
ditions and leading to unfair labour arrangements. Technology, rather than elevat-
ing the workers of the world in the twenty- first century, is actually helping 
business to reconfigure it in a way that leads to “a globalized race to the bottom in 
search of cheaper, faster and more human material sources in order for businesses 
to compete in a globalized 24/7 networked marketplace” (Roberts 2016: 44).
 The recent global economic crisis has also brought economic uncertainty and, 
as a result, more workers have turned to informal self- employment and a number 
of enterprises have been adjusting through increases in temporary or casual 
work, on- call workers, and temporary reductions in working hours. Further, the 
new business model is said to be comprised of the “new augmented workforce”, 
which includes a small proportion of workers on formal contracts, and the 
remaining are temporary workers, on- call workers, and digital platform workers 
(Deloitte 2017). Such business models would increase the trends towards further 
informalisation. In addition, new trends are also emerging wherein multinational 
companies are using street vendors to sell their produce without providing them 
with any labour protection. These trends are likely to continue to grow and, in 
the process, hinder current efforts towards formalisation. Governments have an 
important role to play in regulating platforms. In this context, the role of social 
dialogue is of the utmost importance to ensure that workers are protected. There 
have been some efforts at the national level, but much more needs to be done at 
both the national and international levels to ensure decent work for all.
10 Tax and the informal economy
Lessons from South Africa
Imraan Valodia and David Francis
The relationship between the informal economy and the tax system is an 
important, but under- researched, policy issue. While tax reforms often look at 
ways to bring the informal economy within the tax system, there are some 
important areas which have not received as much attention, beyond this preoccu-
pation with bringing the informal economy into the tax net. Using illustrative 
cases from South Africa, which are applicable in other developing countries, we 
argue that there are a number of important conceptual, methodological and prac-
tical issues that should be considered. We are concerned, here, with four of 
these. The first is how we conceptualise and measure the informal economy from 
an economic policy perspective. Second, we are interested in who falls inside the 
tax net and who does not, and what the implications are, both for our under-
standing of informality, and to create an effective tax policy. Third, we look at 
the implications for competitiveness of businesses in the informal sector who are 
not registered for value added tax (VAT), increasingly the most important form 
of taxation in developing countries. Finally, we examine the impact of the 
attempt by some states, through the imposition of a presumptive tax, to draw 
those in the informal economy into the tax system, and the problems arising 
from this approach.
Tax and the informal economy
The tax system and the informal economy are closely related. Indeed, by some 
conceptions, the informal economy is defined precisely by the economic activity 
that falls outside the tax system. In many economic surveys, whether or not a 
respondent pays tax is often used as a proxy for informality (Gatti and Honorati 
2008; Cichello and Rogan 2017). However, there are several problems with this. 
The first is that it does not identify workers performing precarious informal work 
within the formal sector. Indeed, for South Africa, the International Labour 
Organization (ILO and WIEGO 2013) finds that almost half of informal workers 
are employed within the formal sector itself. Research in South Africa shows 
that using the lack of tax registration as a proxy for informality also has the 
opposite problem in that it incorrectly identifies formal workers as informal 
(Devey, Skinner and Valodia 2006). In South Africa, and in many other countries, 
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employers deduct income tax from workers’ incomes and pay this over to the tax 
authorities through Pay- As-You- Earn (PAYE) systems. In such cases, many 
respondents in household surveys are unaware of their own tax status and that of 
their employers. Indeed, when we compare the proportion of respondents who 
say they do not pay tax, it is far higher than the proportion of respondents who 
report working in occupations we would expect to be largely informal, such as 
livestock herding and informal selling. As we argue above, the relationship 
between tax and informality is not at all clear- cut, and we remain sceptical about 
the use of tax as a proxy for informality.
 Using an enterprise’s tax status to define informality for it and its workers is 
clearly inexact and is an inappropriate proxy for defining informality. However, 
it does draw our attention to our understanding of the dynamics between the tax 
system and the informal economy. If we assume that, as a general rule, most of 
those engaging in informal business fall outside the tax net, this has important 
implications for how we understand the role of the tax system in achieving 
policy outcomes.
The limits of the tax system
People work in informal employment for a number of reasons: some take up 
informal employment, on a paid basis, because there are either insufficient jobs 
in the formal sector, or their skills and education preclude them from a formal 
job. Others, work in self- employment in small- scale enterprises, most commonly 
in the retail and services sector. There is also an argument in the informal 
economy literature that business and individuals may choose to operate inform-
ally in order to escape the burden of the tax system. In reality, there is very little 
empirical evidence to support this argument, and it is important to note that there 
are many reasons why an individual or a business may be informal – most of 
these have to do with poverty, and with the structure of the economy. In South 
Africa, structural barriers such as high entry costs, and high levels of industrial 
concentration mean that there is often no real choice between operating in the 
formal or the informal sector, with many precarious workers and self- employed 
workers having no option but to work informally, though, of course, there are 
exceptions. Under this conception of informality, punitive policy responses 
which aim to drive workers into the formal sector are not appropriate.
 Tax policy is also used to provide relief to both business and individuals. This 
can be in the form of tax incentives, tax credits, or tax relief. Those who are not 
part of the tax system are not eligible to receive these benefits. A good example 
of this is the recent rise in the rate of VAT in South Africa. The South African 
government raised the VAT rate by 1 percentage point, from 14 per cent to 15 
per cent, in April 2018 in order to bolster government finances. VAT is an effi-
cient way to raise revenue and its absolute burden falls largely on the rich, since 
they are the largest consumers of goods and services. Its relative burden, 
however, falls disproportionately on the poor, because the poor spend a larger 
proportion of their incomes on basic expenses. VAT, then, is regressive and 
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requires complementary policies to alleviate its regressive effects. Zero- rating 
can mitigate the regressive effects of VAT, but it has its limits, particularly for 
addressing inequality. This is because there are very few goods that are con-
sumed disproportionately by the poor and are thus appropriate for zero- rating. 
Furthermore, there are some important goods, such as sanitary products, which 
the poor are unable to afford, regardless of whether or not they are zero- rated.
 One of the best ways to address the regressive effects of VAT is through the 
provision of some form of tax credit to poor citizens or residents; in many ways, 
this is more equitable than a system of zero- rating which disproportionately 
benefits the rich in absolute terms (because they spend more in absolute terms, 
they receive a greater tax saving). However, if the poor are not in the tax system, 
benefitting from a tax credit is impossible. The conundrum presented by this 
example forces us to rethink the assumption that informality arises out of a 
choice to avoid regulation and taxation. Instead, because they are informal and 
outside the purview of the tax system, informal workers are sometimes unable to 
benefit from transfers and credits that are made through the tax system, usually 
to address poverty.
Value added tax: a problem for informal retailers
The VAT system in South Africa, and in many other developing countries, raises 
a particular issue for informal retailers, by far the largest proportion of workers 
in the informal economy, accounting for 41.7 per cent of all non- agricultural 
informal sector employment in 2014 (Rogan and Skinner 2018). The VAT regu-
lations in South Africa, similar to other jurisdictions in both developing and 
developed countries, allow very small enterprises to operate outside the VAT 
system. In South Africa, an enterprise with an annual turnover less than 1 million 
Rand (approximately US$70,000) is not required to register as a VAT vendor. 
These enterprises could opt to register, but enterprises with turnover of less than 
50,000 Rand (approximately US$3,500), are precluded from registering as a 
VAT vendor. Thus, in practice, most enterprises that operate in the informal 
economy would not be registered as VAT vendors. As VAT is charged at each 
stage of the production process, each supplier in a supply chain that is a regis-
tered VAT vendor acts as a tax- collection agent for the government: they collect 
the VAT on the sale of the goods, and can claim back the VAT expended on the 
inputs, thus paying over to the tax authority only that VAT related to the value 
added by itself. Informal businesses, which are not VAT vendors, are not able to 
claim back the VAT on the inputs they purchase, and thus have to absorb this 
cost in their final sale price. This clearly has a direct impact on their competit-
iveness and profitability.
 Compare, for example, two enterprises, one formal and registered as a VAT 
vendor and the other informal and not registered as a VAT vendor, selling the 
same product – bread. The formal vendor is able to deduct VAT paid on all 
inputs and capital equipment she purchased, whereas the informal retailer cannot 
– thus, everything else being equal, as a result of the VAT, the informal retailer 
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has higher costs. Furthermore, the formal retailer is able, with the full backing of 
the law, to pass VAT at the final stage of production on to the final consumer. 
The informal retailer does not have the backing of the legal system to enable her 
to pass the VAT she has paid onto the final consumer through the bread price, 
and is therefore likely herself to have to absorb some of this cost.
 Of course, not being a VAT vendor means that an informal retailer does not 
have to incur the costs of compliance with the VAT system, which requires 
adherence to formal accounting or bookkeeping practices which might be 
beyond the reach of many informal enterprises, and would be costly to comply 
with, relative to revenue for these businesses. However, the point here is that 
policy- makers often argue that informal retailers do not pay taxes. As the 
example above demonstrates, because they are deemed to be the final consumer, 
informal retailers do in fact pay VAT and their legal position in the VAT system 
often places them at a significant disadvantage relative to formal retailers against 
whom they compete.
Presumptive direct taxation
Most developing countries are characterised by having a large informal economy 
and a relatively low tax/gross domestic product (GDP) ratio. One of the chal-
lenges facing governments in all countries, but especially in developing coun-
tries, is how to collect sufficient tax revenue to meet national expenditure needs. 
In developing countries in particular, policy- makers are paying increasing atten-
tion to collecting taxes in the informal economy. In order to overcome com-
pliance and information problems which face both informal sector business and 
the revenue service, some developing countries have elected to level a presump-
tive tax on informal business.1 This is especially the case at sub- national level 
where, for example, local governments have been levying presumptive market 
taxes in markets where informal traders conduct their economic activity. Other 
examples include the levying of user fees to access trading sites that are control-
led by local government authorities (Chen 2018).
 From the perspective of informal enterprises, usually run by informal workers 
who are self- employed, there are several problems with a presumptive tax. The 
first is that, by its very nature, a presumptive tax is at best a crude estimation, 
and at worst an arbitrary amount. For precarious businesses in the informal 
sector, it may well be unaffordable. The second is that a presumptive tax often 
curtails the extent to which the taxpayer can engage with the tax authorities. 
Even if the tax dispensation provides for a rebuttable presumptive tax, informal 
business will often have no way of verifying their income. Third, a presumptive 
tax raises the issues we discussed in the first section above: while nominally 
drawing businesses into the tax system, a presumptive tax does not mean that the 
redistributive side of the tax system will be available to those paying the pre-
sumptive tax. Finally, its implementation risks being inequitable; research has 
shown that the more visible informal businesses (often in public space) are more 
likely to be targeted for a presumptive tax (Dube and Casale 2019).
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Addressing the gaps
The discussion above highlights some important conceptual and theoretical chal-
lenges which we need to incorporate in our understanding of the informal 
economy. The first is a definitional one. Analysts and policy- makers, especially 
in the economics arena, continue to use the payment of tax as the primary way to 
identify whether an enterprise is formal or informal. Over the last decade or so, 
significant improvements have been made to bring conceptual clarity to the 
concept of the informal economy, and to the statistical collection of data on the 
informal economy. According to the definition adopted by the International Con-
ference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS), informal enterprises are enterprises that 
are not legally incorporated or registered with a national government authority, 
and informal jobs are those without social protection, or paid annual and sick 
leave from an employer. This definition has nothing to do with whether enter-
prises of the self- employed and workers in informal employment pay taxes. It is 
therefore important that analysts and policy- makers avoid using the payment of 
taxes as a proxy for informality wherever possible. Not only is this conceptually 
incorrect but it also erroneously feeds into a discourse that those in the informal 
economy are not paying taxes, or are hiding from the tax regulations.
 Second, it is important for policy to recognise that not being part of the tax 
system can be disadvantageous to informal enterprises and informal employees. 
As the examples of VAT demonstrate, there can be significant costs to being 
outside the regulatory reach of the tax system. This, of course, challenges the 
theoretical arguments that informality arises out of a choice to avoid regulation 
and taxation.
 Third, the suggestions provided above point to important gaps in tax policy 
and practice. Overcoming these challenges will require a shift in policy thinking 
from one that sees the informal economy as backward and undesirable, to one 
which recognises the merits of the informal economy in and of itself, as a source 
of employment and poverty reduction (especially in the South African case of 
persistent unemployment), and acknowledges that the formal and informal 
sectors are inextricably linked (Rogan 2018a).
 Finally, our discussion to some extent supposes formal and informal sectors 
economies that are largely static – that is, individuals operate either in the one or 
the other. The reality, however, is that there is a high level of churning over time 
as individuals move between formal and informal work (see Heintz and Valodia 
2012; Valodia 2015).
 Finally, the narrative that workers in the informal economy, whether self- 
employed or in informal wage employment, are opting to be informal in order to 
evade taxes is clearly incorrect and needs to be strongly challenged. As our dis-
cussion has shown, through indirect tax systems like VAT, those working in the 
informal economy not only pay taxes, but also being informal may well pose an 
additional tax on them. Moreover, through presumptive taxes in markets and 
other types of user fees, those working in the informal economy do pay direct 
taxes. More research is needed to better understand how these taxes are levied, 
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what the effective rates of taxation may be, and what the economic impact of 
these taxes are on informal enterprises.
Note
1 Joshi, Prichard and Heady (2014) note that presumptive taxes use a simplified tax 
calculation method to lower record- keeping and compliance costs for small firms. In 
countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Ghana, for example, a presumptive 
tax is levied on turnover rather than on profit (ibid.).
11 (Re)conceptualising poverty and 
informal employment
Michael Rogan and Paul Cichello
This chapter aims to address the dominant narrative that informal employment is 
comprised of low- paid and unproductive work. This is not to deny that working 
poverty is the reality for many informal workers or that, of the roughly 839 
million working poor in the developing world who survive on less than $2/day, 
about 80 per cent are informally employed (ILO 2016b). However, the poverty 
narrative ignores what this income provides daily to working individuals and 
families. It also reinforces the dualist conceptualisation of the informal economy 
as a backward sector which is uncoupled from the “modern” formal sector. The 
conventional poverty approach therefore frames the informal economy as a 
problem to be solved rather than as an important source of household income or 
a critical base of the modern economy.
 A better understanding of the role of informal employment in actually redu-
cing poverty – rather than perpetuating it – could influence a new generation of 
policies that recognise and support the role of earnings from informal employ-
ment in the households of the working poor. This is an important consideration 
since progress in reducing working poverty (that is, poverty among the 
employed), particularly in developing countries, has stalled over the past five 
years (ibid.). There will, therefore, come a point when addressing poverty in the 
informal economy will need to receive more attention from countries as they 
strive to meet their poverty reduction targets.
The informal economy and working poverty in South Africa
To explore the potential for measuring the link between informal employment 
and poverty reduction, we undertook a poverty decomposition analysis using 
household survey data from South Africa (Cichello and Rogan 2017). This 
method (Araar and Duclos 2009), based on Shapley values, estimates what the 
rate of poverty would have been without each type of income that the households 
receive (e.g., government transfers, labour market income, remittances, invest-
ments, etc.) ignoring any potentially endogenous responses from the household 
to that lost income.
 South Africa is a middle- income country with a high level of inequality and 
roughly a third of the non- agricultural workforce in informal employment (ILO 
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2018a). A cursory analysis of household income data as typically measured from 
income and expenditure surveys can be deceiving. Absolute levels of earnings 
simply reflect the fact that individual earnings and household incomes are often 
very low in the informal economy. Without contextualising the impact of these 
earnings, a first glance at the distribution of household income in South Africa 
shows that the vast majority (57 per cent) of all household income is attributed 
to “formal” earnings and relatively little income flows into households from gov-
ernment transfers and informal employment, 7 per cent and 9 per cent, respec-
tively. The income from transfers, in the form of the government’s social grant 
programme, is widely acknowledged to have impacted positively on child health 
and education, food security, and in reducing income poverty. In contrast, the 
income that is derived from employment in the informal economy is rarely 
recognised while some policy interventions, namely, the city of Johannesburg’s 
removal of informal traders under ‘Operation Clean Sweep’ in 2013, have act-
ively worked to suppress informal livelihoods.
 When considering the impact of transfer income and earnings from informal 
employment on keeping households above one of the country’s official poverty 
lines, we highlight three findings from the South African case study. First, while 
earnings from formal employment are still the single largest factor in reducing 
poverty, government transfers and earnings from informal employment are actu-
ally more important to poverty reduction, relative to their overall share of house-
hold income. For example, while only 9 per cent of household income comes 
from informal employment, 14 per cent of the household income that moves 
households above the poverty line is attributed to informal employment (Figure 
11.1). This is the case for two reasons. First, the households that are closest to 
the poverty line are more likely to be earning income from the informal 
economy. Second, even though earnings from informal employment are often 
very low, they are often enough to move these households just above, or at least 
closer to, the poverty line. This is an important finding for policy- makers, 
because it highlights the role that earnings from the informal economy contribute 
both to households and to poverty reduction at the national level.
 Second, there is substantial variation in poverty reduction within the informal 
economy. Figure 11.2 illustrates the ratio of poverty reduction to relative income 
in Rand for several types of informal employment in South Africa at the three 
official poverty lines. At all three poverty lines, the contribution of informal self- 
employment to reducing poverty is similar to its contribution to total income 
(hence a ratio of approximately one). In contrast, income from formal employ-
ment contributes less to poverty reduction relative to its large contribution to 
total household income. At the lowest poverty threshold (also called the extreme 
poverty line), the contribution of income from formal employment is only about 
66 per cent of its contribution to total income.
 The incomes from several types of informal employees (both inside and 
outside of the informal sector) appear to be particularly effective in reducing 
poverty. The earnings of domestic workers, for example, constitute more than 
double (e.g., 2.5 times at the lowest poverty line) the amount in poverty 
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Figure 11.1  Contributions to poverty reduction by income source (Shapley poverty 
decompositions).
Source: Own calculations (Cichello and Rogan, 2017) from NIDS using the DASP module developed 
by Araar and Duclos (2007).
Notes
The data are weighted.
Income sources and poverty lines are expressed in monthly per capita terms (2010 prices, z = 306).
Figure 11.2  Poverty reduction ratios by different categories of informal employment 
(Shapley poverty decompositions).
Source: Own calculations (Cichello and Rogan, 2017) from NIDS using the DASP module developed 
by Araar and Duclos (2007).
Notes: 
The data are weighted.
Income sources and poverty lines are expressed in monthly per capita terms (in Rand, 2010 prices).
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 reduction at all three poverty lines relative to their share of overall income. Sim-
ilarly, the earnings of informal employees and casual workers are nearly twice as 
effective at reducing poverty as their contributions to total household income in 
South Africa would suggest.
 Third, the ‘per job’ impact of informal jobs on overall poverty reduction is 
relatively high. In Figure 11.3, the estimated “per job” impact on poverty of 
earnings from informal employment, relative to the impact of a formal job is 
compared. Despite significantly lower incomes in the informal economy, the 
earnings of a typical self- employed worker in South Africa have 63 per cent of 
the poverty- reducing impact, at the extreme poverty line, compared with earn-
ings from a formal sector job. Put differently, eliminating 100 informal self- 
employment activities, as some government policies have sought to do in order 
to discourage “illegal trading”, would drive as many individuals into extreme 
poverty as eliminating 63 formal jobs. It is precisely these types of stark com-
parisons that are made possible when the focus is switched to the contribution of 
informal employment to poverty reduction.
 Informal employees and domestic workers have a “per job” impact on poverty 
reduction which is even closer to a formal job (81 per cent and 85 per cent, 
respectively). In other words, policies which endanger these jobs or reduce their 
earnings would be almost the same as eliminating formal jobs in terms of 
poverty reduction. So it is the ability of these types of employment, despite their 
low earnings and difficult working conditions, to keep households out of poverty 
that makes their contributions so significant.
Figure 11.3  Relative ‘per job’ impact of earnings from informal employment on poverty 
reduction (Shapley poverty decompositions).
Source: Own calculations (Cichello and Rogan, 2017) from NIDS using the DASP module developed 
by Araar and Duclos (2007).
Notes: 
The data are weighted.
Income sources and poverty lines are expressed in monthly per capita terms (Rand 2010 prices).
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(Re)conceptualising poverty and informal employment
One conclusion from the analysis of South African earnings data is that, if gov-
ernments are serious about reducing working poverty in developing countries, 
then protecting the earnings and working conditions of workers in the informal 
economy should be a priority.
 National poverty estimates attract considerable attention from policy- makers, 
donors and development organisations. Without analyses that highlight the role 
of informal employment in actually reducing poverty, the perception will remain 
that informal employment is not a viable solution to poverty reduction because, 
by its very nature, it is low paid or has low productivity and does not offer social 
and legal protection. However, if policy- makers understand the importance of 
earnings from informal employment to keeping many workers and their house-
holds out of poverty, policies concerned with informal employment might look 
quite different. Measuring the contribution of informal earnings towards national 
development goals, such as the poverty headcount, is one way to make this con-
nection more tangible and relevant to policy.
 Data constraints are a key problem, however, since many countries do not 
capture data on total household income (in order to measure income poverty) 
and status in employment (e.g., from Labour Force Surveys) in the same national 
survey. A clear recommendation which stems from this research is that, as coun-
tries work towards developing comparable indicators of working poverty (Oster-
meier et al. 2015), they should also strive to collect data that highlights the 
impact of informal employment on national poverty rates.
 Notwithstanding these existing data constraints, reducing working poverty in 
the informal economy is directly related to meeting three of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) (UNDP n.d.). Since working poverty is a central 
feature of overall income poverty in most developing countries, the goals of 
reducing income poverty (SDG 1) and achieving decent work for all (SDG 8) 
cannot be met without addressing the challenges faced by informal workers in 
pursuing their livelihoods. Moreover, since women who work in the informal 
economy are more likely to be in jobs which are the most vulnerable (ILO 
2018a), protecting earnings in the informal economy is a crucial strategy to 
achieve gender equality (SDG 5).
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Part IV
Labour law and the 
informal economy

12 Revising labour law for work
Judy Fudge
Introduction: can labour law make a contribution?
Should people who sort through trash for a living in the outskirts of Cape Town, 
Kolkata and Buenos Aires be entitled to bargain collectively with the purchasers 
of their cull or with municipal governments for access to waste and the right to 
bid for solid waste management contracts? How do we provide street vendors in 
Nairobi with maternity pay? Should Uber drivers or self- employed domiciliary 
care workers be entitled to the minimum wage and to the right to participate in 
collective bargaining over the conditions of their work?
	 The	broad	question	 that	unites	 these	 specific	examples	 is	whether	 it	 is	pos-
sible to develop a basis for regulating work that can operate in a wide range of 
settings across different levels of economic development. Labour law is simply 
one	strand	in	a	complex	mix	of	regulations,	including	municipal	bylaws	and	sec-
toral economic policies, that shape the standards of living and life chances of 
informal workers. However, if law and public policies continue to draw the 
boundaries of labour rights and standards by reference to the contract of (formal) 
employment,	the	vast	majority	of	informal	workers	will	continue	to	be	excluded	
from these basic rights and protections.
 Moreover, the divide between an employment contract and other work rela-
tions	has	always	presented	particular	difficulties	 for	women.	There	 is	 a	 funda-
mental mismatch between the law’s binary divide and many women’s 
experience,	in	which	the	boundaries	between	paid	and	unpaid	work,	formal	and	
informal work, and between the labour market and social security are permeable 
and shifting. The effects of this mismatch are particularly felt among those 
women homeworkers and other sub- contracted women informal workers, as well 
as	women	who	perform	domiciliary	care,	These	women	workers	often	find	them-
selves characterised as “independent” or “quasi- independent” despite the reality 
of	their	lack	of	real	autonomy	or	self-	sufficiency	in	the	market.
The regulation of work
The standard employment relationship emerged as one of the key institutions of 
labour	 markets	 in	 industrialised	 democracies	 in	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	 twentieth	
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century. It took the legal form of the contract of employment, and its function is 
to link workers’ subordination to managerial prerogatives to protections against 
the abuse of this power. Through the contract of employment, labour law is also 
linked	to	other	areas	of	regulation	such	as	social	security,	tax	and	corporate	law,	
which, in turn, protect workers against a range of social risks through various 
mechanisms of redistribution (Fudge 2017).
	 Changes	 in	production	and	the	ways	in	which	firms	pursue	“flexible”	forms	
of labour, such as casual labour, contract labour, outsourcing, homeworking, and 
other forms of sub- contracting have led to a proliferation of employment and 
work relations and activities that do not depend upon a contract of employment. 
Consequently, they are beyond the scope of labour law and its associated labour 
standards and techniques of regulation, such as collective bargaining. Moreover, 
the prediction that the informal workforce would be absorbed into the formal 
economy as economies modernised has proven to be incorrect. In fact, in devel-
oping and developed countries, the informal economy has persisted and once- 
formal jobs have been informalised, with the result that the majority of workers 
are in low- skilled, poorly paid, intermittent and insecure employment.
 Given the limited coverage of the contract of employment, we need to con-
sider a range of platforms for providing labour rights and standards (Fudge, 
McCrystal and Sankaran 2012). This regulation of work would include the tradi-
tional techniques, such as collective bargaining, and substantive and procedural 
laws,	but	would	be	expanded	to	include	a	wide	range	of	regulatory	techniques,	
such as licensing.
 In some cases, the regulation of work would be similar in many respects to 
the traditional forms of labour law as it would focus on work as a relationship 
between an “employing entity” – an employer, a retailer, a supplier, purchaser – 
or	some	sort	of	entity	 that	exercises	either	economic	or	 labour	process	control	




and techniques for regulating work and protecting workers than those tradition-
ally associated with labour law.
 Policy- making needs to look for functional equivalents to the institutional role 
that the employer played in the standard employment relationship. The idea is to go 
beyond the form of an institution and look at its function since there are a number 
of different institutions that can serve a particular function (Marshall 2016).
Work as a relationship: beyond contract
An important suggestion is to focus on the regulation of personal work relations 
(Freedland	and	Kountouris	2011).	The	benefit	of	this	approach	is	that	work	rela-
tions are no longer seen solely in terms of the subordinated employee, and its 
alter ego, the independent contractor. The regulation of personal work arrange-
ments must be detached from its anchor in the contract of employment. It is also 
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critical to move away from a map of personal work relations that depicts them as 
a series of concentric circles with the contract of employment at its core since 
this map serves to reinforce, rather than diminish, the hold of the contract as the 
foundation of labour law.
 The regulation of work relations should be centred on the worker (Freedland 
and Kountouris 2011: 339). The foundational concept is the personal work rela-
tion,	which	is	defined	as	a	connection	or	set	of	connections,	between	a	worker	
and another person(s) or organisation(s) arising from an engagement or arrange-
ment for the carrying out of work or the rendering of service or services by the 
workers personally (ibid.: 31). This conception is narrower than work since there 
must be a relationship and not simply an activity, and it requires that the worker 
be personally involved in performing the work.
Work as an activity: beyond relationship
Focusing on the relationship with an employer or entity that is functionally equi-
valent to an employer leaves out not just the reality of independent self- 
employed workers, but also the possibility of other or shared sources of 
responsibility, including the state, mutual funds which spread the cost among all 
parties involved and even private insurance. Once the focus is on the worker and 
her activities, rather than on the contractual relationship, it is possible to begin to 
consider a range of ways for dealing with social and economic risks, and not 
simply	 employment	 risk.	 One	 way	 forward	 is	 to	 regard	 maternity	 benefits	 as	
simply a matter for social security, which is the approach adopted by the Inter-
national Labour Organization (ILO) (the Maternity Protection Convention, 2000 
(No. 183)). Economic risks run the gamut from harassment to bribery and evic-
tion, and here insurance schemes need to be combined with initiatives designed 
to cultivate transparency and accountability in public institutions. For some 
informal workers, a guaranteed annual income, sometimes known as a citizen-
ship or basic income, and which has been discussed as a policy reform for over 
30 years, may be more suitable than unemployment insurance for dealing with 
risks to income (McKay 2007).
 In the case of health and safety for informal workers, who are engaged in eco-
nomic activities without a relationship to an entity that controls either their 
labour process or the space where the work is performed, it is crucial to consider 
functional equivalents. For street vendors and waste pickers, the municipality, 
which	controls	the	use	of	public	space	and	waste	and	has	a	tax	base,	may	be	the	
appropriate entity. Health and safety interventions will require innovative low 
cost work organisation and engineering solutions from occupational hygienists 
and occupational medicine specialists. Since informal workers will be unable to 
afford these costs, local government and the formal private sector may have to 
contribute to these costs under a broader umbrella of health protection (Lund and 
Naidoo 2016).
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Collective bargaining, social dialogue and empowerment
Collective representation of informal workers is critical both in terms of shaping 
the workers’ self- interests as workers and for aggregating and articulating their 
needs	and	 interests.	The	ILO	defines	 the	 term	“social	dialogue”	 to	 include	“all	
types of negotiation, consultation or information sharing either among the bipar-
tite parties in the workplace or industrial sector, or by tripartite partners at the 
national level, on issues of common interest” (Ebisui 2012: 4). Collective bar-
gaining is one, but not the only, form of social dialogue. Moreover, social dia-
logue structures need to move from traditional tripartite to broader- based 
dialogue institutions (Sankaran 2016).
 There are a variety of organisational forms that can represent informal 
workers, though the critical ones must be membership- based in order to cultivate 
accountability of the organisation to the informal workers. There are three key 
types of different forms of membership- based organisations, and these different 
forms overlap (Budlender 2013):
1 Unions represent workers with the goal of engaging in collective bargaining 
on their behalf with corporate enterprises, workers’ cooperatives and public 
authorities that directly or indirectly employ workers or impact their work.
2 Worker cooperatives are a form of enterprise that is owned and democratic-
ally controlled by their members, who may either be employed as wage 
workers or as self- employed.
3 Associations are membership- based groups that typically do not engage in 
collective bargaining with a direct employer.
The main counterparts of these informal workers’ organisations are large com-
panies, employer associations, the state or central governments, municipalities, 
the police and employers. Thus, it is critical for informal workers’ organisations 
to identify the entity or authority most responsible for the issues over which they 
wish	 to	 negotiate	 and	 that	 the	 identified	 entity	 then	 becomes	 the	 negotiating	
partner (Carré, Horn and Bonner 2018). It is also important to recognise that the 
negotiating partner may differ for different issues even for a single group of 
workers.
Conclusion
In order to regulate to improve and formalise informal work, it is imperative to 
adopt a strategic conception of work regulation. Its starting point should be the 
dominant actors and social activities bound up in work relations and not the 
existing	legal	categories	of	employee,	worker	or	independent	contractor	nor	on	
pre-	existing	 legal	 jurisdictions,	such	as	 labour,	 immigration,	housing	and	plan-
ning law (Fudge and McCann 2015; von Broembsen and Godfrey 2016). Regu-
latory power, understood as measures or interventions that seek to change the 
behaviour of individuals or groups, is not held solely by governments but dis-
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persed	 throughout	 a	 number	 of	 bodies	 or	 groups,	 such	 as	 firms,	 non-	
governmental and supra- governmental agencies, standard- setting organisations, 
credit- rating agencies, business and professional associations, trade unions, reli-
gious organisations, courts, and others. Successful regulatory strategies must 
engage with economic and social actors whose behaviour is the subject of regu-
lation with the broader goal of building capacities in order to ensure that labour 
market actors internalise norms. In turn, this would ensure the sustainability of 
regulatory interventions to improve the terms and conditions under which 
informal workers work.
13 Domestic workers and informality




Domestic work has historically been rendered invisible, though, with 67 million 
workers worldwide, it is ubiquitous. By turning attention to domestic work, we 
turn attention to the fundamental insight that informality is not synonymous with 
a lack of order (Guha- Khasnobis, Kanbur and Ostrom 2007) or, for that matter, a 
lack of law.
	 Labour	law	is	a	field	that	recognises	sources	of	law	other	than	state-	made	law.	
A host of accepted social norms govern workplaces, whether those workplaces 
are factories or farms, ships or households. Both within classic “employment 
relationships” and a broad range of work relationships, formal and informal, in 
the Global South and the Global North, status- based relational inequality cannot 
be ignored (Atleson 1983).
 The law that governs the household as a workplace – the law of the household 
workplace – is not new law. It has its roots in global histories of slavery and 
colonialism. Those global histories help to explain the remarkable consistency in 
persisting understandings of domestic workers’ status and subordinated social 
location across a range of contexts in the Global North and the Global South. 
They intersect with racial hierarchies and patriarchal norms to render domestic 
workers, and their work, invisible.
 The law of the household workplace is also not family law, though it is often 
framed through the use of the colloquial expression, “like one of the family”. 
The centrality of household economies at various historical moments does not 
make the domestic worker the “substitute” for the woman of the patriarchal 
household. The fact that the word for a “domestic” in so many parts of the world 
is synonymous with “slave” should be taken seriously as a shorthand for the 
place of the worker in the family, and the deeply asymmetrical relationship that 
has become so ubiquitous that its laws1 become invisible.
 When we use the label of informality, are we getting closer to naming and 
redressing historical forms of societal marginalisation, exclusion, inequality and 
invisibility? The question is not simply about legal form: lawyers might assert 
that domestic workers, because they have a relationship of subordination to an 
easily	identified	employer,	are	covered	by	an	employment	contract,	whether	it	is	
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written or, as is usually the case, oral. Because they are subject to a contract of 
employment, the legalistic, private law reasoning goes, they work in the formal 
economy.
 This kind of legal formalism can easily prevent us from seeing what formal-
isation	should	mean,	and	what	it	has	come	to	be	defined	to	mean	in	international	
labour law, via the Transition from the Informal to the Formal Economy Recom-
mendation, 2015 (No. 204). International labour law shifts the focus, so that 
meaningful inclusion in social protection mechanisms is centred. But there is an 
additional dimension that needs attention. In formalising the informal in 
domestic work, it is important not simply to adopt the asymmetrical law of the 
household workplace that perpetuates domestic workers’ substantive inequality 
and structural invisibility. In other words, becoming visible through formalisa-
tion mechanisms does not simply mean becoming a subject of state- made law. 
Regulatory frameworks will be unenforceable, and will fail to formalise 
domestic work, if they are not attentive to the existing norms that order the rela-
tionship in highly inequitable ways. The task is instead to render visible and 
deliberately transgress the asymmetrical law of the household workplace. 
Becoming visible means ensuring that domestic workers are meaningfully 
included in an alternative and transnational – given the structure of the work- 
migration nexus and domestic workers’ own organisational patterns2 – regu-
latory framework that ensures their meaningful incorporation into the corpus of 
a labour law that fosters equality. This is what international standard setting on 
decent work for domestic workers sought to accomplish through the claim of a 
human right to meaningful inclusion in labour law.
Regulatory frameworks and enforcement
The International Labour Organization Law and Practice Report of 2009, which 
led	 to	Convention	No.	 189	 of	 2011,	makes	 the	 case	 for	 specific	 regulation	 of	
decent	 work	 for	 domestic	 workers.	 The	 specificity	 was	 framed	 in	 terms	 of	 a	
deliberate juxtaposition: “work like any other” and “work like no other”. The 
juxtaposition of the two ideas was widely cited in the academic community 
(Shamir and Mundlak, 2011; Smith, 2011; Albin, 2012) as some scholars sought 
to assess whether we should embrace one or the other. My position has consist-
ently been that both are necessary. It is not enough to say that domestic work is 
work like any other and delete the words in an international labour convention or 
a national law that list “domestic workers” among the exclusions. Keeping 
“work as no other” as well is a way to acknowledge that it is necessary to name 
and dislodge the fundamentally asymmetrical law of the household workplace 
that enables domestic workers’ exploitation and assures their de facto exclusion, 
even when de jure they are included. The juxtaposition refocuses attention on 
the compliance- enhancing mechanisms necessary to promote a change in power 
relationships as well as a shift of paradigm (through “aha” moments).
 The Law and Practice Report recognised that a mix of approaches to foster 
compliance is necessary:
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[M]ere tinkering with informal rules in formal legislation is not enough … a 
complementary mix of carrots and sticks – capacity building for domestic 
workers, implementation incentives for employers and robust enforcement 
by governments – is needed if the objective is to be achieved … well- crafted 
regulatory mechanisms with a suitable enforcement machinery make an 
important difference in the everyday lives of domestic workers – and they 
convey the message that domestic workers are indeed workers who deserve 
both rights and respect.
(ILO 2009: paras 40 and 325)
Convention No. 189 and Recommendation No. 201 do some of this work, by 
turning	attention	to	specific	features	of	the	domestic	work	relationship	that	need	
to change. For example, these new international labour standards challenge the 
presumption that only the employer’s needs should determine whether a 
domestic worker “lives in” (Article 9 of Convention No. 189), and call out the 
practice of assuming that when the household is on vacation, so too is the 
accompanying domestic worker (Article 13 of Recommendation No. 201). But 
how can these be enforced?
 The Law and Practice Report documented the extent to which domestic work 
is both deeply localised – isolated as it is in individual households – and charac-
terised	by	considerable	labour	migration	across	national	borders.	While	the	ratifi-
cation of Convention No. 189 has been spectacular, it is even more important to 
think	about	what	is	happening	around	and	beyond	ratification.	To	do	so,	we	need	
to look at a broad range of changes to labour law. The diffusion of a trans-
national legal order on decent work for domestic workers extends well beyond 
the	 ratification	 of	 the	 international	 labour	 standard	 by	 individual	 ILO	member	
states: it includes a range of actions by a range of actors at a range of governance 
levels, from the local to the national to the transnational. Together, the govern-
ance levels are meant to work together, to enhance enforcement.
 In a study that has primarily focused on inspection and compliance mecha-
nisms,	as	well	as	simplification	schemes	that	facilitate	the	delivery	of	social	pro-
tections to domestic workers, interviews were conducted between 2010 and 
2014, with labour inspectors and commissioners at the Commission for Concili-
ation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) in South Africa (Blackett and Tiemeni 
2018) and with labour inspectors and judges at the specialised labour tribunal in 
Côte d’Ivoire (Blackett and Koné-Silué 2019).
 In South Africa, participant observations were undertaken of conciliation 
hearings at CCMA, a mechanism that is well known and amply used by domestic 
workers, usually on termination of employment. Meetings were held with 
CCMA commissioners and representatives of the Ministry of Labour, who were 
able to capture the subtle, slow shift in perception of the domestic worker- 
employer relationship as a relationship of servitude to a decent work relation-
ship, and one that was taking place in the minds of both workers and employers. 
What is distinct about the CCMA, however, is that this relationship is mediated. 
It is not just the employer and the employees who determine the law of the 
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household workplace. Rather, the dispute resolution mechanism is fast, close, 
and cultivates the sense that domestic workers belong there. Its very existence 
says, this is a recognised employment relationship, subject to the “rule of law” 
in the workplace.
 Côte d’Ivoire functions with a generalist labour code, but one that emerges 
out of a postcolonial context in which domestic workers – at the time, mostly 
urban male migrants – were understood to be included. That knowledge persists: 
this author and Dr. Assata Koné-Silué unearthed practices within the labour 
administration that apply the labour code to domestic workers, as well as 50 
written judicial decisions that recognised the domestic work relationship as a 
labour relationship and applied the code, on termination of employment. As one 
labour court judge remarked during interviews, employers tended to be surprised 
that they could even be brought before the labour court. After all, they had pro-
vided the domestic worker with a place to live and some level of comfort. The 
Labour Court, therefore, not only was in the position of recognising the termina-
tion;	it	clarified	to	the	employer	that	this	was,	in	fact,	an	employment	relation-
ship that falls within Article 2 of the Labour Code.3
	 In	each	of	these	national	examples,	significant	and	at	times	surprising	in-	roads	
have been made to promote enforcement of labour laws that seek to secure 
decent work for domestic workers. In South Africa in particular, the negotiation 
of a different “rule of law” in the household workplace is being instituted 
through the accessible, expedited mediation of disputes at the CCMA. While 
studies also foreground the limits of current initiatives, the key is that practices 
are evolving, and that a community of learning can be cultivated that sees form-
alisation as a clear- eyed, counter- hegemonic challenge to asymmetrical work-
place power.
Towards a transnational labour law
The approach to regulating “decent work for domestic workers” has helped to 
shift the meaning of decent work from a minimalist to a fulsome, labour law- 
driven, frame. That fulsome vision should be marshalled to rethink transnational 
labour law – and the role of international labour standards within it – for globali-
sation. It includes rethinking representation to make sure that historically mar-
ginalised workers can participate fully in building the law – state and non- state 
– that governs them. Domestic workers’ social movements are a reminder that a 
broad range of actors – alongside traditional trade unions and employers’ organi-
sations – can be marshalled (Pape 2016). The pivotal joint enabling role of 
WIEGO (Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing) and the 
International Union of Food and Allied Workers to the International Domestic 
Workers’ Network (and now Federation) is an example of the kind of collabora-
tion necessary to strengthen transnational labour law. Some important comment-
ators	in	the	field	understandably	worry	that	domestic	workers	may	have	sought	
inclusion in a sinking labour law ship (Du Toit 2013). Domestic workers act-
ively reinvigorating labour law might respond that reports of its death have been 
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greatly	exaggerated.	Clearly	though,	a	narrow	approach	to	the	field	of	labour	law	
that excludes those on its margins can no longer – if it ever could – be afforded.
 Legal regimes are interconnected. The governance of domestic work in the 
context of globalisation increasingly shows that the borders between inter-
national	law	and	immigration	law	are	porous.	Both	fields	are	intimately	related	
to labour law in a global economy. Emerging transnational legal orders – includ-
ing	on	the	trafficking	of	domestic	work	and	“contemporary	forms	of	slavery”	–	
have	 the	benefit	of	unequivocally	naming	exploitation	and	abuse.	However,	as	
with many approaches that privilege criminalisation, they extend the arm of the 
punitive state without necessarily working on underlying, structural conditions 
that make particular forms of work organisation pervasive (Blackett 2018). They 
run the risk of supplanting rather than enhancing a transnational labour law 
approach to domestic work, which is essentially an approach that takes develop-
ment seriously, and sees labour law as development.
	 This	is	not	a	minor	affirmation,	of	course,	for	it	deliberately	reframes	labour	
law by centring the most marginalised workers whose work predates industriali-
sation, extends beyond the traditional labour market into reproductive labour, 
and takes labour migration beyond national borders as a central subject of labour 
law (Blackett 2011). It posits that they, too, are subjects of labour law, and con-
tends that addressing the regulation of their working lives in a manner that pro-
motes their human dignity and fosters social justice is pivotal to development. In 
the process of decentring industrialisation in labour law, it forces a similar 
decentring of a normatively controlling vision of development.
 Those who work carefully on informality in the Global South have generally 
cultivated a vision of localised, and at times South- South legal reforms rather 
than of legal transplantation from the Global North. The labour law vision 
flowing	through	Convention	No.	189	and	Recommendation	No.	201	takes	law	–	
state- made law and pluralist law – seriously, and seeks to “formalise” in part by 
introducing a new transnational legal order that challenges labour law’s bound-
aries, and is rooted in equality. It works hard to shift the social consensus, and 
promote compliance. It also means that regulatory responses and their enforce-
ment are not expected, either, to be exclusively national.
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Notes
1 In Everyday Transgressions (Blackett 2019), I explain why I follow a familiar, pluralist 
labour law tradition of acknowledging the “law of the shop” rather than invoking the 
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notion of customary law. This choice leads to a clearer acknowledgement that the 
household is a workplace (“law of the household workplace”).
2 Decent work for domestic workers is transnational at the very least in the sense under-
stood by Jessup (1956: 2): “to include all law which regulates actions or events that 
transcend	national	frontiers”.	Halliday	and	Shaffer	(2015:	11)	go	further,	and	frame	the	
notion of transnational legal ordering to mean “a collection of formalised legal norms 
and associated organisations and actors that authoritatively order the understanding and 
practice of law across national jurisdictions”.
3 See Bouake Labour Court, Decision No. 109 of May 2000, Le Juris- Social, 
September 2002.




The systems of work regulation which are in place today are over 100 years old. 
They were conceived in a period in which we had – or thought we had – a fairly 
clear idea of what economic development was all about and what the trajectory 
of development would look like over time.
 Work regulations were designed to ensure that that trajectory was consistent 
with worker health and welfare. A recent series of spectacular industrial acci-
dents in the developing world, most recently in Bangladesh in factories produc-
ing for major brand name retailers from advanced industrial countries, are eerily 
reminiscent of those which gave rise to modern- day regulation in the early twen-
tieth century and make clear that there is still a need for the protections which 
work regulation originally arose to provide. But the economy and its trajectory 
have changed substantially since that time; the original regulatory structure 
focused on manufacturing but the modern economy is much more dependent on 
services; new technologies, new managerial techniques, new forms of business 
organisation and corporate governance, and evolving social mores have led 
many to argue that the existing regulations are anachronistic. These concerns are 
further complicated by the fact that over 40 per cent of workers globally are self- 
employed and only a fraction of these are themselves employers. Regulatory 
policy is thus faced with the problem of trying to identify what kinds of adjust-
ments would facilitate growth and development and which adjustments are basi-
cally an attempt to evade the lessons of history.
 The informal economy has come to play a central role in these debates, or 
rather multiple roles. Its ability to do so derives in no small measure from the 
ambiguity of the concept itself, the fact that there does not seem to be a single 
definition. In a certain sense, it is defined by the formal sector – it is composed 
of economic activities and employment arrangements which do not conform to 
the rules and regulations of the formal economy.1 Part of the ambiguity derives 
from the fact that there are multiple regulations and an enterprise can conform to 
some and not others. The term informality, however, seems to imply more than a 
lack of conformity to formal regulations – it suggests a lack of structure, a kind 
of anarchy. This is very problematic. Lisa Peattie, an anthropologist, argued that 
there is no such thing as an unstructured market, and she was always able to find 
an underlying regulatory structure in even the most apparently isolated enclaves 
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of the economy. All of us who believe that human beings have a tendency to 
organise their lives in structured social relationships may not subscribe to the 
strong versions of Lisa’s view but it is hard to believe that economic activity that 
generates as much as 61 per cent of global employment could operate in the 
unstructured way that the use of the term informality in some scholarship and 
policy analysis seems to imply.
 If informality is not automatically branded as disorganised, then, the informal 
economy offers a set of models of how to organise (and structure) economic 
activity, a set of models which one could think of as alternative to those of the 
formal sector … and one can ask what those models are, how they affect social 
welfare, and what their impact is on economic efficiency. In this sense, the 
informal economy becomes a laboratory for investigating the question of how 
else, besides the regulatory structure we have inherited from industrial history, 
we might organise work. But is it possible to take advantage of that laboratory in 
the existing regulatory structure?
 While the debate that is emerging around this question often focuses on the 
substance of regulations, I would argue that the real need is to create an institu-
tional framework in which the question can be debated and resolved. In this 
context, Andrew Schrank and I have examined the contrast between the US 
approach to work regulation and the approach which originates in France and 
has been adopted in Southern Europe and in Latin America (Piore and Schrank 
2018). We argue that, whereas the critique of regulation has focused almost 
exclusively on the Anglo- Saxon or US system, the Franco- Latin model offers a 
flexible model of regulation which is actually better suited to the need to distin-
guish between the progressive changes in modern economies and a regression 
towards the abuses of an unregulated labour market.
 The US has created a specialised system of work regulation. Regulations are 
administered and enforced by a series of different agencies, each focused on a 
narrow range of concerns (the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 
the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, the 
National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, 
the State Department, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and so on). Work 
regulation tends to be conceived as a list of specific standards or requirements. 
Violations of the different items on the list are punished by a penalty, typically 
in the form of a fine, in extreme cases, by criminal sanctions. The penalties act 
as deterrents against further violations and discharge the obligation of the enter-
prise under the law.
 In France, the whole of the labour code is administered by a single agency. 
The agents (or work inspectors) are expected to bring the enterprise into com-
pliance. Wilful or deliberate violations are punished through fines and other 
sanctions, the inspectors are empowered (and expected) to bring the enterprise 
into compliance and to develop in consultation with the owners and managers a 
plan through which compliance is actually achieved. The provisions of the 
labour code are voluminous and extensive, too voluminous to be enforced liter-
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ally; an inspector cannot possibly check every provision when he or she visits a 
shop and thus they acquire considerable discretion as to which part of the code 
to enforce and under what circumstances. This encourages them to look for the 
underlying causes of violations in the enterprise’s approach to management and 
in its business strategy and to seek remedies which address these causes rather 
than the violations individually and narrowly conceived. The Franco- Latin 
system is thus an approach which pressurises government agencies and the enter-
prises being supervised to think through and address directly the central ques-
tions raised by the recent evolution of the economy, namely, to ask whether and 
under what circumstances informality is a response to modernity and when it is a 
regression to older forms of labour exploitation.
 In my experience, in countries where work regulation is organised on the 
French model, there is a continual conversation about these questions among the 
work inspectors themselves. It is grounded in their own experience in the field 
where they have exposure to a very wide range of working conditions and mana-
gerial practices (probably more than any other actors in the society). Exactly 
how that experience is put to use is in part dependent on the way these agencies 
are managed and whether the ongoing conversation among the line agents ever 
influences official policy and practice. Organisations – of workers, of employers, 
and of other interested parties – can encourage these discussions and enter into 
them as they encounter work inspectors in the field when they are working with 
their members but also by introducing the themes and the voices of the inspec-
tors in the political process and in technical policy discussion and debate.
 A key question then becomes whether a special regulatory regime is 
required for the informal economy. The answer to this question depends on 
whether one thinks of the informal economy as composed of relatively homo-
geneous business and employment units or whether it is a catch- all category 
that is really defined by the formal sector. My own sense is that it is too hetero-
geneous for a dedicated enforcement agency to make sense. What much of the 
informal business units have in common is that they do not pay taxes and so in 
those cases where a dedicated institutional structure has been created (e.g., 
Argentina), it is motivated by a concern with raising revenue, which is hardly 
the major issue posed by informal employment from a social perspective. In 
the advanced developed world, to my knowledge, several countries, most 
notably France and Spain, have historically created specialised inspection 
corps for small firms with the notion in part that the management in these firms 
is less well educated, less schooled in modern business practice, and hence 
needs special guidance, and interviews with the inspectors in these specialised 
units suggest that this is indeed the case. But it is not the same thing as a 
regime of regulation directed at the informal economy. On the other hand, the 
discussion and debates which programmes aimed at informality are likely to 
provoke are precisely the kind of open, public discussion of the causes of poor 
working conditions and the best ways of addressing them. And it is the absence 
of this kind of discussion and debate which leaves the newly developing world 
ignorant of the history of employment conditions in those countries which 
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 preceded them in the developmental paths and denies them the lessons of 
history which would otherwise be the advantage of late development.
Note
1 There are two official international statistical definitions: “informal sector” is an 
enterprise- based definition (i.e., enterprises which are not incorporated or registered 
with a national authority); and “informal employment” is a broader employment- based 
definition (i.e., employment without work- based social protection).

Part V
Urban planning and design
Including informal livelihoods

15 The informal economy in urban 
Africa
Challenging planning theory and praxis
Caroline Skinner and Vanessa Watson
This chapter starts by outlining the extent of informal work and settlements in 
Africa, showing that rather than being an aberration, informality is the norm. 
The current governance context suggests significant dissonance between city 
aspirations and planning systems and pervasive informality, resulting in wide-
spread exclusionary practices. Reflecting on lessons from cases of inclusive 
planning, we highlight the conventional wisdoms in planning that need to be 
challenged. We go on to consider implications for planning practice and con-
clude with areas for future research.
Extent of informality in urban Africa
There are two major characteristics of African urban areas that both the liter-
ature and policy often view separately – informal work and informal settle-
ments. What the first- ever global estimates of informal employment, compiled 
by the International Labour Organization (ILO) with support from WIEGO 
(Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing), show (Table 
15.1) is that most people who work in the Global South work in the informal 
economy.
 Even in urban areas of Africa, over 80 per cent of all workers are informally 
employed. Table 15.2 shows the portion of total employment that is informal in 
a selection of African cities.
 Alongside this high incidence of informal employment in Africa is the great 
extent of shelter, water and sanitation deficits. According to UN Habitat, the 
lowest levels of infrastructure provision are to be found in urban Africa. They 
estimate average coverage of water and sanitation at 89 and 69 per cent respec-
tively, of electricity at 69 per cent and of paved roads at 28 per cent (UN Habitat 
2012: 49). In 2016, they estimated that while one in every eight persons in the 
world lives in a slum, the situation is particularly acute in urban Sub- Saharan 
Africa – where over one in every two residents is a slum dweller (UN Habitat 
2016: 57–8). This is less than the World Bank estimate that 61 per cent of urban 
Africans live in informal settlements (World Bank 2014). While exact estimates 
vary, what is clear is that slums in the region have grown in tandem with rapid 
urbanisation.
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 These trends are intimately interconnected – those who work informally often 
live in slums, slums are not just places of reproduction but also places of work. 
A critical factor that needs to be taken into account in both the design and build-
ing of informal structures and their location is (largely informal) work activities.
Governance context shaping livelihood possibilities
Governance has a significant impact on informal work in urban areas, primarily 
through land use management and planning systems. Most countries have 
detailed and elaborate national planning laws which are often inherited from 
earlier colonial governments and have remained largely unchanged. These laws 
embody older and European visions of what modern cities should be like. They 
emphasise order, cleanliness, adherence to building and planning laws, and 
mono- functional neighbourhoods. They assume that informal work and dwellings 
Table 15.1  Informal employment as a percentage of total, rural and urban employment 
by geographic region (excluding developed countries), 2016*
Region Total Rural Urban
Asia and Pacific 71 86 51
Sub-Saharan Africa
• Southern Africa










Latin America and the Caribbean 54 69 48
Middle East and North Africa 68 74 60
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 37 47 29
Source: Bonnet et al. (2019), Table 3.3, p. 12.
Notes
* These data are for emerging and developing countries only, not developed countries, in the regions.
** For developing countries, the estimates of informal employment in rural and urban areas are 
based on a smaller number of countries (with available data) than the estimates for total employment. 
This accounts for the same estimate for total and rural in developing countries.
Table 15.2  Informal employment as a percentage of total employment in a selection of 
African cities
Country City Percentage 
Benin Cotonou 83
Burkina Faso Ouagadougou 81






Source: adapted from www.wiego.org/informal-economy/statistics/statistical-picture
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are not present or need to be removed. In many university planning schools, stu-
dents are taught to implement this kind of planning through master planning and 
land use zoning. More recent plans for African cities continue this modernist tra-
dition and follow similar principles of orderliness and cleanliness. But there are 
some important contradictions about the way planning systems function.
 The primary contradiction is that most of these cities and towns are largely 
unplanned – informality is everywhere. Elaborate formal planning laws have 
little effect on the ground. Yet this does not make life easier for those who live 
and work informally. The inappropriate and unimplementable formal planning 
systems become a political tool for politicians, officials and even informal 
workers and residents themselves. Time and again politicians have used plan-
ning arguments such as the need to “restore order”, “modernise” and “clean up 
the city” to evict thousands of informal workers and informal settlement 
residents.
 This has frequently happened where urban voters support national opposition 
parties. On other occasions, informal presence has been encouraged by politi-
cians as a “vote- banking” strategy before elections. Or informal workers them-
selves offer political support to promote their claims to land and space. Hence 
cities in Africa (and elsewhere) are often driven by patron- client networks 
searching for exploitative rent- seeking opportunities both outside of, and 
through, formal government institutions and regulations. This is well docu-
mented across the continent – notable examples are Zimbabwe’s 2005 “Opera-
tion Marambatsvini” (Kamete 2007a) and ongoing harassment particularly of 
street vendors (Rogerson 2016), Johannesburg’s “Operation Clean Sweep” 
(Bénit-Gbaffou 2016), Blantyre’s “Operation Dongosolo” (Riley 2014) as well 
as cases in Nigerian cities (Onodugo et al. 2016); Nairobi (Morange 2015); 
Accra (Steel et al. 2014); Lilongwe (Tonda and Kepe 2016) and Kampala 
(Young 2017).
 An added dimension is the big new player in African cities: international 
property developers. Post the 2008 financial crisis, interest in the African prop-
erty market has led to a host of urban land grabs with developers claiming they 
can create “world class cities” through “master planning” Dubai and Shanghai 
look- alike projects. Increasingly politicians support these to gain prestige and 
sometimes wealth. But these projects are simply new versions of urban colonial 
modernisation and are serving to marginalise and exclude even further those 
working and living informally (Watson 2014).
Challenging conventional wisdoms
Reconsidering the role of planning in relation to the informal economy and to 
informal settlements needs to happen conceptually as well as in practice. There 
are a number of conventional wisdoms in planning regarding informality which 
must be challenged – notions around the mono- functionality of homes and the 
role of public space; that informally prepared and distributed foods are a threat 
to consumer health and that informal workers are not contributing to the 
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economy, to climate change mitigation or to urban service delivery. We consider 
each of these in turn.
The home is a workspace for many low- income households
The first conceptual shift needed to inform livelihood- supporting planning 
approaches is the acknowledgement that housing, and settlements, have an eco-
nomic function. Poor households all over the world use their homes to generate 
income through making and/or selling products and services from these sites. 
Yet single- use zoning schemes and infrastructure planning, as well as many state 
housing policies, fail to recognise this important economic role of housing and 
can end up banning such activity and adding to economic costs and inefficien-
cies for home- based workers.
 The Mahila Housing Trust’s (MHT) slum upgrading work in four states of 
India effectively incorporates the economic function of housing, recognising that 
for many of the over 1.5 million members of the Self- Employed Women’s 
Association (SEWA), their homes also function as workplaces. Obino notes that 
in most cases, housing improvements were linked to a desire to expand eco-
nomic productivity. For home- based workers, better housing and services 
allowed more time at productive work, better access to water and safer storage 
for stocks. An electrical connection can allow better equipment such as an elec-
tric sewing machine, while a water connection quickens the production of food 
to be sold on the street. Studies have also found that improved infrastructure can 
stimulate investment in housing, but often this is dependent on loans from finan-
cial institutions (Obino 2013: 4).
Informal workers should have the right to work in public spaces
Many constitutions recognise the right to work. In Colombia, India and Mexico, 
court decisions have drawn on this constitutional right and affirmed the right to 
work on the street. Invoking these constitutional rights represents an advance on 
the far more prevalent view that any form of street- vending is against the law, 
but they do fall short of the specific position that work is a right and prohibition 
of street trading is a denial of that right (Meneses- Reyes and Caballero- Juárez 
2014). Brown (2015) suggests that urban public space should be considered a 
common resource, offering open access to those attempting to secure an income. 
Secure tenure for livelihoods demands as much recognition as it does for housing 
and it is quite possible to extend civil and common law traditions in many parts 
of Africa to accommodate a broader definition of these rights. Brown’s African 
case studies show that in the absence of constitutional measures, collective 
action by informal workers can also open up the opportunity for dialogue with 
the state on rights to public space.
 These arguments for access to streets and public spaces for work have signi-
ficant implications for urban planning. Street vendors and other informal workers 
as well as pedestrians, vehicles and recreational activities use public space and 
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mutual accommodation needs to be found. Street vendors need secure access to 
public space but also have a need for basic infrastructure such as running water, 
electrical connections, waste disposal and toilets. For street vendors as well as 
informal traders located in built markets, priorities are shelter from the elements, 
tables to display goods and storage facilities. Where electricity is accessible, 
some vendors have started more lucrative and value adding trades – carpenter-
ing, sewing, catering and computer and cell phone repairs.1 For waste pickers, 
sorting and storage facilities can transform their work environment and enhance 
their productivity and earning capacity (Dias and Samson 2016).
Informal food trade contributes to addressing food insecurity and 
thus improved health
Planning needs to shift from the assumption that informal food preparation and 
vending are a health threat and should be removed, to an acknowledgement of 
the positive health and economic benefits of this sector if it is correctly supported 
and managed. Urban food security is a key concern in poorer communities, and 
the informal economy is an important way in which the poor gain access to food. 
A 2009 survey across poor areas in 11 cities in southern Africa showed a high 
level of reliance on informal sources for food needs, with some 70 per cent of 
households surveyed normally sourcing food from informal outlets (Crush and 
Frayne 2011: 798). Yet planning and health regulations frequently make it 
extremely difficult for food vendors to operate either in public spaces or in resi-
dential areas and this undermines the access of households to cheap and nutri-
tious food. Moreover, when food vendors are subject to large- scale eviction 
measures, as happened in Blantyre in Malawi in 2006, then the “geography of 
urban poverty is reshaped” and households no longer able to access these 
cheaper outlets suffer worsened food insecurity (Riley 2014).
 Where informal vendors or traders are operating in public spaces and markets, 
the municipality needs to provide services and facilities to ensure a healthy 
selling environment. In Warwick Junction in Durban, South Africa, this was 
achieved through a partnership between the vendors/traders and the municipality, 
along with the careful design of facilities. Water points were designed and 
located to allow for their multiple use for washing, vegetable cleaning, cooking 
and taxi- washing. Toilets were easy to maintain, and were arranged in smaller 
blocks distributed throughout the market. Municipal waste removal was supple-
mented by volunteer market cleaners and intermittent “cleaning blitzes” (Dobson 
and Skinner 2009: 114–17).
Informal operators can contribute to climate change mitigation and 
improved urban services
The contribution of the informal economy to urban sustainability is rarely recog-
nised. It is more often regarded as a polluter of the environment, and planning, 
health and environmental regulations are used to remove and repress it. Yet 
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informal vendors and traders often source locally and make less use of polluting 
plastic packaging than formal shops.
 Municipal waste management schemes that integrate informal recyclers emit 
fewer greenhouse gases, as has been proved in Colombia (Sintana, Damgaard 
and Gomez 2015). In many countries, waste picker movements have negotiated 
with governments to secure integration into municipal recycling schemes. Peru 
and Brazil have both passed progressive national laws that support the integra-
tion and recognition of waste pickers and their cooperatives. In Peru, Law 
29.419 of 2010 regulates the activity of waste pickers, encouraging the registra-
tion of waste pickers via incentives to form waste pickers’ cooperatives (the 
reduction of taxes and the offer of capacity building programmes) while Brazil-
ian law mandates the inclusion of waste picker associations into solid waste 
management systems (Dias 2011b). Belo Horizonte in Brazil, Bogotá in Colom-
bia and Pune in India offer examples of successful integration of waste pickers 
into municipal waste management schemes.
 Dias details the different approaches (2016: 379–82). In all these cases, strong 
cooperatives of waste pickers have advocated for the right to access waste (in 
the case of Bogotá, through the courts) and have secured formal agreements with 
local authorities. In Belo Horizonte, the council has established facilities to sort 
and process waste which the cooperatives manage, and are now receiving finan-
cial incentives for the services they provide. In Pune, the waste picker 
cooperative has been contracted by the city as an independent service provider 
with agreed performance indicators doing door- to-door collection and receiving 
user fees. The Council provides equipment, working space and technical train-
ing. In 2010, the then mayor of Bogotá, in response to a Constitutional Court 
ruling mandating that waste picker cooperatives had the right to bid for solid 
waste management contracts, created a public waste management authority to 
integrate and pay waste pickers for the collection, transportation and recupera-
tion of recyclables.
Implications for planning practice
There is a significant gap between the needs of those working informally and the 
expertise and training of officials charged with the planning and management of 
informal workplaces and spaces. Planning officials rarely understand the highly 
specific and differentiated locational and service requirements of informal 
workers or where their activities fit into wider value chains. It is therefore essen-
tial that any urban intervention aimed at supporting the informal economy 
(whether in public space or home- based) involves extensive negotiation and par-
ticipatory planning processes, as well as professionals willing and able to con-
sider new forms of infrastructure provision and new or adapted rules to manage 
their use and servicing.
 Key to supportive interventions is understanding economic dynamics. In 
Warwick Junction, Durban, South Africa, for example, understanding the spe-
cific economic dynamics within different segments of the informal economy was 
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crucial. Through observation, consultation and many one- on-one discussions, it 
became clear that interventions to enhance the livelihoods of traditional medi-
cine traders were different from interventions needed for bovine head cookers, 
which were different again from supporting waste pickers operating in the area. 
Gleaning these insights involved municipal staff spending much time on the 
streets observing how space was used; one- on-one discussions with individual 
traders about their suppliers and customers to document backward and forward 
linkages of particular trades; and carefully designed participatory processes with 
groups of traders using role play among other techniques (Dobson and Skinner 
2009). Planners also need to understand the impact of value chains. For example, 
for waste pickers the price of recycled metal is set globally and determined by 
the needs of the big players in China and the East, and this directly affects their 
ability to survive economically.
 Factors common to the approach in these cases are:
• individual informal workers (particularly women) and their organisations 
are integrally involved in the process;
• there is recognition of informal workers as knowledgeable and legitimate 
partners;
• planners thus function as facilitators rather than all- knowing experts.
In addition, these cases show the importance of an incremental approach to 
upgrading, making use of experimentation through “pilots”, rather than end- state 
and inflexible master planning.
 A central issue, however, is the necessary balance between regulation and 
control, on the one hand, and inclusive and supportive planning approaches, on 
the other. Where there are competing and conflicting claims on public space 
(vendors vs. pedestrians, commercial vs. social uses of space), or home- based 
work which negatively affects neighbours, processes need to be in place, and 
institutionalised, to reach consensus agreements and mediate competing claims. 
Such arrangements will inevitably be highly context- specific: there are no 
models which can work across all places. The importance of consultative 
approaches and collective action on the part of informal workers has been 
emphasised above; both allow agreements (even in conflictual situations) to be 
worked out and reinforced in wider forums.
 One consultative process increasingly acknowledged as having potential for 
both informal workers and shack- dwellers is that of co- production. In this 
process, communities and groups organise using mapping, surveys, savings 
schemes and learning exchanges to facilitate their empowerment, and then 
engage in partnerships with government on upgrade processes. With both know-
ledge and funding supporting them, communities are far better placed to secure 
appropriate planning interventions. While co- production often focuses on 
informal settlement upgrading, there are also economic benefits to be negotiated. 
For example, a co- production process in Malawi on water access involved the 
state and communities as well as informal water vendors. The co- production 
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arrangement improved water access through increased communal water- kiosks, 
though the functioning of the entire water supply system was not without prob-
lems (Adams and Boateng 2018).
Future research priorities
What is being suggested is a fundamentally different approach to planning prac-
tice – bottom- up, incremental, flexible, economically conversant and acutely 
aware of, and informed by, the specific context and power dynamics. This calls 
for a new cohort of planning practitioners who are willing (and brave enough) to 
try out new approaches as a few experimenters have already done in the cases 
we have highlighted. Importantly, those working and living informally have a 
nuanced understanding of their context, challenging the very notion of “who is a 
planner”.
 In terms of research priorities to support this change, we prioritise detailed 
case study work in what are often regarded as peripheral, informal areas in the 
“ordinary” cities and towns. Duminy et al. (2014: 1) support “careful empirical 
analysis of what actually exists, and critical reflection on how it has come to be 
that way”. Highly contextualised knowledge of the interests, power relations and 
actual daily practices underpinning inclusionary planning processes is the route 
to transforming them.
 These case studies should feed into three important processes. First is chang-
ing planning laws. Berrisford and McAuslan (2017) argue that the future of 
African cities must be shaped by laws that address the lived experience of house-
holds and firms. They suggest this requires taking some Western- style laws and 
some locally emerging ones, identifying the aspects of each that are effective, 
and knitting these together into a legal model that works. This in turn requires 
deep and context- specific research.
 Second is the training of a new cohort of urban planners as is occurring 
through the Indian Institute of Human Settlements and the African Association 
of Planning Schools Model Master’s planning curriculum. Both are suggesting 
using case studies in teaching in combination with experiential learning with 
communities and their support NGOs, and developing good cases is an important 
research task (Watson and Odendaal 2013).
 Third is the call within planning and urban studies to develop theory “from 
the South”. This group of scholars (the Comaroffs, Roy, Simone, Watson, 
Yiftachel among others) as Bhan explains, seek to “unsettle the meta- narratives 
of urban theory told from the great cities – New York, Chicago, London, Paris – 
and locate them in place and time” particularly from places that have so far been 
considered “peripheral” (Bhan 2016: 12).
 A final addition is the need for cross- disciplinary work on informality. Empir-
ical and theoretical work on the informal economy has largely been located in 
development studies and economics. There is insufficient engagement with the 
urban planning field and a tendency to be space- blind in terms of policy devel-
opment. The need for planners to understand the economic informants of these 
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activities suggests that urban spatial planners would do well to engage with 
development studies debates and vice versa.
Note




Urban design is a bridge practice – one that implies flows, is open, plastic and 
reconfigures itself depending on the problem and the agents, actors and constitu-
encies it has to influence. It is plastic enough to even configure and reconfigure 
itself between built form and the broader ecologies of the natural system in 
which it is situated, and more critically as the bridge discipline that embraces the 
autonomy of architecture and the rich terrain of social science that (ideally) 
informs the discipline of urban planning.
 Today urban design seems to be understood in complete contradiction to this 
intent. In fact, democracy with advanced capitalism and neoliberal policy is a 
fatal combination for the urban form of cities more generally and for urban 
design as we imagine its practice. Under this combination, material configura-
tion through architecture and the aspiration of permanence become the default 
conditions for our cities and by extension for the expectations of society from 
urban designers. Here architecture becomes the sole instrument through which 
cities are imagined and formed. This is particularly limiting, given that cities in 
the world are in such a state of flux on account of both political and economic 
uncertainty as well as climate change. So, if anything, urban design should be 
making this state of flux and the impermanence it implies, as well as the design 
of transitions in our built environment, the central agenda. In other words, the 
mission of urban design as a bridge practice could be to straddle and create pro-
ductive feedback loops between these different conditions that are moulding our 
built environment today.
 However, the practice of urban design globally has been limited to create 
coherence, efficiencies, and stability in ways that the urban form for our cities is 
imagined. Architecture becomes the central organizing device for the formation 
of cities. In autocratic governments, the city and its form are imagined more 
often than not by multinational design corporations patronized by the monarch 
and often in complete detachment to the realities on the ground. In democracies, 
on the other hand, it is usually the combination of market forces leveraged by 
developers and financial interests and in some cases (at the smaller neighbour-
hood scale) by community groups or not- for profit- organizations – thus resulting 
in often disparate imaginations as a result of varying aspirations. This is a non- 
productive condition because what has resulted from this are boundaries of 
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 containment for urban design practitioners, thus depriving cities of this crucial 
bridge practice – urban design. A practice that in its original aspirations was to 
connect different disciplines to make for a more productive and synergic engage-
ment with the construction of the city. And to imagine the city as a broad and 
complex ecology of living and working in co- existence within natural systems. 
Thus, the critical questions for the practice of urban design are whether, as a 
practice, it should only respond to the context of its operation, or should it also 
engage with the construction of that context itself?
 Today that context is of a city in flux. In several cities around the world, in 
the post- industrial scenario, a new system has resulted where living and working 
have become extremely fragmented in the formal sector of production but much 
more intertwined in the informal sectors where living and working often occur in 
the same space. Locations of jobs and places of living are not interrelated in the 
predictable fashion when job locations were centralized. However, this has some 
advantages which are not adequately recognized in the formal imaginations of 
the city. For while being fragmented, in some ways working and living have 
become intertwined, albeit informally. Today, in the majority world (of the 
Global South) self- employment accounts for a large majority of livelihoods, 
often in public spaces or private homes. This reality should be the real driver for 
imagining the new self- employed city and what its urban form might be.
 Furthermore, in today’s networked economies, these patterns are not only 
fragmented but in flux and constantly reconfiguring. This results in a condition 
where there is simultaneous fragmentation as well as intertwining of work and 
living spaces and in fact in the structure of the city itself and its form. The notion 
of clear zoning or predictable and implementable land use all breaks down into 
much more multifaceted ways in which the city is used and operates. This is an 
urbanism created by those outside the elite domains of the formal modernity of 
the state. It is what Ravi Sundaram refers to as a “pirate” modernity of the poor 
who slip under the laws of the city to simply survive, without any conscious 
attempt at constructing a counter- culture (Sundaram 2001). The spaces created 
or occupied by the poor have been largely excluded from the cultural discourses 
on globalization, which focus on elite domains of production in the city. They 
tend to fall below the radar of most urban designers, who focus on the public 
realm as we have defined it traditionally, but in this condition the meaning of 
space itself is in flux and ever changing. It is not only the city of the poor, or the 
regular models of the formal and informal and other such binaries, but a kinetic 
space, a space where these models collapse into singular entities and where 
meanings are ever shifting and blurred.
 The questions this raises are as follows: can we design for multiple uses and 
users of space as urban designers and planners? Can we design with a porous 
and fluid mind – one capable of accepting the simultaneous validity of varying 
aspirations? Can other forms of organizations be embedded in the discussion 
about our cities and, if so, how do we recognize and embed this within the 
formal discourse of urban design? This is not an argument for making our cities 
temporary but rather one of recognizing the temporal as an integral part of the 
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city and seeing what space exists for this within the possibilities of urban design 
– all the way from its urban form, public spaces and governance structures.
 So, then, what is the role of urban design in this condition? Most certainly 
this flux is the new normal and, in addition, the spurts of growth and flux trig-
gered by natural and political uncertainty are going to challenge our reading of 
the urban condition and the role of urban design. The issues that could be negoti-
ated in this form of urban design practice, then, are as diverse as memory, geo-
graphy, infrastructure, sanitation, public health governance, ecology, new forms 
of livelihood and urban form, albeit in some measure temporary. These para-
meters could unfold their projective potential, offering alternatives of how to 
embed softer but perhaps more robust systems in urban form otherwise imagined 
with aspirations for more permanency. Andrea Branzi advises us on how to think 
of cities of the future. He suggests that we need to learn to implement reversibil-
ity, avoiding rigid solutions and definitive decisions. He also suggests 
approaches which allow space to be adjusted and reprogrammed with new activ-
ities not foreseen and not necessarily planned (Cardevila 2016). Thus, urban 
design as a practice must acknowledge the need to re- examine permanent solu-
tions as the only mode for the formulation of urban imaginaries, and instead 
imagine new protocols that are constantly reformulated, readapted, and re- 
projected in an iterative search for a temporary equilibrium that reacts to a per-
manent state of flux.
 One could argue that the future of cities depends less on the rearrangement of 
buildings and infrastructure and more on the ability of urban designers to openly 
imagine more malleable technological and material solutions for rapidly shifting 
economic and social landscapes. That is, to imagine a city form that recognizes 
and better handles the temporary and elastic nature of the contemporary and 
emergent built environment with more effective strategies for managing change 
as an essential element for the construction of the urban environment. The chal-
lenge is then learning from these changing conditions on how to manage and 
negotiate different layers of the urban while accommodating emergent needs and 
often largely neglected parts of urban society. Thus, the aspiration would then be 
to imagine a more flexible practice of urban design more aligned with emergent 
realities, enabling us to deal with more complex scenarios than those of static or 
stable consolidated situations.
 The challenge for urban design today is to transform to become more inclu-
sive, thereby recognizing its dependency on other actors and agencies for imple-
mentation and multiple domains for its design. Integral to this new emerging 
approach are incremental strategies and multifaceted feedback loops making the 
process of urban design increasingly dynamic. New technologies could poten-
tially help us spatialize and combine big data as well as grounded knowledge 
and find new ways of discerning emergent patterns to understand spaces in flux. 
This then facilitates a more nuanced, fine- grained, and grounded registrar of the 
reality in which we operate. Perhaps emblematically, urban design today is in a 
place between an intuitive exploration between the formal city represented 
by architecture and the instant city premised on temporality. That is, between 
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formalism with its quest for functionalism and the temporary character of 
informality – in the space of true transitions.
 Then urban design could be about how these spatial possibilities play out to 
influence the quality of lives, of our evolving economy, society and culture and 
the broader well- being of the planet. It is the broader view of planetary implica-
tions and ecological thinking that will prepare for us questions of equity and 
humanism in the context of our urban design praxis. Design for this condition of 
flux will necessitate urban design to think in terms of transitions rather than in 
absolute terms. That is how we may actually avoid designing permanent solu-
tions for perhaps what well might be temporary problems.
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17 Informality, housing and work
The view from Indian cities
Gautam Bhan
This chapter interrogates whether the conceptual frameworks and approaches 
developed within urban practice on informal settlements apply equally well to 
informal livelihoods, and, particularly, how urban planning, engineering and 
design might better respond to such livelihoods. It does so by focusing on the 
links between informality, housing and work with evidence and examples drawn 
from Indian cities. Research, policy and practice within informal housing and 
informal livelihood have a lot to learn from each other, and conversations that 
begin that inter- referencing are essential and critical.
Housing versus houses: the context and frames
Anyone who has spent time in informal settlements knows that the income- poor 
make at least three kinds of housing choices that are driven by the nature of their 
work. First, the nature, design and form of the house they self- construct often 
reflect the need to use the house for work, storage and commerce as well as for 
residential purposes. Second, and more importantly, the location of where they 
live – whether they do so legally or in tension with law and master plans in the 
“slum”– is dominantly determined based on proximity and access to employ-
ment. Often, therefore, workers will tolerate poor material quality of a house that 
is well located rather than take a materially and structurally “better” house that 
makes livelihood unviable. Third, investing in the housing unit itself, especially 
for those who build and improve houses incrementally over a period of time, is 
dependent on work and wages/earnings. In other words, not only can you not 
afford a better house if wages and earnings are unreliable or inadequate, you also 
cannot improve the house you currently live in. In many ways, at individual, 
household and city- scales, the housing question is, in many ways, a livelihoods 
question.
 To understand this more deeply, we must remember that housing is not 
houses. Beyond just the dwelling unit or the house, housing is an assemblage of 
location, services, work and tenure. Elsewhere, my colleagues and I have 
described a framework that argues that housing has to be three things: adequate, 
affordable and viable.1 The first two are familiar to most, touching upon the 
material adequacy of a dwelling unit, its size, its affordability and its tenure 
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security. Viability, however, goes beyond just the dwelling unit. It talks about 
proximity to livelihoods, connections to transport and mobility, and asks whether 
housing can give a sense of belonging to place and society. Viability asks a 
simple but pivotal question: can one make a meaningful life here? Housing 
policy and practice take adequacy and affordability quite seriously, tenure 
security less so, but it rarely is able to take on viability at all. Part of the reason 
is that viability cannot be captured by housing policy alone: it requires integra-
tion into broader economic and spatial planning.
 Like all practice that requires integration across traditionally separated 
sectors, it is very difficult to do. Viability has resulted unintentionally in the 
Indian city so far. The “slum” chooses location, form and proximity to work as 
its primary locational logic. It is viable and affordable. Yet that viability has 
come at the cost of adequacy and tenure security. What planning policy and 
practice have done is to ensure some minimum investments in services and infra-
structure, some incremental moves on tenure, but largely their approach has been 
to “look the other way”. This is an odd mode of practice – it’s hard to imagine 
recommending it as a way to regulate informality.
 This status quo is, however, untenable. Indian cities are changing. The most 
significant emerging threat to viability is no longer that not enough attention is 
being paid to informal settlements. Instead, it is that within the changing polit-
ical economy of Indian urbanisation, the state and other land- owning actors are 
increasingly unwilling to “look the other way.” This implies not only a new 
intensity to cycles of eviction and resettlement across Indian cities as long- held, 
politically negotiated, tenure arrangements are threatened, but also a policy 
framework of building new affordable housing in peripheral locations. This is a 
familiar sight in Indian cities today: vertical, multi- storey small apartment blocks 
as “slum redevelopment”, mostly built at scale in the city’s peripheries where 
land is available cheaply. This new housing stock is a precise schism in our triad. 
It is materially adequate, relatively affordable, but its location and design definit-
ively break the link between housing and work. Affordable, adequate, but not 
viable.
 Finally, new forms of urbanisation – peri- urban development, corridors, 
special economic zones – that are underlying a significant part of urbanisation do 
not have the same historical trajectories that could hold informality in the past. 
These new urban spaces are planned, controlled and enclaved spaces that are 
being built at a time when modes of employment and output are shifting; and the 
relationship between employment and work stands severed. Quick example: 
even the National Manufacturing Policy that speaks of building new industrial 
townships which it calls National Industrial Manufacturing Zones does not 
mention housing even once – not even for formal workers in the planned indus-
trial zones, let alone informal workers in complex, multi- use cities. With trends 
such as these, in the urbanisation that is to come in India – the second largest in 
human history after China – what will be the possibility even of the organic 
informality that has characterised Indian cities so far?
138  Gautam Bhan
How do we think/move from this context?
I suggest three or four ways of thinking and working differently from this current 
set of challenges. First, we have to re- think the techniques and tools of planning. 
Informality in housing has long simply looked at planning as the thing to evade, 
or a modality in post- facto regularisation. But with the ability to evade planning 
increasingly shrinking, we will have to confront the need to engage with the state 
rather than keeping it at a distance. Here, spatial informality has much to learn 
from economic informality. Informal workers have been more successful in 
finding ways to engage with the state that respect its informal nature but also 
seek some form of regulation or support. Take the example of new legislation on 
street vending in India, the idea of “natural markets” as a planning category, or 
even welfare funds for construction workers whether they are formal or informal. 
Residents of informal settlements have been less successful in finding parallel 
modes of recognition that retain the flexibility of informality but reduce its 
vulnerability.
 Such new innovations that could enable recognition of the need for viable 
informal housing require both new research but also new locations. In urban 
India, a long- standing focus on the megacities, such as Delhi and Mumbai, has 
meant that the opportunities and challenges of non- metropolitan cities (which in 
India are 500,000 people and up!) have been under- explored. These are cities 
where urban poverty is ever- present, but housing informality is less severe, 
tenure more secure, and evictions less likely. These are also the cities that will 
enter into new phases of urbanisation within the next decade. It is in these cities 
that planning for future growth is still possible and desirable, and we must ask: 
how will we protect spaces for organic, incremental urban forms to exist as these 
cities grow? Do these forms have to be “informal” in the way we currently 
understand the term? What balance of informal work and space will exist in 
these minor urban centres?
 Second, our approach to planning, as well as to planning education, must 
change. Only one architectural school in India teaches a full course on repair. No 
engineering college teaches courses on retrofitting services into already built 
landscapes. We know how to plan a new layout but not what zone to apply on a 
landscape that is already built before the plan was laid out. Planning is taught in 
India as if the temporalities of urbanisation are yet to come, as if our cities are 
yet to be built instead of the complex urban environments we already have, 
whether intended or unintended. What we need is a new vocabulary of practice: 
repair, retrofit, regularise instead of plan, build and allocate.2
 Third, we have not adequately explored what it means to make arguments, 
frame research and advocate practice at the intersection of multiple informalities. 
For example, can we argue for improvements in informal housing – viability, 
adequacy, or affordability – through its impact on employment? In other words: 
measure service improvements, for example, in housing by measuring impacts 
on wages and earnings in addition to the health benefits of sanitation? We need 
new connections that recognise and take further all the ways that houses become 
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housing. In urban India, the strongest claim to rights in the city currently is 
education, a new fundamental right in the Indian Constitution. This right is 
spatial: the right to go to a school within 2 km of your house. A current legal 
challenge in the Punjab High Court asks: does an informal settlement within 
2 km of a school count as “residence”? This judgment can go either way but one 
can also imagine making an argument that eviction breaks one’s right to educa-
tion – a form of leveraging that I am arguing is inadequately explored in both 
activism and policy. Similarly, the most effective (if not ideal) arguments for 
upgrading slums are currently coming from the impact on improved environ-
mental health and from building city resilience in response to disasters. How do 
we leverage the complementarities here? How do we add a focus on informal 
livelihoods into the mix?
 Fourth, we have to find ways to return some of the responsibility of deliver-
ing housing back to employers, agents, contractors, and the range of actors that 
provide livelihood opportunities, ensuring that we work across the formal- 
informal spectrum. Again, we have been better at this in speaking of social 
security than we have in spatial informality. Can we combine the lessons from 
one into the other? What would it mean to have different kinds of “employers”, 
as a shorthand category, bear responsibility for housing for informal workers? 
What would it look like spatially, financially and in terms of governance? How 
would we deliver housing entitlements to workers outside defined “office” or 
“workspaces” that exist in formal work?
 One idea that cuts across these is the example I want to end with of a new 
focus we could try that I believe brings together housing and work perfectly: 
rental housing. Here also, I mean rental in a deeply temporally flexible way: 
from renting for a night to longer- term rentals. Housing that is flexible, transitory 
but not vulnerable. If access to this kind of housing came on the basis of work 
status but not through particular employers, then a range of actors can be ima-
gined who could manage this new form of housing, with contractors taking time-
 shares, for example, to fulfil mandated worker housing responsibilities in a 
short- term construction project. It is such new forms of inter- linked praxis that 
we must explore as we read informalities together. These forms require us to 
take the spatiality of economic informality, and hence its links to housing, the 
built environment and planning, seriously.
Notes
1 See G. Bhan, S. Harish and G. Anand, Policy Approaches to Affordable Housing in 
India: Problems and Opportunities (Bangalore: Indian Institute for Human Settle-
ments, 2014). Available at: http://iihs.co.in/knowledge- gateway/policy- approach-to- 
affordable-housing- in-urban- india/.
2 See G. Bhan, “Notes on a Southern urban practice”, Environment and Urbanisation 
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Labour law distinguishes employees from what it terms independent contractors. 
Labour law protects employees, whereas law of contract notionally protects 
independent contractors. In most jurisdictions, homeworkers are considered to 
be independent contractors.
 The premise of the law of contract is that the parties to a contract should be 
free to contract on whatever terms they wish, even if to their detriment. Courts 
should honour the “will of the parties” and not interfere in the terms of the con-
tract, unless there are strong public policy imperatives, such as illegal activities.1
 Unless required by legislation, contracts need not be in writing. A valid con-
tract simply requires a “meeting of minds” and agreement on material terms, 
such as what is being exchanged, for how much, and the delivery date. Imagine 
the following agreement between a homeworker and an intermediary:
1 The contractor (who might be an employee, an independent contractor, or 
an agent of the factory) – will deliver pre- cut fabric to the homeworker and 
collect completed T- shirts at an agreed time.
2 The homeworker will provide the sewing machine, the thread, electricity 
and the work space.
3 The homeworker will be paid X per piece.
4 Poor quality goods will be rejected by the contractor’s unilateral decision.
5 The contractor will pay on receipt of goods.
Were the bargaining power distributed equally between the parties, we would 
likely agree that the terms are fair. The problem is that the terms are not negoti-
ated, but imposed by the contractor on a take- it-or- leave it basis; the piece- rate is 
almost always below the equivalent minimum wage for the sector (Pieper and 
Putri 2017; Zhou 2017) and does not cover the homeworker’s production costs, 
excludes social protection costs (such as health care or sick leave); the relationship 
between the contractor and homeworker is seldom arm’s-length: the contractor 
may be from the same community and might also be the (male) money- lender, or 
(male) kin, which affects their power relations; and the contract is embedded 
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within a particular mode of production, known as value chains, which fundament-
ally impacts on the contractual terms.2
 This last point needs elaboration. The contemporary form of transnational 
production is attributable to technological innovation, lower transport costs, 
exchange control de- regulation, the World Trade Organisation law that has 
reduced import tariffs, low wages in developing counties, but also to a develop-
ment ideology that includes “labour flexibility” as a goal for governments and 
corporations (Collins 1990; Baldwin 2011).3 Standing (1999) argues that labour 
flexibility comprises four aspects. (1) production or organisational flexibility 
refers to corporations’ practice of keeping the profitable functions (such as 
research and development, branding and marketing) and outsourcing or sub- 
contracting less profitable aspects, such as production that can be commoditised 
(Klein 1999); (2) wage system flexibility targets the wage costs of production: 
firms reduce their wage costs by restructuring their relationships with workers to 
avoid the responsibilities that come with an employment contract, including by 
sub- contracting work; (3) labour cost flexibility targets the non- wage component 
of labour, including social protection (such as unemployment insurance), com-
pensation for injuries at work, sick leave and supervision costs. Firms find ways 
to transfer these costs to other firms and/or to their workers and these firms (fac-
tories) in turn transfer these costs to sub- contracted labour, including home-
workers; and, finally, (4) numerical flexibility means firms hire when market 
demand is high and lay off when demand is low. Typically, they hire casual, 
part- time or sub- contracted labour (including homeworkers) for high demand 
periods, which enables them to transfer the costs and risks of fluctuating demand 
to these workers. Hiring homeworkers enables manufacturing companies to 
achieve all four forms of labour flexibility.
 A recent global survey (ILO 2017) of 1,454 suppliers to multinational enter-
prises (MNEs) from 87 countries by the International Labour Organization 
shows that MNEs continually pressurise suppliers to drop their prices. Up to 52 
per cent of suppliers that were surveyed sign contracts to produce goods at a 
loss. The primary reason they do so, is to secure future orders. Demanding 
unpaid overtime and keeping wages low for regular workers, combined with out-
sourcing to homeworkers who are paid even less and enjoy fewer labour rights, 
are the suppliers’ primary tactics for keeping costs low.
 In this environment, what might the best legal strategy be to secure labour 
rights for homeworkers, including the right to freedom of association and col-
lective bargaining? Would it be to expand the concept of “employee” in which 
to reclassify homeworkers as several jurisdictions have done? Or devise a sepa-
rate category called “dependent” contractors” in which to classify homeworkers, 
as the 20th International Conference of Labour Statisticians has recommended?4 
Should we look to contract law and regulate contracts between contractors and 
homeworkers? Should we look to human rights law, as per the International 
Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) approach in crafting international law instru-
ments? Which approaches would work across jurisdictions to address the 
problem of mobile capital? And which approaches hold most possibility to 
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address the unfettered power of brands and retailers that enables them to con-
clude contracts with suppliers that allow them to pay $4 per T- shirt – a dollar 
less than the $5 they paid 20 years ago (Baldwin 2011) and to coerce suppliers 
to agree to produce goods at a loss?
 This chapter discusses two international human rights law initiatives and three 
different approaches adopted by countries; and offers brief comments on an ana-
lytical framework as we craft legal strategies for protecting homeworkers.
International law
The ITUC adopted a human rights approach in its negotiations for international 
legal instruments. Both the revised ILO MNE Declaration (which is likely to 
become a Convention), and the Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply 
Chains in the Garment and Footwear Sector (the “Guidance”)5 incorporate the 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.
 According to the Guiding Principles, businesses should assume responsib-
ility for addressing “human rights impacts” attributable to their commercial 
activities, and prevent or mitigate behaviour by other actors in their supply 
chains (such as suppliers or sub- contractors) that violate workers’ human 
rights (Ruggie 2011). Businesses must draft a policy commitment to human 
rights, which should be distributed to all their stakeholders, and undertake a 
due diligence of their supply chains to assess whether the production processes 
might violate workers’ rights. These rights are found in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights,6 the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work, and national legislation. According to the Guiding Principles, 
businesses should use their “leverage” with suppliers to incorporate labour/
human rights in their procurement contracts and to terminate relations with 
recalcitrant suppliers. They should act if workers’ rights might potentially be 
violated, and should implement a remediation process if workers have suffered 
human rights violations.
 The OECD’s (2017) Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains 
in the Garment and Footwear Sector (the “Guidance”) includes a section on 
homeworkers, which recommends particular practices. Businesses are encour-
aged to identify production processes and countries where homeworkers are 
likely to be prevalent and to assess whether their suppliers’ procedures for sourc-
ing from homeworkers are responsible. The recommendations also encourage 
businesses to engage governments to promote homeworkers’ rights and to 
promote their equal treatment to other workers (OECD 2011). The Guidance is 
addressed to multinational enterprises (MNEs) and includes their subsidiaries. 
Importantly, it applies to all sectors and sizes, including small and medium- sized 
enterprises. The criteria for the Guidance to be applicable is that the business 
must either operate or be based in a country that is a signatory to the Guidelines. 
This means that domestic companies also have to adhere to the Guidelines if 
they are based in a country that adheres to the Guidelines. The list of adhering 
countries includes the 36 OECD countries, and 12 non- OECD countries.
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 Human rights discourse can, and does, shift public consciousness, which in 
itself is a form of regulation: market actors change their behaviour in the face of 
sanctions such as potential consumer boycotts. However, compliance by busi-
nesses with the instruments is voluntary, and the focus is on businesses securing 
their suppliers’ compliance and not on challenging their own procurement prac-
tices. In the case of the OECD Guidance, homeworkers could take a case to the 
national contact point (NCP) in the country in which the MNE is domiciled and 
the NCP could make a non- binding finding against the MNE. Even if an MNE is 
not bound by the decision, such a strategy renders homeworkers more visible, 
and enables them to shape the public discourse about homework.
National legislation
National legislation employs one of three approaches. The most common 
approach expands the traditional employment/labour relations legislation that 
covers employees to include sub- contracted work, including homeworkers, 
which effectively extends labour rights to homeworkers on the basis that they 
are disguised employees. The second approach, pioneered by Thailand, is to leg-
islate that the contract between “hirers” and homeworkers must satisfy certain 
conditions for the contract to be valid and legal. The third approach is to 
combine a “due diligence” human rights approach with a “mandatory code” that 
regulates the terms of contract. The chapter briefly discusses each, and their 
method of enforcement.
 Countries such as Bulgaria, Chile, Morocco, Nicaragua, South Africa and 
Tanzania have amended their existing labour legislation to include sub- 
contracted work (“disguised employment”). The weakness of this approach is 
two- fold: first, if the homeworker is contracted directly by a factory, the legis-
lation would help her show that she is de jure the factory’s employee and that 
she is entitled to the same rights as other employees. If, however, she is con-
tracted through an intermediary contractor, including another homeworker, she 
may only be able to establish an employment relationship with the intermediary, 
and not with the factory (unless the intermediary is a factory employee or unless 
an agency relationship can be proved). The claims for labour rights are therefore 
against an intermediary contractor who might have as little bargaining power as 
the homeworker. The Thai legislation has the same effect, in that the “hirer” is 
liable and the legislation does not address the hirer’s claim against the factory. 
Second, if a homeworker works for three different intermediaries, she may not 
be able to satisfy a court that any one is her employer. Australia’s legislation, by 
contrast, regulates the entire chain, rather than the “employment” relationship 
only.7 The homeworker can claim from anyone who she regards as the 
“employer” and if that person is an intermediary contractor, he can make a claim 
against the actual employer.
 The three approaches differ in another important respect. For the first two 
approaches, the burden of enforcement rests with homeworkers.8 In Australia, by 
contrast, several chain actors bear responsibility for enforcement. The retailers, 
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factories, suppliers and contractors each have transparency and disclosure duties 
to the state, and to the trade union. They have a duty if they sell their products in 
the particular state if they have procured from homeworkers in any state of Aus-
tralia, even if that state does not have the same legislation. The state has a duty 
to inspect and can be a party to litigation, and trade unions participate in enforce-
ment by reviewing the details reported by the retailers and other parties, and 
have powers of inspection. This approach reflects “new governance” (Lobel 
2007) theories of regulation, according to which the responsibility of enforce-
ment is distributed across several actors, including self- regulation by the private 
sector, and by civil society (such as unions and non- governmental organisations, 
NGOs) and incentives and enforcement mechanisms (such as duties of transpar-
ency, benchmarks, best practice goals, etc.) are deployed. In the Australian 
example, the combination of hard (state) and soft (new governance) regulatory 
mechanisms has proven to be particularly effective.9
Looking ahead
Even if national law is effective, capital can, and does, move to countries with 
less onerous regulation or weaker enforcement (Pieper and Putri 2017). A plural-
 overlapping conception of governance is therefore critical, meaning that many 
different forms of governance at different jurisdictional spheres should co- exist. 
Governance is needed at the global, regional, national and state level, and no 
one- size-fits- all: different models of regulation and enforcement are feasible and 
effective in different political, cultural and institutional contexts.10 For example, 
the Australian legislation was possible because of strong union pressure and 
union capacity to enforce the legislation (Rawlings 2014).
 The menu of enforcement options needs to be expanded beyond reliance on 
homeworkers to go to court or to a labour tribunal, since the evidence suggests 
that they would rather be exploited than complain and risk losing their work 
(Sinha and Mehrotra 2016; von Broembsen 2018). New governance theory 
offers options that might be used creatively for homeworker organisations to 
participate in enforcement.
 The UK Modern Slavery Act and the Californian Transparency in Supply 
Chains Act, which address forced labour,11 are weak in terms of the responsibil-
ities of businesses or the sanctions against them for non- compliance, but from a 
legal perspective, the innovation of these two national Acts lies in regulating not 
only their domestic corporations’ dealings in other countries, but also foreign 
corporations that sell products to their consumers. They demonstrate that, with 
sufficient political will, governments of developed countries can regulate the 
activities of both multinationals incorporated in their territories that do business 
in other countries, and multinationals that are not incorporated in their jurisdic-
tion, but sell to their domestic markets. These legal strategies could therefore be 
extended to incorporate other rights violations.
 Homeworker organisations could use international law mechanisms – ILO 
mechanisms for countries that have ratified Convention 177, and national contact 
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points (NCPs) in countries that have effective NCPs and are the home country of 
multinational corporations with homeworkers in their supply chains. Consider 
Bulgaria, which has ratified ILO Home Work Convention 177 (C177), con-
cluded a national agreement with trade union federations and with TUSIV 
“Edinstvo” (UNITY in English), the Bulgarian trade union of informal workers. 
The government subsequently amended its Labour Code so that homeworkers 
are treated on equal terms with other employees, in accordance with C177. But 
the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy has failed to enforce the amended 
legislation, claiming that in the absence of written contracts, homeworkers are 
not entitled to the Labour Code’s Chapter VIII provisions for homeworkers.
 A country is required to report to the ILO two years after ratifying a Conven-
tion on its progress on implementation, and thereafter every five years. The most 
representative trade union federation and employer organisation may comment on 
their government’s report; they may also submit their own independent reports on 
the implementation, both in law and in practice, of the convention concerned. In 
2014, UNITY sent a letter to the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR). The CEACR asked the govern-
ment to respond to these charges in its next report and asked for research on home-
workers’ terms and conditions of work. Bulgaria’s next report was due by 1 
September 2018. In August 2018, UNITY submitted its own report to the CEACR, 
and the CEACR has asked the trade union federation and the government to 
respond. Whereas the most representative trade union originally agreed with the 
government’s position, its final report quoted sections of UNITY’s report. Also 
UNITY asked researchers from WIEGO to write a research report on home-
workers’ terms and conditions of work, which it also submitted to CEACR.
 The CEACR used UNITY’s report and WIEGO’s research as the basis of its 
comments and questions to the Bulgarian government. CITUB, the trade union 
federation, initially supported the government position, namely, that home-
workers are independent contractors unless they have employment contracts. 
Once the CEACR asked CITUB to respond to UNITY’s report, CITUB changed 
its position to support UNITY’s argument that the legislation does not reflect the 
national agreement that was signed in November 2018.
 The CEACR’s final comments to the Bulgarian government are the following:
The Committee requests the Government to provide detailed information on 
specific steps taken or envisaged to ensure equality of treatment between 
homeworkers and other workers, including by consulting the social partners 
concerned with a view to identifying homeworkers in an employment rela-
tionship, within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, who should be 
benefiting from the protections afforded by the Labour Code. Further recall-
ing that paragraph 13 of the Home Work Recommendation, 1996 (No. 184), 
provides that minimum rates of wage should be fixed for home work in 
accordance with national law and practice, the Committee asks the Govern-
ment to reply in detail to the observations raised by UNITY in relation to 
the low level of wages earned by home workers.
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 The Committee requests the Government to provide detailed information 
concerning the measures adopted or envisaged to improve the situation of 
homeworkers, and to identify the employers’ and workers’ organisations 
that have been consulted with regard to the development, implementation 
and review of such measures.12
The CEACR’s “requests” addressed to the government are merely requests 
which the government may or may not address in its report in five years’ time. 
The ILO reporting mechanism is therefore very weak as a mechanism to enforce 
compliance with ratified conventions. But the story illustrates the fact that if a 
representative organisation of homeworkers has voice in an international forum, 
it can shift the power relations and the discourse on homework within a country. 
Since the CEACR’s request, the government has been willing to engage with 
UNITY again. It is paying for a meeting on homework, which UNITY is organ-
ising, and to which UNITY may invite its members as well as international 
speakers and the ILO’s international standards department.
 Finally, transnational HomeNets should engage with global sector unions for 
homeworkers to be recognised and protected in global framework agreements 
with brands, and in the provisions in trade agreements that aim to protect labour 
rights.
Notes
 1 Unlike common law countries, many civil law (non- Anglo-Saxon) countries’ law of 
contract requires parties to observe a duty of good faith.
 2 Terms used by different disciplines include global supply chains; global value chains; 
global production networks and global commodity chains. See Sturgeon (2009) for a 
nuanced discussion of the different disciplines and literatures that contribute to global 
value chain analysis, including economic geography, economic sociology, strategic 
management and transaction costs economics.
 3 See Baldwin (2011), who distinguishes between a first and second “unbundling” of 
production and who argues that while global value chains are not new, this second, 
contemporary “unbundling” has different characteristics to the first. For example, in 
the first unbundling, MNEs would establish a plant in a country through a subsidiary, 
i.e., production was vertically integrated, in that the MNE owned shares in its sup-
pliers. With the second unbundling, MNEs have do not own shares in their suppliers, 
who are legally autonomous firms.
 4 WIEGO colleagues were members of the Expert Group on the Revision of the Inter-
national Classification of Status in Employment that worked on proposed criteria for 
such a category in international statistics, but no such category yet exists in law, as far 
as I am aware, despite debates since the 1960s. See Harry Arthurs (1965–66).
 5 Since the 2011 update to the Guidelines, the OECD has clarified what the due dili-
gence process should involve and a due diligence guidance has been developed for 
five different sectors including the garment and footwear sector – a key sector for 
homeworkers.
 6 See Sections 23–5, which pertain to all workers, including homeworkers.
 7 Brazil has also adopted a supply chain approach. The National Labour Law, which 
was promulgated in 1943, states that companies that outsource production share the 
responsibility for the rights of workers in their supply chain (Tilly et al. 2013). The 
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textile sector union has used this legislation to put pressure on the lead firm, or on 
labour inspectors, to realise employment rights and benefits, including social protec-
tion, for homeworkers.
 8 In Thailand, HomeNet Thailand is pressuring the government to enforce the legis-
lation though campaigns targeted at factories complying voluntarily, rather than 
because of inspection, and is loath to litigate.
 9 See Trubeck and Trubeck (2006) for ways in which traditional law and new govern-
ance approaches complement, or work against each other.
10 See Marshall, Shelley. “New Models of Labour Regulation for Non- Standard and 
Informal workers”, paper presented at the Labour Law Research Network Conference, 
University of Toronto, June 2017 (on file with author), for examples to illustrate this 
point.
11 See the United Kingdom’s Modern Slavery Act of 2015; and California’s Transpar-
ency in Supply Chains Act of 2010.
12 See www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:13100:0::NO::P13100_
COMMENT_ID:3966155 (accessed 20 June 2019).
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informal workers at the base of 
global garment value chains
New institutions in the labour market
Meenu Tewari
Ever since work became splintered and distributed across the globe through highly 
mobile value chains, a central concern among labour advocates and regulators has 
been: how and under what conditions can good labour practices and safe working 
conditions be extended to the most vulnerable workers in the lower tiers of global 
value chains? These spaces at the base of global supply chains are often hidden 
from view by layers of opaque, contingent and exploitative contractual ties that 
create new informalities at the bottom of even the most formalised production net-
works. A wave of recent industrial accidents – factory fires and building collapses 
– many of them in the garment districts of Bangladesh (e.g., Tazreen, Rana Plaza), 
but also elsewhere, has focused fresh attention on this dilemma.
 There is widespread agreement today that company codes of conduct and 
their elaborate monitoring systems, though important, are generally unable to 
reach beyond the top tiers of global supply chains. There is also general consen-
sus that voluntary codes alone, without management commitment and retraining, 
have limited impact on factory workers (e.g., Richard Locke’s painstaking 2013 
study). Private systems have evolved from the auditing- policing model of the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, to the more consultative and collaborative model of 
global partnerships and multi- stakeholder engagement of the past 15 years (the 
Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI), Social Accountability International (SAI), 
Better Work, the Fair Labour Association (FLA), the Worker Rights Consortium 
(WRC), and the Alliance and the Accord). Despite these efforts, there has been 
limited success in enforcing labour protections in the lower tiers of global 
chains, let alone beyond them. One global trade unionist associated with a multi- 
stakeholder initiative went so far as to say that the CSR business had done little 
more than generate a “$60 billion industry … Imagine what could have hap-
pened if those funds had gone to the workers, we wouldn’t still be trying to 
define what a living wage should look like” (personal interview, Lakshmi Bhatia, 
2013, referring to discussions with the late Neil Kearney, former Secretary of 
the FLA).
 At the same time, it is also true that without any private regulation, there 
would be many more Tazreens or Rana Plazas. Therein lies the dilemma for the 
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world of private governance: how to ensure a wider socialisation of safe and 
improved working conditions that can reach further and deeper down the value 
chain, and even beyond it, in the face of intensified competition, short lead times, 
low margins, relentless price pressures and the powerful search for low costs.
 On the other hand, and despite important advances, national and sub- national 
governments have also found it equally challenging to enforce or extend formal 
protections and labour laws to the many tiers of informal work associated with 
both export and domestic production. Indeed, many countries are caught within 
dualistic debates about the effects of labour market regulation. Do regulations 
add to labour market rigidity, and thus “cost jobs”, or does undermining labour 
welfare undermine the long- term growth of productivity and hence employment? 
The outcomes of these debates, which turn upon the notion that low factor costs 
act as a draw for foreign investment, have in fact had the opposite effect of what 
either side would hope for: weak or passive enforcement of even existing laws 
and a proliferation of contingent, unprotected, contractual work.
 These meta- narratives and debates, however, obscure the interesting but 
messy ways in which change is actually taking place on the ground: through 
many local, ongoing experiments that signal the emergence of new institutional 
processes in the labour market that may be better able to diffuse inclusive work 
practices more widely among the hard- to-reach, informal and less visible seg-
ments of global export chains. Indeed, these varied and emergent trajectories 
seem to shape patterns of upward mobility for workers while also improving 
firm performance.
 I report briefly on three examples of such emerging institutional arrangements 
in the labour market from my own research on the garment industry in India. 
These efforts are works in progress with many grey areas, but together they 
show that a variety of actors – unions, NGOs, global buyers and governments – 
are experimenting with new ways of organising work such that good labour 
practices are extended not only to workers involved in the lowest links of the 
value chains, but also to the wider communities, or area- based labour markets 
within which these value chains touch down or are embedded.
 An important pattern that cuts across all the examples is the locus of these 
inclusive efforts: while ultimately rooted in issues related to workers’ economic 
lives and working conditions, these efforts do not always originate on the factory 
floor. Rather, they originate in the social sphere of workers’ lives and in the 
places where workers live, including with homeworkers who work in their own 
homes which double as workplaces. Likewise, the focus is not on any one indi-
vidual firm, but on the places and area- based labour markets from which those 
workers are drawn.
Unions organising informal workers successfully in the face 
of neoliberal pressures
The first example comes from the recent work of unions, such as the New Trade 
Union Initiative (NTUI),1 that have successfully organised informal workers (in 
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garments, services, domestic work, agriculture) and won important gains for 
them, despite the prevailing policy rhetoric in favour of market liberalism, labour 
market reform (loosening of rigid regulations) and the general view that unions 
are a burden on firm competitiveness in an era of flexible production. But these 
successes do not track old union expectations of confrontations with manage-
ment, or of traditional forms of shop floor organising, or of tripartite bargaining. 
Unions such as NTUI have succeeded by addressing the issue of labour rights in 
new ways. They reject protectionism as a response to globalisation and hold the 
view that, given the internationalisation of work, it is the global supply chain, 
rather than the nation state alone, that is the appropriate arena for organising 
labour rights: “Effective organisation [today] demands a fundamental realign-
ment of labour to the global supply chain, and not only the nation state.”2 This 
has led the NTUI and its associated unions such as the Garment and Textile 
Workers Union (GATWU) to focus on two strategies simultaneously. First, they 
have focused their organising efforts on the first- tier (India- based) suppliers of 
global brands, rather than third- or fourth- tier suppliers lower down the chain, as 
well as on stores and outlets of the global brands themselves. Their (aspirational) 
goal is to ensure a living wage at the first- tier level, which they expect will 
cascade down the supply chain allowing lower tier suppliers to comply with the 
minimum wage. “If you leave Tier 1 to be minimum wage compliant, you can 
forget about getting Tier 4 to comply with the minimum” (personal interview 
with Ashim Roy, 2006). NTUI has also joined hands with other global trade 
unions to fight for an Asian wage floor to prevent a regional race to the bottom, 
including joining with the Asian Wage Floor Alliance. Second, even more strik-
ing is the path that NTUI (and GATWU) have taken towards shop- floor organ-
ising. In its work on the garment sector in Bengaluru, for example, NTUI first 
began its work at the level of the community, outside the shop floor. It built a 
working women’s non- profit organisation in the garment clusters around Ben-
galuru and focused its attention on building social alliances with a variety of 
institutions (universities, local government) to help provide basic services to 
local workers (water, creches, even proposing to build locally run laundries to 
help manage the workload of the garment workers in these communities).3 This 
helped NTUI and GATWU to not only win local trust but also build leadership 
and organisational capacities among the local garment workers through social 
engagement and tutelage. Many of the leaders who emerged from this process 
later went on to organise the shop floors of the firms they worked in. Through 
their work (and negotiations) on the inside, and cluster- wide protests and picket-
ing of the top tier firms organised by NTUI and GATWU on the outside, the 
union won important minimum wage raises for all workers in the sector, as well 
as fairer cost of living increments to wages, among other gains in the workplace. 
While these workplace gains were important, of equal importance to the lives of 
the workers were the social services that NTUI’s area- based foundation (a sepa-
rate non- profit) brokered through collaborative alliances, materially improving 
the quality of life of the women who worked 16-hour shifts in the garment 
factories.4
154  Meenu Tewari
 The coupling and intertwining of concerns relating to both the social and eco-
nomic lives of the workers have been central to NTUI’s successful organising 
efforts. The actual form this takes varies by sector, but the embedding of the 
economic in the social is a pattern that cuts across all its efforts.
IKEA’s area- based (territorial) efforts to upgrade social 
standards in its carpet belt
A similar area- based approach was followed by IKEA India as it sought new 
ways to keep its carpet- making factories in North India child labour- free. 
IKEA’s approach was two- fold. First, was to integrate its corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and sourcing divisions to ensure that all orders placed were 
compliant from the start, or that the divisions were working with the suppliers to 
make them compliant before procurement was escalated. This was in contrast to 
its earlier (and more common) bifurcated monitoring and policing model that 
operated independently from sourcing. The second part of their approach was to 
step away from focusing only on their core suppliers and put the onus on them to 
be (child- labour) compliant. Rather, IKEA decided to put in place a wider set of 
alliances that would help them make all the communities in their entire carpet- 
making region child labour- free by trying to remove the incentives among 
households in the region to put their children to work. To achieve this, IKEA did 
not simply “throw money at the problem”. They built a series of alliances with a 
variety of actors: university professors, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
and UNICEF ’s India offices, other NGOs (non- governmental organizations) and, 
most importantly, with district administrators and state government officers to 
bring in a variety of existing programmes related to health, education, school 
lunches, and social security. They had identified the presence of punishing debt 
as the deeper, root cause that led families to send their children to work. They 
worked with the state government and UNICEF (United Nations Children’s 
Fund) to help build self- help groups where, through small savings, local women 
could accumulate enough to open bank accounts and borrow at lower interest 
rates to pay off higher debt loans. They also worked with UNICEF to build 
bridge schools to help prepare the children to get back to school.
 This work was not restricted to the home- based workers who were directly 
employed by IKEA’s supplier factories. It involved working with all households 
in the carpet- making belt – irrespective of their current connection to IKEA’s 
work (as they were all “potential workers”/suppliers). The aim was to help make 
progress in eliminating (or at least blunting) the conditions in the entire belt that 
generated the incentives on both the supply and demand side for the use of child 
labour in production (akin to Locke’s (2013) root cause arguments). IKEA did 
not act alone, but worked with a wide set of partners, including several public 
sector institutions. The efforts are a work in progress, and have had mixed 
success, but in the orchestrating of many services and existing public (and multi-
lateral) programmes on households in the region, many important benefits were 
brought to the communities that did not exist before. These have spilled over 
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widely across the communities in IKEA’s supply belt, far beyond specific fac-
tories and home- based carpet weavers supplying directly to IKEA or its supply 
chain. The beneficiaries included all weavers in the region, whether or not they 
currently supplied to IKEA (based on personal interviews with IKEA’s New 
Delhi office, 2005, 2009).
Networked contracting at the bottom of garment export 
chains
The final example comes from an experiment in Mewat district, over an hour 
from Gurgaon and two hours from New Delhi in North India. A novel partner-
ship was forged in this region in 2008–09 when a leading global buyer (Gap 
Inc.), came together with the government (Ministry of Women and Child Devel-
opment), a socially embedded NGO (Society for the Promotion of Youth and 
Masses or SPYM, which had worked with the ministry in the region for 15 years 
organising local women in self- help groups), and two exporters from the 
Gurgaon region to connect local home- based hand embroiderers in two com-
munities of Mewat directly with export markets. The arrangement included an 
attempt to bring the women embroiderers out of their homes and into a com-
munity workspace organised by SPYM so as to provide decent working con-
ditions and ensure that they worked in a child labour- free work setting, all within 
a short walking distance from their homes. The network of collaborators, led by 
Gap, invited one exporter to become associated with each community. The 
exporters (who were interested in child labour- free embroidery) agreed to train 
the workers, place orders, oversee the initial work, pick up the finished work and 
make regular payments based on the total hours put in and monitor the quality of 
the work.
 Gap and the government oversaw the arrangements mainly to ensure that 
minimum wages were paid (pro- rated as piece rates) to each worker based on the 
hours they worked, in a fair, timely and transparent way. The NGO, SPYM, had 
already worked with the government for over 15 years to organise these com-
munities around self- help groups and set up private bank accounts for workers. 
The workers therefore received payment directly into these accounts. SPYM 
retained 20 per cent of the payment of each order to cover its overheads expenses 
and operating costs (rental costs of the space and supplies). While Gap gave two 
instalments of US$5,000 each5 to get the network going, the idea was that as 
long as the orders kept coming in, the programme would be self- sustaining.
 The work centre was not membership- based. It was open to the entire com-
munity and anyone interested in working there was able to do so based on the 
time they had, with the only condition that work not be taken home, and that 
they open a bank account if they did not already have one.
 At its peak, by early 2010, about 800 women had been trained; those who 
worked collectively produced 200,000 pieces of work, earning on average 
between 1,500 and 5,000 rupees per month, depending upon the hours they put 
in. Together they brought in nearly two million rupees into the region in just the 
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first six months of the programme, using the funds to retire debt, send their chil-
dren to school (or to better schools) and defray family expenses.6 The pro-
gramme worked well until the middle of 2010 when the effects of the recession 
led to a reduction in orders, eventually leading to some attrition in the ranks of 
the workers. There was also churn within Gap and the government. Despite the 
churn, the programme survives, albeit at reduced strength. By 2011, both its 
exporters had returned with some work orders, and SPYM was looking for 
domestic buyers.
 Even if the programme eventually does not survive, the skills have been 
retained and it has provided a model to learn from. And two aspects of the 
experiment are striking. First, this programme, like the others described, was 
once again an area- based, labour market- wide effort that was open to all resi-
dents in the targeted region. Like the others, but even more so, there was a strong 
role of the government in orchestrating the programme with a major global 
buyer, Gap. The surprise (to me), however, was that the ministry involved was 
not one that would be expected to be associated with a business- led partnership. 
It was not the labour ministry or an economic ministry, but a social sector minis-
try, the Ministry of Women and Child Development. However, as  Marty Chen 
pointed out, this finding is not likely to be surprising to activists who have long 
worked in the trenches with informal women workers: “as the labour and eco-
nomic ministries would not necessarily recognize home- based women workers 
and not see them as worthy of a business partnership” (Chen, personal commu-
nication, 2019).
 Social bureaucracies are often relegated to second- tier status in the pecking 
order of state power, seen as agents of welfare or “mere” redistribution. But the 
role of the Ministry of Women and Child Development was not incidental in this 
experiment. Their prior work with the households in the region over many years 
had helped establish a foundation of trust and social ties on which an economic, 
market- making partnership could be anchored later when an opportunity pre-
sented itself. This layering aspect of the Mewat partnership suggests that the 
economic role of social bureaucracies is often overlooked or undervalued and 
that they can play an important role in building economic security and account-
able work at the base of the garment export chains – as well as at the bottom of 
the domestic labour market.
 The second point to note is that the partnership that the ministry forged with 
Gap is an example of the kinds of public- private collaborations that are born out 
of the weakness rather than strength of the large and powerful global buyers. In 
this case, Gap sought out the Ministry of Women and Child Development after 
trafficked child labour had been found in one of its North Indian supplier fac-
tories. The public shaming that followed and the company’s inability to handle 
on its own the trafficking problem that had crept into its supply chain, led Gap to 
turn to the government for help and collaboration:
The very fact that we have 94% of the work force in the informal sector … 
However you try and basically shift or change the composition of the crust, 
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pumping in millions and millions of dollars, you are rarely able to penetrate 
deeper … it is so critical for the private sector to actually join hands with 
the government because if we talk about scale … it is time we stop meas-
uring effort and started measuring impact. For this, we need the 
government.
(Interview with Lakshmi Bhatia, former Director of Global Partnerships, 
Gap, 9 July 2011)
In sum, this chapter draws attention to recent experiments that suggest the need 
to look closely at territorial or specialised strategies of diffusing labour standards 
as a complement to sectoral and more universal strategies of labour protection. 
These strategies straddle the complex intersections between the social and eco-
nomic lives of workers and focus not only on individual shop floors, but beyond 
them to area- wide sectoral labour markets. In inverting the pathway of organ-
ising from the places of social reproduction – where workers live – to their 
workplaces, these strategies help build new institutions that can nurture stability 
in a layered and socially embedded middle ground between workers’ social and 
economic lives.7 These strategies are collaborative as well as customised, but 
workers and their allies do not hesitate to resist, though the sphere of resistance 
is different and strategic, aimed at higher level, branded actors rather than the 
local supplier. The role of the state is going to be essential in sustaining these 
processes and determining the nature of outcomes. Interestingly, social bureau-
cracies, and not just economic or labour ministries, are important allies. Such a 
hybrid state regulates as well as collaborates. It learns, and holds open a space 
for relational mediation between firms, labour and civic actors to jointly reach 
workers in the lowest tiers of global subcontracting systems – informal and 
invisible workers who are hard for any single actor to reach on its own in 
sustained ways.
 The broader point is that at a time when firms are restructuring deeply, it is 
insufficient to limit the struggle for workers’ safety and welfare to the workplace 
alone. It is important to bridge labour relations, labour sociology, industry 
studies and institutional explorations of the role of the state in how outcomes for 
labour play out. Spatialised, territory- based strategies (and institutions) described 
here offer important lessons about how to organise for labour welfare and not 
just for workplace safety alone.
Notes
1 A federation of party- independent unions that emerged in the early 2000s and became 
officially federated in 2005.
2 Interview with Ashim Roy of NTUI. See Tewari (2010).
3 This approach is similar to the work and progressive politics of the Industrial Areas 
Foundation (IAF ) that Paul Osterman has written about (Osterman 2003).
4 This struggle has, however, not always extended to home- based workers contracted by 
factories.
5 Given the context, this is a rather small amount.
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6 Interview with former Director of Global Partnerships, Gap, 2011; see Tewari (2017) 
for details.
7 Brazil is an excellent example where the state has succeeded in strengthening labour 
regulations (via the Latin model, see Piore and Schrank 2018) while helping a growing 
number of low- income, low- skilled workers transition from the informal to the formal 
sector through a combination of industrial policy, labour and training policies and its 
social welfare (Bolsa) programmes (see Guinn 2019).
Part VII
Street vendors
Politics and possibilities for inclusion

20 Street vendors and planning 
paradigms
Amin Y. Kamete
Not being a fan of theories, approaches and prescriptions that reek of uni-
versalism, I will not pontificate about prescriptions on specific ways in which 
planning theories and approaches can be modified to benefit street vendors 
everywhere. Instead, this chapter will raise questions and discuss issues that 
might point towards some building blocks of such modifications.
What is not working?
At the risk of oversimplification, it is fair to state that planning theories and 
approaches have been harsh to street vendors because of the ideals they espouse, 
the methods they adopt, and the scale at which they are deployed (see Figure 20.1).
 In terms of the ideals – defined here as standards of perfection or principles to 
be aimed at – it has often been noted that order, improvement and progress 
towards western- inspired modern cities are some of planning’s primary obses-
sions. The single- minded quest for these ideals directly influences the methods 
adopted to attain them. Positivism, which emphasises empirical data and scient-
ific methods, is the key ingredient influencing these methods. This is encapsul-
ated in the process driven by the planning paradigm that has stubbornly refused 
to disappear completely, namely, rational comprehensive planning (RCP).
Figure 20.1 What is not working with current theories and approaches?
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 Then there is scale. Positivism tends to simultaneously universalise 
approaches, depoliticise contexts and technicalise solutions to problems. Mod-
ernist planning, as reflected in the RCP, is no exception. Spatially, because of 
the belief in the universal applicability of scientific solutions and methods, we 
see this being applied at various administrative and spatial scales, with lower 
administrative levels being expected to conform to what is prescribed by the 
levels above them. Thus, we see planning being deployed at national, regional, 
urban, local and “sub- local” scales, with the lower tiers being expected to faith-
fully reflect – or at least not conflict with – the visions and dreams espoused by 
the spatial and administrative levels above them. Given this, it is not surprising 
that the visions and dreams that cascade down the hierarchy are those of the 
dominant groups – the economic and power elite who control the state- level 
bureaucracy responsible for producing the higher- level plans.
 The grand result of the intertwining of ideals, methods and scale is the spawn-
ing of a retinue of exclusionary knowledges and practices that effectively mar-
ginalise some livelihood practices. People who cannot live up to the ideals, are 
perceived as threats, nuisances or misfits, and are dismissed as “ignorant”. 
Because these people operate at local and sub- local scales, they also fall victim 
to top- down (national to local and bureaucrat to public) planning and design 
approaches that marginalise them. This, of course, refers to modernist planning, 
which, despite some tweaking and upheavals, refuses to disappear.
 So, what exactly is wrong with modernist planning? In my research in urban 
Zimbabwe, I have always found out that it all comes down to what Sandercock 
(2003) terms “pillars of modernist planning” which emphasise rational, compre-
hensive and science- based planning while amplifying state- directed futures and 
the public interest. I have also discovered that it is not all about modernist plan-
ning. I have discussed this elsewhere (Kamete 2013). I will focus on some 
important impediments generated by these pillars, namely, the organisation of 
planning, auto- exclusion, excluding the excluders, and pernicious assimilation. 
The effect of these pillars and the impediments they spawn is that street vendors 
are excluded, marginalised and suppressed. It is on these effects and impedi-
ments that attempts to modify planning and design theories and approaches 
should focus.
Modifications to planning theory and approaches?
The tyranny of opposites
No grand solutions will be attempted here, as I do not believe in these. But 
neither do I dismiss attempts at positive and normative planning theory. There is 
value in abstraction and idealism. However, I think there is a tendency to focus 
on generating and pursuing “opposites” to dominant theories, practices and 
approaches. This is not very helpful; this should be done in conjunction with a 
more radical and somewhat uncomfortable route. When it comes to planning 
theories and approaches, the starting point should not only be about generating 
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opposites or friendlier practices and approaches. Some energy should be directed 
at raising unsettling questions to which we might have no answers.
Some building blocks for modifying theory and approaches
What is the danger to street vendors in current practices?
I have argued elsewhere that the real danger to informality is the state’s modern-
ist rationality (Kamete 2017a). In one of his metaphors, Bauman describes the 
modern nation state as the “gardening” state (Bauman 1993). This explains the 
state’s proclivity for order, progress, well- being and betterment (Scott 1998). 
The gardening state is the epitome of “solid modernity” (Bauman 1991) which, 
as Jacobsen and Marshman (2008) assert, is “all about ‘cultivation’, planning 
and design” to improve and speed up the process of western- inspired modernisa-
tion. For street vendors, the danger of the gardening state lies in its “separation” 
practices and the ascription and denying of value to certain spatial practices and 
groups. In this “garden”, people deemed to have value as citizens are nurtured as 
“good plants” whereas those seen as having no value are treated as “weeds” – 
useless social undesirables (Bauman 1991). There is no prize for guessing where 
street vendors are placed in this separation.
Rethinking dreaming and the organisation of planning
What does this have to do with planning? The problem comes down to dream-
ing. There is a danger in coming up with collective templates, be they dreams, 
visions or futures. Yet this is what planning is all about. Plans are collective 
dreams. But then, dreams are about destinations. The problem here is that you 
cannot talk about a destination without identifying obstacles and threats in your 
path. This is where the second threat comes in: the identification and designation 
of “good plants” and “useless weeds” – good citizens and dangerous outlaws. 
So, any planning that entails creating desired futures is potentially exclusionary 
and/or dangerous to people such as street vendors, who do not fit into or cannot 
live up to the dreams and visions of the politically and economically dominant 
groups. It is exclusionary because it inevitably creates undesirables, rejects and 
leftovers; it is dangerous because it constitutes some groups as threats and nuis-
ances. So, the question for planning theory and research is: Should we, as a col-
lectivity, dream at all?
Rethinking development planning
This is something that strikes at the very heart of “development planning” or 
“forward planning”, which is a key component in the organisation of planning. 
Seen this way, the question can be rephrased as: Should society plan at all? My 
view is that it should. Which is where the real challenge for planning theories 
and approaches lies. The challenge is to come up with a different kind of dream-
164  Amin Y. Kamete
ing where the dominant vision does not generate a nightmare for those whose 
dreams do not see the light of day or are not articulated, captured, sought or 
acknowledged in the official plan. In other words, planning theory should come 
up with a way of reconciling the dreams of different strata of society and a way 
of dreaming that does not instinctively divide people into “good plants” and 
“useless weeds”. It should explore a kind of planning where the Other’s failure 
to conform is seen not as a threat to be eliminated or a pathology to be eradi-
cated, cured or excluded, but rather a reflection of diversity of dreams and 
visions or indeed of deficiency in the official plan, and therefore a challenge to 
be confronted and addressed.
Properly theorising development management
Development management is the “policing” arm of planning where the dream is 
meant to be protected and realised. It consists of development control and plan-
ning enforcement. This practice is severely under- theorised in planning scholar-
ship. Planning scholarship relies on perspectives from other disciplines to 
illuminate it. While planning theory has done well in importing, internalising 
and deploying knowledge from other disciplines in development planning, there 
is not much on development management. In the absence of research, develop-
ment control remains a legalistic, depoliticised and technicalised endeavour. 
This makes it “inaccessible” or even hostile to street vendors who, by the time 
development kicks in are classified as hostile deviants and threats. This is so 
because, according to the official plan, where vendors operate they are “out of 
place” – deviants who pay no heed to planning diktats on the occupation and use 
of land.
 The same applies to planning enforcement which is the state’s tool for hand-
ling things, people and activities deemed to be violating planning controls. Plan-
ning enforcement is characterised by “urban cleansing” through evictions and 
demolition. Planning theory and research need to expand to this technicalised 
and depoliticised arena. Research should go beyond describing and critiquing 
urban clean- up campaigns. It should also determine the extent to which planning 
systems and practices are the creators of the “problems” that they now purport to 
resolve and how these systems and practices could be made to work for street 
vendors. The challenge is to come up with perspectives and prescriptions that 
bring politics and context into this arena. Abandoning this important practice in 
the technicist and legalist realm partially explains the persistence of urban clean-
 up operations as the favoured response to “spatial unruliness” (Kamete 2008).
Addressing the under- theorisation of space and place
Another explanation for the dominance of technicalism and legalism in develop-
ment management is the under- theorisation of space and place in planning 
theory. Disciplines such as social theory, urban geography and urban sociology 
have yielded deep insights into the social production of space and the imbrication 
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of power therein. Critical thinkers such as Lefebvre, Foucault and de Certeau 
have offered rich insights into the contestability and “power- laden-ness” of 
space and place. Some planning scholars have built on this line of reasoning and 
produced thought- provoking reflections and analysis on public space and place. 
This should be expected to have an impact on planning and design approaches 
leading to a broadening of practices such as development management beyond 
their present technicist and legalist confines. In theory, this should have led to a 
democratisation and radicalisation of planning practice beyond public participa-
tion and consultation. Arguably, this could lead to the integration of street 
vendors into urban plans and landscapes. There is need for serious research on 
why theories of space and place remain marginalised in planning scholarship and 
how these can be integrated into planning thought, and thence practice.
Dealing with “auto- exclusion”
Planning theory and approaches recognise the importance of involving all stake-
holders in planning. The popularity, and in some countries, the legislation of 
public participation, public consultation and collaborative planning stand as tes-
timony that planning theory and approaches have taken inclusivity on board. 
This should be good news for street vendors. However, in many contexts, 
research shows that participation is not as widespread as would be anticipated. 
The blame cannot exclusively be attributed to planning systems and practices. 
The woeful rate of participation is partly a result of “auto- exclusion” or self- 
exclusion. Marginalised groups such as street vendors have been known to stay 
away from public consultations. They are also known to “exclude the exclud-
ers”, by “locking out” planners and other bureaucrats (Kamete 2007b). This is 
unfortunate because it normally happens during that crucial element of the plan-
ning system, development planning, which, as shown above, is where the plans, 
policies and strategies are conceived, made and adopted. When development 
control and planning enforcement come to haunt them, street vendors, as one 
planner told me during my research in Zimbabwe, “cannot cry foul and say they 
were excluded, when it is they who voluntarily and unwisely boycotted the 
process”.
 The challenge for planning theory and practice is not to be obsessed solely 
with widening participation within the current frameworks and terms of engage-
ment. It should also be concerned with understanding and tackling the dilemmas 
of auto- exclusion. Planning research can contribute to this by, among other 
things, gaining deeper insights into the phenomenon of auto- exclusion in plan-
ning and (re)interrogating the very concept of public participation and public 
consultation.
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Acknowledging and addressing the dangers of “pernicious 
assimilation”
The brief for this part refers to modifying planning theory and approaches “to 
integrate street vendors into urban plans and landscapes”. Elsewhere, I have 
argued that planning theory and approaches should raise uncomfortable ques-
tions about “integration” (Kamete 2017b). I have tackled what I term “pernicious 
assimilation” (ibid.). This exposes the dark side of integration or inclusion. Not 
all mainstreaming, integration or inclusion is good for street vendors. Some inte-
gration practices that emphasise formalisation amount to a sinister “forced con-
version” (Kamete 2013). This entails railroading street vendors into making 
crippling Faustian bargains that strip away the very soul of informality.
 They are forced to shed offending traits of informality and take on the 
favoured traits of formality. What we need is planning theory that does not 
blindly accept integration or mainstreaming as the panaceas for all the problems 
faced by street vendors. Planning theory needs to muddy the waters by exposing 
what amounts to pernicious assimilation. It needs to explore alternatives that 
truly work for marginalised groups. More critical research is needed into prac-
tices of integration in specific contexts to determine their impact on street 
vendors, to capture the vendors’ perspectives, and document their experiences. 
This could help re- evaluate current practices and come up with integration prac-
tices that are not insidiously pernicious.
Conclusion
As indicated above, I am not enamoured by grand universalist prescriptions. I 
am also not convinced that generating opposites to what is not working is the 
best way to go forward. What we need are not ready- made modifications to plan-
ning and design theory and approaches. Our effort should be expended on devel-
oping building blocks that can be adapted to different times and contexts.
21 Street vending and the state
Challenging theory, changing research
Veronica Crossa
A few preambles
Understanding theories that address the relationship between street vendors and 
the state within the Latin American context is not an easy task. Moreover, I am 
quite sceptical of regional narratives that sometimes decontextualize and essen-
tialize people, places and experiences under the academic legitimacy of a spatial 
construction called “a region”, in this case, Latin America. Obviously, there are 
shared characteristics within the region, for instance, the precarious nature of 
work on the street; many of the working conditions of street vendors are similar 
(long hours, uncertainty, waiting, conflicts for and over spaces of work, organ-
izational structures within street vending organizations, and so on). But general-
izing on the relationship between street traders and the state within the entire 
region implies that the state operates in the same fashion, regardless of the 
context. As a geographer, I am more interested in precisely the geographies of 
the state that might shed light on the particularities of each context. State- society 
relations vary geographically and historically. Hence, the first point I want to 
make is that the relationship between street traders and the state is marked by the 
historical- geographical evolution of state- society relations. And this difference is 
not just a point I want to make, but a proposal of how to think and inform current 
research on informality: work that is geographically and historically grounded in 
a particular context, even a particular public space.
 Much of this chapter is based on my experiences, observations and reflections 
on research I have conducted concerning the micro- scale politics of street 
vending in the context of Mexico City. Hence, most of what I will allude to is a 
product of my engagement with geography and urban studies. I do not expect to 
provide a model that can be applied to the entire region of Latin America, nor 
the entire range of studies on this matter within the social sciences.
Relationship between street vending and the state
Theories on the relationship between street vending and the state have mostly 
been framed within the study of informality more broadly. Although there have 
been a range of studies that have looked specifically at the phenomena of street 
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vending, few have developed as grand theories, but have rather explored the 
multiple ways and the conditions under which state institutions are associated 
with so- called informal activities. Hence, it is difficult to detach notions of 
street vending from broader and more abstract concepts as the informal 
economy. The study of street vending and other practices associated with the 
so- called informal economy has traditionally been carried out within the broad 
disciplinary realm of development studies. Viewed originally as an activity 
geographically confined to developing countries, the informal or pre- modern 
sector was defined as a series of economic activities that did not contribute to 
the growth of national economies. The underlying assumption was that 
informal activities had to be pushed into the formal sphere in order for a nation 
to transition into the modern economy, in line with developed nations. Within 
this general interest on informality relative to linear and colonial under-
standings of modernity and development, a sub- sector within urban studies 
also showed an interest in the rise of this form of economic livelihood but 
within the context of important changes in the composition of cities. This work 
developed a perspective which saw life outside the margins of the state (prim-
arily in relation to housing) as a product of the incapacity of rural migrants to 
completely become urbanites, thus living in limbo between the urban- rural and 
the formal- informal.
 Taking Latin America as the regional context, a wide range of studies were 
produced in order to understand the mechanisms developed by recent urban 
migrants to survive in a context of unemployment and general poverty, and 
whether those mechanisms existed on the margins of the state. Early work in the 
informal sector tended to provide a dualist framework based on different and 
sometimes contrasting definitions of “the informal” and “the formal”. Inform-
ality was defined as what formality was not, but not in relation to each other. 
Indeed, these first approaches to informality in general, and also to street vending 
specifically, rarely explored street vending in relation to the formal institutions 
of the state or as a product of the existing fissures within the state. The state was 
never called into question.
 In the last decade or so, informality has returned to the international urban 
planning agenda. Currently, a strand of postcolonial urban scholars calling for 
new geographies of (urban) theory are pushing the politics of informality another 
step. For example, Roy (2005) provides an account of the relationship between 
informal practices and the so- called formal structures of the state, particularly 
regarding urban land and housing. Rather than view informality as synonymous 
with poverty and as a practice confined exclusively to marginalized groups, Roy, 
taking the case of the Indian planning system, argues that the state itself is an 
informalized entity characterized by deregulation, ambiguity and exception 
(Roy, 2009). Hence, while authors have acknowledged that the state can act in 
ways that fall into “informal” practices, Roy suggests that the form of governing 
is itself permeated by the logic of informality (ibid.: 82). In other words, 
informal practices by the state are not random, atomized actions taken by actors 
who fall in between the cracks of formality, rather they are actions which are 
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calculated and that involve purposive action and planning (ibid.: 83). At issue is 
what type of informality is considered legitimate.
Modifying theory?
Recently, the study of street vending has taken on new forms and different theor-
etical paths. This change is partly linked to the proliferation of urban policies 
identified under the rubric of “recovery of public space”, which has involved, 
among other things, the displacement of large sectors of the urban population 
who engage in so- called informal activities. Street vendors have been primary 
targets and constructed as detrimental to the creation of vibrant urban public 
spaces. Indeed, in a number of cities, street vendors and other visible participants 
of informal activities have come to embody a profound set of socio- economic 
and cultural anxieties linked to fear and fury towards the poor urban other. For 
many authors interested in the subject, street vending has served as an analytical 
showcase for addressing more deeply rooted social processes such as different 
conceptions of (dis)order in a changing urban context (Meneses 2011; Silva 
2011). Research on street vending has transitioned from being the subject itself 
to constituting the means for exploring the ways in which a political, cultural, 
social and economic order is established and reproduced in everyday life. This 
implies an important turnaround, with both epistemological and methodological 
implications. It is not that street vending as an analytical reality ceases to be 
important for understanding an urban social order, but that order is approached 
from the concrete realities and the multiple voices of the vendors themselves. 
Although many of the original discussions about, for example, the formal/
informal binary remain a matter of debate, the nature of these issues begins to be 
approached from different theoretical angles. Thus, it is no longer formal- 
informal as two distinct categories of analysis, but as part of a complex set of 
interrelations that overlap, fragment, multiply and unite at different times. In this 
way it could be said that the study of street vending and informality in general 
goes from being analysed as a static condition linked to structural problems such 
as poverty and marginalization to being a highly dynamic practice that is in con-
tinuous negotiation in daily life, involving multiple urban actors, from state 
regulatory actors – such as political- administrative units, police – to neighbours, 
consumers, other street vendors, established merchants and tourists.
 Despite the valuable insight provided by these contemporary approaches, 
there is still much scope for enhancing and delving deeper into many of the con-
cerns posed by these approximations. Concretely, here I want to argue for the 
importance of thinking about four ways in which theories of street vending and 
its relation to the state can be further explored:
1 Spatial systems of management: By this, is meant the normative and extra- 
normative processes that regulate particular spaces. The question here is 
how space is regulated and controlled by multiple agents, including the 
state, street- vending organizations, street vendors (and their systems of 
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organization – the use of labour for the setting of stalls, their costs, and so 
on). Every vendor, every organization has its own spatial arrangement and 
territorial control, depending on the location, the nature of what is sold, and 
so on. These spatial systems of management have to be thought of always in 
conjunction with normative and legal frameworks. Furthermore, these 
formal frameworks must be explored not only in normative terms but also in 
their manifestations in everyday life, through the role of street- level bureau-
crats (Lipsky 1980), who mediate, negotiate, and function as intermediaries 
between what is stipulated by law, in all of its manifestations, and its 
application on the street.
2 Accounting for difference: Stress the importance of recognizing heterogene-
ity among street vendors, rather than only seeing a homogeneous and cohe-
sive body of spatially and temporally fixed individuals with similar 
concerns, backgrounds, and needs; a group comprising individuals con-
ceived as part of a totality in which internal differences are ignored or even 
considered a potential threat to the integrity of the whole. Street vending is 
an extremely diverse activity, comprising individuals and groups who are 
themselves internally differentiated, resulting in different degrees of exclu-
sion, power, resources, mechanisms of exclusion, and practices of negoti-
ation and resistance. De- homogenizing the politics of the informal sector 
highlights different types of social groups involved in the activity.
3 Relational analysis: Relational thinking places emphasis on the interconnec-
tions that shape people and places. Rather than accepting pre- constituted 
identities, relational thinking emphasizes the connections, interrelations, and 
power relations through which identities are constructed and practices are 
framed. A relational approach to understanding street vending can be under-
taken in two ways:
a Breaking binary analyses of formal = state vs. informal = street 
vending. Rather, a relational approach would value the multiple ways in 
which so- called formal activities are consolidated through the repro-
duction of so- called informal practices. For example, in Mexico, the 
precarious nature of the formal economy (extremely low salaries, no 
benefits, etc.) necessarily requires the existence of an informal 
economy; of street vendors to offer food and products at a low cost 
(matching the salaries); and of an informal service sector that allows for 
social reproduction (nannies, domestic workers, caretakers). In many 
cases, a precarious formal labour market is precisely what facilitates the 
consolidation of an informal economy.
b Systems of exchange and reciprocity at the level of everyday 
life, between multiple actors: Within an organization of street vendors; 
between the leader of an organization and street- level bureaucrats; 
between the leader of an organization and street vendors; between street 
vendors and other urban actors (established merchants, neighbours, 
clients); and among street vendors themselves. A fundamental issue 
here is how systems of exchange have changed historically and under 
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what political, economic and cultural conditions these transformations 
have taken place. In Mexico, for example, there are intergenerational 
links between different leaders of street vending organizations that are 
juxtaposed in complex and sometimes conflicting ways with the polit-
ical structure of the state.
4 Symbolic and discursive construction of urban order: Street vending as an 
“urban problem” is defined not only by the state and its multiple institu-
tions, but also by citizens themselves who deposit particular social anxi-
eties around notions of order, hygiene, chaos and aesthetics on street 
vendors. Indeed, street vendors represent the most visible notion of chaos 
for many urban dwellers, especially the upper- middle urban class. Some 
important questions that should be answered are: how are discourses 
around chaos/order constructed and reproduced in everyday life among 
different sectors of the urban population, including, of course, discourses 
produced by the state itself? How do citizens participate in the repro-
duction of such discourses? How is the notion of order symbolically and 
morally constructed, and what role do street vendors play in these con-
structions? (Discourse analysis is useful here – of newspapers, for 
example, or of public policy, of the political rhetoric around public order 
and street vending.)
Shaping research
In this brief final section, I will focus specifically on methodological approaches 
that may help inform the ways in which existing theories can be modified, or 
reworked in order to account for the complexities involved in the relationship 
between street vending and the state. The call is for qualitative research that is 
sensitive to the nuances and multiple contexts within which urban transforma-
tions occur. This form of inquiry involves a combination of different methods 
including observation, discussion, interactions, performance, and conversations. 
It also requires the participation of individuals from various groups to discuss, 
share, and debate over issues and events pertaining to, in this case, changes in 
street vendors’ daily lives.
 Concretely, I would argue that the type of research needed to inform the 
rethinking that is needed entails an ethnographic approach. By this, I mean 
research that can sometimes be slow (ethnography is, by definition slow), but 
that can allow us to understand a specific place, the geography of a locality, the 
history of its people, and more importantly, the changing relations that have 
developed among people in the area. Ethnography entails becoming involved in 
the intricacies of people´s everyday lives, their relations, interactions, modes of 
subsistence, and the ways in which people make sense of their multiple realities. 
While the specific methodological tools may vary within ethnography, the use of 
triangulation yields extremely rich findings, especially information gathered 
from a combination of archival work; interviews (open- ended discussions 
through the use of narratives);1 discourse analysis; participant observation; and 
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focus groups. A rich ethnographic approach can be framed by looking specifi-
cally at the combination of the four themes presented above.
Note
1 In critical ethnography, this approach provides spaces for individuals to voice their 
experiences, knowledge, concerns and necessities that are often unheard and over-
looked by policy circles and legal discussions.
22 Street vendors and regulations
Sally Roever
The state of street vending in cities across the world today is not much different 
than it was 20 years ago: while street vendors contribute to cities by creating 
jobs, generating revenue for local governments, and “bring[ing] life to dull 
streets”, they are also subjects of regulation – and sometimes eviction – due to 
concerns around congestion in public spaces, competition with off- street busi-
nesses, and health and sanitation challenges (Bromley 2000). What is different 
now is that recent research has produced a much more fine- grained under-
standing of the components of regulation and, significantly, the urban policies 
and politics behind them.
 This chapter outlines key insights from the past 20 years of research on four 
areas of regulation as they apply to street trade: (1) licensing regimes; (2) spatial 
regulations; (3) enforcement provisions; and (4) taxation. It then highlights 
important lessons from the day- to-day realities of street trade that are under- 
researched and points to promising areas for future research, drawing on the field 
experience of Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing 
(WIEGO) and StreetNet International, the global federation of street vendor 
organisations.
Street vending regulations: a global view
Licensing regimes
The main difference between a licensing system and a permitting system is that 
a licensing system regulates the right to undertake the activity, while a permit-
ting system regulates the space in which the activity takes place (Horn 2018). In 
many cities, by- laws require street vendors to have a licence in order to trade; 
trading without a licence is thus considered illegal. Through this system, many 
local authorities make explicit their intent to control the number of street vendors 
by limiting the number of licences issued.
 With the criminalisation of vending without a licence built into the legal 
structure, and the limit on available licences built into the policy structure, 
authorities can then selectively enforce the by- law through fines or arrests when 
it is politically convenient to get rid of vendors, and relax enforcement when it is 
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politically convenient to allow them to work. These practices, and the policies 
and political coalitions behind them, are now well documented in cities as 
diverse as Guangzhou (Xue and Huang 2015), Bogotá (Donovan 2008), Mumbai 
(Anjaria 2006) and Johannesburg (Bénit-Gbaffou 2015), among others.
 Historically, licensing regimes have been used in efforts to control economic 
activity under centralised planning paradigms (as in colonial- era legislation in 
India), but under present- day norms of deregulation, licensing and enforcement 
practices often are informed not so much by a planning paradigm as by political 
expediency.
Spatial regulations
Regulations designed to keep street vendors out of certain public spaces are more 
centrally linked to prevailing urban governance paradigms than licensing systems. 
How these paradigms manifest themselves in policy and practice ranges from 
locality- specific permitting regimes that control who can vend in which space, to 
relocation projects designed to “graduate” street vendors to off- street commercial 
premises, to outright evictions, sometimes on a mass scale and sometimes violent 
– the latter of which are now routinely documented via social media.
 There is now a well- established research trajectory analysing these efforts to 
control public space, particularly in the historic centres of Latin American cities 
(Swanson 2007; Crossa 2009; Mackie, Bromley and Brown 2014) and the 
central business districts of African cities (Skinner 2008; Kamete 2012; Morange 
2015). This research examines the political coalitions behind clearances of 
public space. Building on this set of studies, an important recent advance is the 
examination of the conceptual and theoretical frames that inform those coali-
tions, drive their discourses and define their policy choices.
 For example, Aliaga Linares (2018) shows that street vending regulation in 
Lima, Peru, and Bogotá, Colombia, reflects different theoretical views of inform-
ality under different national political economy contexts. During the import sub-
stitution industrialisation period from the 1970s to the mid- 1980s, both cities 
adopted a dualist perspective on the informal economy under socialist urban 
policy regimes; this produced a tolerant regulatory approach to street vending 
involving a mix of licensing, zoning and support for political participation. 
Under structural adjustment policies between the mid- 1980s and the late- 1990s, 
the dualist view was replaced with a legalist view, and neoliberalism replaced 
municipal socialism in both cities (Goldfrank and Schrank 2009), leading to far 
more restrictive regulations. From 2000 to 2010, the two cities diverged. In 
Lima, local government politicians embraced a stronger neoliberal approach that 
framed street vendors as entrepreneurs, leading to policies compelling them to 
relocate to private commercial spaces at their own expense through group 
savings schemes. In Bogotá, a shift back to municipal socialism produced a view 
of street vendors as workers instead of entrepreneurs, which – backed by con-
stitutional court rulings in favour of vendors’ right to work – led to more promo-
tional policies.
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Enforcement provisions
Many researchers have noted the gap between the pervasiveness of street 
vending regulations around the world and their enforcement in practice. This gap 
has been connected to the considerable monetary and human resources required 
to enforce a hopelessly complex regulatory structure (New York City Inde-
pendent Budget Office 2010); the electoral costs of enforcement (Holland 2015); 
and the regulatory spaces that enable local officials to use their positions of rel-
ative power over vendors to undertake selective enforcement (Roever 2016). 
Enforcement via low- level harassment is now well documented in many cities; 
there is even a map of “bribes per square meter” among street vendors for down-
town São Paulo (Itikawa 2006).
 Within the regulations themselves, enforcement provisions commonly allow 
for fines and merchandise confiscations, as well as licence revocations and even 
arrests. These provisions have a significant impact on street vendors’ income, 
productivity and assets (Roever and Skinner 2016). Interestingly, legal chal-
lenges to merchandise confiscations have begun to emerge; for example, a street 
vendor in Durban, with the support of the Legal Resources Centre, won a 2014 
court case challenging the city’s power to impound merchandise and seeking 
compensation (Dobson and Quazi 2015).
Taxation
Notwithstanding the common assumption that street vendors do not pay taxes of 
any kind, regulatory schemes often incorporate some mix of taxes, levies and 
fees. In West African cities, for example, where there is a high density of market 
trade, there is a correspondingly high rate of taxes, levies and fees in markets 
collected on a daily, monthly and/or yearly basis (Adamtey 2015; Horn 2018). 
Street vending generates tax revenue both directly and indirectly; in Los 
Angeles, for example, the potential direct, indirect and induced tax revenue gen-
erated through vendor sales throughout the retail chain is estimated to be $124 
million (Liu, Burns and Flaming 2015: 6).
 Recent studies have begun to unpack the different kinds of taxes, levies and 
fees and the kinds of street vendors to which they are applicable. Entitlement 
fees and valuation fees written into national tax laws, for example, can shape 
the way municipalities charge street vendors for the use of public space 
(Roever 2016). Income tax is rarely applicable to low- income street vendors 
because their earnings fall under the threshold for income taxation; yet many 
street vendors pay value added tax (VAT) on the goods they purchase, without 
any way to pass on the cost of VAT to consumers (Skinner, Reed and Harvey 
2018). A broader literature documents the range of efforts to “tax the informal 
sector” (e.g., Dube and Casale 2016). Recently, researchers have begun to 
examine street vendors’ perceptions of the fairness of those taxes (Rogan 
2018b) within the context of the broader literatures on municipal finance and 
tax justice.
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Street vending realities and future research
Organising and regulation
The extensive literature on street vending regulation reviewed above reflects a 
heavy emphasis on the state, with less attention paid to the dynamics of organ-
ising. Yet the reality is that street vendor organising is centrally related to regu-
lation, whether the organising itself is formal or informal, and whether or not the 
main source of regulation is the state. The global movement of street vendor 
organisations coordinated through StreetNet International is increasingly pushing 
the boundaries of regulation, primarily by expanding the capacity of street 
vending organisations to engage in negotiation and collective bargaining (Carré, 
Horn and Bonner 2018). Thus, efforts by street vendor organisations to engage 
with different government entities in order to develop a harmonised approach to 
street vending regulation represent a key research frontier.
 However, these engagements often do not take place in neatly bound forums 
or easily defined spaces. Rather, they evolve slowly in a variety of different 
modalities, with as many cancelled meetings as meetings held, as many 
unanswered invitations as accepted ones, as many false starts and setbacks as 
agreements made – all in the context of changing political currents and a con-
stant rotation of government authorities with whom to engage. While evictions 
and relocations – as well as resistance strategies against them – are far better 
documented now than they were two decades ago, the spaces in between those 
headlining moments are less well understood.
Workers and entrepreneurs
Above and beyond the localised struggles between street vendors and city 
authorities, a broader struggle for economic inclusion is playing out both within 
organising contexts and between street vendor organisations and the national 
state. This struggle relates to the fact that earnings from street vending can vary 
widely; while most street vendors are own- account workers with unstable earn-
ings, poor access to health services and high exposure to occupational health and 
safety risks, a few become entrepreneurs who own or rent multiple stalls or 
stands, or occupy niche product sectors where earnings’ potential is considerably 
higher. StreetNet International has addressed the resulting class structure expli-
citly by committing itself to supporting the poorest. But government policies and 
programmes often target the entrepreneurial end of the earnings continuum, 
meaning that the poorest vendors are left behind.
 This differentiation has implications for street vendors’ access to social pro-
tection and, more broadly, for formalisation approaches. One emerging model 
(from Brazil) allows “individual microenterprise operators” with low earnings to 
register for social security at subsidised rates, facilitating a type of formalisation 
for those at the lower end of the earnings continuum, but StreetNet organisers 
point out the potential of this model to undermine organising and collective 
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action, given its framing of vendors as entrepreneurs instead of workers. A 
useful approach in future research agendas would be to better understand the 
possibilities of inclusion for the poorest vendors but also those own- account 
workers who are in between the vulnerable poor, on the one hand (e.g., elderly 
and disabled who may be granted privileged access to vending licences), and the 
entrepreneurial middle class (e.g., who can afford to pay to access micro- 
enterprise programmes) on the other. This middle group represents many own- 
account workers but gets relatively less attention in research and policy.
Approaches to knowledge generation
Finally, it is important for future research on street trade to find the middle 
ground in research design between in- depth case studies of a single location and 
quantitative analyses of large datasets that fold street vendors in with other 
informal sector enterprises. Structured comparisons of multiple locations 
drawing on both qualitative and quantitative data help reveal the complexity of 
street trade and its relationship to informality (Aliaga Linares and Roever 2019). 
Recent advances in theoretical and conceptual frameworks can serve as a 
foundation for better understanding of the links between urban dynamics, regu-
lations and the day- to-day realities that street vendors face. Above all, investing 
in participatory approaches to knowledge generation that value street vendors’ 
lived experiences and perceptions (Ogando and Harvey 2019) can provide 
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We were sitting for decades over a pile of gold without really noticing … now 
they are aware of it and are coming for our waste.
(Alex Cardoso, Brazilian catador during Expocatadores, Brazil, 2013)
In recent decades, owners of capital have been looking at waste management as 
a new, emerging, high- yielding global market. The challenge of managing an 
increasing amount of waste represents an opportunity for profit- making for both 
existing and new businesses (World Bank 2012). In sum, waste management has 
become a multimillion- dollar industry.
 Driven both by profit- making and urban paradigms of modern hygienic cities 
(Harpet 1997; Barles 2005; Abussafy 2013), technological solutions to the chal-
lenge of collecting, transporting, disposing of and treating waste are being 
adopted by cities around the world. In the process, the competition for waste, for 
recyclable materials and waste management contracts, has intensified; and the 
livelihoods of traditional waste pickers, and their knowledge of recycling, are 
under threat. Around the world, cities are privatizing waste management and, in 
so doing, dispossessing traditional waste pickers of their right to access and 
recycle waste, thus creating a fight for the appropriation of waste (Samson 2009, 
2014). To paraphrase David Harvey (2004), accumulation of capital (in this case 
waste) by some actors leads to dispossession of capital (waste) for others.
 This competition for waste, for recyclable materials and for waste manage-
ment contracts can be understood as a competition for the right to the city and its 
resources. The French philosopher Lefebvre argued that urban space is an object 
and instrument of confrontation and conflict, and at the same time a means of 
production and a means of control – of domination and power – where various 
interests compete, leading to clashes over appropriation and use of urban space 
(Lefebvre 1974). Over the past decade or more, in the spirit of Lefebvre, a right 
to the city movement has emerged to challenge the capitalist order, to seek a 
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radical restructuring of social, political, and economic relationships in the city 
(Lefebvre 1968; Purcell 2003).
 This chapter illustrates how the accumulation of waste, and waste manage-
ment, by powerful groups, institutions, and elites lead to dispossession of waste 
for traditional waste pickers, undermining their access to waste and to public 
space and their right to transit freely within the city. In the process the system of 
waste management established by the traditional waste pickers, what some 
observers have called socioeconomic metabolic systems1 (Martinez- Alier, 2009; 
Veronesi, 2016; Demaria, 2017) or recylingscape (Samson 2017 and Chapter 25 
in this volume), is being disrupted and displaced, and municipalities refuse to 
acknowledge the waste management and recyling system created by the waste 
pickers.
 To understand the conflicts around waste management and how waste pickers 
operate in urban space, in particular in public space, I will analyse a set of public 
resolutions in Paris, France, in the late nineteenth century and Montevideo, 
Uruguay, between 2012 and 2017: both of which undermined the access of waste 
pickers, an emblematic group of the urban poor, to recyclable materials as well 
as their access to the center of their cities.
Normalizing space and time of waste in Paris
Roughly the same number of waste pickers collected waste from the streets of 
Paris in the late nineteenth century, as do so in Montevideo today. In Paris, in 
1884, according to the official census,2 there were around 7,050 chiffoniers 
(waste pickers) which means around 34,000 persons, lived off collecting and 
recycling waste as a family- based business; who collected about 130,200 tons of 
waste per year generating around 70,000 francs per day in waste- picker incomes, 
and almost 5 million francs per year for the entire recycling and recovery indus-
try.3 Indeed, 85 percent of the reclaimed materials that went into the recycling 
industry came from the work of picking and sorting done by the Parisian 
chiffonniers.
 But over a few decades, following the plans of Baron Haussmann, a civil 
servant and politician, to “modernize Paris”, the city shifted toward capital 
speculation (Harvey 2008a: 458) which led to displacements of the urban poor 
from downtown areas to the city’s periphery/outskirts. The very first waste con-
tainer, which carried the name of the city mayor, Eugène-René Poubelle, was 
introduced in 1870 to normalize both the space in which domestic waste must be 
placed, as well as the time it should be placed, namely, outside on the street right 
before the passage of the waste truck. In 1883, a public ruling, again from mayor 
Poubelle, prohibited waste pickers from emptying the waste containers on the 
public highway, or placing any of the contents outside the container to find what 
might be suitable for reclaiming.
 The Poubelle ruling led to the founding of an association of chiffonniers, 
called the “Chambre Syndicale des Chiffonniers” which characterized the threat 
posed by the ruling to the traditional recycling system as follows:
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A head of household with his wife and three children earned 10 Frs a day or 
2 Frs per person on average. Since garbage can no longer be dumped on 
public roads, 50% of the materials used by chiffoniers is lost to the French 
recycling industry. And instead of 2 Frs a day, the chiffonniers scarcely earn 
1 Fr … Here is the crisis we are undergoing.4
This crisis was not only economical but was also territorial. In order to modern-
ize the collection system and to privatize it for the benefit of specialized com-
panies, the chiffoniers began to be displaced, not only from their homes, but also 
from their working space (Lortie 1992; Kamoun 2000; Barles 2005). The collec-
tion and disposal of waste in the entire city, and particularly in the richest areas 
of Paris where the most valuable recoverable waste was to be found, were 
granted to a company that signed a contract with the state.5
 The future of “modern” waste management finds its beginnings in this ruling 
from the late nineteenth century. As the years passed and as Paris kept growing, 
the chiffoniers continued to lose their right to the city (Harvey 2008b), mani-
fested in their confinement to the periphery and their inability to access and 
enjoy Paris intramuros (Figure 23.1). From an ecological perspective, this shift 
came with a dramatic change in the city’s urban metabolism as modern waste 
management systems no longer engaged in recycling (as the chiffoniers used to 
promote). Waste disposal was centralized into a series of new incinerators, 
further undermining the ability of waste pickers to recover and recycle waste and 
the air quality of the city.
Territorial displacement of clasificadores in Montevideo
A neighbor from Buceo called me and gave me a 29-inch TV that still 
works! If they take us off the street, people do not understand that we lose 
all these opportunities, which are not quantifiable at an economic level, but 
in our own quality of life and our relationship with our neighbors.
(Juan Carlos Silva, clasificador, president of the Trade Union in 
Montevideo, interview 30 November 2015)
In Montevideo today, a city where thousands6 of waste pickers (clasificadores) 
have, historically, recycled everything that they could access,7 capitalism, dis-
guised in public policies with the support of a very progressive government, 
reproduces the same exclusionary practices as in Paris in the late nineteenth 
century. Since 2003, when new waste containers first appeared in public space, 
many waste pickers are no longer able to visit downtown areas for recovery pur-
poses (Figure 23.2). The practice of limiting access to the richest areas of the 
city, and to the waste that is produced there, has been intensified since the new 
system of “hermetic containers” was first introduced in 2015 and since horse 
carts were banned in 2013 from entering the old downtown which was reconfig-
ured as an exclusionary zone. In addition, waste produced by large generators 
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recyclable materials, has become the exclusive domain of private companies or 
individuals driving motorized vehicles, after a rule was passed in 2012 to “form-
alize” what waste pickers had done for decades. This set of policies implies, 
among others, the rupture of a system of social relations that used to link waste 
pickers with more than 3,000 “clients” (Barrenechea and Gonzalez 2003) in the 
city who used to offer their waste “for free” through a solidarity system. The 
new formal enterprises get paid for the amount of waste they collect and dispose 
of, leading to a significant decrease in recycling rates as they simply dispose of 
the recyclable materials into the sanitary landfill, rather than reclaiming them.8 
Therefore, the urban metabolism of the city is again affected by undermining 
access to recyclables for those who historically reclaimed and recycled them. 
This new set of policies, in addition to being insufficient in terms of recycling 
and exclusionary of waste pickers,9 implies a profound dislocation of these 
workers from urban space and, indeed, their city, confining them to the urban 
periphery where they can devote themselves to sorting and selling materials at 
the new sorting centers built by the municipality through the Packaging Law 
established in 2009, where industry responsible for producing large amounts of 
packaging is now responsible for their waste and needs to pay the state a propor-
tion of funds to cover the costs of formal recycling.
Expanding the notion of commons in the city as social factory
To conclude, the right to the city becomes for waste pickers essentially the right 
to centrality, to use and appropriate public space, and not to be excluded from 
the urban form. As Lefebvre (1968) argued, by excluding groups and classes 
from “urbanity”, we are also excluding them from civilisation and society. 
Therefore, claiming the right to the city for waste pickers is a legitimate reaction 
to an increasingly discriminatory and segregated urban paradigm associated with 
the privatization of waste and its management and other policies on the use of 
space. In addressing the urban roots of the May 1968 movement in Paris, Lefeb-
vre argued that capital has moved beyond the factory walls and as a result the 
city has become “the social factory”.10 Hardt and Negri (2001) argued that the 
metropolis is to the multitude what the factory was to the working class. 
Regarding informal waste pickers, most of whom are territorially and organiza-
tionally dispersed, it is crucial to understand that while the struggles of the 
“workers” are aimed at improving working conditions, mobilizations against 
waste dispossession are aimed at claiming and recovering common public goods, 
as a condition to make life – and livelihoods – possible in the great social factory 
that is the city (Castro Coma and Martí Costa 2016).
 The main theoretical challenge would be to expand the notion of common 
goods to include waste as a commons (Cavé 2012, 2015; Zapata and Zapata 
2015; O’Hare 2017) to critically analyse the relations between those who 
produce waste (citizens) or improve it at various scales (waste pickers/recyclers) 
and those who appropriate it for profit (private collection companies). The 
concept of commons should then be framed not as an object but as what is 
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 produced collectively (Federici 2012; Heller 2012), over which control or man-
agement is not delegated to an outside social body but is exercised directly by 
those who produce it. The strength of the commons understood in this sense lies 
in the fact that its production allows us to think about the possibility of generat-
ing something new, to create new forms of reproduction, organization, and regu-
lation of collective life and public governance.
 To spatialize these commons, to think of them from the urban space per-
spective, helps us understand the power and collaborative relationships among 
the actors related to waste management. The recognition of the work, services 
and contributions of waste pickers in the city must be affirmed through a new 
type of community that manages its urban resources in a sustainable way. 
Samson (2015a) and Chikarmane (2016) argue that by mobilizing collectively to 
demand formal incorporation into municipal waste management systems, waste 
pickers are expanding both the public sector and the public sphere, transforming 
relations between the state, the formal economy, the informal economy and resi-
dents, and contributing to the forging of a more inclusive, participatory and 
democratic state. The rights of waste pickers as citizens and workers, including 
linking them with other residents of the city through the management of waste, 
are fundamental for living in a healthy and democratic city that is inclusive of all 
its inhabitants.
 Following the “right to the city” concept and a new understanding of the 
urban space, these principles and practice of communal ownership will help us 
frame a potentially radically different model of municipal waste management 
and governance. This new management and governance model, in which waste 
is produced, managed and controlled by the community, is based on a new inter-
pretation of what is public or common; it challenges the notion of a centralized 
state by pushing for a system that is capable of managing a complex and decen-
tralized communalism (Bookchin 2006).
Notes
 1 What follows this concept, and according to a dialectical vision, is the understanding 
of urban metabolism as a mutually constructive conception of the relations between 
nature and urban society, where nature is metabolically transmuted through urban 
space according to its historical processes (Swyngedouw and Kaika 2000). Therefore, 
in exercising power over ecological and social flows, human beings are active players 
in the evolution of the city.
 2 According to the “Hygienic Research Commission” published in the Official Bulletin 
of 1886 (Barberet 1886: 84).
 3 See Fontaine (1903: 17).
 4 Excerpt from the statement of Mr. Potin, chiffonnier leader, to the Parliamentary 
Commission, March 11, 1884 (Barberet 1886: 70).
 5 “Art. 21 – All the products contained in the receptacles, deposited by the local residents 
or projected illicitly on the public road, will belong to the contractor who will draw such 
a part as it will judge suitable, either by transporting them outside to be delivered to the 
farmer, either by turning them into factories by cremation or by any other method …” 
(Excerpt from the specifications of the company for the removal of sludge and garbage 
and residues sweeping Paris, from 1891 to 1899; Fontaine, 1903: 73).
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 6 From 3,500 waste pickers during stable or positive economic scenarios, to more than 
10,000 as a result of the economic crisis suffered in 2003.
 7 Similar to numbers in Brazil, it has been proved that almost 90 percent of what is 
recycled in the city was thanks to waste pickers at the bottom of the pyramid (2006 
study by the national government).
 8 There is very little economic rentability for them to spend time and resources on 
sorting waste, as most of the value generation came from the high rates charged for 
collection.
 9 From the thousands who have lost their income (the approximate number is under 
investigation), only 128 waste pickers are formalized and working in four new places, 
which are located, as shown in Figure 23.2, far from downtown, near their homes.
10 The social factory is a concept developed by the Italian autonomist Marxist Mario 
Tronti in his book, Factory and Society (1962), to help analyse how capitalist social 
relations had expanded outside the sphere of production to that of society as a whole.




In the experts’ literature about solid waste management (SWM), the type of eco-
nomic service that municipal solid waste management constitutes is not clear: is 
it a public service? Or is it a market economy activity? SWM is conceived vari-
ously as “a demand- driven business, a policy- driven activity and a public good” 
(UN- Habitat 2010: 164). The problem is that SWM is composed of many 
different tasks, which can be unbundled. Whereas street cleaning may be con-
sidered as a public good, the status of door- to-door collection is not as obvious: 
it still can be assimilated to a public good, yet it is one of the services “most 
easily converted to a private good, being divisible among consumers for services 
and payments” (Baud and Post 2003).
 In 1994, a World Bank report, aimed at targeting the areas of potential private 
sector participation in the field of SWM in developing countries, proposed an 
economic characterisation of these successive tasks. Most of them were classi-
fied as public or toll goods. The sale of recyclables was presented as a private 
good. And the common goods box was left empty (Figure 24.1).
 In contrast to this analysis, the idea of urban waste as commons may help us 
re- imagine urban policies beyond the state/market dichotomy that appears today 
as a structural axis of expropriation dynamics, especially in the Global South. 
Urban solid waste could fruitfully be conceived and managed as common pool 
resources. This would imply the attribution of use rights to a diversity of 
reclaiming and recovery agents and devices, in so far as they agree to some regu-
lation and to channel their own refuse (derived from their recovery process) to 
sanitary landfills.
Appropriation conflicts
Defined as something thrown away, waste is an object that no longer belongs to 
anyone. Waste is what has been abandoned, i.e., res derelicta, things over which 
their former owners have renounced their property rights.1
 The so- called “modernisation” process of SWM provokes clashes between 
agents: some experts invoke “contested” waste (Fahmi and Sutton 2010) whereas 
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others talk of “competition” (UN- Habitat 2010: 8). Such “appropriation con-
flicts” (Cavé 2014) over SWM arise, pitting a variety of actors against each other 
(municipal authorities, private operators, waste pickers, residents’ associations, 
industrial companies, etc.), because SWM is no longer only concerned with neu-
tralising a nuisance, but also, increasingly, with recovering a valuable resource.
 It is all the more critical to provide conceptual and operational tools to 
manage urban waste as commons today as most cities (focused on collection and 
disposal) do not recycle any of their waste while an increasing number of agents 
(including large private companies and producer responsibility schemes) now 
show an interest in waste management and recycling as a way to capture cheap 
raw materials: that is, in “urban mining”.
The urban solid waste deposit: an impure public good
The nature of waste is by no means intrinsic. A specific plastic package may be 
seen as a useless residue until there is a shortage, at which point it is re- classified 
Figure 24.1 Public vs private goods in solid waste management.
Source: Cavé (2015: 121).
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and re- valued as a commodity: “this is why what is waste today will not be waste 
tomorrow and why what was, common- sensically, waste yesterday is now 
incorporated as an economic ‘sector’ ” (O’Brien 1999: 278). Precisely because 
of this fluctuating status, it is time to stop dealing with SWM issues in terms of 
the garbage/resource dichotomy, which ultimately implies a public/private good 
dialectic, and instead start considering urban solid waste holistically as a 
common good.
 First, from a spatial perspective, the most lucrative items are gradually 
extracted (“creamed- off ”) from the solid waste stream through several stages of 
upstream interception. The fact that this urban service is provided on the streets 
(and not through an underground network), with successive offloadings, makes 
it possible and relatively easy for non- governmental actors to capture part of the 
flow. In other words, the way waste is managed makes it very difficult to exclude 
anyone from its appropriation.
 Second, from an economic point of view, the reclaiming of recyclable solid 
waste constitutes a coveted objective for several actors. Far from being marginal 
or archaic, the informal recovery sector is embedded in the global industrial 
economy. The analysis of resale prices for reclaimed materials in south- east Bra-
zilian cities demonstrates that the power of mechanisms aimed at catching dry 
waste rests on a non- elastic link to the global market demand for the correspond-
ing virgin materials.2 In other words, the potential economic revenues from the 
trading of solid waste items are substantial. To this extent, waste is a rival good.
 Being both rival and non- excludable, the urban solid waste deposit thus de 
facto appears as a common good. Neither pure resource, nor mere garbage, the 
urban solid waste deposit is always both.
Would it be possible to manage urban waste as Common 
Pool Resources?
When considering the entire deposit of urban solid waste as Common Pool 
Resources (CPR) as defined by Elinor Ostrom (Ostrom 1990), a distinction can 
be made between waste flows and stocks. Recognising this flow- stock structure 
in the SW deposit enables us to penetrate further into the internal dynamics of a 
common good. Indeed, according to Ostrom, any resource system is formed by 
these two interdependent components. The flow refers to units that are removed 
from the resource stock. The stock refers to units that are not removed from the 
resource.
• One portion of the urban solid waste deposit is quickly recovered or pur-
chased and never actually ends up in a landfill. This part that is sufficiently 
valuable not to be discarded can be equated with flows.
• The rest of the deposit is permanently abandoned, of interest only to the 
municipal authorities. That fraction of the deposit, of zero or negative value, 
corresponds to a stock. There is no spontaneous incentive for anyone to get 
involved in its circulation.
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Mixed together, flows and stock constitute the solid waste deposit. Apprehend-
ing the urban waste deposit as CPR implies nonetheless the reversal of the 
internal dynamics of such a system:
• in the CPR described by Ostrom, the stock is necessary to the flow’s 
renewal;
• in the case of solid waste, it is the opposite: the flow is paired with a stock 
that is potentially harmful and that, consequently, must not grow. And 
no- one wants to appropriate that stock.
In other words, the danger does not lie in the stock’s exhaustion, but rather in its 
uncontrolled growth and disposal. Therefore, the risk that informal recovery 
agents are generating is that, by extracting the most lucrative section of the 
deposit, they could throw the municipal service off balance. Indeed, due to fact 
that reclaiming recyclables is largely done by informal agents, waste pickers as 
well as itinerant junk dealers and local shops, municipalities may not be able to 
compensate their collection and treatment costs with the revenue from the sale of 
recyclables. Consequently, the informal recovery agents’ exclusive focus on 
recyclables (flows) may ultimately put the sanitary disposal of residues (stock) 
at risk.
 According to Elinor Ostrom, appropriators of CPR are faced with two kinds 
of problems:
1 The first is rent dissipation. This refers, for instance, to the (economic) risk 
involved when separate door- to-door collection is implemented and the 
deposit is at the same time significantly creamed off upstream. This problem 
could be solved through the “way of attributing a fixed, time- independent 
quantity of resource units [to the various appropriators, so as] to reduce 
uncertainty and conflict over the assignment of rights” (Ostrom 1990: 64). 
In some Brazilian cities, for instance, informal agents agree to stop recover-
ing recyclables from the streets provided that the municipality delivers to 
them the whole output of its separate collection scheme.
2 The second problem consists in the attribution of spatial or temporal access 
to the resource, as reflected in the interception dynamics observed in Vitória 
and Coimbatore (Cavé 2014). According to Ostrom, these kind of problems 
arise “because spatial and temporal distributions of common resource units 
frequently are heterogeneous and uncertain” (1990: 65). As long as recovery 
agents operate informally and/or illegally, it is very difficult for them to save 
and invest financial resources as they have no guarantee at all that they will 
be getting recyclables the next day and at a sufficient rate. They also do not 
care about what happens to final residues (stock) as they are frequently 
chased and repressed by the public agents in charge of it.
Mobilising use rights appears a promising lead. Use rights have been theorised, 
within the resource institutional regimes (RIR) framework, as an analytical and 
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operational tool. Use rights are realised in the privileged access to a flow of 
resource units. Unlike property rights, use rights determine “who might have 
what use of which quantity of the resource, in the form of which goods and ser-
vices derived from it” (Gerber et al., 2009: 7). Use rights thus refer to resource 
management and withdrawal rules that do not grant absolute freedom in the use 
of the resource.3 As a matter of fact, after a long and harsh struggle for the reci-
cladores’ rights, the Colombian Constitutional Court has warranted a “sure and 
safe access” to solid waste to informal recovery agents.4
Concluding remarks
Emanating from a combination of public and private law, use rights seem an 
appropriate prism through which to manage waste as a CPR. Taking into account 
the multi- segmented nature of the SWM service and the economic value of the 
flow part of waste – which make interceptions unavoidable – the assignment of 
targeted use rights could offer an innovative way to solve solid waste appropri-
ation conflicts. Indeed, the main difference between attributing use rights rather 
than property rights is that it makes the appropriators accountable to a regulator 
for the whole flow’s traceability. Indeed, the informal recovery circuits do 
generate various kinds of refuse (solid, liquid, gaseous) that today are dissemi-
nated in the environment without any supervision.
 The inclusion of both stock (for minimisation) and flows (for maximisation) 
within the analytical framework of CPR, suggests the desirability of a semi- 
decentralised SWM system. In such a system, non- governmental recycling initi-
atives would not be eradicated in favour of a monopolistic and centralised 
service focused on landfill solutions. Recovery agents would be incorporated as 
local players able to efficiently capture at source as much waste as possible. 
However, they would be included on the proviso that they would channel their 
own waste residues to the centralised treatment facilities in order to cope with 
environmental and sanitary externalities. Hence, stock management would be 
centralised, and flow management decentralised, as in the case of some Indian 
neighbourhoods or in Surabaya in Indonesia where waste separation, recyclables 
resale and composting are implemented at the Kampung (neighbourhood) level 
and final residues are removed to a centralised sanitary landfill.
Notes
1 Municipal authorities have the “responsibility” of dealing with waste; they do not own 
the waste.
2 Data from CEMPRE (Compromisso Empresarial para Reciclagem, www.cempre.org.
br) shows the monthly resale prices communicated by a series of waste pickers cooper-
atives from the south- east of Brazil for the 2001–2010 period. The materials considered 
are: white paper, cardboard, aluminium cans, plastics soft and hard, PET. Average 
values were aggregated from: Vitória and Guarapari (ES), Itabira (SP), São José dos 
Campos (SP) and Rio de Janeiro (RJ). Data from London Stock Exchange (LSE) indi-
cate the ‘fixing” commodity prices, from Société Générale systems, through one of 
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their major providers, that is, Reuters. These are the daily readings, from Monday to 
Friday, from 3 September 2001 to 13 May 2010, which amounts to 2,194 readings.
3 Close to the notion of “operational level” rights (where we find access rights to CPR as 
well as resource’s units removal rights) (Schlager and Ostrom 1992).
4 Auto 275/11. Available at: www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/autos/2011/
a275-11.htm.
25 The political work of waste picker 
integration
Melanie Samson
Historically, reclaimers who informally collect reusable and recyclable materials 
were as ignored by academics as they were by policy- makers. Although there is 
now burgeoning interest in the people both groups tend to refer to as “waste 
pickers”, these interests are running in different directions. Key areas of focus in 
scholarly research include the role of waste pickers in the production of value, their 
relation to the global economy, their environmental contributions, how they are dis-
possessed by municipal recycling contracts, and how they are organising. For their 
part, policy- makers at levels ranging from local government to the World Bank 
focus their attention on promoting and implementing waste picker integration as 
part of a broader trend towards “formalising the informal economy”. While there is 
a large and growing policy- oriented literature on waste picker integration, curiously 
scant attention has been paid to this global policy trend in academic debates.
 Yet waste picker integration is far from just a technical policy issue. In this 
chapter I argue that the concept of waste picker integration performs important 
political work.1 The chapter further contends that critically interrogating this polit-
ical work is both theoretically generative and relevant to the struggles of reclaimer 
movements. In the chapter I refer to waste picker integration when this concept is 
used, but refer to the workers as reclaimers. “Reclaimer” emphasises that these 
workers are rescuing items with potential value from being wasted and engaging 
in multiple, complex forms of labour to revalue them, while “waste picker” associ-
ates them with rubbish and reduces their work to the simple act of “picking”.
	 The	remainder	of	the	chapter	is	divided	into	three	sections.	The	first	section	
presents four key ways waste picker integration is conceptualised in the liter-
ature.	The	second	section	identifies	the	erasures	that	underpin	these	conceptuali-
sations and the political work that they perform. The concluding section explores 
the transformative political work that is possible when focus is shifted from 
waste picker integration to the integration of municipalities and industry into the 
existing recyclingscape2 established by reclaimers.
Conceptualisations of integration
Kashyap and Visvanathan (2014) note that the term “integration” encompasses a 
wide range of policies and programmes. This can be attributed, at least partially, 
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to the fact that most literature on waste picker integration is policy- oriented. 
Although	authors	generally	do	not	define	what	they	mean	by	integration,	I	argue	
that it is possible to discern four different conceptualisations of waste picker 
integration.
Conceptualisation 1: waste picker integration as charity
The	first	strand	of	literature	implicitly	frames	waste	picker	integration	as	a	charit-
able activity conducted by local government or industry for waste pickers to assist 
them in purportedly marginal, survivalist work. Velis et al. (2012: 60) refer to pro-
jects rooted in this understanding as “traditional development approaches to inte-
gration” that “focus on ‘helping’ waste pickers” without recognising them as 
partners or even consulting them. Such projects typically include the provision of 
training, equipment and space. They can also include initiatives designed by local 
government and/or industry to encourage waste pickers to form companies and 
cooperatives that become the recipients of support and contracts. The four key 
aspects of this conceptualisation are: (1) integration focuses narrowly on the daily 
physical work of extracting, sorting, cleaning and selling materials; (2) integration 
programmes provide support to directly assist waste pickers in conducting their 
work; (3) programmes focus on the integration of waste pickers’ labour, rather 
than integration of their recycling system; and (4) waste pickers are passive targets 
of local government programmes. Unsurprisingly, waste pickers frequently do not 
want to be integrated in the ways envisioned by government and industry, leading 
to project failure and adverse effects for the very reclaimers the projects claim to 
be assisting (Ahmed and Ali 2004; Scheinberg 2012; Velis et al. 2012; Reddy 
2015; Pholoto 2016; Sekhwela 2017).
Conceptualisation 2: waste picker integration as participation
The second conceptualisation continues to frame waste picker integration as 
integration of reclaimers’ daily labour to improve their livelihoods. However, 
policies and programmes are developed through participatory approaches (which 
range from tokenistic to democratic), as policy- makers, donor agencies and aca-
demics increasingly recognise that successful integration requires the active 
involvement of reclaimers (Nas and Jaffe 2004; Nzeadibe and Anyadike 2012; 
Scheinberg 2012; Velis et al. 2012; Ezeah, Fazakerley and Roberts 2013). In 
order to facilitate meaningful participation, support is often provided to waste 
pickers to form and sustain organisations to represent themselves (Gunsilius 
2012; Velis et al. 2012; Masood and Barlow 2013). This approach can also 
include	 attention	 to	 the	 specific	 histories,	 politics	 and	 other	 key	 aspects	 of	
different places in order to identify the most relevant ways to integrate the work 
of waste pickers in a particular context.
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Conceptualisation 3: waste picker integration as a multifaceted 
process
The third conceptualisation also emphasises the importance of participation in 
the integration of reclaimers’ daily work. However, in this approach, waste 
picker integration is conceptualised as a multifaceted process that requires social, 
cultural, political, legal and economic interventions, as each of these spheres 
shapes waste pickers’ work (Dias 2011c; Gunsilius 2012; Scheinberg 2012; 
Ezeah, Fazakerley and Roberts 2013). Due to the stigmatisation of reclaimers, 
strong emphasis is placed on social and cultural interventions to generate the 
recognition of and respect for reclaimers required for them to perform their work 
unhindered (Nas and Jaffe 2004; Nzeadibe and Anyadike 2012; Velis et al. 2012; 
Masood and Barlow 2013; Cohen 2014).
Conceptualisation 4: waste picker integration as social 
transformation
The fourth conceptualisation moves beyond utilitarian integration into other 
spheres. Rather than being an end in itself, waste picker integration is conceptu-
alised as part of larger political projects and struggles for social justice and trans-
formation (Gutberlet 2008; Chikarmane 2012). Dias (2011c) argues that the 
process of developing waste picker integration policies and programmes is as 
important as the policies and programmes themselves, as it forges new forms of 
citizenship. Chikarmane and Narayan (2005) highlight how in organising around 
integration, reclaimers transform their understanding of the world and their place 
within it. Integration therefore becomes one way of changing these current 
oppressive and exclusionary realities. While this conceptualisation of integration 
is held primarily by reclaimer organisations, to a certain extent, it also under-
pinned the policies and programmes of the Workers’ Party (PT) as well as local 
and national governments in Brazil (Gutberlet 2008; Dias 2011a).
Integration as erasure
When looking at the political work of integration, it is useful to think about 
waste picker integration as erasure. As the narrowest form of integration, waste 
picker	integration	as	charity	is	based	on	five	key	erasures.	The	first	is	the	erasure	
of reclaiming as a productive economic activity. This strips reclaimers of their 
identities as workers who make important economic contributions, and enables 
the state and industry to treat reclaimers as the fortunate recipients of municipal 
beneficence.	 In	 doing	 so,	 the	 state	 and	 industry	 relieve	 themselves	 of	 the	
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•	 even	give	reclaimers	preference	over	poor	community	members	when	jobs	
are created in formal recycling programmes.
Second is the erasure of reclaimers’ knowledge. Before reclaimers can even 
start to think of reaching their hands into rubbish bins, they must reject the 
municipality’s understanding of domestic waste as anything disposed of by 
residents,	 and	 develop	 a	 more	 refined	 ontology	 that	 differentiates	 potential	
value from waste. They then need to develop a deep understanding of the 
nature of the different materials they salvage and the differing potential values 
congealed within them. Other essential types of knowledge include knowledge 
of the patterns and rhythms of waste collection in the city; and how to cat-
egorise and prepare materials for sale; and the recycling market and its local 
geographies. By erasing the epistemic agency of reclaimers, municipalities and 
industry reduce reclaimers to unthinking manual labourers who do not possess 
valuable insights into how the recycling system in the city does and should 
function. Municipalities and industry are therefore able to justify denying 
reclaimers’ “epistemic participation” (Fricker 2010; Hookway 2010) in both 
the development of municipal separation at source programmes and, ironically, 
in the design of “integration” programmes.
 Third, just as colonialists cast colonised land as barren, wasted, and lying in 
wait to be put to productive use in their own interests (McClintock 1995; 
Gidwani 2008; Goldstein 2013), municipalities and industry erase the “recy-
clingscape” created by the reclaimers. Due to their unwillingness to recognise 
this informally produced system, municipalities and industry see only a “wastes-
cape”, which conveniently enables them to deem themselves the best custodians 
of the space and midwives of a completely new recyclingscape.
 The fourth erasure is the erasure of reclaimers’ forging of a new sphere of 
accumulation (Samson 2015b). Reclaimers created the recyclable collection 
system in virtually all post- colonial cities. As municipalities treated recyclable 
materials	as	trash	that	needed	to	be	collected,	transported	and	landfilled,	recycla-
bles put out for collection were a cost to the municipality. It was reclaimers who 
identified	 that	 value	 could	 be	 extracted	 from	 items	 misclassified	 as	 waste.	 In	
doing so, they informally created a new sphere of accumulation. By denying its 
existence, municipalities and industry can enclose the recyclables commons in a 
process of accumulation by dispossession (ibid.), claim to be creating a com-
pletely new sphere of accumulation, and avoid paying compensation to the 
reclaimers who are dispossessed.
	 The	final	erasure	is	the	erasure	of	reclaimers’	very	humanity.	The	rendering	
of reclaimers as “human waste” (Bauman 2004) has been documented in cities 
across the world (Nas and Jaffe 2004; Gidwani and Reddy 2011). Understanding 
that reclaimers are framed as “surplus people” living at the very edges of the 
economy and society helps to explain why municipalities feel that they do not 
need to pay reclaimers for the service they provide, include them in the setting 
of priorities and decision- making, or consider how they are affected by separa-
tion at source.
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	 Taken	together,	these	five	erasures	consolidate	existing	power	relations;	dis-
possess reclaimers; exacerbate their political, social, epistemic and economic 
marginalisation; and open new spheres of accumulation for capital and patron-
age for the local state.
 While these erasures are most fully realised in the conceptualisation of waste 
picker integration as charity, to varying degrees they also underpin conceptuali-
sations 2 and 3 of waste picker integration as “participation” and “multifaceted”. 
Although these two conceptualisations recognise reclaimers’ work and know-
ledge, both are highly circumscribed; the work that is acknowledged is limited to 
the daily labour of reclaiming, and reclaimers’ knowledge is drawn on in a utili-
tarian way in order to design better projects and programmes to integrate this 
daily work. Reclaimers are not completely dismissed as human waste, but they 
are also not considered and engaged as complex, multidimensional people 
involved in all spheres of social, political and economic life. Their role in creat-
ing a new sphere of accumulation, and the very existence of that sphere remain 
erased.
 For the most part, projects rooted in conceptualisations 2 and 3 do not recog-
nise the reclaimers’ recyclingscape and focus instead on integrating individual 
reclaimers and cooperatives. Even when the recyclingscape is recognised, it is 
assumed that it should be integrated with the municipality’s envisioned recy-
clingscape or be kept in mind when reclaimers and the municipality collectively 
design a new one. The existing recyclingscape is not given primacy as the 
foundation for any new developments, and at best reclaimers are treated as equal 
partners in these processes rather than leading them.
Municipal and industry integration into the reclaimers’ 
recyclingscape
Just	as	the	meaning	of	“integration”	in	waste	picker	integration	has	been	insuffi-
ciently theorised, the assumption that it is waste pickers who are being integrated 
also needs to be problematised. Reclaimer Louis Mahlangu dismissed this notion 
when	he	 informed	 industry	representatives	and	national	and	 local	officials	 in	a	
meeting that “it is the city who is integrating itself on our existing structures, 
because we’ve been doing it for many years, so it is them who is integrating onto 
our existing system.”
 Rather than looking at how to include reclaimers in formal waste manage-
ment and recycling systems, the real question is how municipal and industry 
systems should integrate into the reclaimers’ recyclingscape. This approach 
redresses the “erasures” of waste picker integration as it recognises reclaimers as 
human beings engaged in all spheres of life; epistemic agents; workers with 
rights to the materials they collect; and creators of the recyclingscape and a new 
sphere of accumulation. As in Latin America, where the people who perform 
this labour and their organisations use names that associate them with recycling 
and the collection of valuable materials, the use of the word reclaimer (rather 
than waste picker) removes the association of reclaimers with the rubbish 
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 residents mix their recyclables into, and focuses instead on reclaimers’ creative 
act of imbuing these trashed recyclables with new value.
 Understanding integration as the integration of municipal and industry systems 
into the reclaimers’ recyclingscape performs important broader transformative 
political work. It expands the ontology of the economy not merely to include the 
informal	economy,	but	also	 to	recognise	 that	activities	defined	as	 informal	often	
serve as the base for integrated economic processes. It also disrupts established 
understandings of who has knowledge and expertise, how knowledge is generated, 
and whose perspectives and ideas are crucial for political and economic processes. 
In doing so, this conceptualisation demands transformations in forms of govern-
ance and in the social, political, economic and cultural spheres.
 This conceptualisation of integration as integration into reclaimers’ recycling-
scape	shares	many	affinities	with	“integration	as	transformation”.	In	this	regard,	
it is important to note that the Portuguese literature about Brazil uses the term 
“inclusive recycling”, and this is typically carried through into English language 
articles written about Brazil (cf. Gutberlet 2008; Dias 2011d). While this moves 
away from the notion that it is waste pickers who must be integrated, the term 
“inclusive recycling” conveys notions of equality between the parties. By con-
trast, redressing the erasures of integration makes clear that reclaimers, the recy-
clingscape they produced and reproduce on a daily basis, and the sphere of 
accumulation they created should be given primacy. It therefore more clearly 
articulates and redresses the existing unequal power dynamics in how municip-
alities and industry relate to reclaimers.
 Of course, it is one thing to call for a transformation in power relations and 
another to actually achieve this. As movements of reclaimers, formal and 
informal workers, and all oppressed and exploited groups know all too well, 
those with power do not readily relinquish it. However, focusing on identifying 
and reversing these and other erasures of integration can hopefully assist 
reclaimer movements in developing and bolstering deeper demands and more 
expansive visions of the future.
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Notes
1 Here I am drawing on Stuart Hall’s (2008) theorisation of the “political work” that 
race does.
2 Swyngedouw’s (1999) concept of the “waterscape” had inspired some waste and 
discard scholars to begin to use the term “wastescape”. I argue that it is crucially 
important to see the “recyclingscape” forged by reclaimers and to understand that this 
is the terrain on which all debates about municipal and industry recycling programmes 
play out.
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Social protection arises in response to different concerns of different nation 
states. Social protection for workers, in the form of access to social insurance, 
appeared as a feature of industrialised nations in the nineteenth century. In 
Germany, in 1889, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck introduced the first measure 
of social security focused on the workforce – specifically, formal workers. Social 
security, as it became known, spread rapidly through Europe. In Britain, an 
organised national programme of school meals appeared in the early twentieth 
century as a response to the poor nutritional state of men presenting themselves 
to fight in the imperialist Anglo- Boer War in South Africa. In the USA, the 
Great Depression triggered the shift in economic policy towards massive invest-
ment in infrastructural and economic programmes, such as the Tennessee Valley 
Authority, as well as initiating a national old age pension system. In Britain, the 
introduction of Beveridge’s plan for a welfare state was blocked by Churchill 
before the Second World War; it was accepted following the war and developed 
into Britain’s comprehensive welfare state that included the social insurance- 
based national health system.
 The core debate in social protection is about the relationships between, and 
respective responsibilities of, the state, the market, and individuals, with a core 
concern being the extent to which state intervention distorts markets and under-
mines the “self- reliance” of families and communities. This relates also to 
whether the objective of social protection is to address and mitigate poverty or 
also to play a redistributive role.
 Welfare regimes in the Global North were largely built on assumptions of 
(nearly) full employment in formal work. It was assumed that workers and their 
families could be protected through contributory social benefits, with a residual 
set of social assistance benefits for the very poor or those unable to enter formal 
labour markets.
 Inexorably, increasing numbers of workers across the world are experiencing 
the erosion of their social protection. Informal workers, by definition, do not 
receive work- related social protection, though some, in some countries, do 
receive social benefits as citizens. The processes of casualisation of employment 
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mean that growing numbers of workers, though they may have steady employ-
ment, nevertheless have some work- related benefits capped, stopped, or never 
awarded at all.
 One of the barriers to the development of appropriate and equitable economic 
and social policies is this: those who “do” social policy do not see informal 
workers – they see citizens, or “poor and vulnerable and marginalised” people. 
Those who “do” economic policy – macro and micro – do not see labour as a 
“produced factor of production” and, therefore, do not see social spending as 
investment in the reproduction of society – and of the labour force – of the 
present and future.
Getting social protection for informal workers on the map
When the WIEGO (Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organ-
izing) Social Protection programme was started in 2000, there was very little pub-
lished work on social protection for informal workers. A singular exception was 
the ILO book, Social Security for the Excluded Majority (Von Ginnekin 1999), 
which explicitly foregrounded informal workers Three years later an edited 
volume commissioned and published by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung assessed 
social protection systems in nine countries in South- east and East Asia (Adam, von 
Hauff, and Marei 2002); all chapters noted the absence of provision for informal 
workers. Elsewhere, some literature and case studies emerged on related topics 
such as micro insurance, micro savings, rotating credit associations by/for informal 
workers and some publications by the Self- Employed Women’s Association 
(SEWA) of India on their health insurance scheme and childcare services.
 One of the first activities of the WIEGO Social Protection programme was a 
book for ILO’s STEP (Strategies and Tools against Social Exclusion and 
Poverty) programme on a gendered approach to social protection for informal 
workers (Lund and Srinivas 2000); this publication purposely moved away from 
the “poor and marginal and excluded” paradigm towards seeing the informally 
employed as workers. The core question framed by WIEGO in this volume was: 
“Under what conditions can what kind of workers in the informal economy (and 
especially poorer women) get access to what core measures of provision, which 
can be incrementally improved upon in the future?” (ibid.).
 In 2002, WIEGO’s Social Protection Programme produced a framework 
paper for its work. Key characteristics of the conceptual and strategic approach 
outlined in that framework paper were:
• It recognises the right to social protection as an inalienable part of work.
• It has as a core variable the different status in employment, along a contin-
uum from wholly formal employment, to informal employment, with many 
gradations in between.
• It focuses on poorer women, but not to the exclusion of men.
• It keeps open a role in social protection for all interest groups.
• It advocates principles of equity and redistribution (Lund 2004: 238).1
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A point of departure was that the strategic approach had to be incremental. It did 
not expect that fundamental differences in worker benefits would be possible in 
the short term, but that fundamental differences would be the longer- term goal. 
As in the book for ILO STEP, the WIEGO framework paper advocated a multi- 
dimensional approach to understanding risk and protection, integrating a life- 
cycle approach, an analysis of work- related risks based on occupational sector 
and place of work, and a commitment to informal worker involvement in policy 
processes and reforms.
 I first presented the framework paper at a 2002 conference of the Inter- 
American Development Bank in Santiago, Chile, at which Armando Barrientos 
also presented a paper on women in the informal economy in Latin America 
(Barrientos 2004). Between 2002 and 2005, WIEGO tested the approach out-
lined in the framework paper in a series of country dialogues and research meet-
ings, in five Latin American and eight Asian countries. During this time, 
relationships were forged with organisations of informal workers and supportive 
NGOs, through the process facilitated in Latin America by Carmen Roca, 
WIEGO’s regional coordinator for Latin America and the Caribbean, and in Asia 
by HomeNet Thailand.
 The launch of the ILO STEP/WIEGO book (Lund and Srinivas 2000) led to a 
further collaboration between ILO STEP and WIEGO. The partners organised a 
technical consultative workshop with the World Bank. The aim was to hold up 
an empirical mirror, as it were, against which to assess the ability of the social 
protection approach of each of the three organisations to integrate informal 
workers. Two case studies were commissioned to interrogate whether and how 
informal workers gained access to social protection: one of horticulture workers 
in Chile and South Africa (by Armando Barrientos and Stephanie Ware Barrien-
tos); the other of garment workers in the Philippines and Thailand (by Donna 
Doane, Rosalinda Ofreneo and Daonoi Srikajon). As far as we know, this was 
the first time that social protection for informal and formal workers was analysed 
using global value chain (GVC) analysis.
 Shortly before the workshop, the World Bank had introduced a “new 
approach” of Social Risk Management (SRM), which was meant to replace its 
short- term social safety net approach (Holzmann and Jorgenson 1999). During 
the workshop between the International Labour Organization (ILO), the World 
Bank and WIEGO, attended by HomeNet Thailand and SEWA among others, 
the weaknesses in the SRM approach became apparent: notably, that the poor 
were seen as responsible for their own social protection, and informal workers 
were not included in the model. It was a remarkable opportunity for the partners 
to come to grips, at a deep level, with the differences in our approaches, drawing 
on the concrete realities of informal workers’ lives. After the workshop, the ILO, 
WIEGO and World Bank produced a book entitled Chains of Production, 
Ladders of Protection which presented the GVC framework, the case studies, 
and the lessons learned (Lund and Nicholson 2003).
 Since then, the WIEGO Social Protection programme has evolved in signi-
ficant ways to include a focus on occupational health and safety and on childcare 
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as core components of social protection; to engage with global debates on uni-
versal health, including issues of financing, costing, and delivery systems; and to 
explore whether and how to engage in issues relating to social protection for 
elderly informal workers. What follows are selected conceptual and strategic 
issues that have emerged during the first two decades of WIEGO’s Social Pro-
tection programme.
Selected policy issues
In the last 20 years, there have been major changes in the social protection arena, 
having to do with the changing role of the state, the need for protection against 
the risks associated with climate change and migration and the role of civil 
society organisations, among other things.
 While there has been withdrawal in many states from social spending, along 
with privatisation of some services, there is also a great deal of new attention on 
cash transfers, and on universal health care/coverage. I select four issues to illus-
trate progress, regress and paradoxes.
Social policy and social protection cannot remediate inequalities 
caused by economic, labour and trade policies that create inequality
The lack of social protection for the majority of workers across the world is a 
disconcertingly hard reality and challenge. WIEGO advocates for greater 
security at work, at the same time knowing that processes such as the informali-
sation of once formal workers is further eroding social provision.
 One vignette: in 2009, WIEGO was asked to present a keynote address to a 
European Commission (EC) and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) joint seminar on “Employment, Social Protection and Decent 
Work in ACP Countries’ (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific)”. The EC and the OECD 
were in the process of encouraging numbers of ACP countries into trade agreements 
that would disadvantage those very countries; the model was so harsh and punitive 
that it was denounced by the World Bank. As noted in my back- to-office report:
This social protection round of training and seminars [being held by the EC 
and OECD] goes in parallel with their economic and aid policies. On the 
one hand, the economic policy branch of the EC is forcing trade deals on 
APC countries which are absolutely sure to impoverish them further; but on 
the other hand, the EC will try and remediate the bad economic and trade 
policy with this sort of “training” in decent work and social protection. It 
just does not make sense.
National and local levels of government
International organisations work chiefly with the nation state as their point of 
entry, and this is the level at which partnerships are typically formed and dealt 
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with (World Trade Organization, World Health Organization, International 
Labour Organization, UN agencies, etc.). In many countries, social policy and 
social protection are developed at the national level. As early as the Social Pro-
tection framework paper, and then made even more clear through WIEGO’s 
occupational health and safety project and health work more generally, is the 
fact that the local, municipal level of government influences the daily lives of 
informal workers most directly, especially with regard to the provision of infra-
structure that will allow workers to access safer and healthier workplaces, 
including their own homes (Lund 2012). WIEGO’s strategic interventions, 
guided by its theory of change, demand that we balance support for organisa-
tions of informal workers on the ground, with an analysis of the hierarchy in the 
vertical ladder between local and state or federal levels of government, and the 
horizontal links at the local level between different functions within local gov-
ernment, as well as within central government. The intersection between social 
protection and urban policies is an area that will be developed in the next phase 
of work. It is an exciting place to be, conceptually, and in terms of identifying 
practical spaces for policy reform.
Universal health coverage (UHC) and private insurance
The last ten years or so have seen the growth, globally, of a commitment to uni-
versal health care, or universal health coverage, endorsed and supported by 
significant philanthropic foundations, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation. The last great push towards uni-
versal health care (UHC) following the Alma Ata Conference in 1978, was based 
on primary health care (PHC); the understanding was that the PHC component 
would be state- provided. Now, in the current fervour of support for UHC, the 
focus is less on public health care and more on health insurance, with many pro-
moters seeing a role for the private insurance firms supported by government. 
Others make the case for different roles that can be played by the state: from 
provision of services to financing, enabling, and guaranteeing the provision of 
services by others.
 There are grave concerns that health programmes underpinned by private 
insurance tend towards the provision of curative services, and away from any 
significant commitment towards preventive health services as one of the pillars 
of primary health care and of public health. This concern is illustrated by the 
design and implementation of the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) in 
India, a government scheme to provide health insurance for families below the 
poverty line (Jain 2012) which now forms part of Ayushman Bharat, a larger 
programme including primary health care.
Cash transfers
A surprising development in social protection in the last 30 years has been the 
rapid spread of cash transfers in Sub- Saharan Africa and Latin America. Some 
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attribute the main cause of the spread of this form of provision to the success of 
some programmes in the Global South (Hanlon, Hulme and Barrientos 2010); 
others proffer the idea of south- south learning, for example, from Brazil to 
Ghana (Foli, Béland and Beck Fenwick 2018); others would say it was important 
that the World Bank’s own researchers found that cash transfers, properly 
designed, could be effective as well as equitable, and could be seen as compen-
sation for the damage caused by the privatisation of pensions schemes under 
structural adjustment. Bob Deacon writes about ILO’s Social Protection Depart-
ment playing a driving role (Deacon 2013); others point to the NGO HelpAge 
International driving the move to cash transfers for elderly people.
 The WIEGO Social Protection team, and WIEGO as a whole, see the merit of 
cash transfers in providing direct income support, especially to women and chil-
dren. The initial model of the Global Social Protection Floor (SPF ) comprised 
essentially cash transfers over the life- cycle, as well as affordable basic health 
care. Early SPF documents acknowledged informal workers but clubbed them 
with “the unemployed”. In the course of the acceptance by all UN agencies of 
the SPFs, and the start of implementation, the focus on informal workers is being 
further diluted. The intended “universality” of the SPFs might be – probably is – 
contributing to the loss of focus on worker- oriented social protection in favour 
of citizen- based social protection (see Laura Alfers, Chapter 27 in this volume).
Going forward
Social protection for informal workers is now on the global policy map. Strong 
partnerships between WIEGO, some local and national actors as well as inter-
national organisations and other NGOs have contributed to this. The processes 
of working through existing organisations of informal workers wherever pos-
sible was a unique and effective way of bridging between organisations of 
workers, on the one hand, and the authorities or agencies who control their 
spaces, on the other.
 Policy research and advocacy on women’s informal work and childcare 
underscore the challenges of making visible all the ways that family care impacts 
the experiences of informal women workers. Participatory action research and 
regional meetings that were part of WIEGO’s Child Care Initiative revealed that 
poorer informal working women themselves do not necessarily articulate child-
care as a priority need. Key organisational and programme leaders have sug-
gested that this might be due to the fact that the workers themselves see childcare 
as something that simply is women’s personal responsibility not that of others or 
society at large.
 The boundary between paid work by adults and unpaid domestic chores, care 
work and reproductive labour is difficult to maintain when advocating for social 
protection, particularly family- related benefits, for women informal workers. 
Diane Elson notes the invisibility of unpaid care work, and how social repro-
duction is taken for granted. She notes that “[the] unpaid care economy is outside 
the production boundary, but its operation has implications for what goes on 
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inside the production boundary” (Elson 2004: 65). So much of unpaid work 
necessary to the household is performed by women that it affects their ability to 
engage in paid work outside of, or even within, the home. Women with children 
engage in the lower earning, least predictable forms of informal work as a result 
of care responsibilities.
 Nevertheless, practical interventions have shown that women do engage with 
specific work- related issues when the connection of these issues to their daily 
work experience is direct and clear. For example, as part of WIEGO projects 
aiming to improve awareness and practices of occupational health and safety in 
Warwick Junction in Durban, South Africa, information campaigns and training 
undertaken “reinforced to traders that they are workers, that the spaces in which 
they work are workplaces, and that they have rights and responsibilities in rela-
tion to that space” (Alfers et al. 2016).
 Going forward, a challenge for policy- relevant research and advocacy for 
social protection is how to maintain the focus on improving paid work, and con-
sider the boundary in women’s lives between unpaid care work roles and earning 
activities, while interacting intellectually and strategically with a broad array of 
international and national organisations and NGOs. Some of these work in 
different but closely related domains and may address only women’s household 
responsibilities, on the one hand, or only consider men’s needs when dealing 
with workers’ social protection, on the other.
 A related challenge, detailed by Laura Alfers in Chapter 27, is how to 
approach social protection through both a citizenship and work status lens, 
encompassing consideration of universal approaches to social protection provi-
sion yet ensuring consideration of the particular features of informal work that 
lead to specific needs of workers. A significant aspect to consider in universal 
approaches is the substantial need for financing support ensuring access to social 
protection for informal workers but also others in similarly tenuous financial 
situations. As Silke Staab in Chapter 28 in this volume concludes, universal 
systems that are built through on- going support from broad- based constituencies 
can be sustainable financially and politically and, in turn, ensure that all workers, 
informal workers among them, are included.
Note
1 The social protection framework had its roots in a study done with Smita Srinivas for 
the ILO initiative “Strategies and Tools against Social Exclusion and Poverty” (Lund 
and Srinivas 2000).
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Rethinking the terms of inclusion
Laura Alfers
In his edited volume, Social Policy in a Development Context, Mkandawire 
(2004) argues that a characteristic of much of the writing on social policy in a 
development context is its “excessive” description and “lack of theoretical and 
conceptual underpinnings”. This chapter reflects on some of the theoretical con-
cepts which may be brought to bear on the study of social protection in relation 
to informal workers. In doing so it aims to contribute to Mkandawire’s call to 
add “methodological thickness” to the study of social policy more generally in 
the developing world. It focuses on the nexus of inclusion and exclusion – con-
cepts that are sometimes explicit, but also often implicit, within much of the 
social protection literature. Questions about inclusion and exclusion manifest in 
different ways, depending on the focus, but there are two areas where they 
impact on WIEGO’s (Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organ-
izing) approach to social protection.
 The first relates to what the historian Frederick Cooper (1996) has called the 
“terms of inclusion” into social protection, and specifically the tension that exists 
between inclusion based on work status, and more universal conceptions where 
inclusion is based on citizenship.1 While this tension is rather a binary, within 
the study of social protection, it often translates into a division between those 
scholars and activists who focus on work- related social protection (oriented 
towards formal workers and based on an employment relationship) and those 
who focus on social protection provided through the state for the vulnerable poor 
outside of the labour market – children, the elderly, and the disabled. Here 
poverty – and the inability to work – are the determining criteria for inclusion. 
Working with informal workers – who are both workers and often poor – means 
that this tension is particularly visible to WIEGO analysts.
 Related to this is the line that is drawn between those members of society who 
are included in social protection systems and those who are excluded. Informal 
workers often fall into the category of the excluded. As the continued existence of 
the informal economy has increasingly been acknowledged, the question of how to 
“extend social protection to informal workers” has become more prominent. There 
are different ideas about the best way to do this – and perspectives are often influ-
enced by whether one comes from a background in work- related social protection 
or from the more development/poverty- centred approach.
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 This chapter suggests two things. First, that instead of focusing on the worker 
or the citizen, as is commonly done, it is important to think about the worker and 
the citizen in relation to one another. This relational approach draws on a 
Marxist dialectical method, allowing us to see different elements within a system 
not as separate, but as “dual aspects of a unity” (Harvey 2010).
 Second, that particularly in relation to informal workers in the context of 
rapid urbanisation, there is a need to think more widely about the exclusion/
inclusion nexus across spheres of policy. Drawing on Du Toit’s (2005) concept 
of “adverse incorporation”, we need to not only think about how to include 
informal workers into systems from which they are excluded, but also think 
about where, how and on what terms informal workers are already included in 
systems, and how this inclusion interacts with the aims and goals of social 
protection.
 In making these arguments, the chapter draws on two short stories derived 
from the history of health policy. In doing so, it shows how historical methods 
may feed into our understanding of current policy debates.
Relating workers and citizens in health provision
Health provision is commonly thought of as an issue of human rights and cit-
izenship, and it is framed as a social issue, not an economic issue. Where people 
as economic agents – as workers – come into view is often limited to a small and 
often ignored area of health – occupational health and safety. Alternatively, work 
comes up in relation to the types of employment contributory health schemes 
which tend to be thought of as ill- suited to development contexts because of 
small formal workforces and because they divide risk pools and reinforce the 
status of an elite class. This means that the worker – the person as an economic 
agent, connected into the economic system – is not a reality that is considered. 
The following story reveals some of the dangers within this position.
 In 1950, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared that health was a 
right for all and in line with the Universal Declaration on Human Rights placed 
the responsibility for health provision squarely on governments. In many African 
countries which were just beginning to emerge from colonial oppression, this 
had some no doubt unintended consequences. British colonial governments, 
while certainly biased towards the interests of large industries, had also put pres-
sure on large employers (plantations, oil companies, mining companies, and so 
on) to provide health services to their workers and families (mainly as a way to 
avoid their own spending on such services). Some (by no means all) of these 
employers complied, thereby providing health services to thousands of workers 
and their families, often in rural areas where the colonial and post- colonial state 
was unwilling or unable to reach.
 The ensuing debates and deliberations played out particularly clearly at the 
1951 Conference on Industry and Tropical Health, which was a gathering of the 
major corporate powerhouses working in the developing world.2 The key issue 
was about “getting out from under”, which meant thinking of ways to free 
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 industry from its prior commitments to general health service provision – not an 
easy process where arrangements were the result of union bargaining. Yet it was 
reasoned that as long as the WHO’s drive towards state provision of primary 
health care continued, it would become easier for business to withdraw. Occupa-
tional health suddenly assumed some strategic importance. If health service pro-
vision was to be renegotiated between the state and business, business should 
rightly take on “preventive and constructive medicine in contradistinction to cur-
ative medicine”, and should involve itself only with workers and not their fam-
ilies. The provision of occupational health services – with a focus on prevention 
and the individual worker – could be the bargaining chip for industry to use to 
free itself from the expensive and complex provisions of general health 
provision.
 Why is this an important story? First, because it shows what can happen when 
the employment space and the citizenship space are not seen together – as two 
elements of a whole. While state health provision has the potential to be more 
egalitarian, the loss of the direct contribution of capital to health systems is prob-
lematic in countries with fragile economies and state capacity, low tax bases and 
low ability to collect taxes.
 Second, it provides a warning about current moves to “delink” social and 
labour protections – including occupational health and safety (OHS) – from the 
employment relationship (World Bank 2019). It has been argued that doing so 
will make protections accessible to informal workers. While this is true – and 
why a universalist perspective is important when talking about informal workers 
– it also means shifting of responsibility away from capital and onto the state. 
This is in a context where states have less and less fiscal space to provide labour 
and social protections. The casualisation of labour continues along with the 
ability to collect payroll taxes and to build up effective contributory schemes, 
and multinationals are ever more creative in avoiding or evading taxation. Ana-
lyses of health policy provision which are solely underpinned by a belief in uni-
versalism may be unable to pick up on this shift and may become vulnerable to 
what Rubery (2015) terms a “dangerous liaison” between universalism and 
neoliberalism.
Social protection, urban policy and adverse incorporation
Another historical anecdote: while workplace- related fatalities in colonial indus-
tries in the Gold Coast (Ghana) were (probably) less than meticulously recorded 
in the annual reports of labour inspectors, the only statistics on work- related 
mortality for the women workers – who were actively discouraged from waged 
employment, but who dominated urban trade – are to be found in the municipal 
sanitation records in, for example, Kumasi.3 In 1924, plague broke out in the 
Asante capital, Kumasi. Percy Selwyn- Clarke, the Medical Officer of Health for 
Kumasi, wrote a report on the outbreak. He concluded that “[the] conditions 
under which food was sold in the market and in which water for drinking and 
washing purposes was obtained both constituted contributory causes to the 
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 outbreak”. To emphasise his point, Selwyn- Clarke recorded the occupations of 
the deceased. The resulting tabulation indicated that petty traders (considered a 
woman’s occupation) were the worst affected with 43 cases of plague. He noted 
that “petty traders and market women stood a greater chance of becoming 
infected than others” because they stored edible goods (later to be sold) in their 
own homes. This attracted rats – the source of the fleas which spread the plague.
 This will not be a surprising story for urbanists, but it does upset the estab-
lished narrative within social protection, which tends to position informal 
workers as existing outside of, and excluded from, social and labour protection 
systems. This is of course often true if we limit the analysis to these policy 
systems, but it is not true if the net is thrown wider to look at urban policies. In 
this story, the market women of Kumasi were more vulnerable to plague because 
they worked in unsanitary conditions, with no access to storage in the markets, a 
still common complaint among street vendors in Ghana. To argue that informal 
workers were excluded from health systems because they were excluded from 
work- related health systems obscures the reality – they are very visible within 
the municipal sanitation reports4 as opposed to their complete absence in the 
labour reports. A more nuanced perspective would shift the focus from exclu-
sion, to think about the relationship between informal workers and urban systems 
as one of adverse incorporation. Rather than simply seeing exclusion, Du Toit 
(2005) argues, when one focuses on the ways in which people are included in 
systems in a manner which serves to disempower them, one is able to understand 
more precisely the multiple ways in which disempowerment is produced in the 
real world.
 One of the key roles of work- related social protection is to protect workers’ 
incomes from risk (health or otherwise). While informal workers are often 
excluded from the social protections which help them to manage risk, many of 
the risks they face – particularly those who work in informal workplaces such as 
urban public space, their own homes, or landfill sites – arise because of the 
adverse ways in which they are incorporated into urban systems. Seeing inclu-
sion and exclusion in this more complex way brings together two areas of policy 
which are generally considered to be unrelated – urban policy and social protec-
tion. It suggests that if we are to think about the world in a way that fits the 
reality of urban informal workers, then there is further work to be done to inter-
rogate the institutional division that exists between social protection and other 
policies, such as urban policies, and a need to think about the concepts which 
will help us to do so.
Notes
1 It should be noted that a third option – of accessing social protection through residency 
– also exists. This is often, however, linked to work status.
2 The Conference was held every four years from 1951 to 1970 at Harvard University, 
funded by the Rockefeller Foundation. This information is drawn from the Proceedings 
of the Conference on Industry and Tropical Health, housed at the Wellcome Trust 
Archives in London.
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3 This information is drawn from the Kumasi Municipal Records from 1925–1926, held 
at the National Archives of Ghana (PRAAD) in Accra.
4 So much so that as Robertson (1984) notes, the standard pronoun in the Accra sanita-
tion reports changed from “he” to “she” which reflected better the gender composition 
of the people with whom they interacted on a daily basis.
28 Social protection for women 
informal workers
Perspectives from Latin America
Silke Staab
For the majority of working women and men, the promise of universal social 
protection remains unfulfilled. Labor market informality is a key driver of this 
exclusion. Gender biases and inequalities – in markets, households, laws and 
policies – exacerbate this exclusion for women, including women in informal 
employment – by systematically devaluing women’s work.
 The widespread legal exclusion of domestic workers – one of the most femin-
ized categories among the informally employed – from formal social protection 
schemes, for example, reflects gendered conceptions of domestic work not being 
“real” work and hence unworthy of the legal and social protections offered to 
other kinds of wage labor. Similar conceptions about what kinds of work are 
appropriate for women and men and the value that is attached to them also shape 
patterns of occupational segregation within the informal economy. Women are 
concentrated at the bottom of the famous WIEGO (Women in Informal Employ-
ment: Globalizing and Organizing) earnings pyramid (as contributing family 
workers and home- based industrial out- workers) (see Chapter 6 in this volume), 
while men are more likely to dominate among informal employers or informal 
wage workers (Chen 2009).
 Gender norms and power relations also shape the division of labor in families 
and communities. The disproportionate responsibility placed on women for 
doing household- related chores and looking after children and other dependents 
means that women interrupt employment more frequently than men and con-
tributes to their concentration in jobs with limited access to social protection. 
Women in informal employment often cite family responsibilities as one of the 
reasons for being in less protected work – because it offers greater “flexibility” 
though this flexibility often comes at the price of lower productivity, higher 
stress levels and potential risks to the well- being of both women and the depend-
ents they look after while also trying to get their work done.
 As a result, classical social security schemes – designed for uninterrupted 
work trajectories in formal employment that enables regular contributions to 
social insurance – have not worked well for women (in general), informal 
workers (in general) and women in informal employment (in particular). In Latin 
America, only 4 out of 10 ten older adults have a contributory pension, i.e., one 
that is linked to previous payroll contributions (Bosch, Melguizo and Pagés 
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2013). In most countries with available data, women are overrepresented among 
those excluded from social protection; and in some, such as the Dominican 
Republic and El Salvador, women’s old- age coverage is less than half of the 
already low coverage of men (UN Women 2015).
 Does this mean that de- linking social protection from employment- based con-
tributory systems is the solution? Developments in Latin American social pro-
tection schemes over the past two decades show that the answer to this question 
depends to a large degree on what “de- linking” is understood to mean.
Isolated transfers versus integrated social protection systems
If de- linking means the promotion of non- contributory programs (i.e., social assist-
ance) as an alternative to employment- based, contributory social security schemes 
– which is what the 2019 World Development Report seemed to suggest (World 
Bank 2018)1 – then the answer to the question above is clearly no. This would not 
only risk eroding benefits that many workers currently rely on, but also let employ-
ers – who are meant to pay their fair share into social security systems – off the 
hook. The answer is also no if de- linking takes the form of fairly isolated and nar-
rowly targeted cash transfers based on means- testing and attached to conditionali-
ties for their recipients. The risk that women in informal employment might fall 
through the cracks in this case is high because they may not be considered “poor 
enough” to qualify. They may also be burdened with fulfilling the conditions 
attached to the transfer, such as attending parenting workshops or taking children 
to check- ups at health care centers that may be difficult to reach, run on schedules 
that are out of sync with their working hours, or involve extensive waiting times. 
These are the main criticisms leveled at conditional cash transfer programs by 
gender equality advocates since the early 2000s when these programs started 
spreading, first, across Latin America and from there to virtually every other 
region of the world (e.g., Molyneux 2006; Cookson 2018).
 But much has happened in Latin America (and elsewhere) since these trans-
fers were first introduced – including efforts to build integrated social protection 
systems that combine and integrate contributory (i.e., linked) and non- 
contributory (i.e., de- linked) elements to enhance the income security of all – 
independent of whether they work in formal or informal employment and indeed 
of whether they work for pay at all.
 These efforts have been insufficient and uneven across countries and in many 
cases started stalling against the economic downturn that affected the region 
from 2010 onwards (UN Women 2017). However, in many countries in the 
region, the aspiration and associated policies to move toward universal social 
protection systems have benefited women, including women in informal employ-
ment. Two main strategies come to the fore.
 On the one hand, there have been efforts to bring informal workers under the 
coverage of existing contributory schemes. The case of Uruguay is illustrative. 
Here, the rates of domestic workers who are covered for health, pensions, unem-
ployment and maternity leave – through mandatory payroll contributions by their 
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employers – rose from 27 to 67 percent between 2004 and 2014 (Meier 2010; 
Cortés 2016). This has been achieved through a combination of legal reforms 
accompanied by awareness- raising, incentives and enforcement in an exception-
ally enabling economic and political environment – including the creation of a 
tripartite wage council in 2008 that enables the domestic workers union to col-
lectively bargain with employer representatives. The SIMPLES scheme in Brazil 
is another positive story where incentives for informal enterprises to formalize 
their activities have not only linked those enterprises to the tax system, but also 
brought their workers under social security coverage. But such success stories 
are not widespread.
 Overall, the incorporation of informal workers into contributory schemes 
seems to have worked better in countries that already had fairly high levels of 
social security coverage (Costa Rica and Uruguay, and to a lesser extent Argen-
tina, Brazil and Chile). In countries with low overall contributory social security 
coverage, such as Mexico and Paraguay, for example, the rates of domestic 
workers who contribute have risen very slowly and remained under 3 percent in 
2014. It has also been relatively more effective for informal wage workers, such 
as temporary agricultural workers, domestic workers or workers in informal 
enterprises where employers can be obliged or incentivized to contribute their 
share than for the self- employed – though a segment of the self- employed, i.e., 
those who have more regular and higher average earnings, may be able to afford 
to make their own contribution to social security.
 Home- based workers, street vendors and waste pickers are unlikely to be part 
of this group. These workers have likely never been linked to employment- based 
social security systems and are unlikely to be linked by way of regular contribu-
tions, because their own earnings are too low and too intermittent and because in 
many cases there is no employer who could be obliged to pay their share.
 Efforts to expand access to social protection that is more independent from 
labor market trajectories and contribution histories are hence important, par-
ticularly for informal workers at the bottom of the informal employment earn-
ings pyramid which is where women are overrepresented. In most Latin 
American countries, the percentage of women who are able to fund their old age 
with a contributory pension is substantially lower than that of men. In this 
context, the expansion of non- contributory social pension, financed through 
general taxation, not only can boost overall coverage but also reduce the gender 
gap in access to pensions.
 Over the past two decades, at least 15 countries in the region have introduced 
new non- contributory pension programs or expanded existing ones to reach a 
wider population. Consider Bolivia and Ecuador, two countries where overall 
coverage was very low in the mid- 1990s. In 1995, when both countries relied 
largely on contributory pension systems, 35 and 22 percent of older people 
respectively had access to a pension, with coverage being much lower among 
women than among men. By 2016, the percentage of older people, women and 
men, with access to a pension had gone up to 97 and 59 percent respectively, 
while gender gaps had practically disappeared (see Figure 28.1).
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 In several countries in the region, including Bolivia, Ecuador and Mexico, 
non- contributory benefits now reach more people than contributory pensions 
(IADB 2019). In others, such as Uruguay, where labor markets are more formal-
ized, non- contributory pensions play a more residual, but nevertheless important 
role in complementing contributory schemes to achieve universal coverage.
 The main take- away from this is that solutions need to be tailored to the spe-
cific needs and capacities of different groups of informal workers. They also 
need to take account of existing pension systems and identify the most promis-
ing approaches for closing the remaining gaps. What works for some will not 
necessarily work for others. Stitching these solutions together into a coherent 
whole that moves toward universal coverage and gradually overcomes the stark 
inequalities in access to and adequacy of social protection both among different 
groups of workers and among women and men, remains one of the main chal-
lenges for Latin America (Arza and Franzoni 2018).
From de- linking to rethinking social protection
Social protection systems that work for women in informal employment do not 
only require linking or de- linking. They require a more radical rethinking. One 
of the main aims of social protection is to guarantee basic income security to 
all, whatever their employment trajectories or capacity to contribute to social 
insurance schemes. They should have a pension when they can no longer work; 
they should have health care when they get sick; and they should receive 
maternity benefits to be able to stop working before and after childbirth. What 
is not often explicitly recognized in mainstream social protection frameworks 
Figure 28.1  Bolivia and Ecuador: pension coverage (contributory and non-contributory) 
by sex, 1995 and 2016.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Inter-American Development Bank’s Labour 
Markets and Social Security Information System (The SIMS), https://mydata.iadb.org/Labor/ 
Database-of-Labor-Markets-and-Social-Security-Info/v2c9-36h7/data (accessed 11 March 2019).
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is that the income security of women is significantly compromised by their 
unpaid care responsibilities. Labor market earnings are their main source of 
income and they get less of those because they do not have access to afford-
able and reliable services that would free up the time they spend on caring for 
aging parents, sick relatives or small children for productive activities (UN 
Women 2015; Alfers 2016).
 Among developing regions, Latin America has been at the forefront of 
debates around unpaid care and domestic chores. Alongside efforts to expand 
social protection, the coverage of care services for children of pre- school age 
has increased significantly between 2000 and 2010. In Ecuador, for example, 
the enrollment of children aged 0–3 years grew from less than 5 percent to 
over 20 percent. In Brazil and Chile, which had enrollment rates of 12 percent 
and 11 percent respectively in 2002, this had increased to 21 percent and 
26 percent by 2010 (UN Women 2017). Much of this expansion was state- led, 
that is, accompanied by significant fiscal investments, and important (albeit 
insufficient) efforts to improve service quality as well as the working con-
ditions of staff. Nevertheless, significant gaps in coverage remain and services 
are not necessarily aligned with the needs of working parents. Most services 
are offered on a half- day basis, for example.
 Some informal worker organizations have taken childcare matters into their 
own hands, advocating for or offering services that are better attuned to the 
needs of their constituency (Moussié 2017). This is important and WIEGO has 
rightly recognized childcare as a strategic area of engagement, one that is gaining 
momentum and where it can contribute to make a difference by highlighting the 
specific needs of women in informal employment as both providers and recipi-
ents of paid childcare services.
Implications for research and policy advocacy
The two points above raise a number of concerns and challenges for future 
research and advocacy on social protection for women in informal employment. 
They highlight the need for context- and status- specific research and analysis of 
social protection systems. What works for which groups of workers? What types 
of informal workers can be meaningfully linked to contributory social protection 
schemes? What might be gained and lost for informal workers by de- linking 
social protection from labor force participation in different contexts?
 Further research is also needed to deepen the understanding of the relation 
between informal employment, care/reproductive work and public policy in the 
lives of women in informal employment. How does one type of work affect the 
other? How well do social protection (and other policies, such as urban plan-
ning) respond to the multiple roles and struggles of women in informal employ-
ment? What are potential functional equivalents to classical social protection 
schemes for women in informal employment?
 In terms of social protection advocacy for informal workers, one of the key 
challenges is to adopt a systemic perspective without losing the focus on 
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informal workers. The most effective and sustainable policy solutions may not 
necessarily be the ones that are targeted specifically at informal workers, but 
those that are aimed at creating universal systems with a broad- based constitu-
ency who can be brought into sustaining services and benefits financially 
(through progressive taxation or cross- subsidies) and politically (through mobil-
ization and claims- making). The policy debates in this area are not always or 
exclusively about informal workers, but about recognition and redistribution 
more broadly and the creation of alliances for universal social protection systems 
that provide workable solutions for all those who are currently excluded.
Note
1 For a critical reading of the WDR’s social protection discussion, see Alfers (2018) and 
Staab (2018).
29 Informal workers in a context of 
urbanisation and migration
Reflections from China for social 
policy in Asia
Sarah Cook
Asia does not lend itself to easy generalisations: the ‘region’ is characterised 
more by huge variation within and between countries than by many similarities. 
This chapter focuses on China, with reflections on migration, informality and 
social policy that may have wider relevance in the region. Across Asia, rapid 
migration – domestic or across borders – and urbanisation are core features of 
development and structural transformation processes: population movement con-
tinues to take place on a staggering scale contributing to the growth of many of 
the world’s megacities. Migration and urbanisation are intrinsically associated 
with informality – of employment, but also of housing, rights to urban “space”, 
status and security, and entitlements or access to services.
 Migration and urbanisation processes are for the most part disorderly and 
unmanaged. Even where population movement has been subject to greater 
control by the state – as in China and Vietnam – for most rural residents, the 
migration process is an individual decision fraught with risk and insecurity. 
Migrants face multiple exclusions – from decent or formal jobs, or access to 
housing and social services. In this chapter I argue that their status as migrants, 
underpinned by China’s state institutionalised urban- rural dualism, is more 
fundamental in shaping vulnerabilities, including employment conditions and 
lack of social rights, than the informality of employment – though the two are 
inextricably linked.
 Despite the growing informalisation of urban employment, informal work in 
China is viewed as a phenomenon almost exclusively associated with migrant 
workers. Policy responses to informal jobs and enterprises in turn focus on 
migrants, often exacerbating their exclusion from space, opportunities or access 
to services. Indeed, the very notion of “informal” employment challenges the 
Chinese state’s aspirations whether for an orderly transition to a market economy 
or for the maintenance of social control. When urban residents visibly joined the 
ranks of “informal” workers following state sector restructuring in the late 
1990s, policy- makers had to grapple with the breakdown of the urban worker/
rural peasant employment dichotomy and associated mechanisms of social 
control. Discomfort with the notion of informality (feizhengui), with its implica-
tions of being outside the formal state system, led instead to wider adoption by 
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scholars and policy- makers of the term ‘flexible’ (linghuo) employment, a recog-
nition of the liberalising reforms necessary to transition to market- based mecha-
nisms of labour allocation (Cook 2008: 50).
 The definitions and concepts of informal work have been blurred through the 
association of informality principally with a “floating population” (liudong 
renkou) of scarcely legal “peasant workers” (nongmingong) outside the formal 
state employment and social security system. This in turn influences what is 
measured and how policies are formulated. Looking at the 2000–2010 decade 
following state enterprise reform, when urban workers were laid off in large 
numbers, estimates for urban informal non- agricultural employment range from 
30 per cent to as high as 60 per cent, depending on definitions, data and methods 
(e.g., Xue et al. 2014; Fang et al. 2016). Such varied estimates, together with a 
lack of research directly on the nature and conditions of informal jobs, or of the 
institutional arrangements that support or hinder formalisation, meant, however, 
that there was a very weak evidence base for policy.
Migration, informality and social policies: the linkages
Migrants to the cities generally face exclusion by virtue of their rural household 
residence (hukou) status that denies them access to many of the entitlements to 
services and benefits of urban residents, as well as through the nature of their 
employment. Can social policy provide a path to greater security for migrant 
informal workers? China has impressively expanded a three- pillar social security 
system, involving contributory insurance and non- contributory assistance, as 
well as service provision. Social policies are, however, designed and imple-
mented within a dualist (rural/urban) framework, underpinned by a wide range 
of state institutions and policies: in this context, notwithstanding a massive 
expansion of benefits and coverage, policies may marginalise migrants and 
further incentivise informality even when the intent is formalisation and 
inclusion.
 Expanding coverage of social protection can take place through a number of 
channels, primarily: the formalisation of employment – where this implies access 
to contributory social security and insurance; through citizenship or residence 
entitlements (whether contributory or non- contributory); or based on need 
(usually non- contributory social assistance). Both social assistance (dibao) and a 
range of insurance programmes started with coverage of formal urban workers, 
later expanding to urban and then rural residents – with different programmes 
and benefits for different groups, as illustrated in Figure 29.1. Notable here is 
that informal employment is a category only applied to rural workers. Urban 
residents receive benefits as residents regardless of employment, hiding numbers 
of low- income urban casual or informal workers who have entitlements to social 
protection as residents.
 Does China’s expanding social policy framework successfully incorporate 
informal migrant workers and meet their needs? China expanded its social assist-
ance programme (dibao) beginning in the late 1990s, initially in response to the 
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inability of urban laid- off workers to find re- employment and rising urban 
poverty. In the early 2000s, the dibao programme was rolled out to rural areas 
along with basic health and pension programmes. For migrants, however, regard-
less of location, benefits remain linked to their rural place of registration unless 
they are covered by formal employment programmes. At lower levels (sub- 
provincial/municipal) of administration, greater integration and portability of 
programmes and benefits are starting to occur, but across provincial boundaries 
this is more challenging. In the case of health, for example, the much higher 
costs of treatment in an urban hospital will generally exceed reimbursement 
limits of a rural scheme, while the referral system rarely works across adminis-
trative boundaries. In the case of pensions, portability or trust in the system (par-
ticularly across jurisdictions) remains an issue. High contributions to formal 
schemes tend to disincentivise formal employment among migrants (particularly 
first generation migrants with strong links to rural areas), who prefer to send 
remittances or invest in housing, children’s education or economic activities in 
their place of origin rather than face an uncertain future pay- out from a scheme 
in another jurisdiction.
 China’s social policy expansion broadly reflects a developmental or produc-
tivist approach, but retains a strong urban bias inherited from the Maoist system. 
Figure 29.1 Social protection schemes for different population groups in China.
Source: Wang (2013: 7), Figure 3.
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During the global financial crisis, the government used social policies to protect 
(urban) workers and jobs, rebalance the economy and stimulate consumption- led 
growth, thus harnessing social policy for crisis management (Cook and Lam 
2011: 145). In this context, migrant workers became a dispensable “shock 
absorber” – with a massive reverse flow back to rural areas. More recent exten-
sions of social policy reflect a growing concern to integrate migrants – and par-
ticularly second- generation migrants – into urban settings (Chen 2017), and to 
increase social “investments” in education and early childhood development to 
enhance future productivity. For migrants, employment remains the main route 
both to urban residence and social protection coverage, while becoming regis-
tered as an urban resident (that is, changing from a rural to urban hukou) is key 
to longer- term security, even while employment may remain informal.
Beyond jobs: family, gender and social reproduction among 
migrant informal workers
Increasing rates of family migration, and demand for women to fill feminised 
occupations (domestic service and care), mean that there is a strong gendered 
dimension to informal employment in China (Cook and Dong 2011). The reform 
period saw labour force participation of women (both urban and rural) decline at 
a faster rate than for men; women were more likely to be laid off from state 
enterprises; wage gaps widened, and informal employment rates for women cor-
respondingly increased (ibid.: 76). The loss of childcare provisions that occurred 
with the dismantling of state and collective services doubly disadvantages female 
migrants with children, limiting their job choices, while the growth of contrib-
utory social insurance schemes exacerbates this disadvantage for women in 
primary care- giving roles. The alternative – leaving children in rural areas – has 
become a major social phenomenon in China, as in other parts of Asia: China 
has over 60 million “left- behind children” with consequences for their cognitive 
development and mental health that are only just starting to be understood. 
Access to services including health, housing, care and education are thus becom-
ing urgent social needs for migrants and their families, and for China’s next gen-
eration. Exacerbating these inequalities, China (like much of Asia) is rapidly 
ageing. Migrants and informal workers have limited old age provisions or care, 
while an elderly urban population relies on care services largely provided by an 
informal (largely female) migrant workforce.
Implications and debates: social policy for current and 
future needs
Migrant informal workers’ access to security, benefits and services requires not 
only well- designed social protection schemes but accompanying access to legal 
rights and security. Social policies can be used to foster inclusion and reduce dis-
crimination – but can equally exacerbate inequalities. The design and implementa-
tion of social policy require systems of identification or criteria for eligibility that 
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do not increase the risk or vulnerability of migrants whose status is often already 
tenuous, or put already vulnerable migrants at further disadvantage.
 To encourage participation in formal contributory or insurance- based 
schemes, portability of benefits and entitlements, equalisation of benefits across 
jurisdictions, as well as mechanisms for guaranteeing access to entitlements, 
need to be secured. Legal protection and recourse to justice need to underpin 
these provisions regardless of location. Barriers posed by administrative or gov-
ernance jurisdictions must be lowered to ensure portability and access – includ-
ing fiscal measures that redistribute from migrant- receiving areas that benefit 
from labour, to the often much poorer sending areas.
 Regardless of employment, access to housing and services are also needed to 
provide security to migrant workers. Migrants remain vulnerable to frequent 
evictions and clearance of homes, places of work or informal schools by the 
authorities.
 New drivers of social policies are seen in the heightened policy emphasis on 
inclusive growth, and on social investment as a means to achieve such inclusion 
while also contributing to economic growth. The emphasis on social investment 
provides entry points for more redistributive policies that can also benefit 
migrants or informal workers, such as expanding services for early childhood 
care and education. These policies invest in individual children, but may also 
relax key constraints on women and potentially reduce the risk of intergenera-
tional poverty traps. In China, such investments are in part driven by a declining 
labour force, an ageing population and an economic slowdown in response to 
which greater emphasis is being placed on the quality and productivity of a 
future workforce. Further research is required to understand related issues asso-
ciated with ageing populations and second- generation migrants as well as the 
impacts on left- behind children. The demand for care work and social service 
provision related to these processes can potentially create opportunities for better 
jobs particularly for women.
 Social policies – in China and beyond – will need to adapt to address new 
risks at the intersection of informality and migration, for example, those associ-
ated with environmental migration/refugees; or from the digital economy and 
automation driving new movements between formal and informal employment 
and unemployment. Across Asia, diverse forms of social protection programmes 
have arisen to address a range of risks in contexts of high levels of informality, 
urbanisation and migration. A comparative evidence base on the outcomes of 
different social policy regimes and programmes would help to identify lessons 
worth sharing.
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The lack of social protection has often been used as a criterion to identify those 
in informal employment.1 While poor working conditions and other deficits in 
decent working conditions exist, the lack of social protection to deal with various 
risks and contingencies is often singled out as a critical aspect of those in 
informal employment. Consequently, policy- makers who wish to facilitate a 
transition from informality to formality have, among various options available 
for this transition, also focused on providing some level of social protection to 
vulnerable sections of those informally employed. For instance, in India, the 
Unorganised Workers Social Security Act, 2008, provides some form of limited 
social security to those persons who are employed or self- employed and who do 
not have access to the broader and deeper coverage of social protection available 
to those in more formal employment relationships. This chapter examines the 
method of financing minimum forms of social protection through the system of 
“cess- financing” (levied as a duty on total turnover or sales) used in India and its 
relevance today to provide social protection for all.
 Achieving uniformity in the levels of social protection may be a sought- after 
goal but financial and functional considerations often result in varying levels of 
social protection available, particularly, for those in informal employment (who 
often receive no or lower levels of social protection). Traditionally, financing of 
many social security schemes has been contributory (with both employers and 
employees contributing differing amounts) or exclusively employer- liability 
schemes where the entire cost is borne by the employer.2 India has experimented 
with a number of social welfare (benefits) schemes that offer a modicum of 
social protection that are not financed through such employer- liability or contrib-
utory schemes but are financed through publicly levied “cesses” upon the indus-
try concerned to finance the payment of such welfare benefits. For example, for 
several years (until as recently as 2017) a cess used to be levied on the produc-
tion of salt to provide for certain benefits in the form of minimum working con-
ditions for workers in salt mines. These benefits were the provision of drinking 
water (an essential requirement considering that salt production in the informal 
sector requires workers to work several hours a day in the searing sun with their 
feet immersed in saline water), gloves, safety equipment like goggles and boots, 
in addition to crucial health camps and crèches. These “benefits” have been 
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funded by levying a cess on salt manufacture and with the government agency/
commission administering the necessary welfare benefits. In other industries 
such as the construction industry, where the cess is collected based upon the 
value of construction, the welfare benefits include, for example, pension, mater-
nity assistance, medical assistance and housing assistance. The benefits provided 
to registered workers in the construction industry are more akin to the traditional 
forms of social security while the benefits provided in relatively poorer indus-
tries, where the cesses collected are lower, are more akin to forms of social 
assistance and improvement of working conditions and do not cover the risks 
and contingencies usually associated with social security.
 The ability of the state to levy such a cess requires legislation to be imposed 
since the cess is nothing other than a tax, not a generalised tax but a specific tax 
imposed on a specific industry and for a specific purpose. Typically, a cess- 
related law would grant the power to the state to impose such a cess and it would 
also indicate the benefits that are to be provided from the collections received.3 
In a very loose sense, such legislation could be seen as creating a right held by 
the workers to claim such benefits; however, the various laws that authorise the 
collection of such cesses do not create corresponding rights on the part of the 
workers to ensure that the cesses are collected in accordance with the law nor do 
they provide for an adequate voice to workers in the allocation of these funds for 
financing the promised benefits. Where the worker organisations raise the issue 
of inadequate coverage of cess collection, such claims are only available against 
the state and not the employer.4
 The benefits are contingent upon the timely collection of cesses by the state 
agencies based on a correct assessment of production or turnover. Although they 
are administered by the labour departments, the assessment of potential cesses 
requires necessary economic inputs and requisite revenue intelligence to ensure 
the maximisation of cess collection. Evasion and non- coverage of economic 
units and employers are a chronic problem plaguing the labour departments 
which are dependent upon the cess collections to provide the benefits which are 
promised under these laws.5 For instance, many of the unregistered beedi (hand- 
rolled cigarettes) units employ women at home and it has been noted that such 
home- based workers are less likely to be covered by welfare benefits as com-
pared to factory workers.6 The advantage that a cess- related system of social 
protection has is that it taxes the final product/turnover and that all sub- 
contracting chains in the production chain also are made liable, albeit indirectly, 
and have to contribute to the social protection provided to all workers. Further, 
since benefits are provided by the labour departments and not individual employ-
ers or units, the need to identify sub- contractors in order to make them contribute 
to such benefits does not arise.
 As noted above, the cess- based system of funding social protection derives its 
resources from taxing the industry as a whole. The justification for such a cess 
has been upheld on the ground that the beneficiaries are those working in the 
system and the incidence of the cess falls upon the employers who are engaged 
in producing the output or product, and can therefore justifiably be required to 
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bear the cost of the benefits. The cess is usually fixed as a proportion of the value 
of the product/turnover irrespective of the numbers of employees who produce 
that output. An establishment or unit producing, for example, salt, in a unit 
where productivity is high and where the workforce is small could end up paying 
a higher cess calculated as a percentage on output even though such a unit, if it 
had been covered by a traditional social protection scheme and where the liab-
ility is determined on an employee basis, could have contributed a relatively 
lower amount, since the contribution of the employer would have been deter-
mined on the basis of the number of employees and their wages.
 The question whether those not directly involved in the production of goods 
and services can also be asked to contribute through a cess to the welfare and 
social protection benefits in a sector/industry is more problematic. The state of 
Kerala in India had sought to create a welfare fund for fish workers, including 
self- employed fish workers, by levying a cess on fish traders and collecting a 
percentage of their turnover/sales for the proposed welfare fund. This law was 
challenged by the fish traders as unconstitutional some years ago on the grounds 
that these traders (who occasionally provided credit to self- employed fish 
workers) could not be compelled to contribute to the welfare fund as there is no 
employer- employee relationship between the fish trader and the fish worker who 
is the beneficiary of such a welfare fund. On the challenge, the Supreme Court 
observed:
State cannot … place the burden of an impost by way of contribution for 
giving effect to the Act and the Scheme made thereunder for the social 
security and social welfare of a section of society upon a person who is not 
a member of such section of society nor an employer of a person who is a 
member of such section of society. The burden of the impost may be placed 
only when there exists the relationship of employer and employee between 
the contributor and the beneficiary of the provision of the Act and the 
Scheme made thereunder.7
Thus, according to this reasoning, the justification for collection of a cess is 
based primarily on the employer and where the unit or industry employs workers 
who produce the output. However, this rigid restriction of the power to collect 
such a cess applies only to instances where an employer- employee relationship 
exists that has been loosened in recent times. A recent case before the Supreme 
Court has upheld a cess levied on all litigants in the state of Kerala to contribute 
to a welfare fund meant for the benefit of advocates appearing in state courts. 
The Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 permits the collection of 
an additional fee (based on the value of the suit, i.e., the value of the relief 
sought) from all litigants approaching the court for relief to contribute to the 
Advocate Welfare Fund to provide some social protection to the advocates at the 
time of retirement/cessation of practice/death. The additional fee is payable irre-
spective of whether or not the litigant engages a lawyer/advocate for his/her 
court case. The additional levy to contribute to the welfare fund for advocates 
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was challenged in the Supreme Court. The court upheld this levy and stated: 
“[I]t becomes apparent that providing social security to the legal profession 
becomes an essential part of any legal system which has to be effective, efficient 
and robust to enable it to provide necessary service to the consumers of justice.”8 
The court can be seen to be endorsing a system of cess/tax on stakeholders/con-
sumers of an industry, in order to pay for the welfare of those engaged or 
working in such an industry. Yet, the constitutional scheme requires legislation 
to be put in place prior to the levy of such a cess/tax. Such cess- based welfare 
schemes are applicable only in certain industries in India, such as building and 
construction, beedi (hand- rolled cigarettes) and certain non- ferrous mines. The 
cess- system of financing welfare contributions has been used in India in a variety 
of sectors, particularly those where informal employment is predominant. 
Recently, as part of the rationalisation of the tax systems across India, the major 
cess- based systems were abolished with the introduction of a Goods and Service 
Tax (GST) from July 2017. The result has been a drying- up of resources for the 
specific industries which used cesses to finance welfare funds. There has been 
mounting opposition to the abolition of cess- financed welfare and social protec-
tion benefits. There is a fear that the specific welfare measure developed over the 
years for specific industries and the measures provided at local levels, such as 
the benefits provided for beedi workers, salt workers or cine- workers, would not 
be reflected in the general social security or welfare measures within a ‘one- size-
fits- all’ approach to the delivery of such benefits. Further, delivery of these bene-
fits was earlier handled in certain industries through tripartite welfare boards.9 
The proposed Code on Social Security has tripartite bodies at the central and 
state levels to monitor the delivery of social security. Yet the number of govern-
ment and legislative representatives in these bodies is significantly larger, 
causing further anxiety over the erosion of the tripartite nature of such boards/
councils. The approach in recent times has been to introduce greater uniformity 
and consolidation of benefits across industries that has caused disquiet among 
trade unions in sectors which had fought for and achieved industry- specific welfare 
funds and delivery of benefits. On the other hand, the costs of collecting the cess 
from each industry and the burden placed on the labour departments have been 
enormous, prompting the justification that such labour- specific cesses also be 
viewed as a form of tax on goods (thereby justifying the amalgamation of all 
cesses into the GST) and as introducing a long- overdue uniformity and efficiency 
in the selection and delivery of welfare benefits provided across industries.
 Future research could examine the capacity of a universal tax (such as a GST) 
that is administered in a centralised manner to finance customised welfare bene-
fits for marginalised and difficult- to-identify groups of workers, such as home- 
based workers and whether the efficiency of universal social security benefits 
outweighs the customised and relatively easier- to access benefits of such cess- 
financed welfare benefits. However, given the low levels of coverage of social 
protection in India and the lack of effective social protection systems, the aboli-
tion of such cesses and the failure to put in place alternate funding for financing 
these modest welfare benefits remain a cause for concern.
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Notes
 1 Section 2(m) of the Unorganised Workers Social Security Act, 2008.
 2 In India, for instance, the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 is an exclusively employer 
liability funded scheme, while the more widespread Employees’ Provident Fund 
Scheme or the Employees’ State Insurance Scheme, which cover important social 
security benefits for workers in large units and their families, are contributory 
schemes.
 3 See the Building and Other Construction Workers Welfare Cess Act, 1996, the Beedi 
Workers Welfare Cess Act, 1976, and the Iron Ore, Manganese Ore and Chrome Ore 
Mines Labour Welfare Cess Act, 1976.
 4 The building and construction workers union has successfully used public interest liti-
gation to compel various states in India to form rules regarding the collection and use 
of cess funds collected for their industry. There is a need for continuous monitoring 
and the use of the large amount of cess funds collected for the construction industry 
has been the principal preoccupation of many of the trade unions in this sector. See, 
for instance, a key ongoing litigation National Campaign Committee for Central 
Legislation on Construction Labour v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 318 
of 2006 in which dozens of orders have already been assessed by the Supreme Court 
of India, and where related petitions have also been filed by the worker organisations 
for implementation of certain orders.
 5 Moving production to smaller unregistered manufacturing units is one way to avoid 
paying the necessary cess and duties. See ILO (n.d.).
 6 See Joh (n.d.).
 7 Koluthara Exports Ltd. v. State of Kerala & Ors (2002(2) SCC 459), Hindustan 
Times v. State of Uttar Pradesh decided 1 November 2002.
 8 Cardamom Marketing Corporation and Anr v. State of Kerala and Ors, (2017) 5 
Supreme Court Cases 255.
 9 See Chapter 32 by Rina Agarwala in this volume for the role played by the tripartite 
boards in the delivery of benefits to informal workers.
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The study of African informal economies has undergone yet another about- face in 
attitudes to informality. Associated with poverty and marginality in the 1970s and 
1980s (ILO 1972), viewed as a seedbed of entrepreneurship in the 1990s (Mac-
Gaffey1991), and as a source of criminality and corruption from the late 1990s 
into the first decade of the new millennium (Bayart, Ellis and Hibou 1999), African 
informal economies have once more been re- branded as a new frontier of growth 
and innovation (Daniels 2010). In the era of “Africa Rising”, informal economies 
are widely touted as a fount of entrepreneurial dynamism, and as a source of 
workers and new consumer markets capable of driving ongoing economic growth. 
What is noteworthy in this panoply of representations of African informality is not 
just how often the characterisation and attendant policy advice shift, but the tend-
ency to shift from one blanket representation of African informal economies to 
another, without ever focusing on the possibility of differences among informal 
economies within the region, except for the conventional division between Sub- 
Saharan and North Africa. Inadequate attention is given to important differences 
among informal economies in Sub- Saharan Africa (Meagher 2014).
Size matters
The tendency towards homogeneous representations of informality in Sub- 
Saharan Africa seems to have been reinforced by the rise of statistical informa-
tion on informality, even though it is increasingly available at the country level. 
Sub- Saharan Africa remains the most informalised region in the world, with 
informality measured at 77 per cent of the non- agricultural workforce and 89 per 
cent of the total workforce (ILO 2018a). Because African informal economies 
are generally quite large, there has been relatively little attention to the signi-
ficant variations in the size of informal economies within the region. While many 
West African countries have exceptionally large informal economies, in the 
range of 68–91 per cent of non- agricultural workers, Southern African countries 
tend to have much smaller informal economies, ranging from 34–55 per cent of 
the non- agricultural workforce.
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 Thandika Mkandawire (2010) has drawn attention to these differences in the 
size of African informal economies, and to the role of the state in this variation. 
While some scholars have examined why South Africa has a relatively small 
informal economy, Mkandawire explains historically why not only South Africa, 
but a range of Southern African countries and some East African countries such 
as Kenya, have noticeably smaller informal economies than are found in other 
parts of Africa. Using Samir Amin’s (1972) famous typology of cash crop, 
labour reserve, and concession economies, Mkandawire traces this to the differ-
ential capacities and economic objectives of colonial states. This reinforces the 
recognition that informal economies are not something that emerges purely 
outside the state, but that the state plays a role in the different size and character 
of informal economies.
Making African informal economies legible
While some attention is now being paid to variations in size, less attention has 
been paid to differences in local informal institutions that create additional vari-
ations between African informal economies. To be sure, there has been a 
growing interest in the internal regulatory character of African informal eco-
nomies since the early 1990s. As Julia Elyachar (2005: 73) explains, where vast 
areas of urban enterprise and national resource flows take place completely 
outside the control of the state, “informality has become too central … to be rel-
egated to the sphere of negative phenomena – ‘the “not formal” ’ ”. This recogni-
tion invites a closer look at the informal institutional systems that shape how 
informal economies operate. Particularly in many African countries, where the 
informal economy is such a significant force, understanding its implications for 
economic change requires a focus on the actual institutional processes at play, 
rather than simply assuming how informal economies work on the basis of ideo-
logical assumptions and pattern variables. As Keith Hart (2006: 33) observed, 
“We need to know … what social forms have emerged to organise the informal 
economy” and to “examine the institutional particulars sustaining whatever takes 
place beyond the law”.
 Growing interest in the regulatory capacities of informal institutions within 
African informal economies has cast new light on informality as something with 
potentially constructive modes of organisation. The “new institutionalist turn” 
has motivated economists and political scientists to take a closer look at the 
informal regulatory systems, leading to the recognition that the informal 
economy is not “unorganised” or criminal by definition, but involves a cornuco-
pia of trading networks, credit systems and institutions of labour control that 
organise economic activity outside the regulatory ambit of the state (Meagher 
2010). Management research grounded in the Bottom of the Pyramid (BoP) 
approach, and corporate interest in penetrating new markets in emerging eco-
nomies, have also generated growing interest in understanding the institutional 
organisation of informal economies. This has been accompanied by a new 
emphasis on making African informal spaces and economic activities “legible” 
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to large- scale capital, not by rationalising and formalising them, but by decipher-
ing their inner workings. BoP specialists Stuart Hart and Ted London (2005) 
insist on the need for business investors to develop “native capability” in order 
to engage more effectively with local informal markets and workers. This has 
been accompanied by a wider “inclusive turn” in international development 
thinking, in which engagement with informal actors and greater inclusion of 
informal economies in the growth process are the order of the day.
Informal economic inclusion in whose interest?
Despite the apparently benign focus on inclusion, efforts to grasp the organisa-
tional logic of African informal economies often disguise more opportunistic 
goals. Many corporate actors and policy- makers regard informal economies as a 
pool of workers, consumers and institutions that can be tapped for new sources 
of corporate profit. Making informal economies legible to capital is not just 
about learning to understand and engage with the needs of informal actors, but 
about using informal workers and institutions to reduce the cost of operating in 
African slums and remote rural areas.
 Inclusive engagement with African informal economies tends to involve 
forms of interaction that are highly selective. Efforts to make informal eco-
nomies legible allow useful informal workers and informal institutions to be 
identified and “included”, while less useful informal actors and institutions are 
further marginalised, and even criminalised (Meagher 2015). In the process, 
informal economic inclusion is turned into an exercise in restructuring and gov-
erning African informal economies in line with the needs of global markets. As 
Catherine Dolan and Kate Roll (2013) explain, building inclusive markets 
involves “working” informal economic spaces – classifying, restructuring and 
managing informal economic systems to meet the needs of global business. 
These “techniques of governance” serve to reformat informal economic systems 
and value chains in ways that privilege the reduction of formal sector costs and 
increase formal sector control, while preserving the “advantages” of low cost 
informal employment. Instead of addressing informality as a condition of vul-
nerability, it is viewed as an array of labour and institutional resources to be har-
nessed rather than transformed.
 As a result, deeper ethnographic attention to the organisation of African 
informal economies has done little to dispel the essentialist perspectives on 
African informality. Viewed as assortments of organisational resources, African 
informal economies are distinguished largely in terms of whether they are useful 
or useless to global capital. Corporate actors focus on connecting with the micro-
 end of informal economies, while bypassing more successful informal traders 
and producers, who are denigrated as exploiters and middlemen. This selective 
engagement cuts out the very nodes of accumulation through which informal 
entrepreneurs improve their livelihoods and move out of poverty. Efforts to cir-
cumvent avenues of accumulation within the informal economy have been 
accompanied by an emphasis on introducing minimalist social protection for 
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informal workers and micro- producers. The risk of this approach is that, as 
James Ferguson (2007) pointed out some years ago, supporting the micro- end of 
the informal economy with limited social protection does not transform informal 
livelihoods; it just makes them more sustainable. In the process, African informal 
economies are only viewed in terms of their ability to reduce transaction costs in 
the formal economy, rather than as livelihood and business systems in their own 
right.
Varieties of African informal economies
What has been missing from the emphasis on the legibility of African informal 
economies is a clear focus on informal economies as economic systems that may 
vary from one country to another. Inadequate attention is paid to the possibility 
that differences in history, colonial states, post- independence governments, and 
the nature of engagement with the global economy might have shaped African 
informal economies differently. Have strong informal entrepreneurial systems 
persisted in some countries while being crushed in others? Is informality more 
strongly associated with poverty or criminality in some countries than in others? 
Are the policy needs of informal actors different in different contexts? Do 
informal actors in some contexts need preferential credit or technical support 
more than social protection? Does social protection promote or distract from 
social and economic transformation? It is important to consider how informal 
economies differ from each other, and to build up policy advocacy on the basis 
of the needs of particular sorts of informal economies.
 Distinguishing among different types of African informal economies requires 
looking at them from the perspective of economic systems shaped by the nature 
of their interaction with the state but also by historical and institutional differ-
ences and by distinctive forms of engagement with the global economy. More 
attention is needed to how differences in pre- colonial economic organisation 
have created complex informal business systems in some parts of Africa which 
are absent in others. Mkandawire (2010) has shown how different types of colo-
nial states gave free rein to informal business networks in former cash crop eco-
nomies concentrated in West Africa, while smashing and criminalising them in 
former labour reserve economies located predominantly in Southern Africa, and 
fostering violent modes of informal labour organisation and control in former 
concession economies of Central Africa. More recent differences in the post- 
colonial state have created a new layer of variation, as some states have focused 
on developing manufacturing industries, others have focused on liberal import- 
export regimes, and still others suffered prolonged periods of war. Distinctive 
patterns of smuggling networks, informal manufacturing clusters, migrant labour 
and criminal gangs emerged from these varied forms of the interface between 
contemporary informal economies and the state. Engagement with the global 
economy has also contributed to variations among African informal economies. 
Bureaucratically effective states and large pools of informal labour have facilit-
ated engagement with global value chains and BoP initiatives. States with 
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weaker bureaucratic capacity and more dynamic informal business systems have 
posed challenges to the penetration of global value chains “from above”, while 
giving rise to the transnational informal economic networks globalising the 
informal economy “from below”.
 While this variation across states suggests a high degree of complexity, it can 
also lead to the identification of distinctive patterns of informal economic organ-
isation. If informal economies are different from each other, policy responses to 
the informal economy also need to vary, and deeper questions must be asked 
about what types of inclusion are appropriate. In some cases, where informal 
economies have developed strong entrepreneurial systems, as in Senegal or 
Nigeria, state support for small enterprise development may be what is most 
needed. Where informal economies consist largely of pools of vulnerable labour 
and bare survival activities, as in South Africa or Namibia, an emphasis on social 
protection may be more appropriate, while facilitating links between informal 
labour and formal sector firms may intensify rather than reduce the exploitative 
processes of labour informalisation. Where informal economic systems involve 
a high degree of criminality and coercion, as in many parts of Central Africa, 
efforts of corporate actors to engage with informal economic systems seem ill- 
conceived.
Concluding thoughts
This think piece reflects on the need to pay more attention to the fact that African 
informal economies have changed over time and developed in very different 
ways. While informal economies in some African countries offer constructive 
possibilities for the development of a locally embedded and dynamic private 
sector, others foster development trajectories of intensifying poverty, economic 
exclusion and even criminality. In the current era of expanding informality and 
corporate links across the formal- informal divide, constructive approaches to 
economic inclusion require more awareness of the divergent trajectories of Afri-
ca’s informal economies and more differentiated policy thinking. I offer three 
suggestions to facilitate a more effective approach to these issues.
 The first is to move beyond essentialist perspectives on economic informality, 
generally, and African informality, in particular. African informal economies do 
not represent a single regulatory logic of non- state organisation. On the contrary, 
distinctive historical patterns have led to the prevalence of very different logics 
of informal organisation. Where former cash crop economies, especially in West 
Africa, are endowed with efficient commercial institutions and ethno- religiously 
embedded governance arrangements, few such institutions have survived in the 
former labour reserve or concession economies in Southern and Central Africa. 
Distinctive informal regulatory logics rather than simple variations in the size of 
informal economies, have varied effects on contemporary economic 
development.
 A second suggestion is that a more historical approach to economic inform-
ality can help to identify how positive as well as negative informal economic 
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trajectories emerge. Grounding contemporary informal economic organisation in 
a richer pre- colonial and colonial institutional context offers new possibilities for 
understanding contemporary relations between informal and formal economies. 
Processes of liberalisation and globalisation have unleashed informal entrepre-
neurship in many former cash crop economies which continue to expand markets 
while confounding capitalist discipline. Conversely, former labour reserve eco-
nomies have given rise to contemporary informal economies with limited capa-
city for entrepreneurship, and former concession economies tend towards more 
brutal systems of unfree labour. It is important to note that the state and the inter-
national actors are as central as embedded local institutions in shaping these 
varied development trajectories, given their important role in selectively promot-
ing, suppressing, or hijacking socially embedded economic arrangements 
(Meagher 2015, 2018).
 Finally, a more comparative, historical approach to the analysis of con-
temporary informality may offer the possibility for more constructive and appro-
priate policy engagement with African informal economies. This contrasts with 
contemporary policy approaches to informality in Africa, dominated by the sup-
pression of informal activity by modernising officials, and inclusive initiatives 
emerging from the business and donor communities. Inclusive arrangements 
promoted through BoP projects and donor experiments with hybrid governance 
should be treated with caution. More questions need to be raised about the 
objectives of inclusion: inclusion of which types of informal economies, in 
whose interest, and on what terms? It matters whether informal economies of 
entrepreneurship, vulnerable employment or unfree labour are being embedded 
in the formal economy, and whether these informal arrangements are being har-
nessed in the interest of global capital, political expediency, or local economic 
transformation.
32 Informal workers and the state 
in India
Rina Agarwala
Informal employment arrangements, which include precarious wage employ-
ment and self- employment, have long served as a “fix” for capital to lower 
labour costs and skirt labour protections. They are not just a residual of a tradi-
tional economy destined to disappear with modernity nor a recent product of 
neoliberalism. Rather, informal employment always has fuelled and always will 
fuel modern capitalist production.
 While informal employment has long persisted, informal workers’ social rela-
tionships with the state, capital and formal workers have changed over time 
under varying regimes of capitalist accumulation. During the shift from agrarian 
to industrial capitalism, state regulations constituted a minority of formally pro-
tected labour, formally registered capital and a standard employment relation-
ship while simultaneously retaining informal labour, now re- defined as an 
excluded, non- standard unprotected “other”. This enabled capital to overtly hire 
formal labour while discreetly hiring informal labour. These moves divided the 
working class into formal workers organised within unions on the shop floor, 
and informal workers who were often excluded from such organisations.
 During the recent shift from industrial to financial capitalism, capital has con-
tinued to exploit informal labour to ensure profitability. Now, however, states 
are retracting twentieth- century regulations that held capital responsible for 
labour, so unprotected informal labour is posited as an ideal, while formal labour 
is depicted as problematic. Private and public capital can overtly hire informal 
labour and decrease their reliance on formal labour.
 Within this context, scholars have shown that informal workers (in both the 
Global North and the Global South) are organising to fight for redistribution and 
recognition. Their movements highlight the contradictory relationship of collab-
oration and contestation they hold with the state, capital and formal workers. 
Like formal workers, informal workers are launching what Karl Polanyi (1944) 
famously called “counter- movements” to resist the de- humanising effects of 
labour commodification (at the material and symbolic levels), and they often 
draw on union models of organisation. But informal workers’ movements are 
also distinct from many formal workers’ movements. First, they struggle for new 
labour protection regulations that offer some redistribution from capital to 
informal workers and fight for new economic policies that support informal 
240  Rina Agarwala
workers’ livelihoods, rather than punish them. These struggles target the state. 
Since informal workers operate outside the protective arm of the state and are 
unable to make demands under existing law, they wield their electoral power as 
mass and poor voters to attract state attention.1
 Second, informal workers’ movements struggle for what Nancy Fraser (2013) 
calls “emancipation” from earlier formal workers’ movements that excluded 
certain races, genders and sub- classes – specifically, informal workers. Such 
exclusions led to dominant state narratives that devalued and punished informal 
labour. Informal workers, therefore, fight such narratives by demanding state 
recognition and valorisation as legitimate economic actors, as workers.
 Informal workers’ movements are at an infant stage and are constrained by 
the marketisation forces of the state and capital. But these challenges must not 
negate their significance in mobilising, organising, and enacting new state pol-
icies that reshape contemporary understandings of “labour” and “capital”.
The case of India
While the state has long featured as a central actor in scholarship on Indian 
labour and development, informal workers have been absent. In the 1980s, 
Pranab Bardhan (1984) supplemented the classical political economy dyad of 
labour and capital with the Indian state as a “third actor” with its own interests, 
power base and collective action strategies. Debates followed on the Indian 
state’s relations with other actors of the triad. Some argued the Indian state was 
so powerful, it eclipsed class politics between capital and labour (Rudolph and 
Rudolph 1987). Others argued that Indian capital pushed the Indian state to 
squeeze labour’s power relative to capital, thereby weakening the state’s power 
to discipline capital (Chibber 2003). Still others argued that politically affiliated 
labour unions in India are more militant and effective than independent unions 
(Teitelbaum 2011). The focus on labour within these debates remained limited to 
formal workers.
 By the 1990s, academic discussions on state- society relations in India turned 
to the post- 1980s upsurge in “new social movements” (NSM) that mobilised 
around ascriptive identities (caste, gender, indigeneity) or specific issues (land, 
environment, education) (Omvedt 1993). Rather than organising into class- based 
unions, NSMs mobilised as unregistered civic rights groups and/or registered 
NGOs. These movements of subaltern groups were lauded for exposing the pat-
riarchy, casteism and ethno- centrism that undergirded many formal workers’ 
movements. But this literature, too, ignored informal workers as politically 
salient.
 Informal workers’ absence in Indian scholarship on state- society relations is 
puzzling. Like formal workers, informal workers’ exploitation forms a bedrock 
of state- supported capitalist accumulation (Luxemburg 1951). Over 90 per cent 
of the workforce in India is informal, including those self- employed in unregu-
lated, small- scale enterprises and wage workers in large, formal enterprises, 
small informal enterprises and households. Like other identity groups, informal 
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workers were excluded from formal labour’s earlier movements for state protec-
tion. There is, therefore, no theoretical reason to omit informal workers from 
analyses of the state, labour and civic engagement. Rather, scholars’ omission is 
based on an erroneous assumption that informal workers are not “real workers” 
interacting with capital or the state and are thus unorganisable.
 Scholars’ blindness to informal workers notwithstanding, Indian informal 
workers, since the 1970s, have been fighting for improved state relations that recog-
nise and regulate their interactions with capital (Rose 1993; Bhatt 2006). Why do 
they target the state? Despite its multiple failings, the Indian state still determines 
economic and labour market policies, and it remains the expected deliverer of 
development, even among militant citizen groups (Sundar 2016). Moreover, for 
self- employed workers who do not have an employer, the state is a key driver of 
their ability to work, as well as their earnings and working conditions.
The Indian state’s contemporary project on informal work
Since the 1980s, the Indian state has enacted several new projects to incorporate 
informality into its development agenda (see Agarwala 2019). While these 
changes are partly due to informal workers’ demands, they also came alongside 
the state’s expanding liberalisation efforts.
 First, despite its refusal to guarantee protection for all workers, the Indian 
government has increasingly recognised informal workers as legitimate actors in 
its development agenda. In official statistics, although informal enterprises have 
long been acknowledged, the Indian government’s National Sample Survey on 
Employment and Unemployment (NSS) counted individual informal workers for 
the first time only in 1999.2 During the 1990s and 2000s, the Indian government 
also set up a high- level committee to calculate income earned from informal 
employment and included informal workers’ organisations in policy dialogues.
 Second, unprotected informal labour in India has become the new ideal. 
Informal wage employment has grown in large, formally regulated firms in the 
private and public sectors. Between 1985 and 2011, the share of informal 
workers in registered factories increased from 12 per cent to 51 per cent (NSS 
2012). Between 1999 and 2011, the share of informal workers in registered 
enterprises grew three times as fast as formal employment in registered enter-
prises (Ghose 2016). In 2011, the Indian government introduced a new category 
of workers, called “regular informal”. These are workers who have an oral or 
written contract, but are not entitled to the minimum wages and the non- wage 
benefits (such as pensions, health care, and annual and sick leave) that formal 
workers receive. Between 1999 and 2011, the share of regular informal workers 
increased from 13 per cent to 18 per cent in the public sector and from 39 per 
cent to 50 per cent in the private sector.3 In many industries (including auto-
mobiles and garment manufacturing), informal and formal workers operate side- 
by-side, despite their unequal protections.
 Finally, unprotected informal labour has now become the foundation of 
Indian employment growth in the non- agricultural sector. Since independence, 
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state development policies have sought to shift labour from agriculture to non- 
agricultural jobs. 2011 marked the first year the majority of Indians worked in 
non- agricultural jobs (at 56 per cent). Agricultural jobs had declined and non- 
agricultural jobs had grown enough to tip the balance in favour of a long- sought 
development ideal. Unlike most East Asian economies that drew on their literate 
workforce to fuel a large manufacturing sector, however, India’s non- agricultural 
employment growth has come from services and construction, where jobs are 
notoriously informal and unprotected. (India’s economic growth, therefore, has 
not been entirely “jobless”, as is often claimed. Rather, the growth has relied on 
bad jobs.)
Indian informal workers’ struggles against the state
Within this context, Indian informal workers across sectors (including construc-
tion, domestic work, street vending, waste- picking, tobacco manufacturing and 
garment manufacturing) have initiated innovative ways to improve state rela-
tions through new legislations that recognise and regulate informal employment 
relationships and seek to redistribute profit shares from capital to labour. Despite 
the expected challenges of implementation, new state legislations are seen by 
informal workers as essential to attaining dignity and arming workers with (at 
least) the threat of enforcement.
Redistribution
Since the 1970s, informal workers have used collective bargaining to improve 
legislation on wages and working conditions to fit multiple informal employment 
relationships. Home- based garment workers have fought to revise local 
minimum wage laws from time- based to piece- rates; self- employed street 
vendors have fought to gain legal access to public space for their businesses, free 
of police harassment; and waste picker cooperatives have attained exclusive 
garbage collection contracts from municipalities (Agarwala 2016).
 Since the 1980s, informal workers have also used their power as mass voters 
to demand the state take responsibility for their welfare needs by enacting and 
implementing an innovative institution, called a “welfare board” (Agarwala 
2013).4 Because informal workers are excluded from collective bargaining 
agreements, welfare boards aim to redistribute some profits from capital and the 
state to informal workers through the delivery of social protection benefits such 
as housing, education scholarships, health care clinics, funeral expenses and pen-
sions. Such welfare boards that target informal workers, rather than formalising 
them, are unique to India. Currently, welfare boards are trade- specific. Most are 
tripartite, where state governments, employers and workers have representation 
and contribute funds. Employers’ contributions come from a tax on production, 
while workers’ contributions come from board membership dues. To register for 
board benefits, workers must prove their informal work status. Unions of 
informal workers have become essential to educating informal workers about 
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welfare boards, providing the state with confirmation of workers’ informal 
status, and pressurising the state to implement the benefits mandated by the 
boards and deliver the promised benefits.
 Informal workers’ struggles for new redistributive legislation have also drawn 
on the judicial activism that grew in India during the 1980s when civic groups 
partnered with the judicial branch to hold the legislative and executive branches 
accountable for socio- economic deprivations through constitutionally guaranteed 
rights- based claims using public interest litigation (PIL) (Agarwala 2018). After 
attaining new legislation that regulates and protects informal employment, 
informal workers have used PILs to hold the judiciary accountable for enforcing 
the executive and legislative branches to implement the laws.
 Informal construction workers offer an important illustration of these redis-
tribution struggles. They have organised at the national level to successfully 
force the national government to enact new legislation, including the 1996 
Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Con-
ditions of Service) Act, which regulates informal employment conditions, and 
the Welfare Cess Act,5 which enacts the Construction Workers’ Welfare Board. 
Subsequently, construction workers successfully used PILs to force all state gov-
ernments to enact the welfare boards at the local levels. As with all welfare 
measures in India, construction workers’ organisations must now expend sub-
stantial time holding governments accountable for implementing the benefits 
mandated by the boards and exposing state mishandling of the welfare funds.
 Due to workers’ efforts, construction workers’ welfare boards have survived 
the government’s recent attack on welfare boards in other sectors (at least at the 
time of writing). Construction boards remain one of the few institutions through 
which the swelling profits of builders can be redistributed to informal workers 
and to workers migrating across state lines. Through the tri- partite governing 
and funding structure of construction welfare boards, organisations have ensured 
the distribution of hundreds of thousands of identity cards to informal workers 
and the collection of hundreds of thousands of dollars for informal workers’ 
welfare. Finally, organisations across the country have used the promise of 
immediate welfare benefits from the construction boards to organise thousands 
of new members.
 Due to these important benefits and despite the implementation challenges of 
construction boards, informal workers continue to demand the creation of new 
welfare boards and the protection of existing welfare boards in other sectors. 
Some of the other welfare boards have provided self- employed workers (such as 
garment workers and domestic workers) with trade- specific inputs and tools. 
Others have aimed to provide generalised welfare to all informal workers across 
sectors (such as the 2008 Social Security Act for Unorganised Workers). These 
newer boards are, unfortunately, not tri- partite and many lacked a defined 
funding source from capital in their original design. But organisations of 
informal workers continue to rely on the promised benefits of these boards to 
mobilise new members, ensure state recognition of informal work, and hold the 
state responsible for some redistribution.
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Recognition
Indian informal workers have also fought to attain state recognition as workers 
and for their economic contributions. This has not been easy since many employ-
ers are unregistered (as in domestic work or small- scale manufacturing), or non- 
existent (as for the self- employed), and work often occurs in non- traditional 
settings (as in the street or private homes). Informal workers’ politics of recogni-
tion has spurred a distinct group- based identity that asserts the group’s vulner-
ability, but fights for protections within that identity, rather than fighting to erase 
the identity by becoming formalised.
 Struggles to incorporate informal workers into government statistics and 
attain new legislation that recognises, regulates and protects informal employ-
ment have helped cement state and public recognition of informal labour. As 
well, through their struggles for union registration and welfare boards, 
informal workers have attained state- sanctioned identity cards, which in turn 
offer informal workers state recognition of their work, even in the absence of 
employer recognition. Most recently, this recognition was afforded to domestic 
workers through the national approval of domestic workers’ unions, despite 
the government’s continuing refusal to enact protective legislations for 
domestic workers. Particularly striking have been self- employed garment 
workers’ and waste pickers’ demands for worker identity cards. To attain 
worker identity cards, these groups exposed the indirect profits the state and 
middle- class citizens (in addition to capital) make off their labour value (Agar-
wala 2016). Informal workers across sectors demand identity cards as essential 
to attaining legal affirmation of their work, dignity as workers, protection 
against police harassment, access to social benefits, and a platform to demand 
legal protection.
 Indian informal workers’ struggles for state redistribution and recognition 
have two noteworthy characteristics. First, to mobilise dispersed workers who 
live with blurred boundaries between work and home (with some working in 
their homes, and others living at their worksites), organisations have mobilised 
informal workers’ class identities at the neighbourhood or worksite – rather than 
at the shop floor level. Importantly, the language of “citizenship”, “space- based 
mobilisation” and “welfare demands on the state” has enabled informal workers’ 
organisations to include subaltern groups (such as women and lower- caste 
members) involved in hidden forms of contract and self- employed work in 
homes and unregistered work sheds. In turn, this has enabled informal workers’ 
struggles for state protection to include workers and occupations that had earlier 
been excluded from formal workers’ movements.
 Second, the effectiveness of informal workers’ struggles is shaped by the 
political and economic context in which they operate, but not always in simple, 
expected ways. In some cases, such as waste picking and street vending, 
informal workers’ ability to build relations with the municipal government is 
key. In other cases, such as construction and tobacco manufacturing, informal 
workers operating under competitive populist parties (even neoliberal) are more 
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successful than those operating under single, hegemonic party rule (even when 
that party is left- wing) (Agarwala 2013).
Next steps
These findings yield important future research agendas. First, the regulation 
approaches commonly used to explain informal employment must be expanded. 
By highlighting informal workers as those operating outside protective labour 
regulation, scholars of the Global South have exposed the structural reasons why 
formal workers, employers and the state rely on informal work under capitalism 
– unregulated work fosters growth (Portes, Castells and Benton 1989; Breman 
and van der Linden 2014). However, these regulation approaches focus only on 
workers’ exclusion from protective regulations, ignoring the punitive state regu-
lations (such as denying access to space, criminalising work, enabling police 
harassment) under which informal workers operate. Regulation approaches also 
do not accommodate informal workers’ efforts to establish new regulations that 
protect, regulate and recognise informal employment. Therefore, to leave more 
theoretical space to examine informal workers’ budding movements, scholars 
must specify that informal workers are those not regulated or protected under 
traditional labour laws based on a formal employer- employee relationship.
 Second, we need more comparative analyses on informal workers’ struggles 
vis- à-vis the state in different locations and sectors. This may involve examining 
movements that are still at an infant stage and others that appear to be faltering. 
But ignoring them will only hinder our understanding of their potential and 
limits.
 Finally, we need deeper research on how different states have established 
hegemonic models of liberalisation that feature informal workers and absolve 
capital of responsibility for labour, while still retaining legitimacy among their 
citizens. Only then can we examine the limits and contradictions of these state 
strategies and ultimately analyse the future of the world’s workers.
Notes
1 See Chen (2014b) for a more in- depth discussion on the difference between punitive 
vs. protective legislation for and government responses to informal work.
2 The Self- Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) and the WIEGO Network, with the 
ILO and the Delhi Group on Informal Sector Statistics advocated for a definition of 
informal employment.
3 Ajit Ghose, ICSSR National Fellow and Honorary Professor, Institute for Human 
Development, New Delhi, February 2017.
4 See Chapter 30 by Kamala Sankaran in this volume for a further discussion of the role 
of welfare boards in realising employer liability for informal workers.
5 A “cess” is a tax. In this case, the cess is collected from large construction companies 
to fund welfare for informal construction workers.
33 Informal domestic workers, 
informal construction workers 
and the state
What prospects for improving labour 
standards?
Chris Tilly
Domestic workers are predominantly employed informally, and so are large 
numbers of construction workers. Both occupations are mainly wage workers, 
distinguishing them from self- employed informal workers. In many parts of the 
world, both professions are heavily populated with migrants, whether internal or 
cross- border. Beyond that, there might not appear to be many commonalities 
between the two types of work – one mainly gendered female and one mainly 
gendered male (though with important exceptions). However, in this chapter, I 
will emphasise their commonalities more than their contrasts. The chapter starts 
by describing developments on the ground, and then turns to recent theory and 
research, at which point the focus broadens to discuss informal work and 
informal worker organising. I draw on a growing literature and especially on 
work by collaborators in a six- country comparative research project on informal 
construction worker and domestic worker organisations, funded by the Ford 
Foundation.1
Domestic work: developments on the ground
There is a perception in many countries that domestic work employment is on 
the rise, due to increases in inequality and in women’s labour force participation. 
However, actual patterns are quite mixed: for example, in China, where domestic 
work had been reduced to a few enclaves by the 1970s, the occupation is 
exploding now, whereas in Mexico and the USA, long- term trends are still 
downward (Hu 2010; Tilly, Rojas and Theodore 2018).
 In recent decades, this sector has seen the expansion of domestic worker 
organisations and the consolidation of regulation and governance of the terms of 
domestic work, the two advancing in tandem and fuelling each other. Both 
trends have advanced at local, national and international levels. The most dra-
matic milestones have been the International Labour Organization’s 2011 adop-
tion of Convention 189 on the rights of domestic workers (Mather 2013; Fish 
2017) and the 2013 formation of the International Domestic Workers Federation, 
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which today has affiliates in over 50 countries (Mather 2014; International 
Domestic Workers Federation 2018). These accomplishments are rendered even 
more dramatic by the fact that the networking process that yielded them com-
menced in earnest in 2006 with the first international conference of domestic 
workers in the Netherlands. WIEGO (Women in Informal Employment: 
 Globalizing and Organizing) has been intimately involved in these develop-
ments, at times seconding staff and providing advice, technical assistance, and 
funding (Bonner, Budin and Pape 2014; Fish 2017).
 But more limited advances began long before. Peru passed domestic worker 
legislation in 2003, China issued its first occupational standards for the sector in 
2000, and New York State extended collective bargaining rights to in- home 
workers employed by a third party (covering home care workers who are pub-
licly funded) as early as 1976. The Latin American domestic workers’ federa-
tion, CONLACTRAHO, had its first congress in 1988, and Mary Goldsmith 
(1992), Joaze Bernardino- Costa (2014) and Premilla Nadasen (2015) have docu-
mented domestic worker unions in Mexico, Brazil, and the United States, respec-
tively, as early as the 1930s. At the same time, it is important to temper the 
optimism of the portrayal of recent gains by underlining that the vast majority of 
domestic workers, even in countries with laws on the books, labour with little or 
no actual organisation or protection.
Informal construction workers: developments on the ground
Construction workers started from a higher baseline of unionisation, but informal 
construction workers have not seen the same kinds of broad advances. To start 
with, there has been unambiguous growth of day labour and other informal con-
struction employment in countries as different as China, Korea, Mexico and the 
USA. In construction, neoliberalisation has typically taken the form of the exten-
sion of subcontracting chains, avoidance of unions where they exist, and wide-
spread flouting of labour and social insurance regulations, shifting more 
construction jobs into informal territory. Thanks to accompanying growth in 
inequality, high- end consumers have nurtured booms in construction and build-
ing rehabilitation, both residential and commercial.
 Informal construction workers have mounted spirited, but mainly localised 
responses. Here is a quick sampling:
• At one end of the spectrum of effective responses are limited but symboli-
cally important actions. Informal construction crews confront their super-
visor or threaten sabotage to challenge wage theft (Swider 2015). A 
Guatemalan union, no longer able to engage in collective bargaining or even 
recruit members due to neoliberal policy turns and ongoing anti- labour 
repression, continues to advocate for workers and run workforce develop-
ment programmes (Mora Salas, Sarmiento and Tilly 2015).
• In a middle range, organisations have scored more institutionalised gains. 
Organisations of informal women construction workers in India have won 
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tripartite welfare funds (Agarwala 2013). US day labourers also fall in the 
intermediate range, having won the legal right to solicit work in public, in 
some localities also gaining funding to run job centres and provide a variety 
of services (Sarmiento et al. 2016).
• A few organisations have overcome the odds to achieve even more substan-
tial successes. Notably, the Korean Construction Workers Union has won 
strikes and secured collective bargaining rights for informal construction 
workers in a number of regions (Yi and Chun 2019).
But the overall track record is spotty at best. In Mexico and South Africa, col-
leagues and I have been unable to find present- day organisations of informal 
construction workers of any significance.
 The global union federation embracing construction workers, the Building 
and Wood Workers International (BWI), has led campaigns supporting migrant 
worker rights, and pushing for labour standards in construction linked to mega- 
sporting events (the Olympics, the World Cup). BWI has notched up important 
successes, starting with the 2010 World Cup in South Africa and escalating to 
hammering out a comprehensive labour standards agreement with Qatar, which 
will host the 2022 World Cup. However, BWI has not yet been able to build a 
network, identity, voice and coordinated global programme for informal con-
struction workers in the way that the International Domestic Workers Federation 
(IDWF ) has done for domestic workers.
Theory and research relevant to these struggles
Four theoretical/empirical discussions are particularly relevant for formulating 
strategies to improve the situation of informal domestic workers and construc-
tion workers. I hasten to add that these discussions speak to informal workers 
more broadly.
 First and foremost, many have pointed out the importance of winning recog-
nition of these workers as bona fide workers, what Jennifer Chun (2009) calls a 
classification struggle. This has been particularly challenging for domestic 
workers, whose status as women (in large part), and often internal or cross- 
border migrants, doing reproductive labour in the home has widely barred them 
from worker status in law and in the public mind. Latin American activists’ 
adoption of the term trabajadora del hogar (household worker), rather than tra-
bajadora doméstica (which conveys echoes of servitude), and the US National 
Domestic Workers Alliance slogan “the work that makes all other work pos-
sible” are examples of contestation on this terrain. Demands for official identity 
cards also engage the issue (Agarwala 2013).
 A second conceptual and strategic arena is the question of appropriate forms 
and levels of regulation. Regarding the level of regulation, schematically there is 
a perpetual debate between Hernando de Soto’s view of the economy – regula-
tion stifles entrepreneurship and should be minimised – and Daron Acemoglu’s 
view – robust institutions ordering economic life are essential to growth, stability 
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and development, as well as equity. Regarding the form of regulation, one 
important choice is between bringing informal work into formal regulatory 
frameworks and upgrading labour standards while keeping it informal. As Rina 
Agarwala (2013), José Itzigsohn (2000), and others have forcefully pointed out, 
informal workers often prefer the flexibility of informal labour – while seeking 
to reduce the precarity associated with it. Day labourers, along with street 
vendors and waste pickers, introduce another dimension of regulation: control of 
public space. Through lobbying, negotiation, protest and simple de facto occupa-
tion, workers dependent on public space to ply their trades seek to rework urban 
governance to accommodate their activities (Sarmiento et al. 2016).
 Third, researchers have examined informal workers’ varied forms of organ-
isation. WIEGO researchers have particularly contributed to this area, examining 
the range of forms that local and national organisations have taken but also 
extending the scope to global networks and global learning processes (Bonner 
2010; Bonner and Spooner 2012; Bonner and Carré 2013). Domestic workers 
have adopted forms including community- based associations, cooperatives and 
trade unions, though over time there has been some movement in the direction of 
trade unions (Bonner 2010; Tilly, Rojas and Theodore 2018). Informal construc-
tion workers have more often opted for union forms, given the model of tradi-
tional construction trade unions, but have also built associations and worker 
centres (Agarwala 2013; Sarmiento et al. 2016). The watchwords for organisa-
tion building have been experimentation, pragmatism, and adaptation to local 
circumstances.
 A fourth rich area of analysis is understanding how informal workers mobilise 
and win in varied settings. Many researchers cite Polanyi’s (1944) notion of 
counter- movements that temper capitalism’s tendency to strip away institutional 
protections from markets (Tilly et al. 2014). Most informal workers, and cer-
tainly the two groups focused on here, tend to lack structural economic power 
and therefore often turn to the state for support. Chun (2009) spotlights symbolic 
power, the garnering of public support by demonstrating worthiness and com-
mitment. The intersectional status of many informal workers can be an important 
asset, yielding multiple identities that can facilitate mobilisation or issue 
framing. Over the last century, US domestic workers have at various times fore-
grounded identities as women, African Americans, low- wage workers, and 
immigrants; Mexican domestic workers have tapped a similar intersectional mix 
of roles (Tilly, Rojas and Theodore 2018).
 On the other hand, traditional power politics is also in play. Agarwala (2013) 
emphasises electoral vote- banking by informal worker organisations. Many, 
including Sarmiento et al. (2016), document the critical role of alliance- building, 
and show how self- organisation generates the legitimacy and credibility neces-
sary to attract allies, as well as the capacity to effectively use them.
 In many settings, alliances of informal worker organisations with traditional 
trade unions are particularly important (Milkman, Bloom and Narro 2010; Fine 
2011; Tilly et al. 2013; Sarmiento et al. 2016; Tilly, Rojas and Theodore 2018). 
But such alliances often build in two tensions. A first friction point is between 
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sympathy without solidarity and solidarity without sympathy. Broad middle- class 
publics often sympathise with the plight of the worst- off workers, those strug-
gling to maintain subsistence and to achieve basic rights, but feel no solidarity 
for those (such as many unionised workers) who have managed to rise above 
subsistence and seek to further improve their bargain with capital – sympathy 
without solidarity. On the other hand, trade union memberships may feel solid-
arity for their fellow unionists, but little concern or responsibility for those, even 
in the same sector, who fall outside the union’s safety net – a solidarity without 
sympathy that may exclude the majority of workers. A related tension pits advo-
cacy without accountability against accountability without advocacy. NGOs, 
advocacy groups, and informal worker associations advocate broadly for the 
rights of marginalised groups of workers, but rarely are the leaders of these 
organisations structurally accountable in the sense of gaining office through 
election and/or sustaining a budget primarily through dues contributions – advo-
cacy without accountability. On the other hand, trade unions, at least in prin-
ciple, are structurally accountable (with elected leadership and dues- funded 
budgets), but that very accountability can mean that unions mirror members’ 
reluctance to advocate for broader groups of workers – accountability without 
advocacy. Eade and Leather (2005) as well as Jenkins (2002) explore this second 
tension in depth. A growing literature examines cases in which pro- worker 
actors have overcome these tensions (e.g., Anner and Evans 2005; Milkman 
2010), but the challenges remain substantial.
In closing
This chapter has ranged from nitty- gritty summaries of gains secured by organi-
sations of informal domestic workers and construction workers, to reflections on 
cosmic contradictions confronting informal worker movements. Domestic 
workers and construction day labourers encounter distinctive challenges and 
have deployed distinctive strategies. But a growing body of evidence suggests 
that despite sectoral differences, some broader patterns hold – an encouraging 
indicator for possibilities of cumulative learning and building of strategic organ-
isational capacity.
Note
1 The six countries are China, India, Korea, Mexico, South Africa and the United States.
34 Waste & Citizenship Forum
Waste pickers and the state in Brazil
Sonia Dias
Introduction
State responsiveness to informal workers’ demands is crucial to their livelihoods. 
Deliberate policies that favour livelihood protection on the part of government 
(at all levels) and openness to engage in multi- sectoral participatory platforms 
can shape inclusive solid waste systems, i.e., a system in which environmental, 
social and livelihoods concerns are addressed.
 Treated as nuisances by authorities and with prejudice by segments of the 
urban population, waste pickers are most often ignored within public policy 
processes and thus frequently suffer from low self- esteem (Dias and Alves 
2008). Nevertheless, they are organised in varied ways: into cooperatives, 
associations, companies, unions, micro- enterprises, regional networks and 
alliances.
 This chapter is about the experience of a multi- stakeholder forum, in Brazil, 
in solid waste management (SWM) – the so- called Waste & Citizenship Forum 
(W&C Forum). This Forum has been a strategy to improve socio- environmental 
standards in the sector through the participation of a variety of political actors, 
including previously voiceless waste pickers’ cooperatives, as well as govern-
ment agencies in the implementation of integrated waste management systems at 
the national, sub- national and local levels.
 As Nancy Fraser (2004) argues, contemporary citizenship claims are chal-
lenging formal notions of citizenship rights and of formal democracy and are 
calling for an integrative notion of social justice. In this regard, Fraser has 
argued for a three- dimensional theory of justice. This means, in her view, the 
incorporation of the political dimension of representation, as well as the eco-
nomic dimension of distribution and the cultural dimension of recognition.1 She 
argues for the need to think integratively as there is an interplay of political, eco-
nomic and cultural injustices, which requires social arrangements that can simul-
taneously address claims for political representation, for redistribution and 
cultural identity. She postulates that
[these] three dimensions stand in relations of mutual entwinement and recipro-
cal influence. Just as the ability to make claims for distribution and recognition 
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depends on relations of representation, so the ability to exercise one’s political 
voice depends on the relations of class and status.
(ibid.: 49)
Within the literature on governance and participation, Fung’s contribution integ-
rates concerns related to effectiveness and social justice, policy and politics 
(Fung 2015). As he notes, governance “is effective to the extent that governance 
arrangements are capable of solving the substantive problems that they are set to 
address: providing education, caring for the indigent, creating security, and pro-
viding public goods and services” (ibid.: 517). The question is whether through 
multi- sectoral participation or individualised coproduction, some innovations 
may help advance effectiveness, legitimacy and social justice, the three key 
values of democratic governance discussed by Fung.
 The chapter will briefly trace the Forum’s genesis, its achievements and chal-
lenges and critically address which lessons can be drawn to inform the debates 
about state transformations and governance, in the context of growing concerns 
about sustainability and claims for social justice.2 I claim that the W&C Forum 
has helped to address key dimensions of social justice as discussed by Fraser and 
has contributed to more effectiveness in waste governance, one of the key ele-
ments in Fung’s discussion of democratic governance.
The Waste & Citizenship Forum: genesis
Up until the early 1990s, waste pickers in Brazil were subjected to a situation of 
great vulnerability, including social and economic exclusion; invisibility in pol-
itics, and a negative representation in the social imaginary. However, as they 
started to get organised into cooperatives in cities such as São Paulo, Belo Hori-
zonte and Porto Alegre, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they started to become 
much more vocal and influential in local policies. In the 1990s, two important 
cities in the country integrated waste picker cooperatives as partners in source 
segregation schemes – Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte. These two cities 
became models for inclusive solid waste systems.
 Organised waste pickers in Brazil were able to achieve greater responsiveness 
from the national and local governments across Brazil and they joined forces 
with other organisations to create the Waste & Citizenship Forum, a multi- 
stakeholder platform (public, private and civil society representation). The cre-
ation of the National Waste & Citizenship Forum stemmed from a need to 
consolidate a participatory approach to urban waste management in Brazil. In 
1998, a study carried out by UNICEF estimated that 45,000 children in Brazil 
worked in waste picking, 30 per cent of them without schooling. Some experi-
ences in partnerships between local governments and civil society in recycling 
projects were analysed in this study. The findings pointed out that urban waste is 
a complex issue that cannot be tackled properly without cooperation between the 
state and civil society. It also showed that waste picking is a fundamental issue 
that needs to be addressed in all its aspects. This meant that improvements in the 
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area required strong coordination of the various interrelated sectors: govern-
ments – at the local, state and national level – waste picker cooperatives, NGOs 
and the private sector.
 Thus, in late 1998, under the leadership of UNICEF, a National Forum called 
Waste & Citizenship was launched, comprised, initially, of 19 entities with the 
objectives of eradicating child labour at open dumps, eradication of open dumps/
implementation of sanitary landfills, and promotion of partnerships between 
municipalities and waste pickers within recycling systems. The main strategies 
of the Forum were: support for the creation of waste picker cooperatives; capa-
city building in technical and social aspects of waste for all partners (coopera-
tives, government, businesses, NGOs); a national campaign to eradicate child 
labour; development of pilot projects in different parts of the country focused on 
integrating waste pickers into formal recycling schemes; and the creation of sub- 
national and municipal W&C forums throughout Brazil to work in coordination 
with the National Forum.
Towards transformative policies?
Following Fraser and Fung’s theoretical frameworks, I examine the Waste & Cit-
izenship Forum along four dimensions – Recognition, Representation, Redistribu-
tion and Governance – in order to assess in which ways the Forum helped advance 
social justice principles and effectiveness in problem solving in solid waste man-
agement. Policies promoted by the Forum addressing recognition focused on cre-
ating a proper term to designate the activity: this was achieved with the creation, in 
2002, of the category “catador de material reciclável” (picker of recyclables) and 
its formal inclusion in the National Classification of Occupations. This enabled 
waste pickers to be visible in the official statistics system in Brazil. In addition, a 
legal framework recognising the right to work and access to recyclables was 
created, including among others: Law 11.107 (2005) that enabled municipalities to 
negotiate agreements with cooperatives for service delivery in municipal recycling 
programmes; Decree 5949 (2006) that mandated that all federal institutions must 
donate recyclables to cooperatives; and the landmark approval of the National 
Solid Waste Policy in which several mechanisms were created for the integration 
of cooperatives as a state policy. Thus, the dimension of recognition addressed the 
improvement of their social image, recognition of informal recyclers’ environ-
mental role, and the creation of their profession.
 Under the dimension of representation, whose focus was on innovative forms 
of representation to increase the voice of the MBOs (membership- based organi-
sations) and support its organising, the Forum contributed with incentives for the 
creation of cooperatives across the country and for the formation of the Movi-
mento Nacional dos Catadores de Material Reciclável (MNCR) – the National 
Movement of Waste Pickers – in 2001. In 2003, the Inter- ministerial Committee 
of Social Inclusion of Waste Pickers was created, composed of representatives 
from federal ministries (Social Development; the Cities; Work and Employment; 
Education and Culture) and with representation of the MNCR.
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 Regarding redistribution, funds from government entities were made avail-
able for capacity building courses for MBOs, for construction and upgrading of 
recycling warehouses, equipment, and vehicles, such as: the 2003 funding line 
(US$2.6 million) opened up by the Ministry of the Environment for waste 
pickers’ cooperatives; the 2004 solidarity credit line for housing; and the 2007 
credit line from the Brazilian Bank for Economic and Social Development for 
infrastructure investment in recycling warehouses, technical assistance and other 
improvement of waste pickers’ spaces. These policies aimed to address the need 
to remedy the unfair distribution of investments in the sanitation sector, which 
had never been directed to this sector group.
 Finally, on the governance dimension, one of the key goals of the Forum was 
eradication of child labour at dumps as a key indicator of effectiveness in 
problem solving. The creation of “bolsa- escola” cash- in benefit enabled many 
children to stop work at dumps and enrol in schools. Improvement in data was 
another key indicator of governance, thus the mapping of waste picking at 
dumps in the National Research on Basic Sanitation (PNSB) in 2000 was a land-
mark as the waste pickers previously were invisible in statistics and in main 
databases. Due to the strong performance of the Prosecutor’s Office for the 
Environment (a partner in the W&C Forum) and the increase in investments in 
the solid waste sector, all of these thanks to the influence of the National Waste 
& Citizenship Forum, there was an improvement in the final disposal of waste 
with a rise in the share of sanitary landfills as the main method of final disposal 
as opposed to open dumps, from 10.7 per cent (1989) to 32.2 per cent by 2000.
 Also, from 2000 onwards, stronger coordination among the different federal 
financing programmes started, as well as the reformulation of government pol-
icies as a way to incorporate the principles of the National Waste & Citizenship 
Forum. The Federal Government invested around US$188 million from 
2000–2002 on SWM projects for the eradication of open dumps (including funds 
to support waste pickers’ livelihoods).
 The process that led to the formation of the Waste & Citizenship Forum and 
the developments towards greater inclusivity of informal waste pickers that 
ensued were possible due to some key enabling conditions. First of all, the cre-
ation of the first cooperatives and their ability to influence policy- making in the 
cities of Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte and São Paulo showed the possibilities of 
integration of informal recyclers into municipal recycling systems. These city 
examples inspired a respected UN agency – UNICEF – to lead the process of 
formation of the Forum aiming at disseminating such examples nationwide. 
UNICEF ’s backing lent visibility to the waste pickers’ demands, as well as 
encouraging the formation of other cooperatives across the country which 
eventually led to the formation of a collective actor – the national movement of 
recyclers (MNCR).
 Another enabling factor is the fact that these processes took place during the 
period of Brazil’s re- democratisation which promoted greater responsiveness by 
state actors to social justice. Forum advocates also managed to forge alliances 
with many change agents in key federal government agencies committed to 
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 pursuing a transformative approach to solid waste management. There was also 
a change in the political culture with more openness from civil society and state 
actors to engage with each other. Another key factor refers to the right institu-
tional design for the Forum as the formation of the National Forum entailed the 
creation of sub- national and municipal forums (multi- scalar) and ensured repres-
entation of waste pickers’ organisations, private and public actors and NGOs. 
Finally, there were four clear goals for the Forums: that is, eradication of child 
labour, eradication of open dumps, introduction of sanitary landfills and integra-
tion of coops in recycling schemes. There were also clear strategies (a child 
labour eradication campaign, capacity building and pilot projects), and a clear 
ethical appeal, i.e., to eradicate child labour as an entry point to raise waste 
pickers’ rights as service providers in recycling systems.
 The Forum’s goals and strategies point to concerted efforts to address the 
main dimensions of social justice and governance in solid waste management. 
The policies under its influence aimed at restructuring the distribution of invest-
ments in the solid waste sector towards fairer allocation of financial and techni-
cal resources that benefited informal workers. It also challenged the social image 
and visibility of informal recyclers, thus challenging their invisibility and non- 
recognition.
 The existence of the Forum itself and the support given by the Forum in the 
creation of other participatory instances, such as the inter- ministerial committee 
for inclusion of recyclers, signal that participatory parity is crucial in addressing 
calls for social justice, i.e., the representation of workers in committees and 
forums that design policies targeted at their segment is crucial in tackling the 
multiple dimensions of injustice, which, as Fraser notes, needs to be done with a 
combination of redistribution, recognition and representation remedies. In addi-
tion to addressing social justice claims, the W&C Forum aimed at improving 
governance in solid waste management, which is crucial, given the current 
environmental crisis in the world.
 The Waste & Citizenship Forum was an important platform in Brazil because 
it was an instance where an extremely marginalised group that suffers from 
extreme lack of recognition and low self- esteem became actively involved in 
participatory governance and, therefore, the case of the forum sheds light on key 
issues related to the forging of participatory governance and social justice 
struggles.
Concluding thoughts
The case of the Brazilian waste pickers shows how, through engaging in partici-
patory spaces, organised workers have managed to advance the notion of “the 
public” and contribute to greater state responsiveness to their demands.
 The main lesson we may draw is that by engaging in participatory platforms 
informal waste pickers might be able to re- signify how they are perceived 
(recognition) and create a channel for dialogue with government (at different 
levels) in which to represent their demands. Also, participation in such forums 
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may translate into effective changes in solid waste management (better govern-
ance) and poverty reduction (redistribution).
 Although the case of the Waste & Citizenship Forum has contributed to 
greater empowerment of waste pickers in Brazil and to state responsiveness to 
their demands, more critical perspectives raise important questions regarding 
power relations, the internal dynamics, representation and other key issues 
within participatory forums. Kate Meagher, for instance, notes that “social mar-
ginalisation and livelihood pressures often leave the associations of the poor vul-
nerable to opportunism or political capture by public officials, NGOs, or even by 
their own leadership” (2011: 51). Her critical perspective serves as a beacon to 
avoid romanticised or idealised views about popular agency and its ability to 
provoke transformative change within the state.
 In closing, there are some gaps in the literature of multi- stakeholder platforms 
worth mentioning. Peter Houtzager, Ruth Berins Collier, John Harriss and 
Adrian G. Lavalle., for instance, note that one of the challenges is to identify the 
competing notions of representation that different types of NGOs, popular organ-
isations and networks deploy in their contests with state actors within platforms 
(Houtzager et al, 2002: 4). It is important to understand the dynamics of parti-
cipation and representation and their impact on furthering citizenship rights. 
There is, also, a need to investigate the rules that structure participation (of 
different actors) in existing municipal Waste & Citizenship Forums across Brazil 
and also to assess these platforms’ contribution to increasing effectiveness in 
problem solving in solid waste management at the local level (Dias 2009).
 The Waste & Citizenship platform brought about changes for more effective 
management of solid waste and the empowerment of the informal recycling 
sector. The Waste & Citizenship platform was an innovative institutional 
arrangement that contributed to putting the issue of the eradication of open 
dumps and claims for social inclusion of informal waste workers on the national 
agenda in Brazil. New challenges lie ahead to further the agenda of coupling 
waste and citizenship.
Notes
1 This means that Nancy Fraser’s framework encompasses a distributive dimension 
(geared to class inequalities), a recognition dimension (focus on status hierarchies) and 
a political dimension – representation – which “furnishes the stage on which struggles 
over distribution and recognition are played out” (2007: 313).
2 This section draws on Sonia Dias (2009).
Conclusion
Martha Chen, Françoise Carré and Sally Roever
The Introduction to this volume summarises the recent rethinking on the 
informal economy by the chapter authors. This Conclusion presents the recom-
mendations of the authors for future research and policy on the informal 
economy. Their recommendations build and expand upon the recent rethinking 
to keep pace with current and predicted changes to economies, to cities, to soci-
eties and to the environment which will reshape and challenge the livelihoods of 
informal workers going forward. As noted in the Introduction, these changes 
include structural shifts and the financialisation of economies; the expanded use 
of digital technologies, robotics and artificial intelligence; increased rural- urban 
and cross- border migration; and increased urbanisation and the resulting intensi-
fied competition for urban space and economic opportunities.
Future research
Paradigm shift
Regarding the overall approach to future research on the informal economy, the 
authors make four overarching sets of recommendations, which together call for 
a paradigm shift which privileges grounded theory building that is transdiscipli-
nary in approach, features the perspectives of informal workers and pays atten-
tion to structural drivers of – and segmentation within – the informal economy. 
The first set of recommendations relates to the source of knowledge and theory. 
The authors emphasise that research and theory- building should be situated in 
realities and perspectives from the Global South where informal employment is 
predominant and where most informal workers live and work: more specifically, 
that future research should interrogate the ground realities of different groups of 
informal workers; that future theories (as well as policy and legal frameworks) 
should reflect these ground realities rather than the realities of (largely formal) 
employment in the Global North; and that future theories (and related policy or 
legal frameworks) should be built inductively, ideally reflecting the lived experi-
ences and perspectives of informal workers.
 As a notable example, the WIEGO (Women in Informal Employment: Glo-
balizing and Organizing) Network is committed to co- producing knowledge with 
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local organisations of informal workers and to featuring the voice and knowledge 
of informal workers in its research reports (Ogando and Harvey 2019). In most of 
its field research projects, as Marty Chen details in Chapter 6, WIEGO partners 
with local organisations of informal workers in all stages of the research process:
• to jointly select priority topics;
• to formulate testable hypotheses and specify appropriate questions;
• to identify and train local researchers;
• to identify and contact the sample population;
• to interpret the research findings;
• to draw out the policy lessons and messages.
The second set of recommendations relates to the type of research. The authors 
emphasise the need for cross- disciplinary research – ideally forging a transdisci-
plinary approach – to fully understand the dynamics of informal employment, 
including what drives it, the working conditions of different groups of informal 
workers and the links between informal employment, the state and capital. As 
Jan Breman puts it: “Interdisciplinarity is the alpha and omega of informality: 
the interconnectedness across the fields parcelled out of economics, political 
science, sociology, anthropology, law, social policy and public administration 
needs to be mapped.” Also, many authors call for policy- relevant research, not 
just research aimed at theoretical debates or academic audiences.
 The third set of recommendations relates to the unit of analysis for future 
research. The authors agree that aggregate measures of the size, composition and 
contribution of the informal economy are needed to attract the attention of 
researchers and policy- makers but that disaggregated data and research findings 
on different segments of the informal workforce are needed to understand 
informality and inform effective policy. Future policy- relevant research should, 
for instance, include interrogation of the working conditions of specific groups 
of informal workers and how different policies, laws and regulations impact 
them. Such an approach would help provide a corrective to existing literature 
that assumes away the different logics governing different groups of workers and 
the value chains in which they are embedded.
 Fourth, the authors also call for research that bridges analysis at the macro, 
sectoral and micro levels to bring out the structural drivers of informality and the 
structural links between the informality of labour, capital and the state. This 
focus on structural drivers and links would help make visible the actors and 
logics that shape the possibilities for inclusive rights- based policy and legal 
frameworks and, thereby, for slowing or reversing the current trend towards 
extreme inequality. While the existing literature offers substantial insights into 
individual- level or supply- side constraints, it has far less to say about the struc-
tural dynamics within which informal enterprises and workers operate. This 
component of a future approach to research would help provide an important 




In terms of research methods, the authors recommend combining different 
research tools – statistical analysis, desk research and field research – recognis-
ing the limitations of each: that statistics often fail to capture dynamics and link-
ages; that existing literature is often context- specific and outdated; and that field 
research often does not produce generalisable findings.
 The authors recommend using mixed methods in field research, both qual-
itative and quantitative. They also call for economic histories that explore the 
impact on informal employment of structural shifts over time in the wider 
economy and labour market.
 In addition to statistical analysis favoured by economists and other policy- 
makers and to truly understand informality in different contexts, the authors call 
for in- depth case studies as well as structural comparisons of such case studies. 
Jan Breman recommends a wide range of grounded case studies which trace the 
connection and interactions between informal workers and other actors or stake-
holders and for “a cross- cutting analysis of existing case studies from a variety 
of analytical perspectives related to the world of informality”. Caroline Skinner 
and Vanessa Watson also prioritise detailed case study work, especially in what 
are often regarded as “peripheral” informal areas in “ordinary” cities and towns, 
to generate “[h]ighly contextualised knowledge of the interests, power relations 
and actual daily practices underpinning inclusionary planning processes”. The 
chapters on specific groups of informal workers in this volume demonstrate the 
analytical power of this in- depth approach.
Themes
The authors identify several broad themes as well as specific topics for future 
research.
 One broad theme is prospective: the impact of current trends – migration, 
urbanisation, climate change, different patterns of economic growth, demo-
graphic change and the pressure to formalise – on informal employment in 
general and on specific groups of informal workers. A second is retrospective: 
the history of the informal economy in specific contexts and, more generally, 
the impact of structural shifts in the economy on the allocation of labour in 
different contexts. The third, for future statistical work and research, is to 
better understand and measure the productivity and economic contribution of 
the informal economy: informed by an analysis of how these are conceptual-
ised and measured in mainstream economics, and official statistics, compared 
to the realities of informal employment and the perceptions of informal 
workers. Fourth, it is necessary to explore and analyse contexts where there 
have been positive and/or negative changes for the livelihoods of informal 
workers, including: who or what was driving the change, and why; and how 
was pressure applied. One concrete priority recommendation is to assess obs-
tacles and setbacks to informal workers’ efforts to organise and to negotiate 
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with powerful agents (city agencies, contractors, developers) whose actions 
impact their livelihoods.
 Another broad topic for future research is segmentation within the informal 
workforce, especially among the self- employed. The authors recommend several 
ways to consider segmentation within informal self- employment, including: old 
and new modes of production (e.g., artisanal and digital); different statuses of 
employment (employers, own- account operators, contributing family workers as 
well as disguised wage employees and dependent contractors); different products 
(traditional and modern, perishables and consumer durables) and markets (local, 
national and international); and contrasting strategies of the self- employed (e.g., 
multiplication versus accumulation).
 Yet another is to map out and analyse the often- overlooked links between 
informal workers and the state (at all levels), on one hand, and corporate enter-
prises, the owners of capital and markets, on the other. Some authors recom-
mend unpacking how these links are mediated, focusing on both the actors – the 
intermediaries (e.g., middlemen, the mafia) – and the vested interests and politics 
involved. As Barbara Harriss- White puts it, the boundary between informality 
and the state is not so much “blurry” as “political”, a function of the exercise of 
power by the state and/or the owners of capital.
 Finally, several authors called for theorising the use of public space for 
informal livelihoods, notably public space and public land in cities and forest, 
pastures and waterways in rural areas. This is because informal workers need 
regulated access to public space and natural resources to pursue their livelihoods 
but are routinely dislocated from them. This is also because informal workers, 
especially in cities, are often seen or portrayed as “undesirable” users of public 
space: a key source of the structured inequalities they face. There is a need to 
“unpack” and theorise the social construction of public space and public land in 
relation to informal livelihoods and, also, informal settlements. In short, the dis-
ciplines and practice of urban studies, urban planning and architecture need new 
or reframed theoretical frameworks to be relevant to all those who live and work 
in cities.
 Despite advances made in statistical measurement of informal employment at 
the national and international levels, as detailed by Françoise Carré, Rodrigo 
Negrete and Joann Vanek in their chapters and summarised in the Introduction, 
more and better statistics are needed. Many countries still do not have a labour 
force survey, and among those that do, the survey is not done routinely and often 
does not include questions that provide for the identification of informal employ-
ment, both inside and outside informal enterprises. A first priority, therefore, is 
to encourage countries to undertake labour force surveys on a timely basis with 
questions on informality harmonised to the International Labour Organization 
standards. An effort to address this gap among Arab countries is being planned 
by the ILO, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western 
Asia (ESCWA) and WIEGO. To facilitate the sustained development of this 
work, a new regional working group on labour indicators has been organised and 
will be closely involved with the project.
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 Producing “better” statistics involves refining the relevant standards and con-
cepts to reflect changing work arrangements and ensuring that all categories of 
workers, especially those in the informal economy, are identified in official sta-
tistics. WIEGO will participate in a consultation process organised by the ILO 
concerning the statistical standards of informality. The advice gained from this 
process will be reviewed by the International Conference of Labour Statisticians 
(ICLS) in 2023. One concern of the ICLS consultation process is the improve-
ment of statistics on informality to support international harmonisation and 
coverage across countries, including developed countries. Another concern is 
refining the concepts related to work in the informal economy to align with deci-
sions taken at the two most recent meetings of the ICLS.
 A key issue in aligning the concepts of informality to the new ICLS frame-
work of work relationships involves developing criteria for identifying inform-
ality in agriculture, in particular, work in subsistence agriculture. Another key 
issue is related to changes in the world of work that led to the new classification 
of status in employment (ICSE- 18) described in Chapter 4 by Françoise Carré. 
This involves the identification of dependent contractors – a category which 
reflects aspects of both wage and self- employment – and capturing the overlap 
between informal employment and non- standard forms of wage employment 
such as short- term work which entails no access to employment- related social 
protection benefits.
 Better statistics also involve the challenge of collecting and tabulating data on 
the specific occupations of workers in the informal economy, for example, 
domestic work, home- based work, street vending, market trade and waste 
picking. These are important sources of employment in developing and emerg-
ing economies. However, as described in Chapter 3 by Joann Vanek, these occu-
pations are more difficult to capture in official statistics than those with formal 
arrangements. Special methods for the collection, classifications and tabulations 
of data as well as publication in formats that can be used by policy- makers and 
advocate are required.
 A complete picture of a country’s informal economy requires not only statis-
tics on employment but also on the contribution of informal enterprises (i.e., the 
informal sector) and informal workers in formal enterprises and households to 
the gross domestic project (GDP). A few countries have prepared estimates of 
the contribution of the informal sector to GDP but only on an ad hoc basis and 
not as part of the routine statistical production. However, Chapter 5, prepared by 
Rodrigo Negrete, based on the statistical advances in Mexico, shows the feasib-
ility and importance of the regular production of statistics not only on the contri-
bution of informal enterprises but also on the economic activities of informal 
workers in formal enterprises or households. Finally, another priority is 
improved data on informal enterprises: their size, ownership, location and branch 
of industry and their share of total enterprises and of enterprises in specific 
branches of industry.
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Future policies
As summarised in the Introduction, the authors make the case that many existing 
policies and laws are legacies from the colonial past and are premised on notions 
of labour markets and employment relations that obtain mainly in the Global 
North. They also argue that surprisingly little attention has been paid to whether 
and how existing policies and regulations impact the informal economy, espe-
cially in the Global South. Further, while the changing nature of work has 
captured the attention and imagination of policy- makers, researchers and the 
general public, there has been limited attention to date on how to regulate new 
(often informal) forms of work.
 The most common policy response to both old and new forms of informal 
employment is a call to formalise them. But there is limited understanding by 
policy- makers themselves of what type of formalisation they are calling for: do 
they want to shift all informal workers to formal jobs, to regulate and tax 
informal enterprises, to extend social protection to all informal workers or some-
thing else? And there is even less understanding of what informal workers want 
and need in the name of formalisation. Also, in discussing the drivers of inform-
ality, more attention is paid to the low capacity of the state than to the deliberate 
policies of the state – or how the state bends its own formal rules.
 What follows is a summary of the dominant narratives about regulation and 
formalisation of the informal economy and the counter- narratives and recom-
mendations of the authors in this volume, including their deliberations at a 2017 
WIEGO research conference held at Harvard University.
Regulation
In the economics discipline, and among economic policy- makers, there are three 
persistent and interrelated assumptions about the informal economy and regula-
tion. New research, however, is beginning to challenge these assumptions and 
provide evidence that further rethinking is necessary.
 The first is that excessive regulations – notably labour regulations – drive or 
cause informality, by creating perverse incentives for firms to operate informally 
outside the purview of regulations. Elsewhere, Ravi Kanbur has argued that
Even if the presence of regulation could explain the level of informality, for 
it to explain increases in informality the regulatory burden would have had 
to have increased. But, in fact, it is well appreciated that in the last two 
decades of liberalisation, the regulatory burden has, if anything, decreased. 
The regulation- based explanation of increasing informality is thus weak 
at best.
(Kanbur 2014: 7)
When it comes to wage employment during this era of de- regulation, many once-
 formal wage jobs have been informalised because many formal firms are hiring 
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workers informally and new forms of work facilitated by digital platforms 
remain outside the scope of regulation.
 The second assumption, a correlate of the first, is that informal workers, busi-
nesses and activities operate outside the reach of the law and the state. And the 
third, a correlate of the second, is that informal workers and operators choose to 
operate outside the reach of the law and state regulation. In testing these assump-
tions, as noted in the Introduction, Urmila Chatterjee and Ravi Kanbur found 
that 97 per cent of manufacturing firms in India have always been smaller in 
size than the mandated threshold for registration and compliance under the 2011 
Factories Act of India and question the policy focus on compliance by informal 
enterprises (Chatterjee and Kanbur 2015).
 Through two decades of research in multiple countries across several conti-
nents, the WIEGO Network has found that informal workers, businesses and 
activities are regulated by the state – typically in ways that are punitive and not 
well understood. Informal workers and businesses tend to be excluded from 
labour, employment and business policies and legislation and are, thereby, 
denied the rights and entitlements afforded to formal employees and businesses. 
At the same time, a complex range of national, sector- specific and city- level reg-
ulations and practices impact informal workers, their businesses and activities. 
These tend not to fit the reality of informal employment and are frequently puni-
tive in their effect; also, non- compliance with the regulations is often treated as a 
criminal offence. In India, for example, street vendors who do not have licences, 
which are difficult to obtain, are subject to summary warrants and fines under the 
criminal code, despite the fact that middle- and low- income populations rely on 
them daily to access food and other basic goods and services.
 In brief, the informal economy is not outside the reach of the state: rather, 
informal workers and operators are often inside the punitive arm of the state but 
outside the protective arm of the state. Elsewhere, Marlese von Broembsen and 
Marty Chen have reported that state harassment of informal workers and denial 
of their due process protections under rule of law are ubiquitous around the 
world. Also, states often fail to implement the relatively few progressive laws 
that are designed to protect or support informal workers (von Broembsen and 
Chen 2016). What informal workers need in order to increase their income 
and thereby contribute to economic growth and the reduction of poverty and 
inequality are enabling and protective laws and regulations and the benefits that 
come with registering their enterprises and paying taxes. The policy challenge is 
to identify which forms of regulations affect which segments of the informal 
economy in what ways; and to develop appropriate and fair regulations for 
different segments – in consultation with and informed by the perspectives of 
informal workers.
 In terms of specific recommendations by the authors, the economists point 
out that many informal workers fall outside, rather than avoid, existing regu-
latory frameworks and tax thresholds. They also argue that policies should focus 
on raising the productivity of informal businesses and the incomes of informal 
workers. The labour lawyers and scholars argue that labour and employment 
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laws, premised on an explicit employer- employee relationship, need to be 
reframed to cover informal employment relationships. The urban planners and 
scholars argue that informal livelihoods and informal settlements, and the links 
between then, need to be integrated into urban plan and designs. The social 
policy scholars call for an integrated approach to social protection for informal 
workers that includes both social assistance and social security, that sees a role 
for both the state and employers in providing social protection, and that extends 
protection to informal workers as both workers and citizens. The sociologists 
and political scientists challenge assumptions about the relationship between the 
state, capital, labour and informality and argue that more policy attention should 
be paid to the informal practices of the state and capital. The home-based 
worker, street vendor and waste picker specialists argue that existing policy and 
legal frameworks should be reframed to match the realities and needs of these 
and other groups of informal workers, rather than requiring informal workers to 
comply with inappropriate laws designed for formal employment and commer-
cial arrangements.
Formalisation
At the heart of the policy debates on the informal economy is the question of 
whether and how to formalise the informal economy. Different analysts and 
stakeholders hold divergent notions of what formalisation of the informal 
economy should entail. To some, it means shifting informal workers to formal 
wage jobs – but this requires creating more formal wage jobs. To others, it 
means registering and taxing informal enterprises. But, as noted by Ravi Kanbur 
as well as Imraan Valodia and David Francis, many informal operators already 
pay a variety of taxes and fees. Further, as noted by Sonia Dias, Lucía Fernan-
dez, Sally Roever and Melanie Samson writing about street vendors and waste 
pickers, informal workers want the benefits that should come with being formal-
ised in exchange for paying taxes.
 WIEGO has sought to influence the formalisation debate to reflect the priority 
needs and demands of informal workers, based on its grounded knowledge of, 
and engagement with, different groups of informal workers. WIEGO has pointed 
out that formalisation policies have different meanings and implications across 
different groups of informal workers; and that the formalisation debate tends to 
focus narrowly on the self- employed in informal enterprises and, especially, on 
the more entrepreneurial self- employed, namely, employers who represent 
around 3 per cent of informal self- employed globally (ILO 2018a). At a 
minimum, the formalisation debate needs to distinguish between wage workers 
in informal jobs and self- employed workers in informal enterprises. Ideally, it 
should further distinguish between different segments of the informal self- 
employed and wage employed as each segment has its specific needs and con-
straints (Chen 2006, 2009).
 WIEGO facilitated a delegation of informal worker leaders to the two- year 
standard- setting discussion on the “Transitioning from the Informal to the 
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Formal Economy” at the International Labour Conferences in 2014 and 2015. To 
prepare the delegation for these discussions, including the formulation of a 
common platform of demands, WIEGO convened three regional workshops with 
informal worker leaders from 55 organisations and 24 countries. The common 
core demands of the informal worker organisations include: the right to organ-
isation, collective representative voice, legal identity and standing as well as 
labour rights, economic rights and social rights, including social protection. The 
WIEGO Network Platform also includes the demands of specific groups of 
workers (WIEGO Network Platform 2014).
 ILO Recommendation 204 on the “Transitioning from the Informal to the 
Formal Economy”, adopted at the 2015 International Labour Conference, 
includes some of the key demands of the informal worker delegation, notably 
the recognition that: most informal workers are from poor households trying to 
earn a living against great odds who need protection and promotion in return for 
regulation and taxation; most informal economic units are single person or 
family operations run by own- account workers who do not hire others; regulated 
access to public space and natural resources are essential to the livelihoods of 
informal workers; and informal livelihoods should not be destroyed in the 
process of formalisation. But the Recommendation falls short in granting the 
membership- based organisations of informal workers a guaranteed and direct 
seat at the ILO tripartite standard- setting negotiation table, due in large part to 
resistance from some trade unions of formal workers.
 Since Recommendation 204 was adopted in 2015, there has been increasing 
pressure on governments to formalise the informal economy. Several authors in 
this volume, notably Barbara Harriss- White, Amin Kamete, Kate Meagher, 
Melanie Samson and Kamala Sankaran, have written about adverse terms of 
formalisation, questioning whose agenda is being served. Amin Kamete makes 
the case that some approaches to formalisation are coercive and force the 
informal workers into “making crippling Faustian bargains that strip away the 
very soul of informality”. As a case in point, the recent demonetisation scheme 
and the new Goods and Services Tax (GST) in India – both promoted in the 
name of formalising the informal economy – have served to cripple, rather than 
formalise, informal enterprises and workers. Demonetisation disproportionately 
affected the (predominantly informal) firms that deal in cash. GST compliance 
has forced business transactions to be digitalised, and compelled formal firms to 
prefer formal suppliers and informal firms to deal with more complicated 
bureaucratic procedures and the loss of contracts from formal firms. In the 
process, the number of jobs in informal enterprises has declined (Kumar 2019). 
As a sector- specific example of formalisation, Melanie Samson presents a typo-
logy of approaches to integrating waste pickers in solid waste management and 
the associated “erasures” of the identity, knowledge and systems of waste 
pickers.
 It is also important to note, as James Heintz highlights in Chapter 8, that the 
formalisation debate “tends to be flawed because it considers the path to form-
ality to be an incremental one, based on individual enterprises or jobs” and the 
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transition from informality to formality to be a simple continuum. He notes that 
many research projects try to document how informal enterprises can move up – 
from very micro, to micro, to small, then medium- scale enterprises. James 
Heintz questions whether this can or should happen one firm at a time; argues 
that the ability of one firm to formalise may depend on what is happening to 
other enterprises in the economy, that is, to the economy’s structure as a whole; 
and calls for more research in this area to truly understand the dynamics of 
informal employment and formalisation.
 Finally, the authors of this volume raise fundamental issues about the politics 
of formalisation. They question “who should comply with what?” in the name of 
formalisation. Must informal workers comply with existing formal policies and 
regulations that are not designed for them? Or do formal policies and regulations 
need to be amended to match the realities and needs of informal workers? Or do 
the state and capital need to comply with the formal policies and regulations 
which they often avoid or find exceptions to? In other words, the authors ques-
tion whether the end goal is to formalise informal workers, their enterprises and 
livelihood activities by making them comply with existing policies and laws. 
Instead, they argue that the end goal should be to reform existing policies and 
laws to match the realities and needs of informal workers. In making the case 
that municipal and industry recycling systems should integrate into the recycling 
system of informal waste pickers, Melanie Samson cites a South African waste 
picker who told a group of national and local officials: “It is the city who is 
integrating itself on our existing structures, because we’ve been doing it for 
many years, so it is them who is integrating onto our existing system.”
 But what about the difficult political challenge of who should – and can – 
regulate the state and capital, especially when they collude to bend formal rules? 
Consider the case of global value chains, a mode of global production which 
encourages governments to attract foreign investors by relaxing regulations and 
multinational companies to shift production to countries with the least- onerous 
regulations or weakest enforcement. To regulate homework in global value 
chains, Marlese von Broembsen recommends a “plural- overlapping conception 
of governance” which combines national regulations with “different forms of 
governance at different jurisdictional spheres”. Von Broembsen sees a role for 
organisations of homeworkers in the governance of global value chains but cau-
tions that the burden of regulation and enforcement should not fall solely on 
homeworkers and their organisations: and calls for multi- stakeholder governance 
involving trade unions, citizen groups, corporations and the state as well as 
homeworker organisations. Similarly, Adele Blackett makes the case for trans-
national regulation of domestic work, an occupation associated with significant 
cross- border migration.
 To sum up, the authors make the case that, in the discourse on regulation and 
formalisation, there is too much focus on the non- compliance or deviance of 
informal workers and too little focus on the non- compliance and deviance of 
state and capital and on the inappropriateness of existing policy and legal frame-
works. They also point out that there is limited focus on institutions and power 
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and how, more specifically, the state and capital not only bend formal rules in 
their favour but also use formal rules to penalise informal workers.
Future vision
Vision
What is being suggested by the authors is a fundamentally different approach to 
the informal economy within their specific disciplines – and more generally. An 
approach that is centred on informal workers, especially the working poor: their 
needs, constraints and aspirations as well as their contributions to the economy, 
society and environment. In other words, an approach in which informal workers 
themselves – as well as their needs and demands – matter in research and policy. 
This approach needs to be led by realities and perspectives in the Global South, 
to be bottom- up and incremental, and to embrace the fluidity and flexibility of 
informality while addressing the associated vulnerabilities for informal workers.
 In practical terms, this approach should seek to reduce the vulnerabilities and 
increase the earnings – and productivity – of informal workers. Doing so requires 
an approach that focuses on linkages between informal settlements and informal 
livelihoods, on the adherence of formal regulations to informal realities, and on 
the compliance of state and capital with formal regulations, rather than just the 
compliance of informal workers and enterprises with existing formal regulations. 
The approach would combine economic analysis with analysis of power 
dynamics in specific contexts – and, ideally, historically – and bridge calls for 
efficiency with calls for social justice.
 As a group, the authors question whose visions and interests are being served 
in the name of regulating and formalising the informal economy: the visions – or 
dreams – of informal workers or the visions of the state (which is often ensnared 
by powerful interests), of capital, of economic and urban planners. In sum, the 
authors challenge attempts to integrate informal workers into existing legal and 
policy frameworks and existing models of labour markets – because the existing 
frameworks and models are not designed for them and, therefore, are either inap-
propriate for, biased against, or punitive towards them.
From vision to reality
Turning this fundamentally different vision into reality will require addressing 
the politics of competing interests and power imbalances. It will require address-
ing the fact that states are often “divided” between the expectation that they 
should serve as guarantor of rights and the rule of law and the temptation or 
incentives they face to violate the rights of the less powerful and their own laws. 
It will also require addressing the fact that the national or local state often col-
ludes with capital or is subordinated to, or overpowered by, capital. It will also 
require addressing the fundamental imbalance of power between informal 
workers, especially the working poor, and the state and the owners of capital.
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 To address these realities, the authors call for a new cohort of economic and 
urban planners who, as Caroline Skinner and Vanessa Watson put it, “are willing 
(and brave enough) to try out new approaches” as a few activist academics, 
together with organisations of informal workers, have already done in the cases 
highlighted in this volume. More fundamentally, the authors recognise that those 
who work and live informally have the best, most nuanced understanding, of 
their own context and have begun to challenge the very notion of “who is a 
planner” and “whose interests are being served in plans”.
Future governance
What is needed going forward, as Melanie Samson puts it, is to challenge the 
existing policy- making processes, captured by the rich and powerful, and to 
privilege the knowledge and collective voice of informal workers in the policy 
process. This will require genuinely inclusive rule- setting and planning pro-
cesses as well as negotiation and conflict resolution processes to reconcile the 
competing vision and interests of informal workers and other, more powerful, 
stakeholders.
 The authors also argue that inclusive policy and negotiating processes should not 
only include organisations of informal workers but be led by them. This is both 
feasible as well as desirable, as illustrated by the promising examples of policy pro-
cesses and outcomes led by organisations of informal workers that are featured in 
this volume: including municipal contracts for waste pickers in two cities in India 
and over 25 cities in Colombia; recognition of the natural markets of street vendors 
in a new law on street vending in India; new supportive legislation for homeworkers 
and domestic workers in Thailand; and new labour legislation in Ghana that covers 
all workers, formal and informal. These substantial gains offer models to counteract 
common views that informal workers are unorganisable, divided, and insignificant 
economic actors unworthy of constructive policy intervention.
 One final important point. In the early twentieth century, when all workers 
were informal, they began to demand – and to design – the rights and benefits of 
what is now considered “standard” formal wage employment. In the early 
twenty- first century, informal workers are also making demands – but their 
demands are different because labour markets and economies today are different 
than those 100 years ago. Despite the formal labour standards negotiated in the 
early twentieth century, today over half of all workers globally are informally 
employed, nearly half are self- employed (mostly own- account or contributing 
family workers) and new forms of non- standard or informal work are emerging. 
Informal workers today are demanding recognition, protection and support as 
informal workers, both wage- employed and self- employed. In sum, informal 
employment, not formal employment, dominates global employment today and 
is likely to continue to do so. What is needed, and recommended by the authors, 
is to transform formal policies, regulations and institutions to reflect the reality 
and perspectives of informal workers, their knowledge and their understanding 
of the wider environment and their way of working within it.
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